119 P.2d 277 | Or. | 1941
Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Fred M. Herdman, deceased, by Elizabeth M. Sigman against Agnes Thompson Herdman, executrix of the estate of *529 Fred M. Herdman, deceased, to establish a claim against estate for the reasonable value of services as a housekeeper rendered the decedent. From a judgment rejecting her claim, plaintiff appeals.
REVERSED. This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court, department of probate, rejecting the claim of Elizabeth M. Sigman for the reasonable value of services as a housekeeper against the estate of Fred M. Herdman, deceased.
The decedent was a resident of Portland. The plaintiff, Mrs. Sigman, was his sister. On June 15, 1933, the decedent's wife died suddenly, and, in response to his request by telegram, Mrs. Sigman came to Portland from her home in Los Angeles and thereafter until October, 1938, when Herdman remarried, served him as his housekeeper. She testified that her brother many times promised to pay her for these services. J.A. Herdman, brother of the deceased, who lived with him during the period in question, corroborated the claimant both as to the nature and extent of the services rendered and the decedent's promise to compensate for them. There was also expert testimony tending to show the reasonable value of the services.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case the defendant moved for a judgment of involuntary nonsuit. The court thereupon rendered an oral decision indicating disbelief in the claimant's testimony, and subsequently entered an order which did not in terms allow the *530 defendant's motion but recited "that claimant failed to prove her claim against said estate by sufficient evidence" and ordered that the claim "be and the same is hereby rejected".
This proceeding is in the nature of an action at law.Turner v. Schlegel,
The corroborating evidence, in our opinion, was clearly sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 2 O.C.L.A. § 19-704. The defendant's attack on that evidence is aimed solely at its weight, not its legal sufficiency to withstand a motion for nonsuit.
The defendant contends that it must be held as a matter of law that the executor properly rejected the *531
claim because it shows on its face the relationship of brother and sister between the decedent and the plaintiff and does not allege an express contract but only facts from which a promise to compensate for the services might be inferred. Defendant citesWilkes v. Cornelius,
Ingram v. Basye,
In the instant case the claim does not show that plaintiff lived with her brother as a member of his family, and Wilkes v.Cornelius, therefore, does not govern. Sargent v. Foland (op. cit. 307).
Nor does the evidence leave the plaintiff's status in her deceased brother's household unambiguous. She had not lived with him before the death of his wife, but came from Los Angeles to Portland at his request and did all the work of a housekeeper, including labor of a menial character, in a twelve-room house in which another brother lived and paid board to the decedent. There were many visitors who stayed for meals, and friends of the decedent would visit in his home for two to six weeks at a time. The circumstances under which the claimant lived in Los Angeles, except that she made her home with her daughter, are not disclosed. The only evidence tending to show in the slightest degree the affection and kindness of a brother towards his sister is the plaintiff's testimony that decedent, over the period of five years that she lived in his home, bought her a hat that cost $1.95, a pair of cheap shoes, two dresses costing $6 and $7.50 respectively, and a winter coat which cost $19.50. He also once gave her $5 as a birthday present, and when she left for Los Angeles gave her $20 and a ticket on the train. On the *533 other hand, the plaintiff testified in answer to the question when and why she left her brother's home:
"I left my brother's home on October 6th, 1938, to return to my daughter, with whom I preferred to live in Los Angeles. I left because Mr. Fred Herdman had married a Miss Agnes Campbell, and didn't need me any longer. I didn't know he was going with any one, or going to get married until he returned to his home saying, `I married Agnes Campbell.' He told me none of his social and financial plans with outside people. I was just the servant in Mr. Fred Herdman's home."
From such testimony as the record contains it would not be unreasonable to infer that the claimant's position was, as she said, that of a servant rather than a member of the family. We indicate no opinion of our own as to the fact, but hold simply that on the record before us it is not shown as matter of law that she lived in her brother's house as a member of the family. That, we think, is a question of fact and not of law.
We are of the opinion, moreover, that it was competent for the plaintiff to show an express understanding or agreement that she was to be compensated for her services, notwithstanding the claim is based on an implied promise, on the principle that any testimony is competent which "warrants the inference that the services were rendered by the claimant with an intention of charging for them and a justifiable expectation of payment, and that they were accepted by the other party with a knowledge, actual or constructive, of this expectation". 28 R.C.L. Work and Labor 687, § 23; Franklin v. Northrup,
We have examined the authorities cited in defendant's brief, but, as they are not inconsistent with the principles of law here stated and in many instances merely illustrate the application of those principles to varying states of fact, we think no useful purpose will be served by specific reference to them.
It may be added that plaintiff's failure to assert her claim until after her brother's death weighs heavily against her; but it is not conclusive, and is but an element, important it is true, to be considered, along with the other facts in evidence, in determining the ultimate question whether the services in question were rendered gratuitously or with the expectation on both sides that they were to be rewarded.
Since the plaintiff made out a case sufficient to be submitted to a jury, it follows that the court below erred in not denying the motion for a nonsuit; and the judgment appealed from is, therefore, reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. *535