Thе petitioner, Sandra Gilpatric, challenges the decision of the New Hampshire Department of Labor (department) awarding an eight percent рermanent impairment award under RSA 281-A:32 (Supp. 1993) (paragraph XII effective until Jan. 1, 1994) (amended effective Jan. 1, 1994). Gilpatric argues that the department erred in nоt accepting the dual diagnosis found in a previous superior court order, and in disregarding her expert’s opinion as to impairment. We affirm.
Gilpatric had been employed at the International Packaging Corporation as a factory assembly-line worker for nearly fifteen years when, in early 1988, she began tо experience tingling and numbness in both her hands and forearms. Her condition was diagnosed as car
After an August 22, 1990, hearing at the department concerning Gilpatric’s cooperation with vocational rehabilitation under RSA 281-A:25 (Supp. 1989) (amended 1990) and the extent of her disability under RSA 281-A:48 (Supp. 1993) (paragraph V effective until Jan. 1, 1994) (amended effective Jan. 1, 1994), the department reduced Gilpatric’s benefits from temporary total disability to the diminished earning capacity rate. The petitioner’s de novo appeal to the superior court, pursuant to the then-existing appeal procedure under RSA 281-A:48, V, resulted in the reversal of the department’s decision and the reinstatement of temporary total disаbility compensation. The court stated in its order of April 21, 1992, that the “nature of Ms. Gilpatric’s injuries is bilateral carpal tunnel/overuse syndrome . . . .”
The final hearing befоre the department was held on December 10, 1992, after Gilpatric made a request for a permanent impairment award pursuant to RSA281-A:32. In this proceeding, the petitioner’s expert, Dr. Rex Carr, presented a rating of thirty-one percent impairment, based on a diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and overuse syndrome, while the insurance carrier’s expert, Dr. Kenneth O’Neil, whose diagnosis was solely bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, rated it as eight perсent impairment. On December 21, 1992, the department determined that Gilpatric was entitled to an eight percent permanent impairment award. Her motion for reconsideration was denied.
Prior to January 1, 1994, permanent impairment awards of the labor commissioner were final, see RSA 281-A:32, XII (Supp. 1993) (effective until Jan. 1, 1994), and the аppropriate remedy for a dispute was certiorari. Petition of Blackford,
Gilpatric first argues that the superior court’s finding in the de novo appeal regarding her diagnosis is entitled tо preclusive effect in this proceeding. We disagree.
If a prior judgment is to estop a party in a later action from relitigating an issue, then at a minimum the issue subject to estoppel
The issue in the prior hearing before the superior court was whether Gilpatric was sufficiently disabled to continue receiving temporary total disability benefits rather than diminished earning capacity benefits (fоr partial disability status). As to this issue of work capacity, Dr. Carr testified in his deposition that Gilpatric suffers from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome which is “a subset of ovеruse syndrome,” plus a “second component of the muscular problem in the arms and wrist.” Dr. Carr also stated that Gilpatric’s total impairment was thirty-one percent. The superior court’s order indicates that the court considered the deposition testimony useful “in detailing Ms. Gilpatric’s physical symptom[at]ology” and in describing the “nature of Ms. Gilpatric’s injuries” to be “bilateral carpal tunnel/overuse syndrome.”
We question whether the threshold requirement for collateral estоppel, namely the existence of a finding by the trial court, is met by this casual language in the trial court order. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the superior court made such a finding, the issues were not identical. The question before the department in December 1992 was whether the petitioner was entitled to a permanent impairment award. This issue is distinct from the issue raised in the superior court of the claimant’s work capacity for purposes of temporary total disability comрensation. Further, the issue before the superior court was one of Gilpatric’s condition at that time. The court made no finding of permanency, but rather reinstated temporary total disability benefits. The issue before the department, however, was one of Gilpatric’s condition some eight months later. See Ainsworth v. Claremont,
“In the event of a dispute as to the amount of compensation or the percentage of permanent partial loss or both, the commissioner shall determine the award to be made on the basis of competent mеdical evidence. The commissioner’s findings shall be final.” RSA 281-A:32, XII (Supp. 1993) (effective until Jan. 1,1994). But see Laws 1993, ch. 226 (effective Jan. 1, 1994). We will not disturb a hearings officer’s factual findings or the decision based thereon if supported by competent evidence in the record. Petition of Blake,
We hold thаt Dr. O’Neil’s diagnosis and evaluation constitute competent medical testimony that supports the hearings officer’s decision. Dr. O’Neil’s diagnosis of “bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome with bilateral carpal tunnel releases” matched the diagnoses of other physicians, including that of Gilpatric’s treating physician, Dr. Noboru Murakami, who examined her and submitted reports to the department. Dr. O’Neil’s calculation of eight percent permanent impairment, following the “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment” published by the American Medical Association, is also found to be reliable. See RSA 281-A:32, XIV (Supp. 1993); N.H. Admin. Rules, Lab 514.03. Since the department based its decision on a competent diagnosis, we reject Gilpatric’s contention that the American Medical Association guidelines were misapplied.
Affirmed.