In Re Harper
{¶ 1} Markita Harpеr, a minor, appeals from the trial court‘s adoption of a magistrate‘s decision finding her delinquent and ordering her committed to the Department of Youth Services for a minimum of six months.
{¶ 2} Harper advances two assignments of error on appeal. First, she contends the trial court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem to assist her. Second, she claims the trial court accepted her admission to the allegations against her without ensuring that the admission was voluntary under
I.
{¶ 3} The record reflects that thirteen-year-old Harper was charged with delinquency for bringing a knife to school. She and her mother subsequently appeared with counsel for an April 30, 2003, preliminary conference before a magistrate. At the outset, the magistrate informed Harper of various rights аnd explained the possible dispositional alternatives that she faced. The State then made a plea offer, which called for Harper to admit the charge in the cоmplaint and a separate charge in exchange for the non-prosecution of other offenses. The magistrate again identified various rights that Harper would give up by entering аn admission to the complaint, and she expressed her desire to do so. Harper then indicated that she was entering the admission of her own free will because she was responsible. The magistrate accepted the admission and plea agreement. The matter proceeded directly to the dispositional phase and, after hearing argument, the magistrate ordered Harper committed to the Department of Youth Services for no less than six months. That same day, the trial court adopted the magistrate‘s decision, as permitted by
II.
{¶ 4} Before addressing the merits of Harper‘s arguments, we note that her failure to file objections to the magistrate‘s decision limits the scope of our review. Under
{¶ 5} The upshot of the foregoing rules is that absent objections to a magistrate‘s decision, a juvenile waives his or her ability to raise assignments of error related to that dеcision. “The waiver under
{¶ 6} In the present case, the waiver rule аpplies because Harper did not file objections to the magistrate‘s decision finding her delinquent and ordering her committed to the Department of Youth Services. In addition, we have reviewed the magistrate‘s decision, and we find no apparent “error of law or other defect” on its face. Neither of the issues Harper raises on appeal is disclоsed by a review of the magistrate‘s decision.
{¶ 7} The only remaining question is whether Harper has demonstrated plain error, which exists when an error “seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122-123, 1997-Ohio-401. With regard to the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem, Hаrper notes that Ohio law requires such an appointment when the interests of a child and parent conflict. See
{¶ 8} Having reviewed the record, we find no error at all in the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem. The transcript of proceedings below reveals no anger or tension between Harper and her mother. The only point of disagreement was that Harper‘s mother, acting out of an apparent desire to help her daughter, requested a more lenient disposition than Harper herself sought. Although Harper preferred commitment to the Department of Youth Services, the record does not reflect a situation in which the magistrate plainly erred by failing to appoint a guardian ad litem on the basis of a conflict of interеst.
{¶ 9} Finally, we find no plain error in the magistrate‘s acceptance of Harper‘s admission to the charge in the complaint. Harper argues that the magistrate violated
{¶ 10} Harper admits that the magistrate at least substantially complied with the second part of the foregoing rule. She contends, however, that the magistrate failed to ensure a voluntary admission. In support, Harper cites the following facts: (1) the magistrate failed to inform her of her right to counsel; (2) she appeared at the conferеnce with substitute counsel; (3) she did not have a guardian ad litem; and (4) the magistrate asked leading questions when discussing her admission. In our view, these facts fail to demonstrate plain error in the acceptance of Harper‘s admission.
{¶ 11} With regard to the right to counsel, the transcript does not support the State‘s claim that the magistrate informed Harper of this right. Indeed, the mаgistrate did not specifically tell her that she had a right to counsel. Although provisions such as
III.
{¶ 12} Based on the reasoning and citation of authority set forth above, we overrule Harper‘s assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division.
Fain, P.J., and Young, J., concur.