In re Gilberto A.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the petitioner appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Westchester County (Spitz, J.), entered January 10, 1996, as granted that branch of the respondent’s motion which was to dismiss that branch of the petition which charged him with acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of unlawful possession of weapons by persons under sixteen.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, that branch of the respondent’s motion which was to dismiss that branch of the petition which charged him with acts, which if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of unlawful possession of weapons by persons under sixteen is denied, that branch of the petition is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Westchester County, for further.proceedings.
The allegations in the petition that the respondent possessed a straight razor (i.e., a box-cutter/razor) while on school grounds were sufficient to allege that he possessed a dangerous knife in violation of
Friedmann, J., dissents and votes to affirm the order appealed from with the following memorandum: I respectfully dissent, and would vote to affirm the order appealed from, dismissing the juvenile delinquency petition as defective.
The nonhearsay allegations of a juvenile delinquency petition and its supporting depositions must establish, if true, every element of the crime charged and the respondent’s commission thereof (see, Family Ct Act § 311.2 [3]; Matter of Jahron S.,
The petition at bar alleged, "[u]pon information and belief’, that the respondent had violated
As the Family Court properly observed, neither "razor” nor "box-cutter” is named in
The Court of Appeals has held that an otherwise- "innocent utilitarian utensil” may be determined to fall within the statutory proscription when the circumstances of its possession, including the behavior of its possessor, demonstrate that the possessor himself considered it a weapon and thus a "dangerous knife” within the contemplation of the statute (see, e.g., Matter of Jamie D.,