Case Information
*0 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 01/20/2015 3:12:01 PM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk *1 ACCEPTED 04-14-00362-CV FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 1/20/2015 3:12:01 PM KEITH HOTTLE CLERK
NO. 04-14-00362-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
I N RE G UARDIANSHIP OF T ERRY L. G ILMER , AN I NCAPACITATED P ERSON O N A PPEAL FROM THE C OUNTY C OURT AT L AW , K ENDALL C OUNTY , T EXAS H ONORABLE B ILL P ALMER P RESIDING C AUSE N O . 13-070-PR
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF H EINRICHS AND D E G ENNARO , P.C. J. Barrett Shipp H OUSTON D UNN , PLLC Samuel V. Houston, III
State Bar No. 24060601 State Bar No. 24041135
100 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 1075 San Antonio, Texas 78216 4040 Broadway, Suite 440 San Antonio, Texas 78209
(210) 366-0900 – Telephone (210) 775-0882 – Telephone
(210) 366-0981 – Fax (210) 826-0075 – Fax
BarrettS@heinrichslaw.com sam@hdappeals.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS SHARLENE GILMER ANDERSON AND DANIEL GILMER *2 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... ii
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 1
I. Dan and Sharlene Do Not Have Interests That Are Adverse to Their Mother. ............................................................................. 1 A. Emotional Frustration Is Not an “Interest” for Purposes of Section 1055.001 of the Estates Code. ........................... 1 B. The Trust Does Not Create an Adverse Interest. ............... 3 C. Dan and Sharlene Acknowledge That Their Mother Needs Care, and They Agreed That a Neutral Third Party Should Be Appointed Guardian. .............................. 4 D. Whatever Frustration Dan and Sharlene Might Have Expressed About Their Parents’ Divorce Does Not Mean That Dan and Sharlene Have Interests Adverse to Their Mother. ................................................................ 6 E. The Trial Court Erred in Taking Judicial Notice of the Divorce Proceeding. .......................................................... 7 II. The Ad Litem Has Not Provided Any Authority from Which the Court Could Conclude That the Trial Court’s Conclusions of Law Are Correct. ..................................................................... 9 III. Prayer. ...................................................................................... 10 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................... 11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ....................................................................... 12
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES
Allison v. Walvoord ,
819 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, orig. proceeding) .................... 2 Betts v. Brown , No. 14-99-00619-CV, 2001 WL 40337
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 18, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) ............................................................ 5, 9 In re C.L. , 304 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.) ................... 8, 9
In re Guardianship of Miller ,
299 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (en banc) .................... 6 In re Guardianship of Olivares , No. 07-07-0275-CV,
2008 WL 5206169 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 12, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) .................................................................................................. 4 In re Guardianship of Valdez , No. 04-07-00712-CV,
2008 WL 2332006 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 4, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) .................................................................................................. 2 McCurry v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. ,
742 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied) ................ 7 Murff v. Murff , 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981) ................................................. 8
USLIFE Title Ins. Co. v. Howard ,
603 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1980, no writ) ........................ 7 STATUTES
T EX . E STATES C ODE § 1101.051 ........................................................................ 8
T EX . E STATES C ODE § 1104.354 ....................................................................... 9
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Frederick R. Franke, Jr.,
Perfect Ambiguity: The Role of the Attorney in Maryland Guardianships , 7 M D . J. OF C ONTEMP . L EGAL I SSUES 223, 233 (1995) ........ 2 ii
TO THE HONORABLE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellants Sharlene Gilmer Anderson and Daniel Gilmer respectfully present this reply brief in support of their principal brief and to respond to
issues raised in the ad litem’s appellee’s brief. Appellants respectfully request
that the Court reverse the trial court’s order dismissing their application to
create a guardianship over their mother.
ARGUMENT
I. Dan and Sharlene Do Not Have Interests That Are Adverse to
Their Mother.
A. Emotional Frustration Is Not an “Interest” for Purposes of Section 1055.001 of the Estates Code.
A guardianship proceeding cannot be commenced by a “person who has an interest that is adverse to a proposed ward or incapacitated person.” T EX .
E STATES C ODE § 1055.001(b). There is no statutory definition for “adverse” or
“interest.” In response to Dan and Sharlene’s principal brief, the ad litem
focuses on the term “adverse” and posits that Dan and Sharlene lack standing
because they have expressed, in phone calls and emails with family members,
their frustration with their mother and her sometimes erratic and destructive
behavior.
There is no authority holding that a person cannot initiate a guardianship proceeding simply because they may have been, at one time or
another, frustrated or upset with the proposed ward. If this were the rule, no
person could ever initiate a guardianship proceeding for a family member. [1]
Accordingly, much of the discussion in the ad litem’s brief need not be
considered.
In analyzing whether a person lacks standing, courts must first identify the applicant’s interest and then determine if that interest is adverse to the
proposed ward. For example, a person who is suing the proposed ward lacks
standing to contest the appointment of a guardian. In re Guardianship of
Valdez , No. 04-07-00712-CV, 2008 WL 2332006, at *2 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio June 4, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The lawsuit creates the
interest, and because the person seeks money or property from the proposed
ward through the lawsuit, the interest is obviously adverse. Id . (“Because Jerry
was suing Martha Jane, he had an interest adverse to her.”). One of the few
authorities cited by the ad litem is in accord. In Allison v. Walvoord , 819
S.W.2d 624, 626-27 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, orig. proceeding), the court
determined that the plaintiffs suing the proposed ward lacked standing to
contest the appointment of a limited guardian. According to the court, the
plaintiffs’ “interest is in obtaining a substantial judgment against [the
proposed ward] which could only adversely affect his welfare.” Id . at 626.
The ad litem cites to and relies upon statements demonstrating Dan and Sharlene’s emotional frustration with their mother. Appellee’s Br. 6-8. But
*6 Dan and Sharlene’s frustrations are not connected to any particular “interest,”
such as a pending lawsuit, claim for money, or property dispute. The ad litem
rests solely upon the fact that Dan and Sharlene have said things about their
mother that were, in his view, not “nice.” Appellee’s Br. 8.
Section 1055.001 and the case law interpreting it do not deny standing to a person who has been frustrated or upset with a proposed ward. There is no
authority even suggesting that being frustrated or upset with the proposed
ward constitutes an adverse interest. Thus, in line with the broad language in
section 1055.001, which confers standing upon “any person,” Dan and
Sharlene have standing to commence a guardianship proceeding over their
mother.
B. The Trust Does Not Create an Adverse Interest. Dan and Sharlene’s principal brief analyzed the Nana Seeley Gilmer Trust’s provisions. That analysis demonstrates that Dan and Sharlene could
not have an adverse interest vis-à-vis the Trust because they do not have a
direct interest in the Trust and neither of them has any ability to directly
control the Trust. Neither Dan nor Sharlene serves as a trustee. CR 340. At
most, Dan and Sharlene are contingent beneficiaries of the Trust. See CR 330.
The possibility that they may inherit their parents’ assets, which may or may
not include Trust assets, is simply not enough to establish an adverse interest.
Applying the analysis in other cases reviewing motions in limine, Dan and Sharlene cannot have an adverse interest relating to the Trust because
they do not have a legal ability to control the Trust. For example, in In re
Guardianship of Olivares , No. 07-07-0275-CV, 2008 WL 5206169, at *1-2
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 12, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.), a son misused a
power of attorney granted to him by his mother, committing multiple acts of
self-dealing after becoming his mother’s fiduciary. As a result, the son was
barred from participating in a guardianship proceeding involving his mother.
Id . at *2. But in this case, Dan and Sharlene do not have any similar level of
legal authority over their mother, the trustee, or the Trust corpus.
C. Dan and Sharlene Acknowledge That Their Mother Needs Care, and They Agreed That a Neutral Third Party Should Be Appointed Guardian.
The record does not support the trial court’s conclusion and ad litem’s assertion that Dan and Sharlene had a “plan to withhold the trust distribution”
from Mrs. Gilmer. The record establishes that no distributions have been
made; but there is no evidence to explain the reason. It is pure speculation for
the ad litem to suggest that there was a “plan,” much less one that Dan and
Sharlene could have legally carried out.
Reading isolated portions of a conversation between Dan and his uncle, the ad litem asserts that Dan’s singular desire was to preserve the Trust assets
for his children. But a thorough reading of the transcript reveals that Dan was
concerned for his mother’s well-being, and he did not want his mother’s sister
(or other members of Linda’s family) to profit at his mother’s expense. Dan
expressed his concerns about his mother and his aunt’s undue influence over
her at multiple times during that conversation:
• Um, my Mother needs help. My Mother does not need what’s currently happening. She does not need what Linda is giving her. She needs doctors. She doesn’t need someone that is . . . currently she’s with Mom, I can pretty much say 100% she’s looking for money, because currently Linda is broke.
• . . . . Mother needs to see doctors. She needs to get situated with her pills. My Mom had a huge Oxicoton addictions about two years ago, that we all worked toward getting her off of. My Mom has huge nutrition problems, huge nutrition problems. That’s why she’s basically losing her hair and why she’s losing her basically muscles, her actually her bones in her jaw. She has got more problems that we have to work through, but my Mother is not willing to do it, and there’s nothing, she’s not going to get the help with Linda.
3 RR:Ex. M-5.
At no time did Dan assert that his mother’s assets should not be used for her care. [2] In fact, Dan said the opposite. See id .; 2 RR 47, 71-72. Sharlene
testified that Trust funds should be used to care for her mother. 2 RR 96-97.
Dan and Sharlene’s complaint was that they did not want Trust assets to flow
to Linda or other members of the Meagher family. See 2 RR 71-72, 96-97. This
is an important distinction not recognized by the trial court or the ad litem.
By seeking to protect their mother from undue influence by others, Dan and Sharlene certainly were not taking any action that would adversely affect
their mother’s welfare or well-being. See Betts v. Brown , No. 14-99-00619-CV,
*9 2001 WL 40337, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 18, 2001, no pet.)
(not designated for publication). The record establishes that they wanted a
neutral third party to ensure that their mother’s needs would be addressed. 2
RR 81, 92. Given the size of her estate and her documented health issues,
neither the trial court nor the ad litem has explained—much less considered—
why it would not be in Mrs. Gilmer’s best interests to a have neutral third
party appointed guardian.
D. Whatever Frustration Dan and Sharlene Might Have Expressed About Their Parents’ Divorce Does Not Mean That Dan and Sharlene Have Interests Adverse to Their Mother.
Dan and Sharlene have maintained that their parents’ divorce proceeding has no effect upon their ability to commence a guardianship
proceeding. The trial court relied heavily upon the notice of lis pendens filed
by Mrs. Gilmer on Dan’s home in its findings and conclusions. CR 453, 455.
But the notice of lis pendens was not the product of a dispute between Mrs.
Gilmer and Dan. It arose out of Mrs. Gilmer’s allegation that her husband used
community funds to purchase Dan’s home; therefore, the dispute is between
Mr. Gilmer and Mrs. Gilmer. 2 RR 49-51; CR 17-18. Further, to the extent that
there was any dispute between Mrs. Gilmer and Dan, the dispute has been
resolved as the notice of lis pendens had been expunged by the time the trial
court heard the motion in limine. 2 RR 49; CR 453. [3] The ad litem did not
address the foregoing analysis in his brief.
The ad litem, instead, returns to subjective emotional statements in arguing that the divorce proceeding gives rise to adverse interests. The ad
litem focuses on the conversation between Dan and his uncle, wherein Dan
discussed the toll the divorce was taking on his father. See 3 RR:Ex. M-5.
Dan’s statements, however, merely express the fact that he and Sharlene had
been offering emotional support to their father during the divorce. See id . The
ad litem posits that an adverse interest must arise because Dan did not say
that he and Sharlene were offering the same emotional support to their
mother during the divorce. The ad litem, however, has cited no authority in
support of this position, and Dan and Sharlene are not aware of any authority
that would support it. Accordingly, there is no adverse interest arising out of
the divorce proceeding.
E. The Trial Court Erred in Taking Judicial Notice of the Divorce Proceeding.
A trial court does not have unfettered discretion to take judicial notice of its file in another case over which it has presided. USLIFE Title Ins. Co. v.
Howard , 603 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1980, no writ).
Rather, the trial court may only do so when the other “case involved the same
*11 subject matter between the same, or practically the same, parties.” Id .; see also
McCurry v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 742 S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 1987, writ denied). Further, the trial court is obligated to notify the
parties that it is taking judicial notice. In re C.L. , 304 S.W.3d 512, 515 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2009, no pet.).
The trial court was not authorized to take judicial notice of the divorce proceeding. Mr. and Mrs. Gilmer’s divorce does not present the same issues as
those raised in the guardianship proceeding. A divorce proceeding is focused
upon a division of the parties’ community property. See Murff v. Murff , 615
S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981). The guardianship proceeding focuses upon
whether a guardian should be appointed over Mrs. Gilmer’s person and estate.
See T EX . E STATES C ODE § 1101.051. Dan and Sharlene are not parties to their
parents’ divorce, and they have no claims against either parent or the
community estate. See 2 RR 77-78, 92-93. [4]
Despite the trial court’s error, the ad litem suggests that Dan and Sharlene failed to raise the issue with the trial court. The record reflects that
the parties were not notified of the trial court’s decision to take judicial notice
until after the trial court signed the order granting the motion in limine and
well after the appeal had been perfected. See CR 418, 455, 458-59. Dan and
Sharlene did file an objection even though the appeal was proceeding forward.
*12 CR 458-59. Thus, the Court should decide whether the trial court erred in
taking judicial notice of the divorce proceeding. See In re C.L. , 304 S.W.3d at
515-16. [5]
II. The Ad Litem Has Not Provided Any Authority from Which
the Court Could Conclude That the Trial Court’s Conclusions of Law Are Correct.
The trial court cited Estates Code section 1104.354(1) in support of its conclusion that Dan and Sharlene lack standing to initiate the guardianship
proceeding. CR 445-56. But section 1104.354(1) only discusses an instance
where a person could not be appointed a guardian: “A person may not be
appointed a guardian if the person: (1) is a party or is a person whose parent is
a party to a lawsuit concerning or affecting the welfare of the proposed ward.”
T EX . E STATES C ODE § 1104.354(1). This section has no application here.
A person could have standing to initiate a guardianship proceeding even though he or she may be disqualified from serving as the guardian. Betts , 2001
WL 40337, at *4. While it may be true that a person who is suing the proposed
ward cannot initiate a guardianship proceeding or serve as the guardian, that
situation is not presented in this case. There is no on-going litigation between
Mrs. Gilmer and her children. [6] Accordingly, for the reasons expressed above
*13 and in Dan and Sharlene’s principal brief, the Court should reverse the trial
court’s order.
III. Prayer.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellants Sharlene Gilmer
Anderson and Daniel Gilmer respectfully pray that the Court reverse the trial
court’s order granting the motion in limine, remand the case to the trial court
for further proceedings, and grant other and further relief to which they may
be justly and equitably entitled.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Samuel V. Houston, III SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III State Bar No. 24041135 H OUSTON D UNN , PLLC 4040 Broadway, Suite 440 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: (210) 775-0882 Fax: (210) 826-0075 sam@hdappeals.com J. Barrett Shipp State Bar No. 24060601 H EINRICHS AND D E G ENNARO , P.C. 100 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 1075 San Antonio, Texas 78216 Telephone: (210) 366-0900 Fax: (210) 366-0981 BarrettS@heinrichslaw.com ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4, the undersigned certifies that the foregoing computer-generated brief contains 2,477
words.
/s/ Samuel V. Houston, III SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III *15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on
the 20th day of January, 2015, to the following:
Shawn Lovorn Via email/eservice
L OVORN L AW F IRM
470 S. Main St. #4
Boerne, Texas 78006
Chris Wallendorf Via email/eservice
Law Office of Chris Wallendorf
722 Front Street, Suite 101
P.O. Box 279
Comfort, Texas 78013
/s/ Samuel V. Houston, III SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III
[1] See Frederick R. Franke, Jr., Perfect Ambiguity: The Role of the Attorney in Maryland Guardianships , 7 M D . J. OF C ONTEMP . L EGAL I SSUES 223, 233 (1995).
[2] Sharlene also had concerns about Linda’s ability to take advantage of Mrs. Gilmer. 2 RR 86-87.
[3] There is no authority to indicate that a notice of lis pendens—standing alone—would give rise to an adverse interest. Relatedly, the mere fact that a person owes a debt to the proposed ward does not automatically establish an adverse interest. In re Guardianship of Miller , 299 S.W.3d 179, 189 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (en banc).
[4] To the extent the ad litem will argue that Dan is a “party” as it relates to the notice of lis pendens filed by Mrs. Gilmer, the notice of lis pendens has been expunged. 2 RR 49; CR 453. Dan has not intervened in the divorce proceeding to pursue claims against his mother.
[5] But see In re C.M.C. , No. 14-12-00186-CV, 2012 WL 3871359 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 30, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g).
[6] Dan and Sharlene are unaware of any authority holding that a person has an adverse interest for purposes of section 1055.001 of the Estates Code simply because their parent is a party to a lawsuit concerning the proposed ward’s welfare.