Lead Opinion
An investigative reporter for the New York Times; the White House correspondent for the weekly news magazine Time; and Time, Inc., the publisher of Time, appeal from orders of the District Court for the District of Columbia finding all three appellants in civil contempt for refusing to give evidence in response to grand jury subpoenas served by Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald. Appellants assert that the information concealed by them, specifically the identity of confidential sources, is protected by a reporter’s privilege arising from the First Amendment, or failing that, by federal common law privilege. The District Court held that neither the First Amendment nor the federal common law provides protection for journalists’ confidential sources in the context of a grand jury investigation. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the District Court that there is no First Amendment privilege protecting the evidence sought. We further conclude that if any such common law privilege exists, it is not absolute, and in this case has been overcome by the filings of the Special Counsel with the District Court. We further conclude that other assignments of error raised by appellants are without merit. We therefore affirm the decision of the District Court.
I. Background
According to the briefs and record before us, the controversy giving rise to this litigation began with a political and news media controversy over a sixteen-word sentence in the State of the Union Address of President George W. Bush on January
On July 14, 2003, columnist Robert Novak published a column in the Chicago Sun-Times in which he asserted that the decision to send Wilson to Niger had been made “routinely without Director George Tenet’s knowledge,” and, most significant to the present litigation, that “two senior administration officials” told him that Wilson’s selection was at the suggestion of Wilson’s wife, Valerie Píame, whom Novak described as a CIA “operative on weapons of mass destruction.” Robert Novak, The Mission to Niger, Chi. Sun-Times, July 14, 2003, at 31. After Novak’s column was published, various media accounts reported that other reporters had been told by government officials that Wilson’s wife worked at the CIA monitoring weapons of mass destruction, and that she was involved in her husband’s selection for the mission to Niger. One such article, published by Time.com on July 17, 2003, was authored in part by appellant Matthew Cooper. That article stated that:
Some government officials have noted to Time in interviews ... that Wilson’s wife, Valerie Píame, is a CIA official who monitors the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ... [and] have suggested that she was involved in the husband’s being dispatched to Niger to investigate reports that Saddam Hussein’s government had sought to purchase large quantities of uranium ore ....
Matthew Cooper et al., A War on Wilson?, Time.Com, at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,465270,00.html (Dec. 13, 2004). Other media accounts reported that “two top White House officials called at least six Washington journalists and •disclosed the identity and occupation of Wilson’s wife.” Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Bush Administration is Focus of Inquiry; CIA Agent’s Identity was Leaked to Media, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 2003, at Al. The Department of Justice undertook an investigation into whether government employees had violated federal law by the unauthorized disclosure of the identity of a CIA agent. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 421 (criminalizing, inter alia, disclosure of the identity of a covert agent by anyone having had authorized access to classified information). As the investigation proceeded, in December of 2003, the Attorney General recused himself from participation and delegated his full authority in the investigation to the Deputy Attorney General as Acting Attorney General. The Deputy, in turn, appointed Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, as Special Counsel and delegated full authority concerning the investigation to him. As part of the ongoing investigation, a grand jury investigation began in January of 2004.
In cooperation with Special Counsel Fitzgerald, the grand jury conducted an extensive investigation. On May 21, 2004, a grand jury subpoena was issued to appellant Matthew Cooper, seeking testimo
A further grand jury subpoena was issued to Time, Inc., seeking the same documents requested in the subpoena to Cooper. Time also moved to quash its subpoena. On August 6, 2004, the District Court denied Time’s motion. Both Cooper and Time refused to comply with the subpoenas despite the District Court’s denial of their motions to quash. The District Court thereafter found that Cooper and Time had refused to comply with the subpoenas without just cause and held them in civil contempt of court. After both Cooper and Time had filed appeals, and further negotiations between Special Counsel and the two had proceeded, Cooper agreed to provide testimony and documents relevant to a specific source who had stated that he had no objection to their release. Cooper and Time fulfilled their obligations under the agreement, the Special Counsel moved to vacate the District Court’s contempt order, and the notices of appeal were voluntarily dismissed.
On September 13, 2004, the grand jury issued a further subpoena to Cooper seeking “[a]ny and all documents ... [relating to] conversations between Matthew Cooper and official source(s) prior to July 14, 2003, concerning in any way: former Ambassador Joseph Wilson; the 2002 trip by former Ambassador Wilson to Niger; Valerie Wilson Píame, a/k/a Valerie Wilson, a/k/a Valerie Píame (the wife of former Ambassador Wilson); and/or any affiliation between Valerie Wilson Píame and the CIA.” An August 2, 2004 subpoena to Time requested “[a]ll notes, tape recordings, emails, or other documents of Matthew Cooper relating to the July 17, 2003 Time, com article entitled ‘A War on Wilson?’ and the July 21, 2003 Time Magazine article entitled, ‘A Question of Trust.’ ” Cooper and Time again moved to quash the subpoenas, and on October 7, 2004, the District Court denied the motion. The two refused to comply with the subpoenas, and on October 13, 2004, the District Court held that their refusal was without just cause and held both in contempt.
In the meantime, on August 12 and August 14, grand jury subpoenas were issued to Judith Miller, seeking documents and testimony related to conversations between her and a specified government official “occurring from on or about July 6, 2003, to on or about July 13, 2003, ... concerning Valerie Píame Wilson (whether referred to by name or by description as the wife of Ambassador Wilson) or concerning Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium.” Miller refused to comply with the subpoenas and moved to quash them. The District Court denied Miller’s motion to quash. Thereafter, the court found that Miller had refused to comply without just cause and held her in civil contempt of court also. She also has appealed.
The appellants have proceeded with common counsel and common briefing in a consolidated proceeding before this court. They assert four theories for reversal. Their first claim is that the First Amendment affords journalists a constitutional right to conceal their confidential sources even against the subpoenas of grand ju
II. Analysis
A. The First Amendment Claim
In his opinion below, the Chief District Judge held that “a reporter called to testify before a grand jury regarding confidential information enjoys no First Amendment protection.” In Re Special Counsel Investigation,
Like the present case, Branzburg was a consolidated proceeding involving multiple contempt proceedings against news media defendants. The named petitioner, Branzburg, had been held in contempt in two related proceedings, arising from one extended task of investigative journalism. The first arose from an article published by his employer, a daily newspaper, describing his observation of two Kentucky residents synthesizing hashish from marijuana as part of a profitable illegal drug operation. The article included a photograph “of hands working above a laboratory table on ... a substance identified .... as hashish.”
The second case involving petitioner Branzburg arose out of a later article published by the same newspaper describing the use of drugs in Frankfort, Kentucky. According to the article, this publication was the product of two weeks spent interviewing drug users in the area. The article further reported that its author had seen some of his sources smoking marijuana. The article related numerous conversations with and observations of unnamed drug users. Branzburg was again subpoenaed to appear before a Kentucky grand jury “to testify in the matter of violation of statutes concerning use and sale of drugs,” id. at 669,
The consolidated petitions in Branzburg also included In re Pappas. Petitioner Pappas was a television newsman-photographer for a Massachusetts television station. On July 30, 1970, during a time of civil unrest in New Bedford, Massachusetts, he gained entrance to the headquarters of the Black Panther Party, upon his agreement not to disclose anything he saw or heard inside the headquarters. Subsequently, he was subpoenaed to appear before a Massachusetts grand jury. Although he appeared and answered other questions, he refused to answer any questions about what had taken place inside the Black Panther headquarters, “claiming that the First Amendment afforded him a privilege to protect confidential informants and their information.” Id. at 673,
In the final petition consolidated in the Branzburg proceedings, the Court considered the petition for certiorari of the United States from a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Caldwell v. United States,
As can be seen from the account of the underlying facts in Branzburg, there is no material factual distinction between the petitions before the Supreme Court in Branzburg and the appeals before us today. Each of the reporters in Branzburg claimed to have received communications from sources in confidence, just as the journalists before us claimed to have done. At least one of the petitioners in Branzburg had witnessed the commission of crimes. On the record before us, there is at least sufficient allegation to warrant grand jury inquiry that one or both journalists received information concerning the identity of a covert operative of the United States from government employees acting in violation of the law by making the disclosure. Each petitioner in Branzburg and each journalist before us claimed or claims the protection of a First Amendment reporter’s privilege. The Supreme Court in no uncertain terms rejected the existence of such a privilege. As we said at the outset of this discussion, the Su
In rejecting the claim of privilege, the Supreme Court made its reasoning transparent and forceful. The High Court recognized that “the grand jury’s authority to subpoena witnesses is not only historic ... but essential to its task.”
Lest there be any mistake as to the breadth of the rejection of the claimed First Amendment privilege, the High Court went on to recognize that “there remain those situations where a source is not engaged in criminal conduct but has information suggesting illegal conduct by others.” Id. at 693,
[W]e cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.
Id. at 695,
The Branzburg Court further supported the rejection of this claimed privilege by the commonsense observation that “it is obvious that agreements to conceal information relevant to the commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy.” Id. at 696,
We have pressed appellants for some distinction between the facts before the Supreme Court in Branzburg and those before us today. They have offered none, nor have we independently found any. Unquestionably, the Supreme Court decided in Branzburg that there is no First Amendment privilege protecting journalists from appearing before a grand jury or from testifying before a grand jury or otherwise providing evidence to a grand jury regardless of any confidence promised by the reporter to any source. The Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question. Without doubt, that is the end of the matter.
Without attempting to resolve any dispute or difference that may exist between Justice Blackmun and the three dissenting justices in McKoy, even if we accept Justice Scalia’s analysis at full value, it does not help appellants in this case. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion was not the opinion of a justice who refused to join the majority. He joined the majority by its terms, rejecting none of Justice White’s reasoning on behalf of the majority. He wrote separately “to emphasize” what seemed to him “to be the limited nature of the Court’s holding.”
Nonetheless, appellants urge that Justice Powell must have been contemplating the creation or recognition of some further sort of First Amendment privilege for reporters asserting confidential sources, else why would he have bothered writing? To that, the United States replies that by its terms Justice Powell’s opinion recognizes only that
if the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only on a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject investigation, of if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law en*12 forcement, he will have access to the court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered.
Id. at 710,
Therefore, the United States contends, Justice Powell, who expressed no disagreement with the majority about the existence of a constitutional privilege, only emphasized that there would be First Amendment protection in cases of bad faith investigations. Appellants counter that Justice Powell could not have meant what the United States argues, as this would have given reporters no more protection than other citizens. However, they never make it clear why they are convinced that Justice Powell must have intended to give reporters more protection than other citizens. The Constitution protects all citizens, and there is no reason to believe that Justice Powell intended to elevate the journalistic class above the rest. Cf. Branzburg at 690,
In any event, whatever Justice Powell specifically intended, he joined the majority. Not only did he join the majority in name, but because of his joinder with the rest of a majority, the Court reached a x’esult that rejected First Amendment privilege not to testify before the grand jury for reporters situated precisely like those in the present case. As we noted above, there is no factual difference between Branzburg and the present case. If Justice Powell in any way meant to afford more protection than was afforded by the rest of the majority, that protection cannot possibly extend to appellants as Branzburg is directly on point and reached a result in which Justice Powell joined, rejecting the applicability of constitutional privilege.
Zerilli cannot possibly help appellants, although they assert that Zerilli, citing Justice Powell’s “deciding vote” in Branzburg, recognized, at least in dicta, a reporter’s privilege in civil cases and held that Branzburg was not controlling as to that issue. Indeed, the Zerilli Court expressly distinguished its case from Branzburg. “Although Branzburg may limit the scope of a reporter’s First Amendment privilege in criminal proceedings, this circuit has px-eviously held that in civil cases, where the public interest in effective law enforcement is absent, that case is not controlling.”
If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the court of appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
B. The Common Law Privilege
Appellants argue that even if there is no First Amendment privilege protecting their confidential source information, we should recognize a privilege under federal common law, arguing that regardless of whether a federal common law privilege protecting reporters existed in 1972 when
C. The Due Process Argument
While appellants insist that their privilege is absolute, they assert a secondary line of argument that if their privilege is conditional, then their due process rights have been violated by the refusal of the Special Counsel and the District Court to provide them access to the Special Counsel’s secret evidentiary submissions in support of the enforcement of the subpoenas. This argument is without merit. As appellants themselves admit in them brief, this circuit has recognized that “a district court can ensure that [grand jury] secrecy is protected by provisions for sealed, or when necessary ex parte, filings.” In re Grand Jury, 121 F.3d 729, 757 (D.C.Cir.1997). Indeed, the rule of grand jury secrecy is so well established that we have noted that “[t]here is a plethora of authority recognizing that the grand jury context presents an unusual setting where privacy and secrecy are the norm.” In re Sealed Case,
As the Supreme Court has reminded us on occasion, “the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts.” United States v. Williams,
In the Douglas Oil decision, the Supreme Court catalogs multiple reasons for preserving the ancient secrecy of the grand jury:
(1) disclosure of pre-indictment proceedings would make many prospective witnesses “hesitant to come foiward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony”; (2) witnesses who did appear “would be less likely to testify fully and frankly as they would be open to retribution as well as inducements”; and (3)*14 there “would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment.”
In re North (Omnibus Order),
Appellants have offered nothing to take the present grand jury investigation outside the general rule, let alone elevate them objections to constitutional due process status. Indeed, appellants’ argument is principally built around a case from another circuit never authoritative here, no longer authoritative in the circuit of its origin, and distinguishable on its facts from the beginning. In United States v. Dinsio,
Similarly, Dinsio was never the law of this circuit, just as it is no longer the law of the Ninth Circuit, and nothing in the law of the District of Columbia Circuit requires or has ever required a district court to interrupt the grand jury while a recalcitrant witness enjoys a series of mini trials over his access to materials cloaked by grand jury secrecy.
Assuming for the sake of this case that the general rule of grand jury secrecy is not sufficient to justify the District Court’s use of in camera and ex parte proceedings, we further note that we have approved the use of such a procedure in other cases raising privilege claims. In In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077,
We affirm the District Court’s ruling on the maintenance of the seal of grand jury secrecy.
In their final argument for reversal of the District Court’s contempt finding, appellants contend that the Special Counsel did not comply with the Department of Justice guidelines for issuing subpoenas to news media and that such failure provides an independent basis for reversal. The District Court expressed its doubt that the DOJ guidelines were enforceable, but found that even if they were, Special Counsel had fully complied with the guidelines. Because we conclude that the guidelines create no enforceable right, we need not reach the question of the Special Counsel’s compliance.
The guidelines in question are set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 and the United States Attorney’s Manual, § 9-2.161. Those guidelines provide that subpoenas for testimony by news media must be approved by the Attorney General, a requirement not pertinent in the present case as the Special Counsel had received delegation of all the Attorney General’s authority, and should meet the following standards:
(a) “In criminal cases, there should be reasonable grounds to believe, based on information obtained from non-media sources, that a crime has occurred, and that the information sought is essential to a successful investigation-particularly with reference to establishing guilt or innocence. The subpoena should not be used to obtain peripheral, nonessential, or speculative information.” 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(f)(1).
(b) Before issuing a subpoena to a member of the news media, all reasonable efforts should be made to obtain the desired information from alternative sources. Id. at §§ 50.10(b), 50.10(f)(3);
(c) Wherever possible, subpoenas should be directed at information regarding a limited subject matter and a reasonably limited period of time. Subpoenas should avoid requiring production of a large volume of unpublished materials and provide reasonable notice of the demand for documents. Id. at § 50.10(f)(6);
(d) “The use of subpoenas to members of the news media should, except under exigent circumstances, be limited to the verification of published information and to such surrounding circumstances as relate to the accuracy of the published information.” Id. at § 50.10(f)(4); and
(e) When issuance of a subpoena to a member of the media is contemplated, the government shall pursue negotiations with the relevant media organization. The negotiations should seek accommodation of the interests of the grand jury and the media. Where the nature of the investigation permits, the government should make clear what its needs are in a particular case as well as its willingness to respond to particular problems of the media. Id. at § 50.10(c).
However, as the District Court correctly observed, the guidelines expressly state that they do “not create or recognize any legally enforceable right in any person.” Id. at § 50.10(n). This reservation has been upheld by several federal appellate and district courts. See In re Special Proceedings,
Appellants rely on Morton v. Ruiz,
Ruiz, however, is distinguishable. Regulations considered by the Court in that case required the publication of directives that “inform the public of privileges and benefits available and of eligibility requirements.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court found that the publication requirement was intended to benefit potential beneficiaries and therefore invalidated a Bureau of Indian Affairs attempt to limit general assistance benefits to otherwise eligible beneficiaries based on an unpublished eligibility requirement. This reasoning has no applicability to the guidelines before us.
It is well established that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is at the very core of the executive function. Courts consistently hesitate to attempt a review of the executive’s exercise of that function. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong,
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
As noted in the opinion of the court, I write separately to express my differing basis for affirming the District Court on the common law privilege issue. I would hold that reporters refusing to testify before grand juries as to their “confidential sources” enjoy no common law privilege beyond the protection against harassing grand juries conducting groundless investigations that is available to all other citizens. While I understand, and do not actually disagree with, the conclusion of
I base my rejection of the common law privilege theory on foundations of precedent, policy, and separation of powers. As to precedent, I find Branzburg v. Hayes,
At page 688,
If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the court of appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”
Maj. Op. at 1149 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
The Supreme Court has rejected a common law privilege for reporters subpoenaed to give evidence to grand juries. In my view that rejection stands unless and until the Supreme Court itself overrules that part of Branzburg. Although the appellants argue that other changes in the law since Branzburg should lead to an opposite result, I think that argument should appropriately be made to the Supreme Court, not the lower courts.
Even if appellants are correct that we would have the power to adopt such a privilege in the face of the Branzburg precedent, I nonetheless would not accept that invitation. Appellants’ argument for our authority to adopt the new privilege begins with the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 501, enacted by Congress in the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, three years after Branzburg, rejected an enumeration of specific federal privileges and provided that privileges in federal criminal cases “shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.” Although the rules became effective after Branzburg, Rule 501 does not effect any change in the authority of federal courts to adopt evidentiary privileges. Before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the authority of the federal courts to adopt common law privileges was governed by case law. The relevant case law provided for precisely the same authority as Congress enacted in the rules. Indeed, the language of the rule is drawn directly from case law governing at the time of Branzburg. The Supreme Court expressly held in Wolfle v. United States,
the rules governing the competence of witnesses in criminal trials in the federal courts are not necessarily restricted to those local rules enforced at the time of the admission into the union of the particular state where the trial takes place, but are governed by common law principles as interpreted and applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and experience.
Appellants persist, however, that the state of the common law has changed sufficiently to warrant a new approach. By appellants’ count, at the time of the Branzburg decision, only seventeen states had enacted what appellants refer to as “shield laws” to protect journalists from forced disclosure of confidential sources or news-gathering materials, while today, thirty-one states (plus the District of Columbia) have such statutes.
Furthermore, even if we are authorized to make that decision, reasons of policy and separation of powers counsel against our exercising that authority. While I concede that the adoption of the “shield” by legislation rather than judicial fiat does not prevent the change being considered by the courts in assessing the common law, I find the adoption of the privilege by the legislatures of the states instructive as to how the federal government should proceed, if at all, to adopt the privilege. The statutes differ greatly as to the scope of the privilege, and as to the identity of persons entitled to the protection of the privilege. We have alluded in the majority opinion to the differing decisions of courts as to civil, criminal, and grand jury proceedings. There is also a more fundamental policy question involved in the crafting of such a privilege.
The Supreme Court itself in Branzburg noted the difficult and vexing nature of this question, observing that applying such privilege would make it
necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualify for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.
The state legislatures have dealt with this vexing question of entitlement to the privilege in a variety of ways. Some are quite restrictive. Alabama limits its protection to “person[s] engaged in, connected with, or employed on any newspaper, radio broadcasting station or television station, while engaged in a newsgathering capacity.” Ala. Code § 12-21-142. Alaska’s statutes protect only the “reporter,” k category limited to “person[s] regularly engaged in the business of collecting or writing news for publication or presentation to the public, through a news organization.” Alaska. Stat. § 09.25.300. The statutory privilege in Arizona protects “a person engaged in newspaper, radio, television or reportorial work, or connected with or employed by a newspaper or radio or television station .... ” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2237. Arkansas’s legislature has declared the privilege applicable to “any editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper, periodical, or radio station, or publisher of any newspaper or periodical, or manager or owner of any radio station .... ” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-510. Delaware is perhaps the most specific, protecting a “reporter,” which
means any journalist, scholar, educator, polemicist, or other individual who either: (a) At the time he or she obtained the information that is sought was earning his or her principal livelihood by, or in each of the preceding 3 weeks or 4 of the preceding 8 weeks had spent at least 20 hours engaged in the practice of, obtaining or preparing information for dissemination with the aid of facilities for the mass reproduction of words, sounds, or images in a form available to the general public; or (b) Obtained the information that is sought while serving in the capacity of an agent, assistant, employee, or supervisor of an individual who qualifies as a reporter under sub-paragraph a.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 4320. Presumably, states such as these would provide the privilege only to the “established” press.
Others are quite inclusive. The Nebraska legislature, for example, has declared:
(1) That the policy of the State of Nebraska is to insure the free flow of news and other information to the public, and that those who gather, write, or edit information for the public or disseminate information to the public may perform these vital functions only in a free and unfettered atmosphere; (2) That such persons shall not be inhibited, directly or indirectly, by governmental restraint or sanction imposed by governmental process, but rather that they shall be encouraged to gather, write, edit, or disseminate news or other information vigorously so that the public may be fully informed.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-144. To that end, it protects any “medium of communication” which term “shall include, but not be limited to, any newspaper, magazine, other periodical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or network, or cable television system.” Id. at § 20-145(2) (emphasis added).
In defining the persons protected by that privilege, Nebraska tells us that “Person shall mean any individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, as
The variety of legislative choices among the states only serves to heighten the concern expressed by the majority in Branzburg. See
Nor does the identity of the protected persons constitute the only difficult policy decision. Branzburg enumerates several concerns. For example, does “the public interest in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources ... take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the future”? Id. at 695,
Should the privilege be absolute or limited? If limited, how limited? Without attempting to catalog, I note that the state statutes provide a variety of answers to that policy question. Therefore, if such a decision requires the resolution of so many difficult policy questions, many of them beyond the normal compass of a single case or controversy such as those with which the courts regularly deal, doesn’t that decision smack of legislation more than adjudication? Here, I think the experience of the states is most instructive. The creation of a reporter’s privilege, if it is to be done at all, looks more like a legislative than an adjudicative decision. I suggest that the media as a whole, or at least those elements of the media concerned about this privilege, would better address those concerns to the Article I legislative branch for presentment to the Article II executive than to the Article III courts.
For all the reasons set forth above, I would hold that there is no common law privilege protecting reporters or any other news media personnel, no matter how de
Notes
. See Opinion of Judge Tatel at pp. 1143-1146.
. By way of comparison, under the constitutional avoidance doctrine, the Supreme Court counsels courts "to adopt constructions of statutes to ‘avoid decision of constitutional questions,' not to deliberately create constitutional questions.” See, e.g., McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
. I wish to make it plain that I do not fault the appellants for making the argument, understanding that they must if they wish to preserve it for Supreme Court review. Nonetheless, I think it is only the High Court and not this one that may act upon that argument.
. The fact that the adoption has been by legislation rather than court decision does not deprive the change in law of common law force. As the Supreme Court has noted, "the policy decisions of the states bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new priyilege or amend the coverage of an existing one[,]” and further has told us that "it is of no consequence that recognition of the privilege in the vast majority of the states is the product of legislative action rather than judicial decision.” Jaffee v. Redmond,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I write separately to emphasize that adherence to the principle of judicial restraint — patience in judicial decision-making — would produce a better result in II.B of the majority opinion. Because my colleagues and I agree that any federal common-law reporter’s privilege that may exist is not absolute and that the Special Counsel’s evidence defeats whatever privilege we may fashion, we need not, and therefore should not, decide anything more today than that the Special Counsel’s evidentiary proffer overcomes any hurdle, however high, a federal common-law reporter’s privilege may erect.
In our circuit it is a venerable practice, and one frequently observed, to assume arguendo the answer to one question — e.g., whether to recognize a federal common-law reporter’s privilege — in order to resolve a given case by answering another and equally dispositive one — e.g., whether any privilege would protect these reporters.
While I am convinced that we need not, and therefore should not, go further than to conclude, as did the district court, see Appendix 35-36, 275, that the Special Counsel’s showing decides the case, I feel compelled to comment briefly on my colleagues’ opposing conclusions if only to make clear why I think it unwise to advance either of them. I cannot agree with Judge Sentelle’s conclusion that the United States Supreme Court has answered the question we now avoid. Branzburg v. Hayes addressed only “whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment ” and “h[e]ld that it does not.”
At the same time, I am far less eager a federal common-law pioneer than Judge Tatel as I find less comfort than he in riding Jaffee v. Redmond,
Because Jaffee sits rather awkwardly within a jurisprudence marked by a fairly uniform disinclination to announce new privileges
For the foregoing reasons, I am convinced that the court would chart the best course by charting the narrowest one and, accordingly, concur only in the judgment with respect to II.B of the majority opinion. In all other respects, I fully concur.
. See, e.g., Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP,
. See, e.g., Tradesmen Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB,
Judge Tatel distinguishes these cases by concluding that their analysis cannot be used to avoid the "dispositive” issue in this case. Tatel Slip Op. at 1145. There are, however, only three ways of answering the question whether these reporters' confidential source information is protected by a federal common-law privilege; (1) there is no privilege, (2) there is an absolute privilege and (3) there is a qualified privilege. None of us, including the reporters in their brief, would choose door number two, see Tatel Slip Op. at 1151; Appellants' Br. at 42, and only one of us heads for door number one, see Sentelle Slip Op. at 1154. That leaves door number three. But in choosing this route, the critical question is not definitional, as Judge Tatel sees it, see Tatel Slip Op. at 1145, but quantitative: Is the Special Counsel’s evidentiary proffer suffi
. Judge Tatel maintains that "DOor the sake of reporters and sources,” we must establish the contours of a privilege in order to "clarify the rules governing their relationship.” Tatel Slip Op. at 1146. But the press's collection of information, including from confidential sources, seems to me near impervious to regulation; "[E]xperience teaches us more than sufficiently that men have nothing less in their power than their tongue ...." Benedict De Spinoza, Ethics 168 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2000); cf. Stanley Walker, City Editor 44 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999) (1934) ("Women, wampum, and wrongdoing are always news.”). As the Branzburg Court recognized, "the relationship of many informants to the press is a symbiotic one which is unlikely to be greatly inhibited by the threat of subpoena.”
.See Branzburg,
. See Univ. of Penn.,
. See United States v. Zolin,
. Zerilli v. Smith,
. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10. As Judge Tatel points out, see Tatel Slip Op. at 1152, the Justice Department regulations aim to "strike the proper balance between the public's interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the public's interest in effective law-enforcement and the fair administration of justice,” id. § 50.10(a),'but the regulations do not balance the two interests. They establish instead that, in requesting authorization' to subpoena a member of the press, the government should: reasonably believe that, in a criminal case, the information sought is essential “to a successful investigation — particularly with reference to directly establishing guilt or innocence,” id. § 50.10(0(1); attempt unsuccessfully to obtain the information from "alternative nonmedia sources,” id. § 50.10(0(3); seek only to verily, "except under exigent circumstances,” published information and "such surrounding circumstances as relate to the accuracy of the published information,” id. § 50.10(0(4); treat "[e]ven” requests for publicly disclosed information "with care to avoid claims of harasspient,” id. § 50.10(0(5); and, "wherever possible,” seek material information on a limited subject matter and for a limited time period, avoid requiring the production of large quantities of unpublished material and "give reasonable and timely notice of the demand for documents,” id. § 50.10(0(6).
. See In re Williams,
. Judge Tatel insists that his test is not "novel ..., considering its basis in Zerilli and Carey and the Justice Department’s own guidelines.” Tatel Slip Op. at 1153. But the central factors of his test — the balancing of "the public interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm the leak caused, against the public interest in newsgathering, measured by the leaked information’s value,” Tatel Slip Op. at 1152 — find no support that I can detect in those cases. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10; Zerilli,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in the judgment.
This case involves a clash between two truth-seeking institutions: the grand jury and the press. On the one hand, the grand jury, a body “deeply rooted in Anglo-American history” and guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Calandra,
I.
Although I join the court’s rejection of appellants’ First Amendment argument, I am uncertain that Branzburg offers “no support” for a constitutional reporter privilege in the grand jury context. See majority op. at 1147 -1148. To be sure, Branzburg upheld the enforcement of subpoenas seeking confidential source information, including notes and testimony about interviews and observations at a militant group’s headquarters. See
Then there is Justice Powell’s “enigmatic concurring opinion.” Id. at 725,
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
Id. at 710,
In this case, however, our hands are tied for two independent reasons. First, although this circuit has limited Branzburg in other contexts, see Zerilli,
Second, although Branzburg involved militants and drug dealers rather than government leakers, the factual parallels between that case and this one preclude us from quashing the subpoenas on constitutional grounds. See majority op. at 10. If, as Branzburg concludes, the First Amendment permits compulsion of reporters’ testimony about individuals manufacturing drugs or plotting against the government, see
II.
But Brcmzburg is not the end of the story. In 1975 — three years after Brcmzburg — Congress enacted Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, authorizing federal courts to develop evidentiary privileges in federal question cases according to “the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted ... in the light of reason and experience.” Fed.R.Evid. 501; see also Pub.L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat.1926 (1975). Given Branzburg’s instruction that “Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned,”
Under Rule 501, that common lawmaking obligation exists whether or not, absent the rule’s delegation, Congress would be “the more appropriate institution to reconcile the competing interests ... that inform any reporter’s privilege to withhold relevant information from a bona fide grand jury.” Sep. op. at 1161 (Henderson, J., concurring) (citing Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC,
In this case, just as Jaffee v. Redmond recognized a common law psychotherapist privilege based on “the uniform judgment of the States,”
Before undertaking that analysis, I think it helpful to explain why, in my view, we should not, as would Judge Henderson, short-circuit Jajfee’s framework and decide whether the special counsel may over
Because the Jaffee analysis is thus essential to resolving this case (assuming a privilege exists), our frequent practice of avoiding non-essential issues is inapplicable. To be sure, declining to resolve waived issues, see, e.g., Carney v. Am. Univ.,
Accordingly, given that we must apply some test to the government’s showing, if we simply assume the privilege exists but our assumption is wrong, then we will have reached out to establish a framework for a non-existent claim — an undertaking hardly consistent with principles of judicial restraint. Indeed, our decision would establish a precedent, potentially binding on future panels, regarding the scope of the assumed privilege, even though resolving that question was entirely unnecessary. Therefore, I think it imperative to decide as a threshold matter whether the privilege exists, turning only afterwards to the privilege’s specific contours.
In this case, moreover, the issue of the privilege’s existence is fully briefed, and resolving it definitively will provide critical guidance in similar situations in the future. This is not the only case to raise reporter privilege issues in D.C. federal courts in recent years. See Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Thus, I agree with Judge Sentelle that “the question of the existence of such privilege vel non is logically anterior to the quantum of proof necessary to overcome it.” Sep. op. at 1153 (Sentelle, J., concurring). Without resolving the first question, we cannot and should not decide the second.
Existence of the Privilege
Under Jajfee, the common law analysis starts with the interests that call for recognizing a privilege. See
Like psychotherapists, as well as attorneys and spouses, all of whom enjoy privileges under Rule 501, see, e.g., Jaffee,
Because of these chilling effects, “[without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants ... seek access ... is unlikely to come into being.” Id. Consequently, as with other privileges, “the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of the privilege is modest.” Id. At the same time, although suppression of some leaks is surely desirable (a point to which I shall return), the public harm that would flow from undermining all source relationships would be immense. For example, appellant Judith Miller tells us that her Pulitzer Prizewinning articles on Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network relied on “information received from confidential sources at the highest levels of our government.” (Miller
It is true, as the special counsel observes, that apart from affidavits and citations to two articles in them reply brief, the reporters present no empirical evidence that denial of the privilege “will have a significant impact on the free flow of information protected by the First Amendment.” Appellee’s Br. at 47. But the Supreme Court has never required proponents of a privilege to adduce scientific studies demonstrating the privilege’s benefits. Rather, as the Jaffee dissenters pointed out, the empirical question— “[h]ow likely is it that a person will be deterred from seeking psychological counseling, or from being completely truthful in the course of such counseling, because of fear of later disclosure in litigation?” — was one “[t]he Court [did] not attempt to answer.”
Likewise, in Trammel v. United States, while justifying the privilege against adverse spousal testimony in terms of “marital harmony,”
Turning next, as did Jaffee, to the consensus among states, I find support for the privilege at least as strong for journalists as for psychotherapists. Just as in Jaffee, where “the fact that all 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege” favored an exercise of federal common lawmaking, see
Making the case for a privilege here even stronger than in Jaffee, federal authorities also favor recognizing a privilege for reporters’ confidential sources. As noted earlier, we ourselves have limited discovery of reporters’ sources in both civil and criminal litigation, see Zerilli,
Resisting this consensus, the special counsel asserts that Branzburg already performed the analysis required by Rule 501, thus “resolv[ing] the common law argument.” Appellee’s Br. at 35; see also sep. op. at 1153 -1155 (Sentelle, J., concurring). Branzburg did no such thing. As the Branzburg majority’s very first sentence makes plain, the “issue” in that case was “whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of
Nor does Branzburg support the concurrence’s constitutional avoidance theory. See sep. op. at 1154 (Sentelle, J., concurring). Although the Branzburg majority could have avoided the First Amendment claim by recognizing a common law privilege, given that the majority opinion neither did so nor even raised that possibility, Branzburg’s holding hardly forecloses the common law argument presented here. Quite the contrary, Branzburg acknowledged that “Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned,”
Given that the common law issue thus remains open, this court must assess the reporters’ claim in light of “reason and experience” today. As Branzburg itself observes in describing Congress’s powers, privilege rules may require “refashion[ing] ... as experience from time to time may dictate.”
For much the same reason, the omission of a reporter privilege from the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee’s draft rules submitted to Congress in 1972 (and ultimately replaced by Rule 501) need not ■ dictate the outcome here. True, as the special counsel points out, the Supreme Court in United States v. Gillock,
Equally inconsequential is the adoption of the reporter privilege in thirty-one states through legislation, rather than judicial action. See sep. op. at 1156 (Sentelle, J., concurring). As the Jajfee dissent pointed out, a far greater proportion of states — indeed, every state — established the psychotherapist privilege by statute, see Jaffee,
In sum, “reason and experience,” as evidenced by the laws of forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, as well as federal courts and the federal government, support recognition of a privilege for reporters’ confidential sources. To disregard this modern consensus in favor of decades-old views, as the special counsel urges, would not only imperil vital newsgathering, but also shirk the common law function assigned by Rule 501 and “freeze the law of privilege” contrary to Congress’s wishes, see Trammel,
The next step, according to Jaffee, is to determine what principles govern the privilege’s application in this case. See Jaffee,
Here, even assuming that some jurisdictions categorically exclude grand jury subpoenas — a proposition for which the special counsel cites no authority — the interests protected by the privilege militate against such a limited approach. Although the public interest in law enforcement may well be at its apex when the government is investigating crime, news stories of paramount First Amendment importance, such as reports about government corruption or wrongdoing, may involve sources who “would surely be chilled,” Jaffee,
As to the scope of the privilege, however, I agree with the special counsel that protection for source identities cannot be absolute. Leaks similar to the crime suspected here (exposure of a covert agent) apparently caused the deaths of several CIA operatives in the late 1970s and early 1980s, including the agency’s Athens station chief. See Haig v. Agee,
Of course, in some cases a leak’s value may far exceed its harm, thus calling into question the law enforcement rationale for disrupting reporter-source relationships. For example, assuming Miller’s prize-winning Osama bin Laden series caused no significant harm, I find it difficult to see how one could justify compelling her to disclose her sources, given the obvious benefit of alerting the public to then-underappreciated threats from al Qaeda. News reports about a recent budget controversy regarding a super-secret satellite program inspire another example (though I know nothing about the dispute’s details and express no view as to its merits). See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Justice Reviews Request for Probe of Satellite Reports, Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 2004, at A3; Douglas Jehl, New Spy Plan Said to Involve Satellite System, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2004, at Al. Despite the necessary secrecy of intelligence-gathering methods, it seems hard to imagine how the harm in leaking generic descriptions of such a program could outweigh the benefit of informing the public about billions of dollars wasted on technology considered duplicative and unnecessary by leading Senators from both parties. In contrast to the nuclear weapon and military strike examples mentioned above, cases like these appear to involve a balance of harm and news value that strongly favors protecting news-gathering methods.
Given these contrasting examples, much as our civil cases balance “the public interest in protecting the reporter’s sources against the private interest in compelling disclosure,” Zerilli,
Citing our reporter privilege cases— Zerilli, Carey, and Ahn — the special counsel urges us to rely on two factors deemed “central” in those decisions and emphasized in the Justice Department guidelines: first, the requesting party’s need for the evidence, and second, that party’s exhaustion of alternative sources. See Zerilli,
In leak cases, then, courts applying the privilege must consider not only the government’s need for the information and exhaustion of alternative sources, but also the two competing public interests lying at the heart of the balancing test. Specifically, the court must weigh the public interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm the leak caused, against the public interest in newsgathering, measured by the leaked information’s value. That framework allows authorities seeking to punish a leak to access key evidence when the leaked information does more harm than good, such as in the nuclear weapon and military strike examples, while preventing discovery when no public interest supports it, as would appear to be the case with Miller’s Osama bin Laden articles. Though flexible, these standards (contrary to the special counsel’s claim) are hardly unmanageable. Indeed, the Supreme Court employs a similar requirement of “legitimate news interest,” meaning “value and concern to the public at the time of publication,” in assessing restrictions on government employee speech. See City of San Diego v. Roe,
Though recognizing that leaks with “national security implications” raise different concerns from “information in the nature of ‘whistleblowing,’ ” Appellee’s Br. at 44, 48, the special counsel insists that the prosecutor, not the court, should assess factors other than need and exhaustion. Under this theory, balancing the two remaining concerns, the harmfulness of the leaked information and the damage to newsgathering that might flow from enforcing the disputed subpoenas, would be a matter of prosecutorial discretion. In my view, the special counsel’s position distorts the roles of judge and prosecutor in evidentiary disputes.
Although courts certainly defer to executive judgments about which crimes merit prosecution — a judgment that is, after all, a “core executive constitutional function,” United States v. Armstrong,
Moreover, in addition to these principles applicable to the judicial role in any evidentiary dispute, the dynamics of leak inquiries afford a particularly compelling reason for judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial judgments regarding a leak’s harm and news value. Because leak cases typically require the government to investigate itself, if leaks reveal mistakes that high-level officials would have preferred to keep secret, the administration may pursue the source with excessive zeal, regardless of the leaked information’s public value. Of course, in this case a special counsel was appointed to exercise independent judgment. Yet independent prosecutors, too, may skew their assessments of the public interests implicated when a reporter is subpoenaed. After all, special prosecutors, immune to political control and lacking a docket of other cases, face pressure to justify their appointments by bagging their prey. Cf. Morrison v. Olson,
Paralleling the special counsel’s argument about executive discretion, my concurring colleague suggests that my approach pays insufficient deference to Congress. See sep. op at 1163 (Henderson, J., concurring). “Branzburg” she writes, “warns of the risk inherent in the judicial assessment of the importance of prosecuting particular crimes.” See id. Although it is true that Branzburg cautioned against second-guessing the “legislative judgment ... of what conduct is liable to criminal prosecution,”
Furthermore, and perhaps even more important, Branzburg addressed only a First Amendment privilege claim. See supra at 1148. In that case, therefore, because Congress cannot overturn constitutionally based decisions, recognizing the asserted privilege would have permanently foreclosed punishment of any crimes dependent on proof subject to the privilege. The qualified privilege I would recognize,
Next, the special counsel argues that waivers signed by suspected sources represent an “additional factor” favoring compulsion of the reporters’ testimony. Appellee’s Br. at 46. As the reporters point out, however, numerous eases (including persuasive district court decisions from this circuit) indicate that only reporters, not sources, may waive the privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson,
As this case law recognizes, a source’s waiver is irrelevant to the reasons for the privilege. Because the government could demand waivers — perhaps even before any leak occurs — as a condition of employment, a privilege subject to waiver may, again, amount to ho privilege at all, even in those leak cases where protecting the confidential source is most compelling. Moreover, although the attorney-client and psychotherapist privileges are waivable by clients and patients, respectively, see, e.g., In re Sealed Case,
Consistent with that purpose, the privilege belongs to the reporter. Not only are journalists best able to judge the imperatives of newsgathering, but while the source’s interest is limited to the particular case, the reporter’s interest aligns with the public, for journalists must cultivate relationships with other sources who might keep mum if waiving confidentiality at the government’s behest could lead to their exposure. Indeed, as compared to counseling-related privileges, the privilege against spousal testimony represents a better analogy. Just as under Trammel’s waiver theory testifying spouses, regardless of the other spouse’s wishes, may judge for themselves whether their testimony will undermine “marital harmony,” see Trammel,
In any event, although Jqffee said that “[mjaking the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation ... [will] eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege,”
In short, the question in this case is whether Miller’s and Cooper’s sources released information more harmful than newsworthy. If so, then the public interest in punishing the wrongdoers — and deterring future leaks — outweighs any burden on newsgathering, and no privilege covers the communication (provided, of course, that the special counsel demonstrates necessity and exhaustion of alternative evidentiary sources).
III.
Applying this standard to the facts of this case, and considering first only the public record, I have no doubt that the leak at issue was a serious matter. Authorized “to investigate and prosecute violations of any federal criminal laws related to the underlying alleged unauthorized disclosure, as well as federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, [his] investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses,” see Letter from James B. Comey, Acting Attorney General, to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois (Feb. 6, 2004), the special counsel is attempting to discover the origins of press reports describing Valerie Píame as a CIA operative monitoring weapons of mass destruction. See majority op. at 1142 -1144. These reports appeared after Plame’s husband, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, wrote in a New York Times op-ed column that his findings on an official mission to Niger in 2002 cast doubt on President Bush’s assertion in his January 2003 State of the Union address that Iraq “recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” See id. at 3.
An alleged covert agent, Píame evidently traveled overseas on clandestine missions beginning nearly two decades ago. See, e.g., Richard Leiby & Dana Priest,
The leak of Plame’s apparent employment, moreover, had marginal news value. To be sure, insofar as Plame’s CIA relationship may have helped explain her husband’s selection for the Niger trip, that information could bear on her husband’s credibility and thus contribute to public debate over the president’s “sixteen words.” Compared to the damage of undermining covert intelligence-gathering, however, this slight news value cannot, in my view, justify privileging the leaker’s identity.
Turning now to the classified material, I agree with the special counsel that ex parte review presents no due process difficulty. To be sure, grand jury secrecy is not absolute. As Rule 6(e) itself provides, courts may “authorize disclosure ... of a grand jury matter ... preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(E). In addition, as the reporters point out, even apart from United States v. Dinsio,
In this circuit, however, we have approved the use of “in camera, ex parte proceedings to determine the propriety of a grand jury subpoena or the existence of a crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege when such proceedings are necessary to ensure the secrecy of ongoing grand jury proceedings.” In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077,
That said, without benefit of the adversarial process, we must take care to ensure
With respect to Miller, the special counsel seeks evidence regarding two exchanges with I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser: first, an in-person meeting in Washington, D.C. on July 8, 2008, and second, a telephone conversation on July 12, 2003. Before the grand jury, Libby testified that although he had previously learned about Wilson’s ivife’s employment, he had forgotten it by July 8 and recalled no discussion of Wilson during his meeting with Miller. (I-105, 13k-35, 279.) As to the July 12 conversation, Libby stated, “I said to her that, that I didn’t know if it was true, but that reporters had told us that the ambassador’s wife works at the CIA that I didn’t knaui anything about it.” (1-208.) Because other testimony and evidence raises doubts about Libby’s claims, the special counsel believes Miller’s testimony is “essential to determining whether Libby is guilty of crimes, including perjury, false statements and the improper disclosure of national defense information.” (8/27/Ok Aff. at 28; see also id. at 1-2.)
The special counsel’s argument is persuasive. As Libby admits, in mid-June 2003, when reports first appeared about the Niger trip, the vice president informed Libby “in an off sort of curiosity sort of fashion” that the Niger envoy’s wife worked at the CIA’s counterproliferation division. (1-50-55, 2k5-k6.) In addition, handwritten notes by Libby’s CIA briefer indicate that Libby referred to “Joe Wilson” and “Valerie Wilson” in a conversation on June lk- (8/27/Ok Aff. at 12.) Nevertheless, Libby maintains that he believed he was learning about Wilson’s wife’s identity for the first time when he spoke with NBC Washington Bureau Chief Tim Russert on July 10 or 11 regarding coverage of the Niger issue by MSNBC correspondent Chris Matthews. (1-162-69; 8/27/Ok Aff. at 9-10.) According to Libby, Russert told him, “[D]id you know that Ambassador Wilson’s wife works at the CIA? ... [AJll the reporters know it.” (1-166.) Claiming to have been “a little taken aback by that, ” Libby testified, “I said, no, I don’t know that intentionally because I didn’t want him to take anything I was saying as in any way confirming what he said, because at that point in time I did not recall that I had ever known, and I thought this is something that he was telling me that I was first learning.” (1-166.)
Russert recalls this conversation very differently. In his deposition, describing Píame’s employment as a fact that would have been “[v]ery” significant to him — one he would have discussed with NBC management and potentially sought to broadcast — Russert stated, “I have no recollection of knowing that [Wilson’s wife roorked at the CIA], so it was impossible for me to have [told Libby] that.” (I-k3; 32.) Asked to describe his “reaction” to Novak’s July lk column, Russert said, “Wow. When I read that — it was the first time I knew who Joe Wilson’s wife roas and that she was a CIA operative.... [I]t was news to me. ” (I-k33.)
Also contrary to Libby’s testimony, it appears that Libby discussed Plame’s employment on several occasions before July 10. (See 8/27/Ok Aff. at 11-12.) For example, then-White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer recalls that over lunch on July 7, the day before Libby’s meeting with Miller, Libby told him, “[T]he Vice-President did not send Ambassador Wilson to Niger ... the CIA sent Ambassador Wilson to Niger.... [H]e was sent by his
As to the July 12 conversation, * * * * * [REDACTED] * * * * *
Libby called several journalists, including Cooper and Miller. (1-202-03.) As Libby tells it, Cooper, whom he reached first, asked him why Wilson claimed Cheney had ordered the trip, to which Libby responded, “[Y]ou know, off-the-record, reporters are telling us that Ambassador Wilson’s wife works at the CIA and I don’t know if it’s true.... [W]e don’t know Mr. Wilson, rue didn’t know anything about his mission, so I don’t know if it’s true. But if it’s true, it may explain how he knows some people at the Agency and maybe he got some bad skinny, you know, some bad information.” (1-203-06.) According to Libby, Miller, too, said something that “triggered” him to mention that “reporters had told us that the ambassador’s wife works at the CIA.” (1-207-09.)
In contrast, in a deposition limited to Cooper’s contacts with Libby (see 11-32-33, 107), Cooper said that he (Cooper) asked Libby “something along the lines of what do you know about Wilson’s wife being involved in, you know, sending him an this mission?” (11-53.) According to Cooper, Libby responded, “[YJeah, I’ve heard that too” (11-51), which Cooper took as confirmation (11-81-91). * * * * * [REDACTED] * * * * *
Given the evidence contradicting Libby’s testimony, the special counsel appears already to have at least circumstantial grounds for a perjury charge, if nothing else. Miller’s testimony, however, could settle the matter. If Libby mentioned Píame during the July 8 meeting — and Miller’s responses to the documentary subpoena suggest she has notes from that conversation (see 8/27/01 Ajf. at 19-20) — • then Libby’s version of events would be demonstrably false, since the conversation occurred before he spoke to Russert. Even if he first mentioned Píame on July 12, as he claims, inconsistencies between his recollection and Miller’s could reinforce suspicions of perjury. What’s more, if Libby mentioned Píame’s covert status in either conversation, charges under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 50 U.S.C. § 121, currently off the table for lack of evidence (see 8/27/01 Aff. at 28 & n.15), might become viable. Thus, because Miller may provide key corroboration or contradiction of Libby’s claims — evidence obviously available from no other source— the special counsel has made a compelling showing that the subpoenas directed at Miller are vital to an accurate assessment of Libby’s conduct.
Regarding Cooper, * * * * *[REDACTED] * * * *
In any event, as with the Miller subpoenas, the evidence sought from Cooper appears essential to accurate understanding of events and could obviously provide information unavailable elsewhere. Thus, again, the special counsel has shown that this evidence is crucial to accurate decision-making by the grand jury.
As to the leaks’ harmfulness, although the record omits specifics about Píame’s work, it appears to confirm, as alleged in the public record and reported in the press, that she worked for the CIA in some unusual capacity relating to counterproli
Most telling of all, Harlow, the CIA spokesperson, though confirming Plame’s employment, asked Novak to withhold her name, stating that “although it is very unlikely that she will ever be on another overseas mission ... it might be embarrassing if she goes on foreign travel on her own” (11-168-69), a statement that strongly implies Píame was covert at least at some point. While another case might require more specific evidence that a leak harmed national security, this showing suffices here, given the information’s extremely slight news value and the lack of any serious dispute regarding Plame’s employment.
Finally, while it is true that on the current record the special counsel’s strongest charges are for perjury and false statements rather than security-related crimes, that fact does not alter the privilege analysis. Insofar as false testimony may have impaired the special counsel’s identification of culprits, perjury in this context is itself a crime with national security implications. What’s more, because the charges contemplated here relate to false denials of responsibility for Plame’s exposure, prosecuting perjury or false statements tvould be tantamount to punishing the leak. Thus, given the compelling showing of need and exhaustion, plus the sharply tilted balance between harm and neivs value, the special counsel may overcome the reporters’ qualified privilege, even if his only purpose — at least at this stage of his investigation — is to shore up perjury charges against leading suspects such as Libby ***** [REDACTED] * * * * *
In sum, based on an exhaustive investigation, the special counsel has established the need for Miller’s and Cooper’s testimony. Thus, considering the gravity of the suspected crime and the low value of the leaked information, no privilege bars the subpoenas.
One last point. In concluding that no privilege applies in this case, I have assigned no importance to the fact that neither Cooper nor Miller, perhaps recognizing the irresponsible (and quite possibly illegal) nature of the leaks at issue, revealed Plame’s employment, though Cooper wrote about it after Novak’s column appeared. Contrary to the reporters’ view, this apparent self-restraint spares Miller and Cooper no obligation to testify. Narrowly drawn limitations on the public’s right to evidence, testimonial privileges apply “only where necessary to achieve [their] purpose,” Fisher v. United States,
Indeed, Cooper’s own Time, com article illustrates this point. True, his story revealed a suspicious confluence of leaks, contributing to the outcry that led to this investigation. Yet the article had that effect precisely because the leaked information — Plame’s covert status — lacked significant news value. In essence, seeking protection for sources whose nefariousness he himself exposed, Cooper asks us to protect criminal leaks so that he can write about the crime. The greater public interest lies in preventing the leak to begin with. Had Cooper based his report on leaks about the leaks — say, from a whistleblower who revealed the plot against Wilson — the situation would be different. Because in that case the source would not have revealed the name of a covert agent, but instead revealed the fact that others had done so, the balance of news value and harm would shift in favor of protecting the whistleblower. Yet it appears Cooper relied on the Píame leaks themselves, drawing the inference of sinister motive on his own. Accordingly, his story itself makes the case for punishing the leakers. While requiring Cooper to testify may discourage future leaks, discouraging leaks of this kind is precisely what the public interest requires.
IV.
I conclude, as I began, With the tensions at work in this case. Here, two reporters and a news magazine, informants to the public, seek to keep a grand jury uninformed. Representing two equally fundamental principles — rule of law and free speech — the special counsel and the reporters both aim to facilitate fully informed and accurate decision-making by those they serve: the grand jury and the electorate. To this court falls the task of balancing the two sides’ concerns.
As James Madison explained, “[A] people who mean to be them own Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” See In re Lindsey,
Were the leak at issue in this case less harmful to national security or more vital to public debate, or had the special counsel failed to demonstrate the grand jury’s need for the reporters’ evidence, I might have supported the motion to quash. Because identifying appellants’ sources instead appears essential to remedying a serious breach of public trust, I join in affirming the district court’s orders compelling their testimony.