Clаimant, Carrie Jones, appeals as of right from a Wayne Circuit Court order compelling the forfeiture of Jones’ interest in $28,088 and other miscellaneous items named in a search war *202 rant pursuant to MCL 333.7521 et seq.; MSA 14.15(7521) et seq. We affirm.
On Decеmber 10, 1985, the Wayne County Federal Task Force executed a search warrant at 459 East Euclid in Detroit. The warrant authorized the seizure of controlled substances, proceeds from the trаfficking of controlled substances, paraphernalia and records related thereto, and firearms used to protect the controlled substances. In addition, the warrant authorized thе seizure of items establishing the residency and control of 459 East Euclid, which was described in the warrant as a "two story two family dwelling.” The basis for the warrant was information obtained from a confidential informant on the use of 459 East Euclid to store controlled substances and proceeds and the task force’s surveillance of that address as well as two other addresses on Delmar Street, whiсh were believed to be the distribution point for the controlled substances.
Carrie Jones was present during the search of 459 East Euclid, and it is not disputed that she resided in the lower level of that addrеss. When executing the warrant, officers were required to break through locked iron gates at the entrance of two bedrooms on the lower level. Heroin, paraphernalia and records relating to the trafficking of controlled substances, firearms, money, and other items were seized.
The prosecutor then commenced a statutory forfeiture process against the items seized, and Jones responded by moving to quash the search warrant, suppress all physical evidence seized from her premises, and for the return of all the evidence. On April 7, 1986, the triаl court denied Jones’ motion to quash the search warrant and suppress the evidence, which was argued solely on the basis of the information contained in the war *203 rant. On February 19, 1987, the forfeiture hearing was held, with Jones’ attorney stipulating to the admission of all facts necessary for the prosecutor to establish a prima facie case of forfeiture. Jones’ attorney also asserted that he could not rebut the stipulated-to evidence because Jones declined to appear and would not testify. Based on this record, the trial court ordered the forfeiture of all items seized to the extent of Jones’ interest.
On appeal, Jones seeks the return of the property seized from her residence on the basis that the warrant was not suрported by probable cause and was overly broad. The prosecutor argues that the search warrant was valid and further contests this Court’s jurisdiction and Jones’ standing in this forfeiture action. Sinсe the jurisdictional and standing issues are preliminary to all other issues we must decide, they shall be considered first.
The prosecutor’s objection to this Court’s jurisdiction was first raised in a motion to dismiss, which wаs denied by a panel of this Court for lack of merit. On appeal, the prosecutor continues to argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction because, it is claimed, the order of forfeiture was еxecuted on March 11, 1987, thereby resulting in the release of the "res.” Based on the record before us, we must disagree.
Forfeiture proceedings are in rem civil proceedings.
People v United States Currency,
Under the Michigan forfeiture statute, MCL
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333.7523(2); MSA 14.15(7523)(2), the court has jurisdiction over the res, despite the possession of the res by the seizing agency, with control being retained by the court by subjecting the agency’s сustody of the res to the order and judgment of the court. The court here issued a final forfeiture order under the statute and we have jurisdiction to review the order under MCR 7.203(A). Thus, contrary to the prosecutor’s contention, we do have jurisdiction. The federal cases relied on by the prosecutor, although seeming to support the notion that an execution of the judgment deprives bоth the lower and appellate courts of jurisdiction, are really concerned with the concept of mootness. Compare
United States v $57,480.05 United States Currency,
722 F2d 1457 (CA 9, 1984), with
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co v The Vessel Bay Ridge,
703 F2d 381, 384 (CA 9, 1983), cert dis
If, as the prosecutor claims, the judgment was properly executed, then there would be no res subject to the court’s control to return to Jones and a dismissal based on mootness would be justified. Under these circumstances, and because an аppeal will not ordinarily stay the effect or enforceability of the judgment, it is incumbent upon a claimant such as Jones to obtain a stay of the judgment if she desires to seek a return of the res on appeal. See MCR 7.209.
Nevertheless, we decline to dismiss for mootness. While an issue not addressed in the trial court can be considered on appeal if necessary to a proper
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determination of the case, this is so only if the record contains all the facts necessary to determine the claim.
Trail Clinic, PC v Bloch,
With regard to the prosecutor’s challenge to Jones’ standing to seek the return of the seized items, we decline to consider this issue since it was not raised below and no cross-appeal was filed. Compare
People v Smith,
The sole issue raised by Jones concerns the validity of the search warrant. Jones argues that the property, particularly the money, was illegally
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seized and, therefore, should be returned. As the prosecutor points out, however, Jones’ attornеy stipulated to the admission of the warrant at the forfeiture hearing. Further, even when property is illegally seized, it is still subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521; MSA 14.15(7521) if the probable cause for the seizure can be supported by untainted, admissible evidence.
In re Forfeiture of United States Currency,
Even if this issue was properly preserved for appeal, we would not reverse.
1
A magistrate’s finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant is based upon the facts relatеd within the affidavit presented to the magistrate. MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3);
People v White,
We similarly reject Jones’ claim that the warrant was overly broad. Both the items to be seized and the place to be searched were described with particularity. This is so despite the faсt that the place to be searched, 459 East Euclid, was described as a two-story, two-family dwelling, since it is clear from the face of the warrant that the identity of the persons residing at or in control of that address were unknown and the facts related to the magistrate showed that probable cause related to the entire premises. 2 The magistrate’s decision to authorize а search of the entire premises was not an abuse of discretion. People v White, supra, p 463. Accordingly, even if Jones preserved this issue for appeal, we would uphold the validity of the warrant.
Affirmed._
Notes
The prosеcutor argues that, even if the warrant was insufficient under MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3), the evidence was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in
United States v Leon,
See MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4);
People v Woodward,