OPINION
Opinion by
Relator, Great Lakes Dredge & Dоck Company, L.L.C. (“Great Lakes”), requests this Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the Respondent, the Honorable Ricardo Rodriguez, Jr., 1 to enforce a venue-selection agreement. Finding no abuse of discretion, we deny Great Lakes’s petition.
I. Background
Nelson Ramos was employed by Great Lakes beginning in 2006. Upon his employment, he was required to sign a document titled, “Employee Acceptance of Forum Selection” (hereinafter “the Agreement”). 2 The Agreement provides as follows:
As a condition of employment with Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company LLC, the EMPLOYEE and Great *70 Lakes Dredge & Dock Company, LLC mutually agree that any claim for personal, emotional, physical, or economic injury [including death] pursuant to Federal law, general maritime law, the Jones Act, or the laws of any State, or otherwise arising out of EMPLOYEE’S employment with Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company, LLC shall, if ever made the basis of litigation initiated by EMPLOYEE be filed, at the option of the EMPLOYEE, in any one of the following jurisdictions only:
(a) the Circuit Court for the County of DuPage, State of Illinois; or
(b) The Court designated below in the State of residence of the EMPLOYEE or in the State in which the accident made the basis of the lawsuit occurred, as follows:
STATE STATE COURT
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Florida Clay County
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Texas District Courts of Harris County, Texas
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or
(c)The United States Federal District Court in the State of residence of the EMPLOYEE or in the State in which the accident made the basis of the lawsuit occurred, as follows:
STATE FEDERAL COURT
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Florida Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division
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Texas Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
It is undisputed that on May 5, 2006, Ramоs signed the Agreement and began working for Great Lakes. Ramos was laid off on June 10, 2006, at the completion of a dredging project, but he was rehired on June 19, 2006, to begin another project aboard the Dredge ILLINOIS, a vessel owned and operated by Great Lakes. Ramos allegedly sustained injuries aboard that vessel in August 2006.
On January 23, 2007, Ramos filed suit against Great Lakes in Hidalgo County District Court, alleging that his injuries were the result of maritime negligence and the Dredge ILLINOIS’S unseaworthiness. Ramos asserted claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (formerly codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688). 3 Great Lakes responded with a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternаtive, Motion to Transfer Venue and, subject thereto, Special Exceptions and Answer. Great Lakes argued that the Agreement mandated that suit be filed in either a state district court in Harris County, Texas, or in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. 4
*71 Ramos filed a response, arguing that the “mandatory venue provision for the Jones Act requires Plaintiffs suit to be brought in Hidalgo County; and ... [t]he forum selection clause is vague, unjust, and unreasonable.” Attached to the response was an affidavit signed by Ramos, stating that while working on a job in Florida, he was “forced” to sign the Agreement. He states that hе was told by a Great Lakes representative “that if [he] did not sign the form [he] would be terminated.” Finally, he states that he did not receive any consideration for signing the form. Ramos also filed a short brief setting out authority for his positions.
Judge Rodriguez held a hearing on Great Lakes’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, transfer. Great Lakes’s petition for writ of mandamus states that arguments were presented at the hearing, but no other evidence was presented. See Tex.R.App. P. 52.7(a)(2). On June 6, 2007, Judge Rodriguez denied Great Lakes’s *72 motion to dismiss without stating the reasons for his ruling. The mandamus proceeding followed.
II. Mandamus Standard
Mandamus is an extraоrdinary remedy that is available when the relator demonstrates that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that it has an inadequate remedy by appeal.
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
The relator must also show that his or her appеllate remedy is inadequate.
In re Prudential,
III. Enforceability of Venue Selection Agreement
Great Lakes asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to enforce a forum-selection agreement. Great Lakes argues that, under the Texаs Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements, forum-selection agreements are presumptively enforceable, and Ramos has not raised a valid defense to enforcement.
See In re AutoNation, Inc.,
In response, Ramos asserts that the mandatory venue statute in place at the time suit was filed, former Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code section 15.018, provided that Ramos’s Jones Act claim could be brоught in Hidalgo County, where Ramos resided. Additionally, under that same section, suit could not be brought in Harris County. 5 He argues that, under *73 the Texas Supreme Court’s decisions in Leonard v. Paxson 6 and Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 7 a party’s pre-suit agreement to set venue in a particular county that is contrary to a mandatory venue statute is void and unenforceable. Great Lakes counters that Leonard and Fidelity were decided prior to the supreme court’s recent trend of enforcing forum-selection agreements and are effectively supplanted. For the following reasons, we disagree with Great Lakes.
A. Terminology — “Venue” v. “Forum.”
In this case, the parties have used “forum” and “venue” interchangeably. We pause to note the difference between the two terms to avoid any confusion about our holding. Each term has a distinct legal meaning that must be carefully observed, even though in some instances, Texas ease law has muddled the distinction between the two.
8
Accelerated Christian Educ., Inc. v. Oracle Corp.,
“Forum” generally refers to a sovereign or a state.
See Scott v. Gallagher,
Great Lakes does not dispute that under the contract and under federal law, 9 Ramos has the right to bring his Jones Act claim in Texas state court. In fact, the Agreement expressly states that the choices provided are entirely “at the option of the EMPLOYEE.” The only disagreement, it appears, is whether Ramos was required to adhere to the venue requirements of the Agreement and bring his suit in a Harris County district court. We will now turn to the arguments.
B. Early Texas cases refused to enforce pre-suit venue selection agreements in contravention of mandatory venue statutes based on the “ouster” doctrine and the policy reasons behind the legislative venue scheme.
As early as 1919, the Texas Supreme Court refused to enforce an agreement regarding
venue within Texas
that contravened the statutory venue scheme.
Int’l Travelers’ Ass’n v. Branum,
The court agreed with the plaintiff, holding that the agreement to limit venue was vоid as against public policy.
Branum,
Second, the court cited what would later be called the “ouster” doctrine, which is often traced to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Insurance Co. v. Morse. Id.
at 631-32 (citing
Ins. Co. v. Morse,
Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him. A man may not barter away his life, or his freedom, or his substantial rights. In a criminal case, he can not, as was held in *75 Cancemi’s case,18 N.Y. 128 , be tried in any other manner than by a jury of twelve men, although he consent in open court to be tried by a jury of eleven men. In a civil case he may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or to the decision of a single judge. So he may omit to exercise his right to remove his suit to a Federal tribunal, as oftеn as he thinks fit, in each recurring case. In these aspects any citizen may no doubt waive the rights to which he may be entitled. He can not, however, bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented. That the agreement of the insurance company is invalid upon the principles mentioned, numerous cases may be cited to prove. They show that agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.
Morse,
C. More recent Texas cases rely on the legislature’s provision of contractual venue in specific, limited circumstances and expand upon the traditional justifications for refusing to enforce venue-selection agreements.
More recently, in
Fidelity Union Life Insurance Co. v. Evans,
the Texas Supreme Court again considered the effeсt of a venue-selection agreement that contravened a mandatory venue statute.
The supreme court cited Branum, noting its holding that “an advance agreement about venue mаy not contravene the statutory scheme for fixing venue.” Id. The court’s reasoning, however, included more justification than its earlier decision in Branum. See id. First, the court noted that the venue statutes at the time provided parties the right to agree to venue only when “the obligation sued upon is to be performed in the particular county of venue.” Id. (citing Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995, § 5 (current version at Tex Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.035 (Vernon 2002))). The cases cited to the court by Fidelity as support for enforcing its venue-selection agreement were under this provision, and the court held they did not support Fidelity’s position. Id. at 536-37.
Second, the court discussed the Branum case and the рolicy reasons for enacting mandatory venue statutes. Id. at 537. Specifically, it noted that “venue is a matter of general convenience and expediency, whereas contracts which change the venue rules disturb the symmetry of the law.” Id. It noted that the opinion of the court of civil appeals below, however, had articulated more policy reasons than those discussed in Branum. Id. Specifically, the court of civil appeals below noted that the legislature engages in a policy choice when it enacts venue rules, necessarily choosing *76 to bestow more fаvor on either a plaintiff or defendant in particular eases:
A party litigating away from home has the same disadvantage whether he is plaintiff or defendant. When two parties live in different counties, only one can enjoy the home-county privilege. A choice must be made, and the legislature has chosen to give that privilege to defendant as a general rule, subject to enumerated exceptions, and no exception is provided for cases in which the parties have agreed to suit in a particular county. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1995 (1964). In order to maintain suit away from defendant’s residenсe, plaintiff has the burden to prove that his case falls within one of the exceptions, and doubts must be resolved in favor of the general rule. Moreover, the defendant’s privilege of defending in his home county is such a valuable right that it must be protected even at the cost of two trials of the same issue. In Branurn the public policy against permitting parties to contract away procedural rights was decisive in favor of a plaintiff who was entitled to a venue privilege under one of the exceptions. We hold that the same policy applies even more strongly to a defendant whо is entitled to a venue privilege under the general rule. In this case, since we have also the mandatory provisions of Article 4656 requiring an injunction to be returnable to defendant’s county, the policy against the contractual provision in question is especially strong.
Fid. Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans,
the fixing of venue by contract, except in such instances as permitted by Article 1995, § 5, is invalid and cannot be the subject of a private contract.... Article 4656 placed venue for an injunction suit in the county in which defendant Evans had his domicile; we hold that a variance of that statute is not the subject of a private contract.
Fid. Union Life Ins. Co., All S.W.2d at 537.
Most recently in 1983, in
Leonard v. Paxson,
the Texas Suрreme Court analyzed a venue-selection agreement that conflicted with the Texas Family Code’s mandatory venue provisions.
The supreme court cited the mandatory venue rule in suits affecting the parent-child relationship and determined they applied to the case. Id. at 441. The court cited Fidelity, holding that the mandatory venue provisions of the family code could not be “negated by contract.” Id. at 441-42. “To hold otherwise would defeat the legislature’s intent that matters affecting the parent-child relationship be heard in the county where the child rеsides, and would promote forum shopping by contract.” Id. at 442.
*77 D. The Texas Supreme Court’s recent trend toward enforcement of forum selection agreements is based on the court’s rejection of the “ouster” doctrine.
Similarly, Texas courts, like most American courts, historically disfavored forum-selection clauses.
In re AIU Ins. Co.,
In the years since
In re MU Insurance Co.,
the Texas Supreme Court has steadfastly held that forum-selection agreements are generally enforceable.
See In re Autonation, Inc.,
E. The Texas Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements regarding forum-selection clauses do not supplant its decisions regarding venue-selection agreements.
Contrary to Great Lakes’s arguments, we hold that the supreme court’s recent decisions regarding forum-selection clauses, rejecting the “ouster” doсtrine, do not supplant firmly established Texas law regarding the enforcement of venue-selection agreements that contravene a mandatory venue statute. First, the Texas Supreme Court was certainly aware of the holdings in
Branum, Leonard,
and
Fidelity
at the time it decided
In re MU,
but it chose not to expressly overrule those cases. Chief Justice Thomas R. Phillips cited these cases in his dissent in
In re MU
and carefully explained that these cases related to venue.
See In re MU Ins. Co.,
Second, although the decision in MU appears to supplant one of the reasons stated by the Texas Supreme Court for refusing enforcement of a venue selection agreement — the “ouster” doctrine — it does not address a separate, critical reason for why venue selection agreements in contra *78 vention of mandatory venue statutes should not be enforced. In re AIU did not address the legislature’s prerogative to set venue or the policy reasons for refusing to enforce a venue-selection clause in light of those legislative choices. See id. at 109-21. This legislative prerogative was relied on heavily in the cases discussed above where the Texas Supreme Court refused to enforce a venue-selection agreement contrary to a mandatory venue provision. See discussion, supra Part III.B.-C. Accordingly, after In re AIU, a highly significant reason to refuse enforcement of venue-selection clauses remains intact.
Finally, refusing to enforce a venue-selection agreement in contravention of a mandatory venue statute actually appears to be consistent with the Texas Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements regarding forum-selection agreements and with the legislative venue scheme. Although forum-selection agreements are presumptively enforceable, there are exceptions. One of those exceptions occurs when enforcement of the forum-selection agreement contravenes a strong public policy of the forum.
In re AIU Ins. Co.,
In
In re Autonation,
the supreme court’s most recent pronouncement on forum-selection clauses, the court faced an argument that enforcement of a forum-selection clause in a covenant not to compete, selecting an out-of-state forum for a suit against a Texas resident, would violate Texas public policy.
In re Autonation, Inc.,
In contrast to
Autonation,
the Texas legislature
has
enacted statutes that govern venue for suits brought in Texas State courts, expressing a legislative policy as to where a particular suit may be brought. Tex. Civ. Prac.
&
Rem.Code Ann. Ch. 15 (Vernon 2002 & Supp.2006). The legislature has provided that in very limited circumstances, a party may contract around а mandatory venue statute.
Id.
Parties to a “major transaction,” which must be evidenced by a written agreement and involve consideration with an aggregate stated value of at least one million dollars, may provide for venue in the contract.
Id.
§ 15.020. In contrast, in other transactions of any amount where the contract provides that an obligation is to be performed in a particular county, the legislature has provided venue is
permissive
in that county.
Id.
§ 15.035. Given these specific instructions from the legislature, we must assume that the legislature intended that any other type of venue-selection agreement would be unenforceable.
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc.,
Accordingly, we believe that the theoretical underpinnings for
In re AIU
and its progeny do not apply to venue-selection agreements, and the supreme court did not intend to supplant nearly a hundred years of Texas case law
11
or the legislative policies expressed in chapter 15 of the civil practice and remedies code. We implicitly recognized as much when, in 2006, we refused to enforce a venue-selection agreement that contravened a mandatory venue provision.
See Fleming v. Ahumada,
IV. Conclusion
Texas law prohibits parties from contracting away mandatory venue. The trial court properly refused to enforce such an agreement in this case. Because Great Lakes was required to show an abuse of discretion for which an appeal is inadequate, and we find no abuse of discretion, we must deny Great Lakes’s petition for writ of mandamus.
Walker,
Notes
. Presiding judge of the 92nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.
. Ramos signed a Spanish translation of this document. Ramos does not dispute that the language quoted by Great Lakes in its petition is a true and accurate translation of the document Ramos signed. Accordingly, we will recite the relevant portions in English.
. The Jones Act was recodified in 2006. See Pub.L. No. 109-304, § 6(c), 120 Stat. 1510 (2006).
. Great Lakes also filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, seeking a declaration of its rights under the “forum” selection agreement. Ramos rеsponded by filing a Motion to Abate and Response to Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. On September 24, 2007, the United States District Court denied Ramos's motion to abate, but it has not yet finally determined Great Lakes’s request for declaratory relief.
See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
v.
Ramos,
No. H-07-0630,
Additionally, Great Lakes points us to a case pending in the Southern District of Texas that involves similar issues to those involved in the instаnt case.
See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., LLC v. Larrísquitu, et al.,
Nos. H-06-3489, H-06-3669, H-06-4040, pending in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas. There, Great Lakes filed a declaratory judgment action seeking an injunction and a declaration that the seaman-plaintiffs, in three state court actions similar to Ramos's state court action, cannot proceed against Great Lakes anywhere other than in the Harris County District Courts or the Southern District of Texas pursuant to the same "forum” selection clause at issue here. The federal district court held that it was precluded by the federal Anti-injunction Act from issuing an injunction or any declaratory judgment that wоuld, in effect, preclude the state courts from proceeding.
See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., LLC v. Larrísquitu,
Nos. H-06-3489, H-06-3669, H-06-4040,
The court addressed the seaman-plaintiffs’ arguments that the "forum” selection agreements are unenforceable as against public policy in Jones Act cases.
Id.
at *15-16,
The Larrísquitu court did not address the applicability of the prior, and applicable, version of the mandatory venue statute in Texas or the distinction between forum-selection clauses and venue-selection clauses, as we conclude we must. In fact, thе district court expressly recognized our authority to make our own determination of the issues in this case and in the Larrísquitu state court cases, if they come before us. See id. ("The state courts are competent to determine the enforceability of the parties’ forum-selection agreements.”). The federal district court has not issued a declaratory judgment in either the Ramos or the Larrísquitu case. Finding no bar to our consideration of the issues, we proceed to make our own determination.
. Acts of 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 138 (codified at former Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.018 (2002), amended by Acts of 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 203, § 2, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 203) (current version at Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.0181 (effective May 24, 2007)). The former statute provided:
All suits brought under ... the Jones Act shall be brought: (1) in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred;
(2) in the county where the defendant's principal office in this state is located; or
(3) in the county where the plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action accrued.
Id. It is undisputed that (1) Ramos’s injury occurred in Florida, (2) that Great Lakes’s principal place of business is in Oak Brook, Illinois; and (3) that Ramos resides in Hidal-go County. Although Great Lakes asserts in its reply brief in a footnote that its principal office in Texas is located in Harris County, Texas, Great Lakes does not cite any authority *73 in the record for this proposition that was presented to the trial court. Thus, on the record before the court, Harris County is not a choice under the mandatory venue provision in effect at the time Ramos filed suit, which is applicable to this case. Acts of 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 203, § 3, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 203 (codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.0181 (effective May 24, 2007) (“The change in law made by this Act applies only to an action commenced on or after the effective date of this Act. An action commenced before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect immediately before the effective date of this Act, and that law is continued in effect for that purpose.”)). Nevertheless, the mandatory venue statute expressly gave Ramos the option to choose venue from the three alternatives. Under the following discussion, taking away that choice by way of a venue agreement is inconsistent with the mandatory venue scheme and equally as unenforceable.
.
.
.
See, e.g., Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Gonzalez,
. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1);
Stier v. Reading & Bates Corp.,
. A “plea of privilege” is the term previously used to refer to the procedural mechanism for transferring venue. See McDonald & Carlson, Texas Civil Practice, § 6.1 (2006).
. Many cases prior to
In re AIU
followed
Braman, Leonard,
and
Fidelity. See, e.g., In re Calderon,