In re H.C.
¶1 A.B. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s termination of reunification services and grant of permanent custody and guardianship of her minor son, H.C. (Child), to his father, R.C. (Father). We affirm.
¶2 Child was born in 2013. Mother and Father later filed for divorce and, in 2016, entered a stipulation regarding parent-time. The stipulation provided that Child would “primarily reside with Mother” in Utah and that he would have parent-time with Father in Florida for four weeks during the summer and would spend alternating Christmas holidays with Father.
¶3 In June 2020, Child visited Father in Florida for Father’s four-week parent-time. There, Child told Father that “he was getting hit with a belt and a hanger” at home and that Mother’s husband (Stepfather) punched him in the stomach. Father reported the allegation to Utah’s Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). DCFS’s further investigation revealed that Stepfather would scream at Child, strike him with a belt, and punch and “whoop” him. The investigation also revealed that Mother spanked Child with her hand, a hanger, or a spatula, often leaving behind red marks where Child was struck.
¶4 Toward the end of June, the State filed a Verified Petition for Protective Supervision, in which it described what DCFS’s investigation revealed.1 Following a hearing in early July, the juvenile court placed Child under temporary protective supervision services and ordered that Child remain in Florida with Father.
¶5 In August 2020, Father filed for temporary custody of Child. In a subsequent hearing, the court declined to rule on the motion until Mother and Stepfather’s case was adjudicated. But after Father asserted that the purpose of the motion was to ensure
¶6 The following month, DCFS submitted a child and family plan to the court, which required, among other things, that Mother and Stepfather attend parenting courses, complete psychological evaluations, and complete the recommendations resulting from the psychological evaluations. Mother and Father indicated that they agreed with the plan. The court set the primary permanency goal for Child as “reunification with his Mother” and set a concurrent goal of “permanent custody and guardianship with a relative,” which the court stated Father “of course . . . would qualify as.”2 The court also adjudicated Child dependent as to Father.3
¶7 In December 2020, the State filed an Amended Verified Petition for Protective Supervision, in which it again alleged that Stepfather spanked and punched Child in the stomach, screamed at Child, and would “whoop” Child. The petition also again
¶8 Nonetheless, Mother and Stepfather waived trial and entered pleas under rule 34(e) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, thereby acknowledging that the allegations in the amended petition could be accepted as true but without admitting they were. Following a hearing, the court deemed the amended petition’s allegations to be true and adjudicated Child neglected as to Mother and Stepfather “based upon concerns of inappropriate discipline and parenting deficits.” The court further stated that based on its finding of neglect, Child came “under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act and [is] under jurisdiction of the court.”
¶9 After the court issued its ruling, Mother requested that Child be returned to her. The court noted that Father had a right to respond and declined to rule on the request until the disposition hearing scheduled for later that month. Prior to the hearing, Father filed a request that he retain custody of Child and that Child remain in his care.
¶10 At the disposition hearing, the guardian ad litem (the GAL) stated that “the child and family plan seems appropriate” and that the case remains a protective supervision services case. The GAL also stated that the permanency plan of reunification seemed to be in Child’s best interest but noted that the question of custody remained to be resolved.
¶11 Next, Mother renewed her request that Child be returned to her, noting that she and Stepfather were “doing well and are engaged with DCFS.” Father opposed this request, arguing that it was in Child’s best interest to remain with him in Florida. The court denied Mother’s request, stating that it “needs to see how
¶12 In March 2021, the court held a review hearing at which the GAL indicated that Child “continually expressed . . . that he likes it in Florida” and “is happy with” Father. Although Child was not afraid or unwilling to return to Mother, he told the GAL that he preferred to remain in Florida with Father. The GAL expressed that he was “confident that [Child] could be okay in either location.” Next, Mother requested a trial home placement, which the court did not authorize because it wished first to review Mother’s and Stepfather’s parental fitness evaluations and to allow therapists to opine on the matter.
¶13 In June 2021, Mother filed a request that Child be returned to her care, asserting that she “has completed all of the services required by the Child and Family Plan.” At a hearing held that same month, the State did not take a position on whether Child should return to Mother or remain with Father, stating that “[b]oth homes seem appropriate” and that Child’s needs would be met in either home. The GAL provided the same opinion but reiterated that Child had repeatedly expressed a preference to stay with Father. The court ruled that Child was to remain in Florida with Father and scheduled a permanency hearing to determine “whether the primary permanency goal should remain in effect and be carried out or whether the concurrent [goal]” of permanent custody and guardianship with a relative “should now be adopted as the primary goal.”
¶14 The court granted Mother’s subsequent request that Child come to Utah for an in-person visit. Child visited Mother for a
¶15 In August 2021, the court held the permanency hearing in which the State, Mother, and Father all presented evidence. A DCFS caseworker testified that Mother and Stepfather had completed the goals outlined in the child and family plan. She also stated that Mother and Child had been having regular supervised telephonic or virtual visits and that Mother had been behaving appropriately, although Child at times seemed uninterested in talking. She also reported on Child’s week-long visit to Utah, stating that it went well. The caseworker recommended, should reunification with Mother continue to remain the permanency goal, “that a trial home placement be authorized for [Child] to return to Utah” before the beginning of the school year.
¶16 Father called family members who testified that Child was faring well with him in Florida. Father’s wife also testified that she and Father refrain from corporal punishment and instead discipline Child by taking away privileges. She said that Father will occasionally have Child do “about five or ten” pushups as a form of discipline.
¶17 Father described how Child’s schooling had improved since he had come to live with him but stated that despite this progress, Child was still being held back in second grade. He recounted that Mother had called family services in Florida claiming that Father was neglecting Child, but the case was quickly closed as baseless. He also stated that Mother refused to pay her share of Child’s medical expenses. Father expressed concerns about Child returning to Mother based on the court’s
¶18 Father also called Child’s therapist, guidance counselor, and teacher to testify. The therapist testified that when Child first came to see her six months earlier, he was “[v]ery dysregulated,” “had very poor interpersonal skills,” and had “very poor boundaries” but that he had improved with therapy. She also stated that Child expressed a desire to remain with Father in Florida, primarily “because of whoopings” he had received in Utah. The therapist did acknowledge it was possible that Child’s reluctance to return to Mother might be due to his adjustment disorder, which made Child dislike “being moved from place to place.”
¶19 The guidance counselor testified that Child was evaluated before he began school in Florida and that his reading level “was significantly low.” Although Child’s reading level improved with tutoring, she stated that because “he still was significantly low in reading,” the school recommended that he repeat second grade. She stated that Child would also benefit from repeating second grade because he was one of the younger children in his grade level and his social maturity was therefore lower than that of his peers. For example, Child had struggled more than his classmates with making friends and would become upset if one of his friends chose another friend, “which is common . . . for younger kids.”
¶20 The teacher testified that Child suffered from behavioral issues when he first began school but that he had since greatly improved, and she “saw him definitely mature throughout the school year.” She believed that Father and his wife, whom she described as “very involved parents,” contributed to this marked improvement in Child. The teacher stated that Child was clean, always brought a nutritious meal to school, and appeared to be “[v]ery well taken care of physically.”
¶22 Mother testified that she and Child enjoyed a close relationship but that she had felt “alienated” from him over the past year. She stated that she had secured a spot for Child at a Utah school that had a specialized tutoring program for children who were reading below their expected level. Mother testified that Child had a good relationship with his half-siblings and step-sibling who also lived with Mother and Stepfather. She stated that she was concerned about Child living with Father because Father “has a temper,” and she recounted a prior incident in which Father had wrapped one of her other children tightly in a blanket and would not let him out even though he was screaming.4 Mother also recounted the incident during Child’s visit to Utah when she began calling Father because Child was misbehaving. “Child ripped the phone from me and hung up on it and then started bawling his eyes out, saying he didn’t want me to call him because he would punish him.” Mother submitted the
¶23 Mother also testified that when Child visited her in Utah, she sent Stepfather to pick Child up from the airport because their youngest child had a medical emergency. She also stated that she set up an appointment with an optometrist and purchased glasses for Child during the visit, but she was not able to schedule an in-person family therapy session with Child because her therapist was on vacation at that time. Mother stated that she believed that family therapy was necessary to assist in rebuilding her relationship with Child, but only “[t]o an extent” because they still had “a very good relationship in person.”
¶24 During closing arguments, the State argued that Child should return to Mother because this was a reunification case, Mother and Stepfather had completed the child and family plan, and there were no safety concerns. The GAL argued in closing that although he did not have safety concerns about Child returning to Mother and although he believed that Child “would be fine in either placement,” it was in Child’s best interest to remain with Father because he was “thriving” and had “made significant progress” with Father and because Child had consistently expressed a desire to remain with Father. The GAL thus argued that the permanency goal should be adjusted so that Child would remain with Father and that “significant visitation” should be provided to Mother.
¶25 Mother argued that Child should be returned to her care because this was a reunification case in which she and Stepfather had fully complied with the child and family plan and because there were no safety concerns regarding Child’s return. Stepfather added that this juvenile case was “being used to wage what appears to be and amounts to be like a custody fight.” He argued that because the goals of reunification had been met, Child should
¶26 Father argued that the court needed to decide what was in Child’s best interest and that it would be inefficient and against Child’s best interest to leave the determination regarding custody to the district court. He argued that Mother was “very ignorant” of Child’s needs and that Child’s education and social skills had “drastically improved” while Child was in his care. He also argued that there was no evidence that Stepfather had a good relationship with Child given their limited contact over the past year and that, given their past interaction, it was “highly inappropriate” for Mother to send Stepfather to pick Child up from the airport during his visit to Utah. Father thus asked the court to change the permanency goal, terminate reunification services, and award continued custody of Child to him, with Mother having “appropriate parent-time.”
¶27 The juvenile court issued a Preliminary Custody Order in which it changed the permanency goal for Child to permanent custody and guardianship with Father. The court stated this order was “issued only for the purpose of directing the parties as to where [Child] should be enrolled in school” and that an order with findings of fact and conclusions of law would be forthcoming.
¶28 In December 2021, the court issued a Review Order in which it granted “permanent legal and physical custody and guardianship” of Child to Father and standard out-of-state parent-time to Mother. Although the court made limited findings of fact in that order, it indicated that it would issue a more detailed set of findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining its decision. The court then closed the case and terminated its jurisdiction.
¶30 Although the court commended Mother and Stepfather for completing the child and family plan and appearing “to have made the changes necessary to achieve an acceptable level of safety in their home,” the court stated that this did not mean that it found “their home to be perfect, or even optimal, for the healthy rearing of children” and that it meant “only that they meet a minimal standard of safety, entitling them to be free of state intervention in their private home and family life.” Citing
¶31 The court explained that because it had made a finding of neglect as to Mother and a finding of dependency as to Father, “the parental presumptions for both parents have been rebutted and they are on equal footing before the Court.”5 And because
¶32 The court noted that although the parental presumptions of both parents had been rebutted, the difference between the finding of neglect as to Mother and dependency as to Father “is significant.” Namely, the former included a finding of fault while the latter did not, meaning that Mother had harmed Child while Father had not. Compare
¶33 In conducting its best interest analysis, the court noted that Mother “displayed an acrimonious attitude toward” Father throughout the proceeding and engaged in “harassment tactics” while Child was living with Father. For example, Mother “refus[ed] to pay small sums of money, delay[ed] the sharing of insurance information for [Child’s] medical or dental care, and refus[ed] to provide documentation needed for his school enrollment.” She also contacted Florida welfare authorities, but her complaints were determined to be meritless, and the court found it notable that she did not notify the court or Utah DCFS of her concerns. The court reasoned that based on “the attitude and level of anger” Mother displayed toward Father during the proceeding, “[i]t is foreseeable that [Mother] will exercise her anger against [Father] by being uncooperative with allowing contact and parent time between [Child] and [Father], despite that relationship being of exceptional importance and benefit to [Child].”
¶34 The court further noted that Mother’s “quest to have [Child] return to her care seemed less about their relationship and more about the financial implications of custody.” And “[m]ore importantly, despite the rehabilitative services she completed, she seems to lose focus on [Child’s] needs.” In support of this conclusion, the court pointed to the fact that Mother sent Stepfather, “a person who has mistreated [Child] and who[m] he fears,” to pick Child up from the airport during his Utah visit,
¶35 The order next pointed to the fact that Child had made educational progress while with Father, whereas Mother “was not even aware of [Child’s] delays.” And while Child’s need to be held back a year was “regrettable,” the court stated it believed it was in Child’s best interest and that it was not attributable to Child’s placement with Father, who did everything in his power to address Child’s educational delays. The court found that Mother’s “apparent lack of interest in [Child’s] current schooling and her lack of accountability for his educational deficits, despite their origination while [Child] was in her home, suggest his delays are more likely a result of inattention on her part rather than any failure by [Father].”
¶36 And while the court praised Child’s progress in his mental health and socialization while with Father, the court noted that Mother failed to schedule an appointment with a family therapist when Child was visiting her in Utah. Although Mother’s therapist
¶37 The court also noted that Child “has not seemed disturbed by his separation” from his half-siblings and step-sibling who reside with Mother and Stepfather and that he also has a new half-sibling in Father’s house. Additionally, Child had expressed a desire to remain with Father, and “[g]iven what [Child] has experienced in his short life, his desires should be considered.”
¶38 “Balancing all factors,” the court concluded that it was in Child’s best interest that Father be granted custody. The court stated that this “will maintain [Child’s] current stability and protect his important relationships, as well as sustain his progress in both school and therapy.” The court also held that it was in Child’s best interest that he “have meaningful parent-time with [Mother]” due to her successful completion of the child and family plan. But it concluded that “returning [Child] to [Mother’s] home would create a substantial risk of detriment to his physical or emotional wellbeing.”
¶39 Mother appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶40 Mother first argues that the juvenile court “committed threshold legal errors” in its application of
ANALYSIS
I. Section 80-3-409(2)
¶41
(a) If reunification services are ordered . . . the juvenile court shall, at the permanency hearing, determine . . . whether the minor may safely be returned to the custody of the minor’s parent.
(b) If the juvenile court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that return of the minor to the minor’s parent would create a substantial risk of detriment to the minor’s physical or emotional well-being, the minor may not be returned to the custody of the minor’s parent.
¶42 Mother argues that the juvenile court’s analysis under
A. Safety Finding
¶43 Mother argues that the juvenile court committed legal error because it “made no finding that Mother was unsafe, and, based on the evidence produced at the permanency hearing” in which the State, the DCFS caseworker, and the GAL all informed the court they did not have any safety concerns regarding Child’s return to Mother, “any such finding would have been against the clear weight of the evidence.” In essence, Mother’s argument seems to assume that subsection (a) of
¶45 Here, the juvenile court determined that returning Child to Mother’s “home would create a substantial risk of detriment to
B. Substantial-Risk-of-Detriment Analysis
¶46 Mother argues that “[t]he juvenile court made a threshold legal error when it substituted its best-interests analysis in the place of the statutorily required analysis of whether returning custody to Mother would constitute a substantial risk of detriment to Child.” Unlike with the best-interest inquiry, Mother asserts, the substantial-risk-of-detriment inquiry “does not holistically examine all the relevant circumstances of the child’s life,” but instead focuses on “whether the child will be harmed by returning to the parent.” See In re K.S., 2022 UT App 68, ¶ 53, 512 P.3d 497 (“The best interest test is broad, and is intended as a holistic examination of all the relevant circumstances that might affect a child’s situation.“) (quotation simplified).
¶47 But Mother mischaracterizes the court’s analysis. While the court noted in its Permanency Hearing Order, with our emphasis, that “[t]he analysis of where [Child] should be placed on a permanent basis must focus on his best interests,” the court also entered two specific findings: first, that returning Child to
¶48 To be sure, the findings the court made supporting various aspects of its analysis in this case overlapped. Among other things, the court’s analysis emphasized the following findings: that Mother’s acrimonious attitude toward Father would likely negatively affect Child’s relationship with him; that Mother employed a “manipulative parenting approach” by focusing on “impeaching” Father rather than addressing Child’s needs; that Mother sent Stepfather, who had previously mistreated Child and with whom Child had little contact throughout the past year, to
¶49 Furthermore, the court’s best-interest analysis was appropriate under
¶50 For all these reasons, the juvenile court did not commit legal error in conducting its analysis under
II. Grant of Permanent Custody and Guardianship to Father
¶51 Mother next argues that the juvenile court erred in ordering placement of Child “in the permanent legal and physical custody of [Father].” First, she argues that the court’s grant of permanent custody to Father “overstepped the statutory distinctions between juvenile courts and district courts.” Second, she asserts that the court’s order “overstepped the statutes that direct when and how permanency plans should be changed.” We disagree on both counts.
¶52 In support of her first argument, Mother asserts that “[j]uvenile courts should not be deciding custody between two fit parents.” She contends that while “the juvenile court’s primary concern is the relationship between a child and a parent who has been accused of abuse or neglect,” see
¶54 Mother’s arguments, however, are flawed in several respects. As an initial matter, contrary to her assertions, this was
¶55 Additionally, because “the juvenile court has power to enter decisions regarding the custody of Child notwithstanding any continuing jurisdiction the district court may retain[,] . . . the juvenile court can modify custody and grant permanent custody” to the noncustodial parent, In re J.H., 2006 UT App 205, ¶ 11, 138 P.3d 70, so long as it is authorized by statute to do so in that particular circumstance, In re B.B., 2002 UT App 82, ¶ 12, 45 P.3d 527 (stating that juvenile courts, being “creatures of statute,” “are allowed to do only what the legislature has expressly authorized“) (quotation simplified). See
¶56 The juvenile court obtained original jurisdiction over Child when the State petitioned the court for protective supervision services, alleging abuse and neglect. See
¶58 Here, as discussed above, the court determined that Child could not safely be returned to Mother because there was a substantial risk of detriment to Child’s physical or emotional well-being. See
¶59 Here, the court determined that granting permanent custody and guardianship to Father and parent-time with Mother was the most appropriate of the three limited dispositional choices available to it—i.e., “termination of parental rights, adoption, or permanent custody and guardianship.”13 Utah Code
CONCLUSION
¶60 The juvenile court did not err in its analysis under
¶61 Affirmed.