In re H.C.
{¶1} This cause came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to
{¶2} On January 14, 2015, appellant, the state, filed a complaint against appellee, 37-year-old H.C., for the rape and kidnapping of a female victim. The state alleged that on January 16, 1995, H.C., then 17 years old, sexually assaulted a 14-year-old victim.
{¶3} On January 15, 2015, the state filed a brief in support of jurisdiction and a request for oral hearing. The state argued that the juvenile court possessed jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to
{¶4} One day later, on January 16, 2015, the juvenile court dismissed the state‘s complaint with рrejudice for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to
{¶5} “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of а court to entertain and adjudicate a particular class of cases.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. “The exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court cannot be waived.” State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995), paragraph two of the syllabus. A trial cоurt‘s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. In re T.J.B., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130725, 2014-Ohio-2028, ¶ 7, citing Dikong v. Ohio Supports, Inc., 2013-Ohio-33, 985 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.).
{¶6} Ohio juvenile courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over cases “‘[c]oncerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint, indictment, or information is alleged * * * to be * * * a delinquent * * * child.‘” State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697, 983 N.E.2d 302, quoting
If a person under eighteen years of age allegedly commits an act that wоuld be a felony if committed by an adult and if the person is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until after the person attains twenty-one years of age, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to hear or determine any portion of the case charging the person with committing that act. In those circumstances, divisions (B) and (C) of section 2151.26 of the Revised Code do not apply regаrding the act, the case charging the the person with committing the act shall be a criminal prosecution commenced and heard in the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense as if the person had been eighteen years of age or older when the person committed the act, all proceedings pertaining to the act shall be within the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the offense, and the court having jurisdiction of the offense has all authority and duties in the case as it has in other criminal cases commenced in that court.
{¶8}
[s]ubject to division (C)(3) of this seсtion, any person who violates a federal or state law or a municipal ordinance prior to attaining eighteen years of age shall be deemed a “child” irrespective of that persоn‘s age at the time the complaint with respect to that violation is filed or the hearing on the complaint is held.
Furthermore,
[a]ny person who, while under eighteen years of age, commits an act that would be a fеlony if committed by an adult and who is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until after the person attains twenty-one years of age is not a child in relation to that act.
{¶10} We begin by analyzing the relevant statutes at issue, and by noting that the case law on this topic is sparse.
{¶12} This issue was clearly anticipated by the state when it submitted its brief in support of jurisdiction. The state averred that H.C. was detained аnd brought to the Cleveland Police Department for questioning when he was 17 years old. Moreover, the state posited that H.C. provided authorities with a statement in which he admitted to having consensual sex with the viсtim. Additionally, the state attached a photocopy of a booking card for the court‘s review in furtherance of its argument that H.C. had been “taken into custody or apprehended” within the meaning of
{¶13} Hоwever, our review of the juvenile court‘s entry disposing of the complaint reveals that the trial court neither considered nor addressed the merits of the state‘s argument. Although the juvenile court in this case rеlied on
{¶14} Moreover, we cannot ignore the significant questions that remain unanswered regarding whether or not H.C. wаs “taken into custody or apprehended” for the alleged crimes. For example, the circumstances behind H.C.‘s questioning at the police department and how long he was detained remain unknown. Furthermore, what the investigating officers meant by indicating “non-physical” next to “arrested at” on the booking card remains a mystery. These important issues could have, and should have, been investigated and resolved by the trial court based on the significant allegations made by the state prior to dismissing the complaint under
{¶15} Based on the anemic record before us, due in part to the juvenile court‘s hasty dismissal of the complaint, we are presently unable to make an adequate determination as to whether or not H.C. was “taken into custody or apprehended” within the meaning of the statute. We reiterate that our disposition of this case makes no recommendation regarding whether or not H.C. was, in fact, “taken into custody or apprehended” for the alleged crimes. However, we do believe that the trial court failed to investigate the state‘s plausible allegations and failed to adequately explain its rationale for dismissing the complaint under
{¶16} Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of this case and remand the сase to the juvenile court, which is directed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the allegations made in the state‘s jurisdictional brief and to make a determination as to whether H.C. was “taken into custody or apprehended” within the meaning of
It is ordered that appellant recover of said appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR