66 Ind. App. 298 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1917
— The Industrial Board of this state has submitted a statement of facts on which it has certified a question of law in substance as follows:
Statement of Facts.
The Columbia Insurance Company is a duly organized corporation under the laws of the State of Indiana and prior to March 19, 1917, had been duly authorized to transact the business of fire insurance in the States of Ohio and Michigan; that on and prior to March 20, 1917, Charles H. Harraden was employed by said insurance company at the monthly
‘ ‘ That on the 19th day of March, 1917, said Charles H. Harraden was in Detroit, Mich.; that on said date he was instructed by the home office of said insurance company to proceed to Boyne City, Michigan, to adjust a loss covered by a policy of said company and to transfer its agency. That in response to said telegram the said Charles H. Harraden did proceed to Boyne City, Michigan; that‘he arrived at Boyne City on the evening of March 20th after dark, by rail; that at said time the streets and sidewalks of Boyne City, Michigan, were covered with snow and ice; that upon alighting from the train at the railroad station at Boyne City, the said Charles H. Harraden, in company with other traveling men, started to walk from the railroad station upon the sidewalk to the hotel; that the sidewalk over which the said Charles H. Harraden and other traveling men were walking was covered with ice; that while in the act of walking from the railroad station to the hotel the said Charles H. Harraden slipped upon the ice upon the sidewalk and fell, and in falling received a compound fracture of the upper third of the femur of the leg; that as a result of said injury said Charles H.
“That the insurance company did not provide the said Charles H. Harraden with an attending physician and with the necessary hospital and surgical services and supplies during the first thirty days after the injury; that provision therefor was made by the said Charles H. Harraden, himself, and he thereby incurred an expense of $250.00 for surgeon’s fees and supplies and $350.00 for hospital services and supplies.
“That the said Charles H. Harraden makes claim for compensation and for the approval of his physician and hospital expenses.
“It is conceded by the insurance.company that the accident of said Charles H. Harraden occurred in the course of his employment-and that he would b¿ entitled to an award of compensation and the approval of his expenses for physician and hospital service, except that it claims that the accident resulting in his injury did not arise out of his employment.”
Certified Question of Law-.
“Did the accident, resulting in the injury to Charles H. Harraden, described in the foregoing statement of facts, arise out of his employment with the Columbia Insurance Company?”
The insurance company contends that the risk of falling on the icy sidewalk did not arise out of and in the course of Harraden’s employment within the contemplation or meaning of the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act, supra; that such risk was one to which the general public was equally exposed with
Harraden contends that his claim is for “an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment” by the insurance company, and that he is entitled to the benefits prescribed by the act aforesaid; that his said employment was the proximate cause of his injury; that the hazard which resulted in the accident which caused his injury was peculiar to his employment, and but for such employment he would not have suffered the injury at the time and place indicated; that when so injured he was performing the duties of his employment at the time and place directed by his employer.
Section 2 of the act, supra, in question provides for “compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.” See also §76d. Section 20 provides for compensation “whether injury by accident or death resulting from such injury occurs in the state or in some other state or in a foreign country.”
The precise question presented is new in this state, though, as applied to certain facts, this court has given interpretation to the language of the statute, which authorizes compensation for “an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.” Union Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Davis (1916), 64 Ind. App. 227, 115 N. E. 676; In re Loper (1917), 64 Ind. App. 571, 116 N. E. 324. In the cases just cited the court recognizes the general rule adopted by the courts of Massachusetts and other states in dealing with statutes similar to ours.
This general rule is stated by the Supreme Court
The statute imposes two conditions, both of which the claimant is required to satisfy before he is entitled to compensation, viz., the injury must arise out of, and in the course of, the employment. The cases present a variety of conditions which have been Held to meet the requirements of the statute. Hop
The decisions of the courts of England and the courts of several of our states where the question has arisen announce the rule that the facts in any-given case must show that the injury arose out of the employment and was a risk reasonably incident thereto, as distinguished from risks to which the general public is exposed. 1 Honnold, Workmen’s Compensation 119 and notes; Blakey v. Robson, etc., Co. S. C. (1912), Ct. Sess. Cas. 334; Rodger v. Paisley School Board (1912), Ct. Sess. Cas. 584; Kitchenham, v. S. S. “Johannesburg” (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 311; Amys v. Barton (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 117; Craig v. S. S. “Calabria” (1914), 7 B. W. C. C. 932; Bryant, Admx., v. Fissell (1913), 84 N. J. Law 72, 86 Atl. 458 ; Milliken’s Case (1914), 216 Mass. 293, 103 N. E. 898, L. R. A. 1916A 337; Milwaukee v. Althoff (1914), 156 Wis. 68, 145 N. W. 238, L. R. A. 1916A 327.
Injuries resulting from exposure to conditions due to the weather or natural elements, such as heat, cold, ice, snow, or lightning, are generally classed as risks to which the general public is exposed, and as not coming within the purview of workmen’s com
While recognizing the general rule above stated, there are many cases which the courts hold are not governed by it, or that they are controlled by well-recognized exceptions to such general rule. Where the employment of the injured person requires him to be at the place where his injury is received, and he is in fact at such place in pursuance of the discharge of the duties of his employment, the risk thereby encountered is held to be incident to such employment, though the injury may have resulted from conditions produced by the weather to which persons generally in that locality were exposed. Where the duties of the employe require him to travel and visit different places in order that he may discharge the duties of his employment, his place of work is thereby enlarged or extended to include all the places to which such employe necessarily goes in discharging the duties of his employment. While the conditions produced by the weather may in a sense affect all alike in the particular vicinity, yet the fact remains that a person so employed is much more exposed to such hazards than the public generally because of the duties enjoined upon bim by his employment and the place or places to which he must necessarily go in the discharge of such duties. L. R. A. 1917D 114, and notes; White v. W. & T. Avery (1915), 53 Scot. L. R. 122; Larke v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1916), 90 Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320, L. R. A. 1916E 584; Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., supra; Warner v. Couchman (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 32, 39; Andrew v. Failsworth Industrial Society
In Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., supra, the Supreme Court considered a case growing out of an injury caused by a fall on a slippery street by one employed to supervise his employer’s plants, located in different cities. He fell while going from the sidewalk on the street to board a street car to return to his home in the evening after he had returned from a tour of inspection.
The court held in substance that the injury was not one arising out of his employment within the meaning of the statute; that there was no causal connection between the accident causing the injury and his' employment; that the act excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the employe would have been equally exposed apart from his employment; that there must be some causal connection between the injury and the employment to entitle the injured employe to the benefits of the act.
In Larke v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, the Supreme Court of Connecticut considered a case where frostbite caused a lesion in the skin of the nose, through which erysipelas was contracted, which
“The conditions of employment which expose the employe to an injury which arises out of the employment are such as are peculiar to this employment, and not such exposures as the ordinary person is subjected to. It is therefore immaterial where the expo
We find decisions holding that injuries caused by lightning, by heat, and by cold, do not arise out of the employment, and others holding the contrary view, on the theory that there was something in the employment or manner or place in which or where the work was to be done which exposed the employe to greater danger from such agencies than that encountered by the general public in the particular
In volume 53 of Scottish Law Reporter, 122 et seq., supra, we find an extended discussion of the subject by different Lords of the First Division of the Court of Session. Among other things ' Lord Skerrington said (p. 124): “In my opinion however, it is enough to entitle a workman to compensation if he can say that on the occasion when he was injured by a peril of the street his duty to his employer took him to that street, though the occasion may have been of a rare and exceptional character. ’ ’ Lord Mackenzie said (p. 127): “A risk incidental to the employment may also be a risk common to the public. That a risk common to the public should he a risk incidental to the employment the employee must be exceptionally exposed by his employment to ' the common risk. ’ ’ The Lord President of the court said (p. 128): “The arbitrator, who is final on questions of fact, has found here as a matter of fact that the appellant in pursuance of his duty had to walk from Forestmill to Kennet on the day that the accident befell him. The day was frosty; the road was slippery. * * *
“It is common ground that the accident arose in the course of the appellant’s employment. The question for our decision is whether it arose out of his employment.- Now the learned arbitrator came to
“In my view that is an unsound statement of the law, for the risk on that road at that particular time appears to me to have been a risk incidental to the man’s employment. And it was not the less a risk incidental to the man’s employment because every pedestrian on that road at that time would have required to face it, or because the appellant was facing it for the first and, it may be, the only time. * * *
“The principle which, it appears to me, lies at the root of these decisions, and which distinguishes them and marks them out from other cases more or less germane to this chapter of law, was never better stated than in the passage from Lord Kinnear’s opinion in the case of M’Neice, which I venture once more to quote, where he says, ‘According to the statement, the man had certainly, in the course of his employment to traverse this particular road for his employers’ purposes, and therefore the dangers and risks of that particular road at the time and on the occasion in question are, to my mind, incidental to the employment.’ And I think when Lord Kinnear said that he was stating the law with fulness and accuracy. And quite obviously, I think, his statement would not have been in any way affected — is not in any way affected — by the consideration that other pedestrians might have to face that particular risk if they were on the road at the time, or that the workman was on the road for the first and, it my be, the only time. ’ ’
The facts on which the question presented is based invoke the application not only of the principles applied in cases of accident due wholly to conditions produced by the weather, but likewise invoke the principles applied to accidents causing injuries to persons whose employment require them to go upon public streets or into like places of danger.
The distinction is made on the ground that by virtue of the employment such injured persons were more exposed to such hazards than other persons generally upon such streets or in such places, and likewise because but for such employment, in all reasonable probability, the injuries would not have been received. Pierce v. Provident Clothing, etc., Co., supra; M’Neice v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., supra; Martin v. John Lovibond & Sons, supra; Pigeon’s Case, supra; Larke v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra; Rayner v. Sligh Furniture Co., supra.
We therefore answer the question submitted by the Industrial Board in the affirmative.
Note. — Reported in 118 N. E. 142. See note ante 261.