IN RE: EX PARTE APPLICATION OF MARIA CLAUDIA BELDI, MARIA INES BELDI, AND ANTONIO FABIO BELDI TO TAKE DISCOVERY FOR USE IN A FOREIGN PROCEEDING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1782
24-MC-421 (VEC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
May 21, 2026
VALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge
OPINION & ORDER
Antônio Roberto Beldi, Marco Antônio Beldi, Maria Theresa Beldi de Souza, Thais Barros Beldi, and various business entities that one or a combination of these individuals control (collectively, the “Intervenors“) moved (1) to vacate the Court‘s order granting an ex parte application for judicial assistance pursuant to
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the R&R, and refers to its Background Section for a detailed factual and procedural overview. See R&R at 2–8. For clarity and consistency, the Court adopts the defined terms set forth in the R&R.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
A. Section 1782
In order to grant an application to take discovery pursuant to
If the statutory requirements are met, the quеstion whether to grant a Section 1782 is left to the district court‘s discretion. The Supreme Court has identified four factors (the ”Intel factors“) for courts to consider in exercising such discretion: (1) whether the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding; (2) the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance; (3) whether the Section 1782 request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States; and (4) whether the Section 1782
B. Reviewing Objections to a Report & Recommendation
In reviewing a magistrate judge‘s R&R, a district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”
II. The R&R is Adopted in Full
The Intervenors do not object to Magistrate Judge Figueredo‘s recommendation that this Court find that the first and third statutory requirements have been satisfied. The Court finds no clear error in, and agrees with, those recommendations. The Intervenors do, however, object to Magistrate Judge Figueredo‘s recоmmendation that this Court find the second statutory requirement has been satisfied and to her recommendation that this Court find that the four Intel factors favor granting the application. The Court reviews those portions of the R&R de novo.
A. The Second Statutory Requirement Has Been Met and the Second and Third Intel Factors Favor Granting the Application
The Intervenors’ argument that the second statutory requirement has not been met and their arguments that the second and third Intel factors favor denying the application are materially similar. See Objs. at 11–19, 24–25. The Court, therefore, considers those arguments in tandem.
The second and third Intel factors are similar in that they direct the Court to consider how the materials being sought will be used in the underlying proceedings. The second Intel factor requires the Court to considеr “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. In analyzing a foreign court‘s “receptivity” to this Court‘s assistance, the key question is whether the foreign tribunal “would reject evidence obtained with the aid of section 1782.” In re Saul Klein, No. 23-MC-211 (PAE), 2023 WL 8827847, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2023), aff‘d sub nom. Klein v. Altara RK Invs. Ltd., No. 24-228-CV, 2025 WL 560105 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2025) (quoting Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1995)). The third Intel factor asks whether the application “conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering limits or other policies of a foreign country or the United States.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265. “[P]roof-gathering restrictions are best understood as rules akin to privileges that prohibit the acquisition or use of certain
At bottom, the Intervenors’ arguments as to the second statutory requirement and the second and third Intel factors are the same. They contend that Brazilian law forecloses the Applicants from presenting information abоut Mr. Alexandre Beldi‘s non-Brazil-based assets in the Probate Proceeding, and, therefore, that (1) the requested materials are not “for use” in the Probate Proceeding,
The Court approaches the Intervenоrs’ argument, which relies on a nuanced analysis of Brazilian law, with caution. Section 1782 was enacted with the “twin aims of providing efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation in our federal courts and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts.” In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992). “[I]t is unwise—as well as in tension with the aims of section 1782—for district judges to try to glean the accepted practices and attitudes of othеr nations from what are likely to be conflicting and, perhaps, biased interpretations of foreign law.” Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1099. Accordingly, “absent authoritative proof that a foreign tribunal would reject the evidence obtained with the aid of section 1782, . . . a district court should not refrain from granting the assistance afforded under the Act based simply on allegations to that effect.” In re Application for an Ord. Permitting Metallgesellschaft AG to take Discovery, 121 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see In re Saul Klein, 2023 WL 8827847, at *11 (applying the
The evidence that the Intervenors have offered for the proposition that the Applicants will be unable to use the materials they seek here in the Probate Proceeding is in no way “authoritative.” Id. As an initial matter, the Applicants and the Intervenors have presented conflicting testimony on the subject from Brazilian legal experts. The Applicants’ experts assert that Brazilian law requires the Probate Court to maintain an inventory of all inter vivos gifts and assets located abroad, see Godoy Decl., Dkt. 29 ¶¶ 27–28, 31, 39-40, 47–48, 53, and that the inventory for Mr. Alexandre Bеldi may be incomplete, see Silva Vieira Decl., Dkt. 3 ¶¶ 16–18, 24. The Intervenors’ expert, Alessandro Lima Amaral, asserts the opposite: that “the Probate Court has no jurisdiction to rule on assets that are outside of Brazil and, therefore, the information from international financial institutions are [sic] irrelevant to the Probate Proceeding.”2 Amaral Decl., Dkt. 11 ¶ 43. Parsing these competing assertions would require the Court to act as referee in “a battle-by-affidavit of international legal experts.” Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1099. The Second Circuit has warned district judges against doing precisely that. Id.
To the extent the Intervenors cite specific Brazilian legal principles to support their argument, they are far from authoritative on the question of whether the discovery sought by the Applicants might be usable in the Probate Proceedings. For example, Mr. Amaral claims that Brazilian law “clearly establishes that the law applicable to the deceased‘s assets located outside
Mr. Amaral‘s declaration is equally imprecise in its analysis of decisions by the Brazilian Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Justice (the “STJ,” Brazil‘s highest court for non-constitutional matters) that purportedly stand for the proposition that “in matters of probate proceeding, it is not appropriate for Brazilian courts to take any measures aimed at the identification and/or division оf assets located abroad.” Id. ¶ 78. Again, the Court has no way of knowing whether Mr. Amaral‘s descriptions of the Brazilian courts’ decisions are reliable, particularly considering that they are not supported by any citations to the record, the provenance of the translated quotations he provides is unknown, and the summaries and excerpted quotations he provides are devoid of context. See id. ¶¶ 78–84 & nn.17–21. Simply put, the Intervenors invite the Court to draw sweeping conclusiоns about Brazilian law on the basis of their expert‘s self-serving, conclusory characterizations. The Court declines to do so. See Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1099–100 (“[W]e do not read [section 1782] to condone speculative forays into legal territories unfamiliar to federal judges. Such a costly, time-consuming, and inherently unreliable method of deciding section 1782 requests cannot possibly promote the ‘twin aims’ of the statute.“); Brandi-Dohrn, 673 F.3d at 82 (“[R]equiring a district court to apply the admissibility
Looking beyond their assessments of Brazilian law generally and toward their analyses of Brazillian courts’ decisions in this dispute specifically, the Intervenors still fall far short of presenting authoritative proof that the discovery sought by the Applicants would not be permitted in the Probate Proceeding. The Intervenors’ central argument is that Brazilian courts have “repeatedly and for years rejectеd Applicants’ request for authority to seek discovery from U.S. financial institutions,” supposedly because such evidence “is not relevant to the Brazilian Probate Proceeding.” Objs. at 18. That is, to put it mildly, a selective characterization. As discussed in detail in the R&R, see R&R at 3–6, the question of whether the Probate Court may issue ofícios seeking information from U.S.-based financial institutions in connection with the Probate Proceeding is one that has been decided and re-decided by the Probate Cоurt, the Court of Appeals, and the STJ many times over the past fifteen years. The Probate Court first granted the Applicants’ request to issue ofícios to obtain materials from foreign financial institutions in December 2010. Aramal Decl. ¶ 37. The Probate Court rescinded the ofícios that same month, id. ¶ 39, and denied a request to reissue them in April 2011, id. ¶¶ 44–45. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Probate Court and directed it to reissue the ofícios in July 2011. Id. ¶ 45–47. Then, in October 2011, the Court of Appeals, at the Intervenors’ request, changed course again and directed the Probate Court to сancel the recently-reissued ofícios. Id. ¶ 49. The Court of Appeals reiterated that decision in October 2012 and May 2015 orders. Id. ¶¶ 50, 52–53. In September 2024, however, the STJ reversed the Court of Appeals. Id. ¶ 59. That decision is currently pending appeal by the Intervenors. Id. ¶¶ 54, 62–63.
As an alternative to denying the Section 1782 application outright, the Intervenors argue that the Court should hold the application in abeyance until the STJ rules on the Intervenors’ appeal of the September 2024 order. They argue that decision “will give clear direction on whether the Brazilian Probate Proceeding is receptive to discovery from U.S. financial institutions.” Objs. at 18. The Intervenors’ proposed course of action — for which they cite no supporting legal authority — gets the law precisely backwards. It is because the law in Brazil is ambiguous that Section 1782 relief should not be delayed. The Second Circuit has instructed
The Intervenors’ argument that the Court should hold the application in abeyance out of “deference to the Brazilian courts” is likewise unpersuasive. Objs. at 18. Nothing in the R&R or this Opinion expressеs any view on the correct interpretation of Brazilian law, and Brazilian courts are free to disregard, or exclude altogether, any evidence they deem irrelevant. See Brandi-Dohrn, 673 F.3d at 82 (“[W]e need not be concerned with issues of parity because the ultimate admissibility of the evidence is determined by the foreign tribunal.“).
In sum, because there is no authoritative proof that Brazilian courts would reject the materials that the Applicants seek to obtain via their request, the Cоurt rejects the Intervenors’ objections to Magistrate Judge Figueredo‘s recommendation that this Court find that the second statutory requirement has been satisfied and that the second and third Intel factors weigh in favor of granting the application.
B. The First Intel Factor Favors Granting the Application
The first Intel factor provides that “when the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant [in the underlying proceedings abroad] . . . the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not
Nevertheless, the Intervenors argue that the “critical” inquiry of the first Intel factor is not whether the target of the subpoena is a party but “whether the foreign tribunal can obtain the discovery sought in the Section 1782 application.” Objs. at 24. The Intervenors’ counterintuitive reading of the plain text of Intel relies on a strained interpretation of another case in this District, In re Saul Klein. That case, like this one, concerned a Section 1782 application to obtain records from various U.S. financial institutions in connection with a Brazilian probate proceeding. 2023 WL 8827847, at *11. Unlike here, however, the materials sought in Klein were bank records that belonged to the parties; thus, even though the financial institutions themselves were non-parties, the request was for records that the parties “ha[d] access to and could access were such materials sought of them in a Brazilian proceeding.” Id. Under those circumstances, the court construed the request as being, “in substance,” for party documents. Id. That is not the situation here; the records sought pertain to over thirty entities and individuals, some of whom are parties to the Brazilian proceeding and some of whom are not. See, e.g., Shapiro Decl. Ex. C, Dkt. 2-3 at 2.
Even to the extent the subpoenas do seek information about the Intervenors, it is not clear — and the Intervenors have not asserted — that the information requested in the subpoenas would be equally accessible to the Intervenors and the financial institutions. See In re Klein, 2023 WL 8827847, at *11 (first Intel factor disfavors Section 1782 relief where the application sought documents like “bank statements,” and the parties “do[] not dispute that, to the extent the
C. The Fourth Intel Factor Favors Granting the Application
The fourth Intel factor directs courts to “assess whether the discovery sought is overbroad or unduly burdensome by applying the familiar standards of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Mees, 793 F.3d at 302.
The Intervenors argue that the Applicants’ proposed subpoenas are “unduly intrusive” and a “fishing expedition” in large part because they seek “all documents and communications concerning any financial transaction relating to 35 entities and 5 individuals—without any time limitation.” Objs. at 20–21. At the outset, the Court notes that the Intervenors are ill-situated to bring this argument. It is the financial institutions, not the Intervenors, who are the targets of the
Even if the Intervenors were the appropriate party to challenge the subpoenas’ scope, quashing the subpoenas altogether would be inappropriate. The Intervenors conceded at oral argument before Magistrate Judge Figueredo that, although the subpoenas seek records that post-date Mr. Alexandre Beldi‘s death, it is nevertheless “conceivable” that those records could “shed some light on an asset transfer or gift” that occurred during his lifetime. Oct. 3, 2025, Tr., Dkt. 49 at 31:3–11. Moreover, as the R&R notes, the Applicants have conducted a forensic examination and filed an expert report explaining in detail how the subpoenaed financial institutions were identified and why they believe they are likely to have relevant information. See Vieira Decl. ¶¶ 10–13, 20–22; Oct. 3, 2025, Tr. at 68–69; Notice of Forensic Accounting Report, Dkt. 52 ¶¶ 16–19, 24–25, 105. If doubts remain about the appropriate scоpe of the subpoenas, the subpoenaed entities themselves are free to meet and confer with the Applicants to discuss narrowing the subpoenas. See In re SPS I Fundo de Investimento de Acoes - Investimento no Exterior, No. 22-MC-00118 (LAK), 2022 WL 17553067, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2022) (”
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in full. The Motion to vacate the Court‘s September 23, 2024, Order granting the Section 1782 application in this action and to quash the subpoenas issued and served pursuant to that application is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the open motion at Dkt. 9.
Not later than June 4, 2026, the parties must meet and confer and file a joint letter advising the Court as to what they believe are the appropriate next steps, if any, in this matter.
SO ORDERED.
Date: May 21, 2026 VALERIE CAPRONI
New York, NY United States District Judge