In re H.W.
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} In this case, we determine whether a trial court abuses its discretion when it removes a child’s grandparents as parties to an action for permanent custody after the child’s parent reaches the age of majority. Because we hold that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in such an instance, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts
{¶ 2} At age 15, Tanna Howser, n.k.a. Tanna Howser-Walford, gave birth to H.W. in 1999 while living at home with her parents, Gaylene and Thomas Howser. Also living at the home was the child’s 27-year-old father, and he and Tanna had engaged in sexual relations with her parents’ knowledge and consent.
{¶ 3} At 12 days old, H.W. was removed from Tanna’s care and taken into temporary custody by Ashtabula County Children Services Board (“Children Services”). Children Services filed a motion for permanent custody, and H.W. was placed in the home of Angela and Michael Williams, a “foster to adopt” family. About three months after her child was removed by the agency, Tanna herself was removed from her parents’ home because they continued to allow the
{¶ 4} In 2001 and 2002, hearings regarding H.W.’s permanent custody were held before a magistrate, who recommended that Children Services be granted permanent custody. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation and granted Children Services’ motion for permanent custody.
{¶ 5} H.W.’s mother, Tanna, H.W.’s grandmother, Gaylene, and Tanna’s legal guardian, Kim Johnson, all appealed the trial court’s judgment. Holding that the trial court had admitted inadmissible hearsay statements, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. A magistrate conducted another hearing, and in 2004, the trial court once more granted Children Services’ motion for permanent custody. Tanna and Gaylene both appealed, and the court of appeals again reversed and remanded the case for a hearing de novo. In re Walker,
{¶ 6} Following this second remand, Children Services filed a motion to remove H.W.’s grandparents, Thomas and Gaylene, from the action, arguing that they were no longer necessary parties because Tanna was no longer a minor. The motion to remove relied upon language in the appellate decision requiring that “the trial court’s determination of [Children Services’] motion [for permanent custody] should be based on the status of the parties, including their current ages, at the time of the de novo hearing.” Id. at ¶ 47. Gaylene opposed the motion to remove, claiming that because she was a necessary party at the time the child was removed from Tanna’s care, she remained a necessary party throughout the action. The trial court granted the agency’s motion to remove the grandparents, but did not articulate its specific reasons for doing so.
{¶ 7} Gaylene appealed her removal, and the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. In re Walker, 11th Dist. No. 2005-A-0067,
{¶ 8} We accepted this matter as a discretionary appeal to decide whether a trial court abuses its discretion when it removes a child’s grandparents as parties to a permanent-custody action after the child’s parent reaches the age of majority. To constitute an abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial court must be more than an error of law or judgment; it must result from an attitude that is “unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983),
{¶ 9} We recognize that ideally, grandparents will be bound to their grandchildren not only by ties of blood, but by ties of love and affection. Unfortunately, the world we live in is not always an ideal one, and at times, it becomes necessary to determine what legal rights grandparents have to their grandchildren. Grandparents may be granted visitation rights upon their motion in certain circumstances, when such rights are found to be in the best interest of the grandchild.
{¶ 10} Grandparents possess limited legal rights in juvenile proceedings through the operation of the Juvenile Rules. Specifically,
{¶ 11} We disagree with the concurring opinion in the court of appeals that prior participation in a legal proceeding alone gives rise to a vested legal interest in that proceeding. The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to custody proceedings in juvenile court except when they are clearly inapplicable,
{¶ 12} When Children Services first sought to obtain permanent custody of H.W., Tanna, the child’s mother, was under the age of majority. Thus, as required by
{¶ 13} We cannot say then that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Children Services’ motion to remove Gaylene as a party. The only legal interest Gaylene had in the proceeding was provided by
Conclusion
{¶ 14} Accordingly, we hold that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when, after a parent, or parents, involved in a custody proceeding reach the age of majority, it removes as parties to the action the child’s grandparents, who have no independent legal interest or rights in the proceeding. This holding does not require automatic removal of grandparents as parties simply because the parent of the child in question has reached the age of majority, however.
{¶ 15} In this case, the trial court properly exercised the discretion given it under the Juvenile Rules when it granted the motion to remove Thomas and Gaylene Howser.
{¶ 16} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Concurrence in Part
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 17} I concur in the syllabus because it relates to general circumstances. I dissent because in the case before us, I believe that the trial court abused its discretion. I agree with Judge O’Toole that the grandmother’s “participation may be necessary to assist her daughter to regain custody due to assertions by CHS that the daughter suffers from mental retardation and may need her own mother to adequately parent her child if she should regain custody.” In re Walker, 11th Dist. No. 2005-A-0067,