Pеtitioner herein, E. M. (Pete) Bishop, seeks his discharge from a judgment and sentence imposed on January 17, 1962, by the district court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, on which he was sentenced to serve eight years in the state penitentiary fоr the offense of armed robbery, conjoint, after former conviction of a felony.
Petitioner and Max Leroy Steed, Jack Allen Barber, and Charles Henry Woods were jointly charged with the commission of armed robbеry, allegedly committed on July 30, 1961. They were granted separate trials, and petitioner was tried by a jury and convicted. At a separate trial Jack Allen Barber was also convicted of the same offense. Barber’s subsequent successful appeal to the United States Supreme Court by certiorari has a material bearing on the matter before the Court, and for that reason that case will be referred to herein.
At the preliminary hearing on the conjoint charge, held on August 22, 1961, in the Tulsa County Court of Common Pleas, one defendant, Charles Henry Woods, elected to testify for the State and his testimony was transcribed into record form. Subsequently, at petitioner’s trial the State contended that the material witness, Charles Henry Woods, was unavailable to testify in that he was incarcerated in the federal penitentiary at Texarkana, Texas. Over defendant’s objections the trial court permitted the reading of the transcript of the witness’ preliminary hearing testimony. The same situation also existed when Jack Allen Barber was tried, except his counsel did not cross-examine the witness at thе preliminary hearing, whereas petitioner’s counsel did exercise his right to cross-examine the witness.
*771
Petitioner attempted to appeal his conviction to this Court, but such appeal failed when the attorney general’s motion to dismiss for the reason thе case-made failed to contained a copy of the record of judgment and sentence, was sustained. See: Bishop v. State, Okl.Cr.,
Thereafter Barber sought relief in the Federal Courts by petition for writ of habeas corpus. Relief was denied in the U. S. District Court,
Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court by petition for writ of habeas corpus, basing his relief on the United States Supreme Court decision in Barber v. Page,
Petitioner further sets forth in his petition that his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution [confrontation clause thereof] were violated, when the trial court permitted the reading of the transcript of testimony of Woods, at his trial; and that the provisions of the Sixth Amendment have been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution; and, that petitioner is therefore entitled to be discharged from the Tulsa County district court judgment and sentence.
Incidental to the earlier trial in Tulsa County from which petitioner is seeking relief, he was granted a parole from the State penitentiary on or about July 13, 1965. Thereafter, petitioner and several others were tried and convicted in the Federal District Court on “counterfeiting” charges, for which petitioner was sentenced by the U. S. District Court fоr the Northern District of Oklahoma in case No. 67-Cr-58, on May 21, 1968. In passing judgment and sentence, the U. S. District Court recognized the State’s outstanding claim against petitioner, and provided that when such State sentence is complеted, petitioner shall be delivered to the U. S. Marshal for commencement of his federal penitentiary sentence.
In the habeas corpus proceeding now before this Court, petitioner contends that the Tulsa County district court judgment and sentence is void, because his constitutional rights were violated when he stood trial; and that he is entitled to the same relief granted Jack Allen Barber, by the United States Supreme Court.
About the only diffеrence between petitioner’s situation and that of Jack Allen Barber is that Barber’s counsel did not cross-examine Charles Henry Woods at the preliminary hearing, whereas as stated earlier, petitioner’s cоunsel did so cross-examine the witness.
In meeting Barber’s situation, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall, quoting from Mattox v. United States (1895),
“The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment] * * * was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits * * * being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of *772 the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only оf testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, hut of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he givеs his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”
The crux of the Supreme Court’s decision seems to lie in the recognized fact that the State made no showing that any effort whatsoever was made to return the witness from the federаl penitentiary to testify; and the Court recites the existing provisions which permit the return of a federal prisoner to testify in a State trial upon a proper request being made. Instead, however, it appears that the State merely relied on the fact that the witness was outside the jurisdiction of the trial court, in the custody of federal authorities, and hence unavailable to testify. In meeting this proposition, the Supreme Court said:
“Tо suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial [as contended by the State’s Attorney] hardly comports with this Court’s definition of a waiver as ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst,304 U.S. 458 , 464,58 S.Ct. 1019 , 1023,82 L.Ed. 1461 , (1938); and Brookhart v. Janis,384 U.S. 1 , 4,86 S.Ct. 1245 , 1246,16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).”
It is clear in Barber’s case that the requirement of the “confrontation clause” was not met. However, in petitioner’s case he admits thаt his counsel cross-examined the witness at the preliminary hearing; but petitioner contends further that such preliminary hearing cross-examination is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the “Confrontation Clause”. We obsеrve the dictum of the Supreme Court’s decision continues in this regard:
“Moreover, we would reach the same result on the facts of this case had petitioner’s counsel actually cross-examined Woods at the рreliminary hearing. See Motes v. United States,178 U.S. 458 ,20 S.Ct. 993 ,44 L.Ed. 1150 , (1900). The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of. the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial.” (Emphasis added).
We are of the opinion, however, that thе Honorable United States Supreme Court decision does not preclude the use of such preliminary hearing testimony, in proper circumstances. The transcript of testimony recorded at the preliminary hearing may be read at the accused’s trial when those circumstances exist. But in that instance, the State is required to show that a diligent effort has been made to locate the missing witness, and that he is actually unavailable. The Supreme Court said in reference to this question:
“ * * * [Tjhere may be some justification for hоlding that the opportunity for cross-examination of testimony at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable * * (Emphasis added.)
This Court provided in Newton v. State, Okl.Cr.,
With reference to petitioner’s contention that the denial of his constitutional rights at his trial prejudiced him, this Court said in Application of Fowler, Okl.Cr.,
“A denial of a constitutional right to a person prosecuted for a crime is prima facie prejudicial.”
See also Howington v. State,
And thereafter, on page 778 of 356 P.2d of the Fowler decision, supra, this Court said further:
“ ‘When a person is held in custody under a void order of commitment, or is imprisoned without due process of law under the sentence of any court of the state, it is not only within the authority of this court, but it is its duty upon habeas corpus to inquire into the illegality of the commitment when the matter is properly brought before it by petition, and if it be adjudged that the order of commitment was made without authority of law, the person will be entitled to a discharge from custody in order to preserve the constitutional right of all persons not tо be deprived of liberty without due process of law.’ Ex parte Meadows,70 Okl.Cr. 304 ,106 P.2d 139 , 141.”
We are, therefore, of the opinion that petitioner is entitled to relief in accordance with the reasons herein set forth.
It is therеfore the order of the Court that the Warden of the state penitentiary, Ray H. Page, relinquish all custody of petitioner herein, E. M. (Pete) Bishop, to the Sheriff of Tulsa County, Oklahoma for further proceedings in the district court of Tulsa County, not inconsistent with the provisions of this opinion and the rule set forth in Barber v. Page, supra. Otherwise, he should be discharged from said judgment and sentence.
And, further, insofar as E. M. (Pete) Bishop is presently under sentence by the Unitеd States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, in that Court’s case No. 67-Cr-58, in the event the Tulsa County district court should discharge him from its judgment and sentence, he shall be retained in the custody of the sheriff of Tulsa County for possession by the Federal authorities, as directed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.
Writ of habeas corpus granted in accordance herewith.