{¶ 3} On June 12, 2006, Gould admitted to violating the terms of her community control, and the trial court restored her to probation. She was placed on electronically-monitored house arrest for the initial period of her probation.
{¶ 4} On June 28, 2006, Gould cut off and removed the ankle bracelet portion of her electronic-monitoring device. She then left her home without the permission of her parents, the probation department or the trial court.
{¶ 5} On August 25, 2006, Gould was charged with delinquency by reason of committing escape, a third degree felony if committed by an adult, in violation or R.C. 2921.034.
{¶ 6} On January 3, 2007, Gould entered a plea of no contest to the escape charge, stipulating to the facts alleged in the complaint.
{¶ 7} The magistrate found Gould to be delinquent for the offense of escape as alleged. At the disposition hearing, Gould was committed to the Ohio *3 Department of Youth Services for a minimum period of six months to a maximum period of her twenty-first birthday.
{¶ 8} In the interim, on October 6, 2006, Gould was charged with delinquency by reason of committing unauthorized use of a motor vehicle based upon the events surrounding her alleged escape on June 28, 2006. Gould admitted to this new charge on January 3, 2007. She was committed to the ODYS on that charge in addition to the escape charge and the trial court ordered the commitments to be served concurrently.
{¶ 9} On April 23, 2007, the magistrate issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. On May 7, 2007, Gould filed objections to the magistrate's decision. On July 2, 2007, via Judgment Entry, the trial court denied the objections.
{¶ 10} Gould now appeals, assigning as error:
{¶ 11} "I. THE JUVENILE COURT VIOLATED NITALEEN GOULD'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT ADJUDICATED HER DELINQUENT OF ESCAPE ABSENT PROOF OF EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HER BY SUFFICIENT, COMPETENT, AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 12} "II. THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ORDERED NITALEEN'S COMMITMENTS TO BE IMPOSED ON JANUARY 3, 2007, RATHER THAN ON OCTOBER 26, 2006, IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2152.01." *4
{¶ 14} To support a claim of insufficiency, an appellant must show there is a failure of proof on at least one element of the offense.State v. Thompkins (1997),
{¶ 15} R.C.
{¶ 16} "(A)(1) No person, knowing the person is under detention or being reckless in that regard, shall purposely break or attempt to break the detention, or purposely fail to return to detention, either following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period, or at the time required when serving a sentence in intermittent confinement."
{¶ 17} Appellant argues her conviction for escape, based on the allegations contained in the complaint, is a legal impossibility. Appellant maintains electronic home monitoring is not a form of detention pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 18} The current version of the statute defines detention as:
{¶ 19} (E) "Detention" means arrest; confinement in any vehicle subsequent to an arrest; confinement in any public or private facility for custody of persons charged with or convicted of crime in this state or another state or under the *5
laws of the United States or alleged or found to be a delinquent child or unruly child in this state or another state or under the laws of the United States; hospitalization, institutionalization, or confinement in any public or private facility that is ordered pursuant to or under the authority of section
{¶ 20} In 1996, pursuant to House Bill 1996 H 154, the State legislature rewrote division (E) and deleted division (J) of the statute. Prior to the amendment, division (E) and former division (J) read, respectively:
{¶ 21} "(E) `Detention' means arrest; confinement in any vehicle subsequent to an arrest; confinement in any facility for custody of persons charged with or convicted of crime or alleged or found to be a delinquent child or unruly child; *6
hospitalization, institutionalization, or confinement in any facility that is ordered pursuant to or under the authority of section
{¶ 22} "(1) The person is required to remain in the person's home or in the other premises for the period of the confinement, except for periods of time during which the person is at the person's place of employment or at other premises as authorized by the court;
{¶ 23} "(2) One of the following applies:
{¶ 24} "(a) The person is subject to monitoring by an electronic monitoring device, as defined in section
{¶ 25} "(b) The person is required by the court to report periodically to a person designated by the court;
{¶ 26} "(c) The person is subject to monitoring by an electronic monitoring device and is required to report periodically to a person designated by the court;
{¶ 27} "(3) The person is subject to any other restrictions and requirements imposed by the court."
{¶ 28} "(J) `Electronic monitoring device' has the same meaning as in section
{¶ 29} Prior to the 1996 amendment, Senate Bill 1995 S 2 rewrote division (E); added division (J); and made other changes to reflect gender neutral language. Prior to the 1995 amendment, division (E) read:
{¶ 30} "(E) `Detention' means arrest; confinement in any vehicle subsequent to an arrest; confinement in any facility for custody of persons charged with or convicted of crime or alleged or found to be a delinquent child or unruly child; hospitalization, institutionalization, or confinement in any facility that is ordered pursuant to or under the authority of section
{¶ 31} The 1974 Committee Comment to the statute, reads, in part:
{¶ 32} "`Detention' includes arrest, which may be with or without confinement. It also includes confinement in a lock-up, jail, workhouse, juvenile detention facility, Ohio Youth Commission facility, or penal or reformatory institution. Detention also includes detention pending extradition or deportation. The definition expressly excludes the supervision and restraint incidental to probation, parole, and release on bail."
{¶ 33} "`Detention facility' is broadly defined to include any temporary or permanent lock-up, jail, workhouse, or juvenile or adult penal or reformatory facility."
{¶ 34} In support of her argument, Gould cites this Court's opinion inState v. Dye, Richland App. No. 2006-CA-8,
{¶ 35} "Appellant, in his sole assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for jail time credit for time served on electronically monitored house arrest. We disagree.
{¶ 36} "In order for appellant to receive credit towards his prison sentence, the period of house arrest must be considered confinement within the meaning of R.C.
{¶ 37} "Appellant, like the appellants in Bates, supra, andStuder, supra, was placed on electronically monitored house arrest as a condition of bond. Appellant was free on bond and such constraint was incidental to his release on bail. R.C.
{¶ 38} Similarly Appellant cites the First District Court of Appeals decision in State v. Anderson,
{¶ 39} "Post-trial electronic monitoring is not a form of detention. R.C.
{¶ 40} FN11. R.C.
{¶ 41} FN12. 1974 Committee Comment to H.B. No. 511 (found in annotations to R.C.
{¶ 42} FN13. See State v. Faulkner (1995),
{¶ 43} Upon review of both this Court's opinion in Dye, supra, and the First District's opinion in Anderson, supra, both opinions are based upon language in the statute which was deleted by the 1996 amendments to the statute. The First District in Anderson relies on the 1974 Committee Comment to the statute, which refers to language in the original version of the statute expressly excluding the supervision and restraint incidental to probation, parole, and release on bail. However, on review of the 1995 and 1996 amendments to the statute set forth above, the amendments remove the language from the statute which is referred to in the Committee Comment and relied on in both Dye and Anderson. Accordingly, both Dye and Anderson are based on language in the statute which is no longer contained in the current version of the statute. Furthermore, Dye is distinguishable in that it involved pre-trial, not post-trial electronic house monitoring. *11
{¶ 44} The current version of the statute does not exclude supervision and restraint incidental to probation, parole and release on bail in the definition of detention. In this case, Appellant was confined to electronically-monitored house arrest in her grandmother's private home after having been adjudicated delinquent for the charge of gross sexual imposition.
{¶ 45} Based upon the above and the facts set forth in the complaint, the State has proven the essential elements of the charge of escape. Accordingly, Gould's adjudication as delinquent of escape is not against the sufficiency of the evidence, as there is not a failure of proof on an essential element of the offense.
{¶ 46} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 48} The statute provides:
{¶ 49} "(A) The overriding purposes for dispositions under this chapter are to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to this chapter, protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender's actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender. These purposes shall be achieved by a system of graduated sanctions and services."
{¶ 50} On July 19, 2006, Gould admitted to absconding from probation. As a result, the trial court found her to be in violation of the terms of her probation, *12 and committed her to DYS on a previously suspended commitment. On January 3, 2007, she also stipulated to the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. As addressed in the first assignment of error, she was adjudicated delinquent on the charge of escape relative to the same incident. Pursuant to her original adjudication for gross sexual imposition, Appellant was committed to ODYS until January 3, 2007. Her commitment for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and escape commenced on January 3, 2007. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering her new sentence to begin on January 3, 2007.
{¶ 51} Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
*13Hoffman, P.J., Farmer, J. and Delaney, J. concur