In Re Hallinan
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Traynor
Vincent W. Hallinan was charged by indictment with violating section 145, subdivision (b), of the
Hallinan has not made the required showing of discrimination to sustain his contention that he is being denied equal protection of the laws. (See
Snowden
v.
Hughes,
321
Although the problem of defining moral turpitude is not without difficulty (see
In re Hatch,
10 Cal.2d 147, 151 [73 P.2d 885] ; dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in
Jordan
v.
De George,
341 U.S. 223, 232 [71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886] ;
Schmidt
v.
United States,
177 F.2d 450, 451), it is settled that whatever else it may mean, it includes fraud and that a crime in which an intent to defraud is an essential element is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Jordan
v.
De George, supra,
341 U.S. 223,
227; United States
v.
Reimer,
113 F.2d 429, 431;
United States
v.
Day,
51 F.2d 1022;
In re Crane
[Cal.], 189 P. 1072; see also
Ex Parte Wall,
107 U.S. 265, 273 [2 S.Ct. 569, 27 L.Ed. 552] ;
People
v.
Wisecarver,
67 Cal.App.2d 203, 208 [153 P.2d 778].) It is also settled that the related group of offenses involving intentional dis
Conversely, if a conviction for any crime can be had without proof of facts showing moral turpitude, an attorney convicted of such a crime cannot be summarily disbarred under sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business and Professions Code. Moral turpitude must be inherent in the commission of the crime itself to warrant summary disbarment under those sections. As we said in
In re Rothrock,
16 Cal.2d 449, 454 [106 P.2d 907, 131 A.L.R. 226], an “attorney’s name will not be stricken from the rolls where the
nature of the particular crime
does not reflect a bad moral character with respect to the duties of the attorney’s profession.” [Italics added.] (See
In re McAllister, supra,
14 Cal.2d 602, 603-604.) The language of the statute itself clearly indicates that an attorney can be summarily disbarred only when the
crime
of which he was convicted involves moral turpitude. Even if it is assumed that statements in the indictment or judgment of conviction describing conduct that goes beyond the essential elements of the crime charged are a part of the
A similar rule has been established by the federal courts. In proceedings for the deportation of aliens twice convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude” (
In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147 [73 P.2d 885], is not inconsistent with the rule that the crime of which an attorney is convicted must necessarily involve moral turpitude to warrant summary disbarment. The Hatch case was not a summary proceeding, since Hatch was given a hearing before this court and an opportunity to show that he was not guilty of moral turpitude.
The crucial question in the present proceeding, therefore, is whether or not an intent to defraud the United States is an essential element of the crime proscribed by section 145, subdivision (b), of the Internal Revenue Code. If an intent to defraud is not an essential element and a person may be convicted thereunder without proof of that intent or other conduct evidencing moral turpitude, an attorney convicted of that crime cannot be summarily disbarred. Since section 145, subdivision (b), is a United States statute, we must accept the interpretation given it by the United States courts. (Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 [69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282] ; Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 31 Cal.2d 117, 121-122 [187 P.2d 729]; Caminetti v. Imperial Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, 59 Cal.App.2d 476, 490; see also Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal.2d 848, 852 [271 P.2d 18]; Op. Atty. Gen., No. 54/37, June 4,1954, pp. 6-7.)
These courts have definitely held that an intent to defraud is not an essential element of section 145, subdivision (b), and that a conviction under that section does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. In
United States
v.
Scharton,
285 U.S. 518 [52 S.Ct. 416, 76 L.Ed. 917], the defendant was indicted for violating section 1114(b) [now § 145, subd. (b)] for attempting to evade taxes by falsely understating taxable income. He contended that the general three-year period of limitations had expired and that the prosecution was therefore barred. The United States contended, however, that the special six-year statute of limitations applicable to offenses involving fraud or attempts to defraud the government was controlling. It urged, as the State Bar does in the present proceeding, that “fraud is implicit in the concept of evading or defeating; and [that] . . . [a]ny effort to defeat or evade a tax is . . . tantamount to and . . . possess [es] every element of an attempt to defraud the taxing body.” (285 U.S. 518, 520-521.) The Supreme Court noted that many statutes expressly make an intent to defraud an essential element of the offense, and that under these statutes “an indictment
Two years after the decision in the Scharton case, the Supreme Court in
United States
v.
Murdock,
290 U.S. 389 [54 S.Ct. 223, 78 L.Ed. 381], had occasion to consider the meaning of the word “willfully” in section 145, subdivision (a), of the Internal Revenue Code.
*
In that case the defendant was indicted for “willfully” refusing to supply information about deductions claimed in his tax returns. He based his refusal on a claim of privilege against self-incrimination under state statutes, but the court had held on an earlier appeal
(United States
v.
Murdoch,
284 U.S. 141 [52 S.Ct. 63, 76 L.Ed. 210]) that the privilege could not be invoked. In defining the word “willfully” the court said that it “denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it generally
The foregoing cases establish that fraud is not an essential element of the offense proscribed by section 145, subdivision (b), that some measure of bad faith or evil intent is an essential element, but that such bad faith or evil intent, which can be inferred from evidence that the defendant acted without justifiable excuse, without ground for believing his acts were lawful, or in careless disregard of the lawfulness of his acts does not necessarily involve moral turpitude.
This conclusion finds support in the decisions of the courts of other states in proceedings to disbar attorneys convicted of violating section 145, subdivision (b). Although most of these states have provisions for summary disbarment similar to that of California, in none of them was disbarment ordered solely on the record of conviction without an independent investigation of the question whether the attorney’s conduct involved moral turpitude. In
In re Diesen,
173 Minn. 297 [217 N.W. 356], on which the State Bar relies, the court referred the proceeding to a referee to investigate the question of moral turpitude, and on the basis of his report suspended Diesen for a period of three years. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has established the practice of having a committee of the State Bar Association investigate the question of misconduct, when an attorney has been convicted of violating section 145, subdivision (b).
(Louisiana State Bar Assn.
v.
Steiner,
204 La. 1073 [16 So. 2d 843, 847];
Louisiana State Bar Assn.
v.
Connolly,
201 La. 342 [9 So.2d 582, 592].) In the Connolly case, the State Bar Commissioner recommended that the pro
Although every conviction for violating section 145, subdivision (b), may not involve moral turpitude, some convictions may. In such eases discipline or disbarment should be imposed by nonsummary procedures. (
The motion to dismiss is denied and the matter is referred to the Board of Governors of the State Bar for a hearing, report, and recommendation on the question whether the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which Vincent W. Hallinan was convicted involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting disbarment or suspension.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Carter, J., did not participate herein.
Notes
“Any person required under this chapter to collect, account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this chapter, who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, and any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this chapter or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be lined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.”
‘ ‘ Conviction of a felony or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude, constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension as provided in section 6102.
“The record of conviction shall be conclusive evidence and the clerk of the court in which the conviction is had shall, within thirty days thereafter, transmit a certified copy of the record of conviction to the Supreme Court. The proceedings to disbar or suspend an attorney shall be undertaken by the court upon receipt of the certified copy of the record of conviction.
“A plea or verdict of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere is deemed to be a conviction within the meaning of this section.”
“Upon the receipt of the certified copy of the record of conviction of an attorney of a crime involving moral turpitude, the court shall . . . order the attorney disbarred when the time for appeal has elapsed or the judgment of conviction has been affirmed on appeal. . . .
“The other provisions of this article providing a procedure for the disbarment or suspension of an attorney do not apply to an attorney convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, unless expressly made applicable,”
That section has since been amended to include pleas of nolo contendere. (Stats. 1953, chap. 44, § 1.)
Seetion 145(a) states that any person “who willfully fails” to pay his taxes, make a return or declaration, keep records, and supply information as required by law is guilty of a misdemeanor, while section 145(b) makes a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax a felony. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the element imported by the word “willfully” is the same for both crimes, and that the difference between the two offenses is to be found in the “positive attempt” that is required to violate section 145(b). The difference is thus one between willful omission and willful commission. See, Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497-499 [63 S.Ct. 364, 87 L.Ed. 418].
Citing In re Diesen, supra. It should be noted, however, that the Diesen case was decided before United States v. Scharton, supra, and that the statute under which Diesen was convicted specifically made fraud an element of the offense. The Maryland court also cited in support of its dictum, In re Wiltsie, 109 Wash. 261 (1920) in which an attorney ivas disbarred for soliciting business and filing false claims for exemption from selective service. In re Peters, 73 Mont. 284 (1925), also cited, was a disbarment proceeding based on Peters’ conviction for filing false reports as an officer of a bank with intent to deceive the IT. S. Comptroller of Currency.