{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Glenn Goodman Jr., appeals from the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, classifying him as a juvenile sex offender pursuant to R.C. 2152.83 and 2950.01. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
{¶ 2} On February 12, 2002, Goodman’s mother entered the computer room of the family home and found Goodman engaged in sexual conduct with his three-year-old half-brother. Goodman’s mother called the Ashtabula County Sheriffs Department, which subsequently took Goodman into custody.
{¶ 3} On February 13, 2003, the Ashtabula County Sheriffs Department filed a complaint in the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, charging Goodman, then age 17, with being a juvenile delinquent by reasоn of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), a felony of the first degree if committed by an adult. Upon arraignment, Goodman denied the charge.
{¶ 4} On March 12, 2003, the juvenile court conducted an adjudicatory hearing, finding Goodman delinquent in the matter and committing him to the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS”) for an indefinite term ranging from one year up to the date of Goodman’s 21st birthday.
{¶ 5} On August 11, 2003, Goodman became subject to supervised release from ODYS. On October 1, 2003, a juvenile-sexual-offender-classification hearing, pursuant to R.C. 2950.01 and 2152.83, was held. At this hearing, Goodman was found to be a juvenile offender registrant, under R.C. 2152.811 et seq. The classification requires the appellant, for a period оf ten years, to register in the county in which he resides and to register with the county sheriff of any county in which he resides for more than seven days.
{¶ 6} Goodman timely filed an appeal from the judgment, raising the following assignments of error:
{¶ 7} “[1.] “The Ashtabula County Juvenile Court erred to the prejudice of appellant when it declined to address the issue of the constitutionality of Ohio Revised Code Section 2950 as it is applied to juvenile offenders.
{¶ 8} “[2.] The appellant did nоt receive the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.
{¶ 9} “[3.] Ohio Revised Code Section 2152.83 is uncоnstitutional as it violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution.”
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{¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, Goodman alleges that the juvenile court committed error by not addressing the constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 2950 as it is applied to juvenile defenders. Goodman relies upon the Ohio Supreme Court’s language in
Johnson v. BP Chemicals, Inc.
(1999),
{¶ 11} Section 1, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution states, “The judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas * * * and such other courts inferior to the supreme court as may from time to time be established by law.” Moreover, “[t]he power and duty of the judiciary to determine the constitutionality and, therefore, [t]he validity of the acts of the other branches of government have firmly been established as an essential feature of the Ohio system of separаtion of powers.”
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward
(1999),
{¶ 12} At the hearing, Goodman’s counsel stated, “We would submit to the court that this is an appropriate situation for a trial level court to look at and make a determination that the statute is unconstitutional * * *. The primary matters being there the overall philosophy of juvenile law with regard to confidentiality with regard to rehabilitation and treatment as opposed to punishment. * * * And also in support of that, we would say that the recent reports that indicate Mr. Goodman’s progress in terms of how counseling has worked * * * would make that appropriate as well.” The trial court declined tо address the constitutional issue and subsequently determined that the lowest classification under R.C. Chapter 2950 applied.
{¶ 13} Goodman concedes that the constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 2950 was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court in
State v. Williams
(2000),
{¶ 14} We begin our discussion by reiterating the fundamental precept that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality with respect to enactments of the Ohio General Assembly.
Ottawa Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Marblehead
*196
(1999),
{¶ 15} In R.C. 2950.02(A)(1), the General Assembly sets forth its legislative findings and public policy declaration with regard to the reporting requirement, stating, “If the public is provided adequate notice and information about * * * delinquent children who commit sexually oriented offenses * * *, members of the public and communities can * * * prеpare themselves * * * for the * * * delinquent child’s release from imprisonment, a prison term, or other confinement or detention.” In the collective wisdom of the General Assembly, the reporting requirements are necessary because “[t]he penal, juvenile, and mental health components of the justice system of this state are largely hidden from public view, and a lack of information from any component may result in the failure of the system to sаtisfy this paramount governmental interest of public safety * * *.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2905.02(A)(3).
{¶ 16} Courts have repeatedly held that R.C. Chapter 2950 is constitutional. In
Williams,
{¶ 17} In
Cook,
{¶ 18} Courts in Ohio have additionally found that the rеgistration requirements of R.C. Chapter 2950 withstood constitutional challenges on the basis of overbreadth, due process, and equal protection under Section 10, Article I of the
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Ohio Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
State v. Hill
(Jul. 24, 1998), 2nd Dist. No. 16791,
{¶ 19} The statements of Goodman’s counsel indicate that Goodman challenged the constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 2950 on the basis of the right to privacy and the alleged punitive nature of the reporting requirеment. As the Supreme Court stated in
Williams,
“there is nothing in R.C. Chapter 2950 that infringes upon any fundamental right of privacy or any other fundamental constitutional right that has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Because neither a susрect class [i.e., sex offenders] nor a fundamental constitutional right is implicated by the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950, a rational basis analysis is appropriate.”
{¶ 20} Moreover, courts in Ohio have repeatedly held that R.C. Chapter 2950 is not by its nature a punitive statute.
Williams,
{¶ 21} In his second assignment of error, Goodman claims that counsel was ineffective for raising only a perfunctory argument related to the сonstitutionality of R.C. Chapter 2950.
{¶ 22} The United States Supreme Court adopted a two-part test for determining whether trial counsel was ineffective: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” meaning that “сounsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Strickland v. Washington
(1984),
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{¶ 28} “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance * * * [and] the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonаbleness.” Id. at 687-688,
{¶ 24} Tо establish prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
State v. Bradley
(1989),
{¶ 25} We find that Goodman’s counsel wаs not ineffective. Appellant’s counsel did, in fact, challenge the constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 2950. Furthermore, since the statute in question has withstood all prior constitutional challenges, Goodman cannot prove thе existence of a reasonable probability that counsel’s alleged deficiency was outcome-determinative. Thus, Goodman’s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 26} In his third assignment of error, Goodman argues that R.C. 2152.83 and R.C. Chapter 2950 unconstitutionally discriminate against juveniles who were 16 or 17 years of age at the time the delinquent act was committed. We addressed the constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 2950 in the first assignment of error. The issue of the constitutionality оf R.C. 2152.83 was not raised at the trial court level. It is well settled that an appellate court “will not consider a question not presented, considered, or decided by a lower court.”
Kalish v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
(1977),
{¶ 27} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division.
Judgment affirmed.