In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum. Corporate Grand Jury Witness and "John Doe" v. United StatesIn Re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum. Corporate Grand Jury Witness and "John Doe" v. United States
This matter consists of consolidated appeals, the first by Richard Roe Corporation from a contempt order for refusing to produce documents, the second by a corporate officer from a denial of a motion to intervene.
The appeal from the order of civil contempt involves the refusal of Richard Roe Corporation to produce nine corporate documents. Although, the district court held that the documents fell within the attorney-client privilege, it ordered their production on the grounds that they were subject to the crime/fraud exception to that privilege. We reverse.
The district court utilized the procedures approved in
In Re John Doe Corp.,
We, therefore, reverse the orders of contempt and remand the case to the district court. To the extent that one or more of the disputed documents is subject only in part to the attorney-client privilege, appropriate redaction should be made by the district court and production of the unprivileged portion should follow.
The second appeal is from a denial by the district court of a motion to intervene in the enforcement proceedings discussed above. The party seeking to intervene is an officer of Richard Roe Corporation who claims that certain documents sought by the subpoena are subject to a claim by him of attorney-client privilege. We affirm.
The motion to intervene was not accompanied by an affidavit setting out a factual basis for John Doe’s claim of privilege upon which the motion was based. Rather, it was accompanied only by assertions of counsel that John Doe had been represented in a personal capacity by Richard Roe Corporation’s attorneys. Given the patent insufficiency of this submission, the district court was not obliged to accord John Doe an evidentiary hearing at which he might produce evidence in support of the claim of privilege and was correct in denying the motion to intervene. The fact that the documents are in. the possession of the corporation is itself enough to rebut a naked claim of personal privilege without a substantial factual submission in support of the motion. Absent such a submission, possession by the corporation presumptively indicates either that the communications to counsel were in the course of the corporation’s business rather than John Doe’s personal affairs or that John Doe waived the privilege by disclosure of the communications to third parties, namely other employees of the corporation. Whether an adequate showing of personal privilege might ever be made in such circumstances we need not decide since the showing here was palpably inadequate. Accordingly, we do not intend to preclude by this opinion any future proffer or showing that John Doe may choose to make.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.