113 Misc. 2d 532 | N.Y.C. Fam. Ct. | 1982
OPINION OF THE COURT
When the Department of Probation has, in a timely manner, completed its attempts at adjusting a juvenile delinquency petition and the County Attorney has not acted within 30 days to disapprove of the petition, failure on the part of anyone to file a juvenile delinquency petition for 11 months after the adjustment period ended must result in the dismissal of the petition. Both the clear statutory scheme set forth in article 7 of the Family Court Act and the fundamental fairness required by the concept of due process of law are defeated by such a delay in initiating a fact-finding hearing in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.
I. FACTS
A petition signed by a Syracuse police officer, Robert A. Laun, on February 6, 1981, was filed with the court on November 20, 1981. The petition alleges that respondent, age 14 years, committed an act which would constitute the crime of assault in the third degree if the act had been done by an adult. The alleged act was committed on December 5, 1980.
On February 24, 1982 the Law Guardian and County Attorney appeared. The case was adjourned until March 8, 1982 and the attorneys were given leave to brief the court on the motion to dismiss. On March 8, 1982, the Law Guardian and the County Attorney having submitted memoranda of law to the court, the petition was dismissed.
II. LAW
A. THE NATURE OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS
Article 7 of the Family Court Act grants exclusive jurisdiction over acts which would be crimes if committed by an adult when such acts are committed by children who fall within the age categories over which the court has jurisdiction. (Family Ct Act, § 712, subd [a]; §§ 713, 714.) Juvenile delinquency proceedings, unknown to the common law, are statutory proceedings. (See 4 Blackstone’s Comm, pp 22-23; Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 Stan L Rev 1187.) As a statutory court, Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and “cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute”. (Matter of Borkowski v Borkowski, 38 AD2d 752, 753; accord Matter of Thomson, 79 AD2d 880.)
While juvenile delinquency proceedings have long been recognized as quasi-criminal in nature (Matter of Gregory W., 19 NY2d 55), and while juvenile respondents enjoy some constitutionally protected rights associated with criminal procedure (see, e.g., Matter of Gault, 387 US 1 [the essentials of due process and fair treatment including written notice of the specific charge sufficiently in advance of a hearing, notification to the child and the child’s par
The passage of the Juvenile Offender Law of 1978, which removed from the Family Court’s original jurisdiction certain violent acts committed by persons under 16, and gave initial jurisdiction over those acts to the criminal court, emphasizes the fact that juvenile delinquency proceedings are special proceedings distinct from either criminal proceedings or civil proceedings. (L 1978, ch 481; see McLaughlin and Whisenand, Jury Trial, Public Trial and Free Press in Juvenile Proceedings: An Analysis and Comparison of the IJA/ABA, Task Force, and NAC Standards, 46 Brooklyn L Rev 1.)
B. THE STATUTORY SCHEME FOR
INITIATING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS
Although no Statute of Limitations is set forth in article 7 of the Family Court Act, a clear pattern of timely restraints emerges from an examination of the statute. The efforts of adjustment by the Department of Probation pursuant to the rules of the court (22 NYCRR Part 2507) “may not extend for a period of more than two months without leave of a judge of the court, who may extend the period for an additional sixty days.” (Family Ct Act, § 734, subd [c].) If a juvenile delinquency case is successfully adjusted, the case is deemed closed. (22 NYCRR 2507.4 [a] [3].) If the matter is not successfullly adjusted, “or if the adjustment process is terminated either at the insistence of the probation service or by the withdrawal of the potential respondent, the person seeking to originate the proceedings will be notified of that fact and the case will be referred to the court”. (22 NYCRR 2507.4 [a] [4].) At no time may the probation service prevent a person who wishes to file a petition from access to the court. (Family Ct Act, § 734, subd [b]; 22 NYCRR 2507.4 [a] [5].)
Here, the Department of Probation acted in a timely fashion. On or about December 5, 1980, respondent allegedly participated in conduct which, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime of assault in the third degree. On December 10, 1980 the petitioner’s voluntary affidavit was taken by the Syracuse Police Department, Juvenile Division. The affidavit was filed with the Onondga County Probation Department on December 7,1980, at which time the adjustment period began. (22 NYCRR 2507.4 [c]; Matter of Joseph S., 102 Misc 2d 913; Matter of Walters, supra.) Adjustment efforts were terminated on February 6, 1981, when a verified petition was signed by Officer Laun of the
No juvenile delinquency petition may be filed pursuant to article 7 of the Family Court Act unless the County Attorney has approved the petition. (Family Ct Act, § 734-a, subd [a].) The County Attorney may decline to approve the juvenile delinquency petition. (Family Ct Act, § 734-a, subd [c].) The County Attorney must state his reasons for such action in writing. (Family Ct Act, § 734-a, subd [c].) The County Attorney has 30 days in which to exercise his discretion “after the date the petition was submitted for his approval.” (Family Ct Act, § 734-a, subd [d].) “Any petition which has not been approved * * * shall be deemed approved.” (Family Ct Act, § 734-a, subd [d].) This statutory provision further illustrates the distinction between juvenile delinquency proceedings and criminal prosecutions, where the power of the prosecutor is unfettered. (See United States v Cox, 342 F2d 167.)
A criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument (CPL 1.20, subd 17), or by arrest. {United States v Marion, 404 US 307.) A juvenile delinquency proceeding is certainly commenced by the filing of a petition. (Family Ct Act, § 731; cf. Matter of Schaefer, 97 Misc 2d 487.) Thus, the issue here revolves around the question of undue delay in the preaccusatory stage of the proceeding, which is governed largely by the fundamental fairness required by due process of law. (See Matter of Walters, 91 Misc 2d 728, supra; McKeiver v Pennsylvania, 403 US 528, supra; People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241.) The speedy trial guarantees of the Constitution of the United States are not at issue here (cf. Matter of Patrick G., 92 Misc 2d 126; see Matter of Daniel D., 27 NY2d 90; Matter of Anthony P., 104 Misc 2d 1024).
Essentially, this case involves statutory interpretation. The plain meaning of a statute is to be preferred over interpretive readings of a statute. (United States v Sullivan, 332 US 689; McBoyle v United States, 283 US 25; Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470.) Here, specific