190 P. 209 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1920
The petitioner is seeking under this writ to secure his discharge from the custody of the sheriff of Los Angeles County. The sheriff justifies the detention of petitioner under an order of arrest issued by the superior court of Los Angeles county by virtue of the provisions of section 479 of the Code of Civil Procedure for arrest and bail in civil actions.
It is contended by petitioner that the affidavit under which the arrest was ordered is not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to make the order.
The affidavit purports to be in pursuance of subdivisions 2 and 4 of said section 479 Under subdivision 2 it is apparently sought to charge the defendant with having converted to his own use and embezzled money or property belonging to the plaintiff, while the same was in defendant's custody in a fiduciary employment as agent of plaintiff, and in the course of his employment as such agent. Under subdivision 4 it is attempted to charge the defendant with fraud in concealing or disposing of the property for the detention or conversion of which the action is brought. At any rate, if the affidavit does not state facts bringing the matter within these provisions of the subdivisions named, it is wholly and hopelessly futile.
The matters alleged in the affidavit, so far as they are material in determining the objections to its sufficiency, are as follows: "R. H. Chappel, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: I am the Assistant Treasurer of the Standard Scale Supply company, a corporation, plaintiff herein; that at all of the times herein alleged the property hereinafter described was the property of plaintiff herein, until the fraudulent conversion of the money arising from the sale thereof by defendant, with whom all of said personal property was placed by plaintiff, as plaintiff's agent. . . . *109 That defendant herein, at times actually unknown to affiant and plaintiff corporation, but believed to be on or about two years next preceding the bringing of the suit herein, did unlawfully, wrongfully and fraudulently convert to his own use and dispose of and sell the hereinbefore described personal property, with the intent to cheat and defraud plaintiff of said personal property and the value thereof; that defendant has received the full value of said property in money; and has unlawfully, wrongfully and fraudulently refused to pay to plaintiff, or account to plaintiff, for said money, and no part of the money so received therefrom by the defendant has ever been delivered to or paid to plaintiff . . . "
[1] It is apparent that an essential of an affidavit, to justify the order of arrest under subdivision 2, is that the misappropriation or conversion of the property occurred in the course of the defendant's employment as agent of plaintiff. The fact that he was at any time such agent is only impliedly stated, by referring to the defendant as one "with whom all of said property was placed by plaintiff, as plaintiff's agent." This averment, such as it is, refers to the time when the property was intrusted to defendant. The time when the alleged misappropriation took place is expressly declared to be unknown to affiant or plaintiff, and is nowhere intimated that the fiduciary relation existed at that time, or that the acts complained of were in the course of his employment.
[2] As to the averment charging fraudulent conversion under subdivision 4 of the section, it may be said to be substantially in the language of the statute. It has been held that an affidavit charging the acts substantially in the language of the statute is sufficiently specific if the allegations are made upon affiant's own knowledge of the facts. (Matter of Caples,
It is difficult to understand how, even on the most positive statement of personal knowledge, the bare averment that the act was done fraudulently can be accepted as a statement of fact in support of an order of arrest, whereby in a civil action a defendant is deprived of his liberty, when the same statement would constitute an insufficient averment of the fraud in the complaint to recover the money or property claimed to be misappropriated. (Heller v. Dyerville Mfg. Co.,
In this case the defendant, petitioner here, seems to have come lawfully into the possession of the property involved. It does not appear when it was delivered to him, but it is admitted that for a period of two years or upward the plaintiff corporation had had no knowledge of its condition or whereabouts, or the circumstances under which the petitioner disposed of it. It would be the establishment of a dangerous precedent to permit the petitioner here to be deprived of his liberty upon the bare statement of a conclusion or opinion of the assistant treasurer of the company that there was a fraudulent conversion of the goods.
The petitioner is discharged.
Finlayson, P. J., and Thomas, J., concurred. *112