272 F. 975 | 2d Cir. | 1921
(after stating the facts as above).
In the ordinary case, such as this suit of Niles v. Havens, a discharge is a defense; such defense is one that the state or any other court is bound to consider (Hill v. Harding, 107 U. S. 631, 2 Sup. Ct. 404, 27 L. Ed. 493), and if error is committed in failing to accord to the discharge its due weight, the way is open to the national Supreme Court (Dimock v. Revere, etc., Co., 117 U. S. 559, 6 Sup. Ct. 855, 29 L. Ed. 994). But no authority exists for leaving the tribunal, where the discharge was or might have been pleaded, and enj oining the collection of a judgment against a discharged bankrupt because the bankruptcy court thinks that some other tribunal erred either in fact or law as to the effect of such discharge. - ■
The bankruptcy courts possess no such revisory powers; the true doctrine was early pointed out by Brown, D. J., in Re Rosenthal (D. C.) 108 Fed. 370. The point was distinctly ruled in a case not distinguishable from this in Hellman v. Goldstone, 161 Fed. 913, 88 C. C. A. 604, and In re Weisberg (D. C.) 253 Fed. 833, correctly covers the whole matter.
The order under review is reversed, with costs.