OPINION OF THE COURT
In this matter of first impression for the courts of appeals, we must decide whether a restitution order from a state criminal prosecution for theft by deception, which directs payment to the fraud victim, is exempt from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).
1
This case distills into a judgment between the literal language of this Bankruptcy Code provision and federalism doctrine as expounded by the Supreme Court in
Kelly v. Robinson,
I.
In October 1999, Robert Hewitt hired Gerald Thompson, a developer with cash flow problems, to build a house. Unbeknownst to Hewitt, Thompson diverted some of Hewitt’s materials payments to other projects, to the tune of over $20,000. By the time Hewitt became aware of Thompson’s deceit, the complete house Hewitt had paid for was a doorless skeleton without an exterior finish.
Hewitt lodged a criminal complaint against Thompson in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Cape May County. The criminal case was pursued by a county prosecutor. Thereafter, Thompson filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13, an action he soon converted to Chapter 7. Hewitt was listed as a creditor and received notice of the filing and of the deadlines in the case. Though the debt Thompson owed Hewitt was the result of deception, Hewitt did not object to the discharge of the debt under § 523(a)(2)(A) *364 or (a)(4), which except from discharge debts arising from fraud and larceny, respectively. Hewitt merely sent a letter protesting discharge to the Chapter 7 trustee. 2 Thompson received his Chapter 7 discharge on February 6, 2002. He filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on February 21, 2002.
On January 31, 2002, Thompson pled guilty to issuing bad checks in the criminal case that originated with Hewitt’s complaint. On April 12, 2002, Thompson was sentenced to, inter alia, five years’ probation and $22,785 restitution. The restitution was payable at $500 per month through the Cape May Probation Department. The restitution payments were to be forwarded to Hewitt ($20,000) and another of Thompson’s victims.
Thompson filed this action for injunctive relief as part of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy to determine whether Thompson’s obligations to Hewitt under the restitution order were discharged in the Chapter 7 case. 3
II.
Thompson conceded at oral argument that neither § 523(a)(7) nor any other Bankruptcy Code provision empowers a federal court to enjoin the continuance of a state criminal proceeding to collect a debt incurred through fraud.
4
Thompson also acknowledged that a federal court would be powerless to block a state court from imposing some other punishment, such as incarceration, upon a debtor as a substitute for his restitution obligation. Rather, Thompson argues that the “payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit” qualifier of § 523(a)(7), and this Court’s interpretation of the clause in
In re Rashid,
Kelly
involved a Connecticut welfare cheat, Carolyn Robinson, who pled guilty to larceny.
Section 523(a)(7) contains three criteria, each of which a creditor must establish to prevail. The debt must be (1) a “fine, penalty, or forfeiture,” subject to the qualifications that (2) it is “payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit”; (3) and “is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.”
Kelly
began its analysis by observing that under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, courts, exercising their “tradition-aid • • • reluctan[ce] to interpret federal bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments,”
We do not think Congress lightly would limit the rehabilitative and deterrent options available to state criminal judges.... This Court has recognized that the States’ interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief, [citing Younger v. Harris,401 U.S. 37 , 44-45,91 S.Ct. 746 ,27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) ]. This reflection of our federalism must influence our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in this case.
Id.
at 49,
Regarding the second of the two qualifying clauses of § 523(a)(7), though the restitution appeared to be calibrated to the penny of Robinson’s wrongful receipts, the Court did not consider the restitution to be “compensation for [the State’s] actual pecuniary loss.”
Id.
at 52,
The first qualifying clause of § 523(a)(7), that the debt be “payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit,” was not in doubt in
Kelly
— the restitution was payable to the State’s probation office, and the payments would be added to Connecticut’s treasury. Tellingly, however, the Court, reading the provision to “create[ ] a broad
*366
exception for all penal sanctions,”
id.
at 51,
The only meaningful factual difference between
Kelly
and this case is the identity of the victim. Whereas in
Kelly,
the state welfare agency was defrauded and the state itself would receive the debtor’s restitution payments, here the victim/restitution recipient is an individual. Where, as here, state criminal restitution orders are implicated, however, this distinction does not seem to matter under
Kelly,
and we are to give great weight to the Supreme Court’s considered dicta in limning the breadth of situations its decisions govern.
See In re McDonald,
Nowhere in its discussion of the victim’s role in restitution orders did the
Kelly
Court suggest that the “payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit” language is actually limited to government victims. The Court noted that (1) unlike fines, restitution is forwarded to the victim; (2) the “criminal justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit of victims”; (3) the criminal context undermines the conclusion that restitution is for the benefit of victims; (4) victims do not determine whether and in what amount restitution is ordered; and (5) the state’s penal goals, not the victim’s injury, generally determines whether restitution will be imposed.
Id.
at 52,
In
Towers,
the Seventh Circuit held that a civil restitution order won by the State of Illinois, and payable to Towers’ fraud victims, was dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding notwithstanding § 523(a)(7). Absent the “principal interpretive tool used in
Kelly
— the proposition that courts are ‘reluctant to interpret federal bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments’ (
Relying heavily on
Towers,
this Court in
Rashid
held that a federal criminal restitution order that arose before the 1994 addition of § 523(a)(13), which exempts from discharge restitution obligations arising under Title 18 of the United States Code, was dischargeable because the “payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit” requirement was not satisfied.
6
Rashid,
Importantly for present purposes,
Rash-id
noted that the
Kelly
Court “grounded its opinion on federalism concerns” and cited approvingly
Towers’
observation that “ § 523(a)(7) ‘offers weak support for exempting restitution orders from discharge’
without the aid of federalism concerns.” Id.
at 207 (emphasis added) (quoting
Towers,
Towers concerns a civil rather than criminal order of restitution. Federal criminal restitution orders and civil restitution orders share one important distinction from Kelly — neither implicates the federal court’s longstanding “reluc-tan[ce] to interpret federal bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments.”
Rashid,
III.
Unlike
Towers
and
Rashid,
the federalism considerations repeatedly stressed in
Kelly
are implicated with full force here. Read through the lens of federalism, our decision to discount a literal reading of the qualifying clause of § 523(a)(7) at issue is unremarkable. The correctness of this tack is fortified by judicial tradition and Congressional acquiescence concerning the nondischargeability of state criminal restitution orders.
8
Indeed, in reversing the
*368
Second Circuit’s decision, which “focused primarily on the language of ... § 523 of the Code,” the Supreme Court observed that under its cases the text “is only the starting point” of statutory construction.
Kelly,
Here, as in
Kelly,
“we must consider the language of ... § 523 in light of the history of bankruptcy court deference to criminal judgments and in light of the interests of the States in unfettered administration of their criminal justice systems.”
Kelly,
Notes
. Section 523(a)(7) excepts from discharge the bankrupt's debts to the extent "such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss....”
.Sections 523(a)(2) and (4) are of no use to Hewitt now, because unlike § 523(a)(7) complaints, which can be filed “at any time,” creditors with notice must avail themselves of §§ 523(a)(2)'s and (4)’s discharge exceptions within a fixed period in the bankruptcy proceeding itself. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(b)-(c). We recognize the government interest in resolving fraud claims in the bankruptcy case, and that at some level Hewitt is culpable for not properly objecting before Thompson's discharge. Still, we will not interfere with the New Jersey criminal judgment. As witnessed by Hewitt's litigating to preserve Thompson’s restitution obligation more than three years after the sentence was imposed, we doubt many fraud victims will sleep on their rights as Hewitt did.
. Upon filing this action, Thompson apparently stopped making payments. On August 30, 2002, the New Jersey Superior Court ordered Thompson to show cause why he should not be incarcerated for failing to make his scheduled restitution payments.
. Though some bankruptcy courts have interpreted the discharge injunction of § 524(a)(2) in that way, probing the criminal proceeding for its "principal motivation” and enjoining it where the prosecution is motivated by a desire to compensate the fraud victim,
see, e.g., In re Brinkman,
. Citing the provision’s legislative history, the Court noted that ''[i]t seems likely that the limitation of § 523(a)(7) to fines assessed 'for the benefit of a governmental unit' was intended to prevent application of that subsection to wholly private penalties such as punitive damages.”
Kelly,
. Given the federalism interests central to Kelly, and the observation that Congress has left § 523(a)(7) untouched since Kelly’s broad pronouncement that the provision “preserves from discharge any condition a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence,” we think it would be anomalous were federal criminal restitution orders to pass through bankruptcy intact while their state analogs are discharged.
. The same situation obtains here. Though Thompson’s restitution payments pass through the Cape May Probation Department before reaching Hewitt, as illustrated by the fact that Hewitt himself is contesting the discharge and not the Probation Department or the Cape May Office of the Prosecutor, the restitution is effectively paid by Thompson to Hewitt.
See also Towers,
. Congress's willingness to assert its authority under the Bankruptcy Clause to address the dischargeability of criminal restitution orders — superseding Supreme Court decisions when necessary — marks as conspicuous its silence in the wake of Kelly’s broad wording. *368 As noted above, in 1994, Congress made federal criminal restitution orders nondischargeable when it enacted 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(13).
Four years earlier, a mere six months after the Court in
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Public Welfare v. Davenport,
