MEMORANDUM OPINION SUSTAINING OBJECTION TO EXEMPTIONS
The Trustee objected to Debtor’s exemption of an earned income credit received in a tax refund. After reviewing the parties’ 'briefs and arguments and pertinent authorities, the court sustains the trustee’s objection to the exemption. The court has jurisdiction over this core proceeding and may enter final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (E) and (0).
BACKGROUND
On March 4, 1996, Debtor filed a Chapter 7 case. On April 22, 1996, Debtor filed an Amended Schedule B, in which she listed for the first time a tax refund of $2,600.00, and an Amended Schedule C, in which she claimed exemptions to the refund under several sections of the Missouri exemption statute. The only disputed exemption in the tax refund is $1,370.00 representing an earned income credit, which debtor claimed exempt under Mo.Rev.Stat. § 513.430(10)(a) as a “local public assistance benefit.” On April 26, 1996, the trustee filed an Objection to Exemptions, asserting that none of the tax refund is exempt under § 513.430(10)(a).
DISCUSSION
Debtor asserts alternatively that $1,370.00 of the tax refund, representing an earned income credit, is not property of the estate, or if it is, it is exempt as a “local public assistance benefit” under Missouri’s exemption statute.
*616 I. Property of the Estate
An earned income credit, created by 26 U.S.C. § 32 (1994), is a refundable tax credit provided for low income workers who have dependent children and who maintain a household.
In the Matter of Davis,
Cases are split regarding whether an earned income credit constitutes property of the estate. Cases which hold the earned income credit is not property of the estate are primarily older cases, which looked to the policy of the now superseded Bankruptcy Act to construe what constituted property of the estate, and emphasized the distinction between the credit and a tax refund.
See Hoffman v. Searles,
More recent cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code have held that the earned income credit is property of the estate under the express language of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
In re George,
Hoffman,
decided under the old Bankruptcy Act, held the earned income credit was not property of the estate, citing ease law which held that the statutory definition of property of the estate then in effect must be limited by the purpose and policy of the Bankruptcy Act.
Hoffman
construed the Bankruptcy Act to include only property which was “sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and (not sufficiently) entangled with the bankrupt’s ability to make an unencumbered fresh start.”
Even after enactment of § 541, some courts held that an earned income credit was not estate property. Those courts analyzed the nature and purpose of the earned income credit and reasoned, as in
Hoffman,
that it was distinguishable from a tax refund, which belongs to the estate.
Hurles,
Section 541(a) is construed broadly:
The scope of [§ 541(a) ... ] is very broad and includes property of all descriptions, tangible and intangible, as well as causes of action.... Property of the estate generally includes the debtor’s interest in property that has restrictions or conditions on its transfer.
Ramsay v. Dowden,
This court finds persuasive those cases which rely on the plain language of § 541(a)(1) to hold that an earned income credit is property of the estate.
George,
A person eligible for an earned income credit must file a tax return in order to obtain it and in some instances may seek to recover the credit in advance.
Davis,
II. Exemption as Local Public Assistance Benefit
Section 513.430(10)(a), Missouri Revised Statutes, exempts the right to receive a “social security benefit, unemployment compensation or a local public assistance benefit.” The federal earned income credit is not a social security benefit or unemployment compensation, so the question is whether, as debtor contends, it is a “local public assistance benefit.” The court concludes it is not.
“Local public assistance benefit” is not defined in Missouri’s exemption statute or case law. Absent a statutory definition, the statute should be examined “according to the conventional rules of statutory construction: absent statutory definitions, we accord words and phrases their ordinary and natural meaning and avoid rendering them meaningless, redundant, or superfluous.”
In the Matter of Merchants Grain, Inc.,
Whether in common parlance or in legal terms, and certainly in the context in this state statute, “local” denotes a space or application more limited in scope than “federal.” Webster’s Third New international Dictionary (1981) defines “local” as:
[C]haracterized by, relating to, or occupying a particular place; characteristic of or confined to a particular place; not general or widespread 3. relating to what is local; not broad or general 4. current only in a particular section of a country — used of words or expressions ... 5a. primarily serving the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision b. applicable in or relating to such a district only ... (local taxes). [Parenthetical examples and dictionary symbols omitted.]
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines “local government” as a “[c]ity, county, or other governing body at a level smaller than a state” and “local law” as “[o]ne which operates over a particular locality instead of over the whole territory of the state_”
These definitions indicate the term “local” in the Missouri statute references something other than a public assistance benefit or tax credit granted by federal statute. There is nothing to indicate “local” was intended to have some specialized definition within the context of this particular statute, so one must assume the legislature intended that the general, commonly understood meaning of the word be applied.
If Debtor’s definition were applied to include a federal benefit, the illogical result would be that “local” would take on a meaning approaching an antonym, i.e. something federal, general, comprehensive and greater in scope than local. If the legislature had intended a broader meaning, it could have simply omitted the word “local” altogether. Alternatively, the legislature could have defined the term in the statute or employed *618 more explicit language, such as “federal, state or local public assistance benefit.”
Use of the term “local” qualifies the type of benefits that are exemptible, as recognized in
Davis,
Cases from other jurisdictions which exempted earned income credits from property of the estate as public assistance or social welfare benefits are distinguishable because with one exception, the state exemption statutes did not address exemptions of “local” public assistance benefits.
See, e.g., In re Brown,
In the exception, even though the court recognized that the term “local” qualified the type of benefits that could be exempted under Iowa’s statute, it allowed exemption of the earned income credit, citing Iowa’s policy to construe exemption statutes liberally, because the trustee failed to assert the credit was not a “local” public assistance benefit.
Davis,
The court does not adopt debtor’s argument that the earned income credit constitutes a special form of social engineering which elevates the credit beyond the plain language of the Missouri exemption statute. All government grants, as the product of a legislative body’s determination of social values, are some form of social engineering. An earned income credit is the product of such a determination and unquestionably provides a monetary benefit or perhaps, used in loose terms, a “public assistance benefit” to Debt- or. Again, however, the question for exemption purposes is whether the claimed exemption falls within the express language of the applicable exemption statute.
Missouri’s exemption statutes are liberally construed,
Murray v. Zuke,
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Trustee’s Objection to Exemption is sustained as to the $1,370.00 portion of Debt- or’s 1995 tax refund claimed under Mo.Rev. Stat. § 513.430(10)(a).