I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs IBEW Local No. 58 Annuity Fund, Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund of IBEW Local No. 58, and IBEW Local No. 58 have filed a securities class action complaint against Defendants on behalf of all purchasers of EveryWare Global, Inc. (“EveryWare”) securities between May 21, 2013 and May 16, 2014, asserting claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”). Six Defendants or groups of Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint on various grounds: Defendants Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., CJS Securities, Inc., Telsey Advisory Group, LLC, Imperial Capital, LLC and BTIG, LLC (the “Underwriter Defendants”) (Doc. 110); Defen
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the six Motions to Dismiss because Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
This action concerns a purported “pump and dump” scheme by the Monomoy Defendants (a group of New York City-based private equity funds as well as their two principals, Defendants Collin and Presser), Sheppard, and Peters to inflate the price of EveryWare Global Inc. stock so that the Monomoy Defendants could sell their 15 million shares before the share price plummeted. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges the following facts.
In March of 2012, Monomoy combined two private kitchenware companies already under its control, Oneida, Ltd. and Anchor Hocking LLC, into EveryWare Global Inc., a producer, marketer, and distributor of kitchenware. (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶¶ 56-58.) Sheppard served as CEO beginning in April of 2012. (Id. at ¶ 22.) On May 21, 2013, EveryWare Global Inc. merged with ROI Acquisition Corp. (“ROI”), a “blank check” company, defined as a publicly traded company that raises money to pursue an acquisition of an existing company. (Id. at ¶ 59.) After the merger was complete, the Monomoy Defendants were the controlling shareholders of the new public company EveryWare (“Every-Ware” or “the Company”), owning more than 60% of the Company’s common stock. (Id. at ¶ 61.) Under the terms of the merger, the Monomoy Defendants received a $90 million payment and approximately 15 million shares of common stock in Every-Ware, while ROI’s shareholders received about 35% of the shares in the new company. (Id. at ¶ 63; 5/21/13 8-K, Doc. 111-3.) These terms were disclosed publicly. (5/21/13 8-K, Doc. 111-3.) Before the merger, EveryWare had assets of $320 million and liabilities of $310 million and, after the merger, EveryWare had assets of $323 million and liabilities of $382 million. (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶ 63.) EveryWare stock began trading at $10 per share following the merger. (Doc. 111-24.)
The merger agreement between ROI and EveryWare (“Merger Agreement”) provided that shares owned by the Monomoy Defendants were subject to a six month Lock-Up Agreement that barred them from selling their shares until November 18, 2013 unless the share price exceeded $12.50 for 20 trading days within a 30-trading-day period commencing at least 90 days after May 21, 2013 or the Audit Cqmmittee of the EveryWare Board waived the lock-up restriction. (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶¶ 65-66; 5/21/13 Form 8-K, Doc. 111-3 at 44.) The Merger Agreement also entitled Monomoy to retain up to 3.5 million “earn-out” shares if the price of EveryWare stock hit certain targets for
On January 31, 2013, before the merger with ROI, the former EveryWare publicly issued its 2013 revenue and earnings projections. (Id. at ¶ 71.) The company projected annual revenue of $457 million for 2013 as well as an adjusted EBITDA
The amended complaint also states that several other witnesses, including a sales manager, a district sales manager, an inventory control manager, a national sales manager, and the Director of Finance for EveryWare’s United Kingdom office, attested to a “serious cut back in Every-Ware’s inventory and a deterioration in EveryWare’s operations.” (Id. at ¶ 83.) The confidential witnesses reported: staff reductions, inventory shortages, and declining sales (id. at ¶¶ 85-86); information from vendors that EveryWare had begun slowing payments to them between June 2013 and September 2013 (id. at ¶ 92); products being “stuck on the docks” due to Every-Ware’s inability to pay for them (id. at ¶ 94); and a statement to Confidential Witness 7 (“CW7”), the Director of Finance in the United Kingdom office, from the head of EveryWare International, Colin Walker, in November 2013 that there was a lack of capital to pay the Company’s debts. (Id. at ¶ 97.) CW7 also stated that in July 2013 it would have been “unmistakable” to Every-Ware management that the Company was running out of money and in danger of defaulting on its debt because of the fact
In January of 2013, Peters became the CFO of EveryWare. (Id. at ¶ 23.)
In its January 31, 2013 presentation to investors, the Company displayed a chart representing the value of its stock in relation to comparable companies, suggesting that its share price was a relative bargain. (Id. at ¶ 123.) It also laid out its 2013 financial projections, which included predictions of an 8% increase in revenue and a 10% increase in EBITDA over 2012. (Id. at ¶ 124.) The investor presentation was incorporated by reference into the first amendment to the Registration Statement for the Secondary Offering. (Id. at ¶ 125.)
In late May, EveryWare released its financial results from the first quarter of 2013, which reflected growth in both revenue and EBITDA. (5/21/13 Form 8-K, Doc. 111-3 at 64.) On August 1, 2013, Every-Ware disclosed financial results for the second quarter of 2013, reporting that revenue for the first six months of 2013 had increased 2.8% over the first six months of 2012 and that adjusted EBITDA was up 3.4% over that same time period. (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶137.) Sheppard also reported that the results “were in line with our internal expectations” and that the “fundamentals and outlook for our business and industry remain strong.” (Id. at ¶ 138.) On a conference call with analysts in which Defendants Sheppard and Peters participated, Sheppard reaffirmed that Ev-eryWare was “on track to meet our stated financial commitments for 2013.” (Id. at ¶ 140.) Peters also stated that the Company was “sticking to the numbers that we’ve disclosed before” with regard to its EBIT-DA prediction of $61 million. (Id. at ¶ 145.) Sheppard also stated that the revenue estimate may even be low, musing that $460 million might be more accurate, and that even that prediction was “an attempt to be conservative.” (Id. at ¶¶ 146-47.) One of the Underwriter Defendants, the Telsey Advisory Group, in recommending a target share price of $14, noted in an analyst report that “EveryWare maintained its adjusted EBITDA guidance of $61 million and now expects sales to be [approximately] $460 million, $3 million higher than previously forecast, due to the contribution of the recently announced acquisition in the U.K.” (Id. at ¶ 150.)
The Company’s August 2013 earnings statement noted that its projections “involve a number of risks and uncertainties” and that EveryWare’s “actual results or performance may be materially different from those expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements.” (8/1/13 Form 8-K, Doc. 111-6 at 9.)
According to the amended complaint, as an “accounting gimmick” EveryWare included $5.9 million in factory expenses as inventories, rather than recognizing them as expenses at the time they were incurred, and then waiting until after the Secondary Offering to reveal them as expenses in the fourth quarter of 2013. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 100.) Plaintiffs allege that this accounting .maneuver was intended to make the Company’s profit margins appear stronger than they were, and that once the accounting adjustment was made in the fourth quarter, adjusted EBITDA decreased by 113% compared to 2012. (Id. at ¶ 102.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that the Company sold products below the cost of production in order to record sales and build up revenues, even though its profits were taking a hit, because ,it would make the Company appear strong in the lead-up to the Secondary Offering. (Id. at ¶ 103.) Sheppard’s successor as CEO, Sam Solomon, later stated on an April 1, 2014 call
In the three months leading up to the Secondary Offering, EveryWare’s stock was trading at an average daily closing price of $12.68. (Doc. 118, Ex. 4.) Meanwhile, the Company was preparing for the Secondary Offering. On June 17, 2013, Ev-eryWare filed a Form S-3 Registration Statement (“Registration Statement”) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in which it announced its intent to sell 21,313,334 shares of EveryWare common stock, more than 15 million of which would be sold by the Monomoy Defendants, comprising all of the Monomoy Defendants’ shares. (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶ 107.) Defendant Sheppard also announced his intent to sell 8,171 shares. (Id.) On August 13, 2013, the Company filéd an amendment to the Registration Statement, reducing the number of shares it intended to sell to 6.5 million, 5.1 million of which would be sold by the Monomoy Defendants and 2,763 by Sheppard. (Id. at ¶ 108.) The Company filed another amendment on September 3, 2013, slightly revising its target number of shares to sell, and on September 9, 2013, the SEC granted EveryWare and the selling stockholders the right to conduct the Secondary Offering. (Id. at ¶ 109.)
On September 12, 2013, the Company announced both that it would sell 4 million shares of common stock in the Secondary Offering and that the Audit Committee had waived the lock-up restrictions to permit the Monomoy Defendants to sell their stock. (Id. at ¶ 110.) On September 16, 2013, EveryWare released the Prospectus for the Secondary Offering, providing for an initial sale of 1.75 million shares at a price of $11.50 per share. (Id. at ¶ 159.) The Monomoy Defendants sold just under I.7 million shares of common stock in the Secondary Offering, approximately 90% of the shares sold in the Secondary Offering. (Id. at ¶ 115.) The sales by the Monomoy Defendants, after payment of fees and costs to Underwriter Defendants, totaled approximately $18.5 million. After the Secondary Offering, the Monomoy Entities continued to hold about 60% of Every-Ware’s common stock. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Neither Sheppard nor Peters sold any stock in the Secondary Offering. (9/16/13 Prospectus, Doc. 111-11 at 91.) As of September II, 2013, Sheppard owned 40,691 shares of common stock and Peters owned 100 shares. (Id.)
Three weeks after the Secondary Offering, Kerri Love, EveryWare’s Chief Administrative Officer and General Counsel, was fired. (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶ 111.) According to a complaint filed by former EveryWare employee Michael Stewart, Love had complained to top managers, including Peters, about inaccurate financial disclosures and threatened to report her discovery to the SEC. (Id. at ¶¶ 112-13.) Stewart was tasked with investigating Love’s records. (Id. at ¶ 112.) Love eventually entered a confidential separation agreement with the Company. (Id. at ¶ 113.) After she was fired, Stewart was eventually terminated as well, which he characterized as retaliatory. (Id. at ¶ 114.)
Plaintiffs allege that the Registration Statement, which incorporated by reference the earlier 2013 projections from the Company’s Forms 8-K, was false and misleading because it failed to disclose that the Company was in the midst of collapse and had essentially run out of money. (Id. at ¶ 155.) Further, Plaintiffs claim that the
The Final Prospectus accompanying the Secondary Offering incorporated by reference a draft agreement between the underwriters and selling shareholders, including Monomoy, which provided that “[t]he sale of Shares by each Selling Stockholder pursuant to this Agreement is not prompted by such Selling Stockholder’s knowledge of any material information concerning the Company or any of its subsidiaries which is not set forth in the Prospectus.” (Id. at ¶ 156.) The Agreement also contained a statement that no selling shareholder would take any action that would reasonably be expected to result in the stabilization or manipulation of the price of any security of the Company to facilitate the sale or resale of shares. (Id. at ¶ 157.) Plaintiffs allege that these statements were false and misleading because the Monomoy Defendants knew that they had stripped EveryWare of its capital and strangled it of the resources it needed to survive, and had also taken a number of steps to manipulate the price of the stock. (Id. at ¶¶ 156,157.)
On October 30, '2013, EveryWare released its third quarter financial results. (Id. at ¶ 164.) Based on a reported loss of $1.1 million for the third quarter of 2013, the Company revised its expected revenues from $460 million to $445-455 million and its expected EBITDA from $61 million to $55-57 million. (Id.) On a call with investors that same day, Peters stated that the declining profits were caused by a drop in sales in the highly profitable food service division of the company. (Id.) Later that day, three of the Underwriter Defendants issued analyst reports dropping the target price for the stock to $13 from previously issued target prices of $14 or $15. (Id. at ¶ 165.) The share price on the market plummeted from $19.00 on October 29, 2013 to $8.36 on November 1. 2013. (Id. at ¶ 166.) On November 19, 2013, one of the underwriters, Oppenheimer & Co., opined that EveryWare’s management had a “meaningful credibility deficit” among investors. (Id. at ¶ 167.)
On February 25, 2014, Sheppard resigned as CEO and the Board of Directors replaced him with Sam Solomon. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 168.) The stock price dropped from $7.58 to $5.45 from February 24, 2014 to February 26, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 168.) Oppenheimer wrote in its analyst report that it was “blindsided” by the announcement and again reduced its rating, criticizing the company’s “execution” and noting “a distinct lack of visibility into the company’s strategy.” (Id. at ¶ 169.) On March 5, 2014, EveryWare announced that it was postponing its fourth quarter and full-year 2013 earnings release, triggering a further decline in the share price from $5.46 to $4.07. (Id. at ¶ 170.)
On March 31, 2014, the Company belatedly issued those results, reporting total revenue of $439.8 million for 2013 and adjusted EBITDA of $51.5 million. (Id. at ¶ 171.) These numbers were significantly
On May 15, 2014, EveryWare announced a net loss for the first quarter of 2014 of $38.4 millión, compared to a net income of $0.2 million for the first quarter of 2013. (Id. at ¶ 172.) The Company further announced that it was in default on its financial debt covenants in its loan agreements with banks, and that, it would require an infusion of $18.7 million in additional capital to cure the default. (Id.) The Company announced the temporary closing of two factories and a mass layoff, as well as decreases in net sales, along with significant decreases in revenue across all but the international segment of the business. (Id. at ¶ 173.)
By the next day, the share price reached an all-time low of $0.94/share. (Id. at ¶ 175.) On April 7, 2015, EveryWare filed for bankruptcy. (Id. at ¶ 176.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in this Court on October 7, 2014. (Doc. 1.) The original complaint named EveryWare, Sheppard, Peters, and current EveryWare CEO Solomon as Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-14.) Plaintiffs asserted causes of action for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 against all Defendants and violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against Sheppard, Peters, and Solomon, (Id. at ¶¶ 42-54.)
Plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint on May 15, 2015. (Doc. 38.) The amended complaint added the Monomoy Defendants, the Non-Management Director Defendants, and the Underwriter Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-53.) The amended complaint ■ includes the following counts, the third, fourth, and fifth of which were new:
• Count I for violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 against Sheppard, Peters, and the Mo-nomoy Defendants;
• Count II for violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against Sheppard, Peters, and the Monomoy Defendants;
• Count III for violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 against Sheppard, Peters, Collin, Presses Jurbala, the Non-Management Director Defendants, and the Underwriter Defendants;
• Count IV for violations of Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 against Sheppard, Peters, Collin, Presser, Jurbala, the Non-Management Director Defendants, and the Underwriter Defendants;
• Count V for violation of Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 against Sheppard, Peters, and the Monomoy Defendants.
(Id. at ¶¶ 190-225.) Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages for all class members, including interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 75-76.) Plaintiffs assert no claims against EveryWare in the amended complaint because it is currently in bankruptcy proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and, therefore, subject to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1). (Id. at ¶ 21.)
All Defendants all moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim: the Underwriter Defendants (Doc. 110), the Monomoy Defendants (Doc. Ill), Defendant Sheppard (Doc. 112), Defendant Peters (Doc. 113), the Non-Management Director Defendants (Doc. 114), and Defendant Michael Jurbala (Doc. 115). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for review.
The Court may dismiss a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Such a 'motion “is a- test of the plaintiffs cause of action as stated in the complaint, ■ not a challenge to the plaintiffs factual allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus,
With regard to Plaintiffs’ claims sounding in fraud, Plaintiffs must also satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Rule 9(b) requires that “in any complaint averring fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc.,
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendants move for dismissal of all of Plaintiffs’ claims. First, they assert that Plaintiffs’ claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act (Count I) must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not pleaded a materially false or. misleading statement or omission attributable to any Defendant or, in the alternative, have not properly pleaded scienter or loss causation. (Doc. Ill at 18.) Second, they argue that Defendants’ claims under Sections 11 ■ and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act (Counts III and IV) are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and, alternatively, because Plaintiffs lack statutory standing under both Sections 11' and 12(a)(2), (Id.) In the alterna
As a preliminary matter, the Court grants Defendants’ request to take judicial notice of public documents, including documents filed with the SEC, attached to their various motions to dismiss. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court “may consider materials in addition to the complaint if such materials are public records or are otherwise appropriate for the taking of judicial notice.” New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP,
A. Section 10(b) Claims
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 forbids (1) the “use or employ[ment] ... of any ... deceptive device,” (2) “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” and (3) “in contravention of’ Securities and Exchange Commission “rules and regulations.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Commission Rule 10b-5 forbids, among other things, the making of “any untrue statement of a material fact” or the omission of any material fact “necessary in order to make the statements made ... not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 24010b-5(b). See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo,
In cases involving publicly traded securities, the essential elements of an action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can be summarized as: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter, that is, a wrongful state of mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation, a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the loss. Dura,
The Court will first determine whether Plaintiffs have properly pleaded any actionable false or misleading statements. Plaintiffs have identified the following allegedly false and misleading statements: (1) the 2013 earnings and revenue projections; (2) misleading statements from the Monomoy Defendants and Sheppard that EveryWare was being priced at a discount compared to comparable companies; and (3) statements by Sheppard, Peters, and the Monomoy Defendants that the company remained “on track” to meet the 2013 projections.
1. The 2013 Projections
The parties do not dispute that revenue and earnings projections are generally considered “forward-looking” within the meaning of the PSLRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(l) (“The term ‘forward-looking statement’ means ... a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items.”) Ordinarily, the maker of such a forward-looking statement is protected from liability for that statement under the PSLRA safe-harbor provision. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l). The safe harbor does not apply, however, if: “the statement was material; if defendants had actual knowledge that it was false or misleading; and if the statement was not identified as ‘forward-looking’ or lacked meaningful cautionary statements.” Helwig v. Vencor,
Plaintiffs contend that they have shown that Sheppard and Monomoy had actual knowledge of the falsity of the 2013 projections because Sheppard “disregard[ed] the views of EveryWare’s senior finance officials in issuing 2013 projections that were ‘substantially higher’ than what they recommended and without disclosing to investors the dissenting views of these officials.” (Doc. 118 at 27.) Plaintiffs contend that the statements they have identified are actionable because they do not “fairly align[] with the information in the issuer’s posses
Confidential witnesses “may assist securities fraud plaintiffs ... so long as they are not vague and conclusory.” Local 295/Local 851 IBT Bmp’r Grp. Pension Tr.,
CW1 was a Senior Vice President of Sales at EveryWare until June 2013. (Am. Compl, Doe. 38 at ¶74.) The complaint alleges that he and a co-worker worked on the formulation of the 2013 projections between October and December 2012, and that, in particular, he was “responsible for providing estimates for one of the largest segments of the Company in terms of its earnings and revenue.” (Id. at ¶¶ 75-76.) He and his coworker discussed their estimates with then-CFO Church, and all three individuals agreed that the estimates were reasonable and should be presented to Sheppard. (Id. at ¶ 76.) Church then told CW1 that Sheppard had rejected the 2013 estimates because he wanted a higher sales revenue projection, to which CW1 responded that he did not think a higher number was realistic. (Id. at ¶ 77.) According to the complaint, CW1 also states that his coworker thought that the 2013 projections
These statements do not suffice to show that Sheppard (or Peters, who was not yet CFO during the time that CWl was involved in the formulations of the projections) had actual knowledge that the projections were false or misleading. First of all, there is no allegation that CWl or his coworker ever talked directly to Sheppard or that Church conveyed their statements to Sheppard. Second, there is no indication that Church ever told Sheppard he thought the new projections were unreasonable or misleading in any way, or that Grannis or anyone else ever told Sheppard that they believed insufficient inventory would make the sales goals unachievable. Third, the complaint states that CWl was responsible for sales figures in “one of the largest segments of the Company,” which presumably indicates that other senior officials in other segments of EveryWare also had input into the formulation of the projections, but Plaintiffs allege no facts about the recommended projections of other officials or about the process Sheppard used to craft the final overall projections. The facts Plaintiffs do offer regarding CWl do not suggest how much of a role CWl actually had in formulating the Company’s overall 2013 projections. And finally, there are no numbers behind CWl’s contentions; he does not state what his initial recommended projection was, so the size of the discrepancy between his recommendation and the final 2013- projections is unknown.
The complaint, therefore, fails to show actual knowledge on many levels. A plaintiff “must identify particular (and material) facts going to the basis for the [defendant’s] opinion — facts about the inquiry the [defendant] did or did not conduct or the knowledge it did or did not have— whose omission makes the opinion statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person.” Omnicare,
Plaintiffs simply cannot show through CWl’s statements — none of which was made directly to Sheppard or any other Monomoy Defendant, see Konkol,
2. Statements Regarding the Value of EveryWare Stock
In the January 31, 2013 investor presentation, EveryWare pegged the Company’s enterprise value at $420.5 million and characterized EveryWare’s stock as an “attractive valuation” because its enterprise value was only 6.9 times expected 2013 earnings, as compared to other similar companies whose enterprise values were 8.1 times their expected 2013 earnings. (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶ 123.) Therefore, its share price, which is commonly calculated using enterprise value and expected earnings, would seem to be a relative bargain. (Id.) The investor presentation, including statements about the enterprise value, were later incorporated by reference in SEC filings on June 11, 2013 and September 16, 2013. Plaintiffs contend that because the statements regarding the stock’s value were premised on false and misleading 2013 projections, these statements were also misleading. The parties do not dispute that these statements were not'forward-looking, and thus not protected by the safe harbor, so the Court will analyze whether these statements were false or misleading and whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged with particularity the facts on which their belief was formed. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l).‘
Plaintiffs have not met their burden because: (1) the calculation of the enterprise value was not derived from the 2013 projections and; (2) Defendants fully disclosed how it was calculated and why they believed the stock was an attractive valuation. In its January 31, 2013 investor presentation, EveryWare disclosed the simple formula it used to calculate enterprise value: its pro forma shares outstanding (17.6 million) multiplied by an estimated share price of $10,
3. Statements that EveryWare Remained “On Track” to Meet Its Projections
a. False or Misleading
Plaintiff next points to statements from Sheppard and Peters, as well as state
Some courts have labeled statements that a company was “on track” or “still going strong” to meet its revenue projections as statements that are “not forward-looking but statements relating to current conditions.” Mulligan v. Impax Labs., Inc.,
Plaintiffs contend that these statements that the 2013 projections were on track were misleading because: (1) by August 2013 EveryWare had essentially run out of money and was forced to leave shipments from vendors sitting on the docks due to the Company’s inability to pay for them (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶¶ 92-94); (2) most of the Company’s orders for the end of 2013 had already been placed by this time, so they would have known that they were unlikely to meet their optimistic projections (id. at ¶ 98); (3) EveryWare’s reported results as of August 1, 2013 were inflated by accounting manipulations designed to hide $5.9 million in factory costs (id,- at ¶¶ 99-102); and (4) EveryWare sold prod
b. Scienter
Ultimately, however, even though the Plaintiffs have pointed to statements regarding current conditions that Sheppard, Peters, and EveryWare made on August 1, 2013 that are not entitled to the PSLRA safe harbor, Plaintiffs cannot survive the motion to dismiss because they fail plausibly to allege scienter. The PSLRA requires that the complaint “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). The required state of mind for a Section 10(b) claim, scienter, is “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.” Tellabs,
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to plead scienter because: (1) the alleged scheme makes no sense as a motive for fraud, given that the Monomoy Defendants stood to lose much more financially from the demise of EveryWare than they stood to gain from selling the stock at an inflated price; (2) the so-called Helwig factors that are indicative of scienter militate against such an inference; (3) the allegations regarding the Company’s development of its 2013 projections do not create any basis for inferring scienter; and (4) the remaining allegations related to inventory accounting and other matters fail to identify any impropriety. (Doc. Ill at 47.)
Plaintiffs put forward the following theory as to scienter, which the Court will consider holistically, taking all of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations into account. They allege that Sheppard was aware that the Company was running out of money because he was involved on an operational level in formulating the projections and tracking the revenue and earnings figures. Plaintiffs further rely on the temporal proximity between Sheppard’s “on track” statements on August 1, 2013 and the “actual disastrous year-end results.” (Doc. 118 at 39.) Further, the alleged accounting improprieties, including those cited by former General Counsel Love, and the fact that EveryWare was selling products for less than the cost of production, should have been enough for Sheppard to infer that the Company was running out of money. Finally, the fact that there is a long “lead time” for EveryWare’s orders allows an inference that sales figures would have
Although the Court cannot say that this theory is outlandish, and may even be plausible, under the Tellabs standard it is simply not “cogent and at least as compelling” as the opposing inference toward which Defendants point the Court, namely, that Defendants’ actions show that they wanted the Company to succeed. Defendants first rely on the fact that the Monomoy Defendants ultimately only sold 1.7 million shares for proceeds of $18.5 million, which was only a little over 10% of the 15 million shares they held at the time. After the stock price plummeted and the Company was in crisis, Monomoy invested an additional $20 million — more than they received from the sale of stock at the Secondary, Offering — in an attempt to prop up the flailing Company, (8/14/14 Form 10-Q, Doc. 111-20 at 32.)
Peters owned only 100 shares at the time of the Secondary Offering and he sold none of them in the Offering. (9/9/13 Prospectus Supplement, Doc. 111-11 at S-86.) He also held options for 122,000 shares that would not have vested until June 2014 at the earliest. (4/14/14 Schedule 14A, Doc. 123-3 at 5.) Sheppard did not sell any stock in the Secondary Offering and, in fact, increased his ownership stake from 8,171 shares immediately after the ROI merger to 40,691 shares at the time of the Secondary Offering, which would have been a curious choice if he planned to commit fraud that would cause the stock price to plummet, .yet not sell any shares m the Secondary Offering. (See 5/28/13 Form 8-K, Doc. 111-3 at 25 and Prospectus S ipplement, Doc. 111-11 at S-86.) Sheppard also owned a substantial number of shares that would have vested annually over a four-year period. (4/14/14 Schedule 14A, Doc.
Having reviewed these competing inferences, the Court finds that the inferences Plaintiffs draw from the facts alleged in the complaint áre not as compelling as those of Defendants. The Monomoy Defendants had a greater motive to see Every-Ware succeed, and they ultimately lost millions more than they received in the Secondary Offering. Plaintiffs have not offered a compelling, reason why Defendants would have sold 1.7 million shares as opposed to the entire 15 million shares they owned. They cannot explain why the Mo-nomoy Entites would pump $20 million into the company in an effort to prop it up, or why a loss of more than they had gained from the merger — the $90 million cash payout and the $18 million in shares sold — creates an inference of scienter. Nor can the Court even infer that filing the S-3 Registration Statement indicated that Defendants ever intended to sell 15 million shares in the Secondary Offering. As Defendants point out, all shelf registrations, once granted by the SEC, are active for up to three years, and therefore filing a Registration Statement indicating an intent to sell 15 million shares on June 17,2013 does not necessarily show that the Monomoy Defendants intended to sell all of these shares at the Secondary Offering. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(5) (“Securities registered on an automatic shelf registration statement ... may be offered and sold only if not more than three years have elapsed since the initial effective date of the registration statement under which they are being offered and sold... ”).
Moreover, EveryWare’s publicly available correspondence with the SEC during this period supports an inference that the Monomoy Defendants did not reduce the number of shares they sought to sell because they were worried about the appearance of trying to commit too much fraud, as it were. Rather, a more compelling inference is that the Company elected to reduce the number of shares it would sell in order to avoid the longer review process by the SEC that would have resulted if they tried to register more than one-third of the Company’s shares.
Upon holistic review of these allegations, it is simply more likely that the Monomoy Defendants’ actions indicated an intent for the Company to succeed, not to inflate the stock price and ultimately let the Company fail.
As to Sheppard and Peters, they gained nothing from the Secondary Offering because they sold no shares. See PR Diamonds,
Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged “motives to commit fraud as opposed to motives common to corporations and executives generally” such as an executive’s “desire for the company to appear successful and ... to protect his position in the company and increase his compensation.” Local 295,
Plaintiffs’ allegations as to Peters’ scien-ter fail for the same reasons as to Sheppard’s, as he did not sell stock in the Secondary Offering and, indeed, did not stand to benefit .from his stock options until June 2014 at the earliest, which sharply cuts against any inference of scien-ter because he would not be motivated to see the stock price drop before then.
The Court’s finding that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded scienter is buttressed by the absence of allegations under the Helwig factors. In Helwig, the Sixth Circuit laid out a non-exhaustive list of nine factors relevant to a determination of whether a plaintiff has adequately pleaded scienter, including:
(1) insider trading at a suspicious time or in an unusual amount;
(2) divergence between internal reports and .external statements on the same subject;
(3) closeness in time of an allegedly fraudulent statement or omission and the later disclosure of inconsistent information;
(4) evidence of bribery by a top company official;
(5) existence of an ancillary lawsuit charging fraud by a company and the company’s quick settlement of that suit;
(6) disregard of the most current factual information before making statements;
(7) disclosure of accounting information in such a way that its negative implications could only be understood by someone with a high degree of sophistication;
(8) the personal interest of certain directors in not informing disinterested directors of an impending sale of stock; and
(9) the self-interested motivation of defendants in the form of saving their salaries or jobs.
First, there are no allegations that the first, fourth, fifth, or eighth factors are present here. As discussed earlier, the sales figures CW1 presented to then-CFO Church are not sufficient to establish that there was a “divergence between internal reports and external statements on the same subject,” Helwig,
Plaintiffs have failed to put forth an inference of scienter that is at least as compelling as any competing inference. Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not properly pleaded scienter, it need not reach the question of whether their allegations of loss causation are sufficient. The Court finds that Defendants’ statements on the August 1, 2013 investor call and press release are not actionable under Section 10(b) and, therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Section 10(b) claims.
B. Section 20(a) Control-Person Claims
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act imposes secondary liability on persons who “control” the violators of Section 10(b). In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig.,
C. Section 11 and 12(a)(2) Claims
1. Statute of Limitations for Claims Against Newly-Added Defendants
All of the Defendants to this suit, with the exception of Sheppard and Peters, were not named in the original complaint but instead were added to the May 15, 2015 amended complaint. (See Docs. 1, 38.) Defendants now assert that Section 11 and 12 claims against all Defendants except Sheppard and Peters must be dismissed because the amended complaint was filed more than one year after October 30, 2013, the date on which EveryWare revised its 2013 projections. (Doc. 11 at 4-5.)
The statute of limitations applicable to Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims under the Securities Act is set forth at 15 U.S.C. § 77m, which states that:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under [Section 11] or [Section 12(a)(2) ] of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence,In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created under [Section 11] of this title more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under [Section 12(a)(2)] of this title more than three years after the sale.
The Sixth Circuit has held that an applicable one-year statute of limitations may be triggered by inquiry notice as well as actual notice. New England Health Care Employees,
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs had actual notice of the. alleged fraud on October 30, 2013, when EveryWare released its third-quarter financial results and revised its 2013 financial projections downward. (Doc. Ill at 19.) Additionally, Defendants argue that even if the statute of limitations was not triggered on October 30, 2013, it was certainly triggered by the March 31, 2014 publication of the company’s 2013 Year-End Results. (Doc. 114 at 8.) Using either date, more than a year lapsed between the actual notice and the filing of the amended complaint on May 15, 2015. (Id.)
Even if Plaintiffs did not have actual notice of the alleged fraud, Defendants contend they had inquiry notice of the fraud on October 30, 2013, and certainly on March 31, 2014, because a reasonable investor would have interpreted the negative financial results to indicate the possibility of misrepresentations or omissions in the Registration Statement and Prospectus. (Id. at 11.)
Plaintiffs respond that it is “nonsensical” to expect that a reasonable investor would have notice of fraud merely by a company’s downward revision in its financial projections. (Doc. 118 at 50.) They attempt to bolster their argument further by noting that Sheppard and EveryWare made “self-serving statements attempting to blame EveryWare’s negative results on unexpected events.”
A plaintiff “need not have fully discovered the nature and extent of the fraud before he was on notice that something may have been amiss. Inquiry notice is triggered by evidence of the possibility of fraud, not full exposition of the scam itself.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc.,
Here, the Amended Complaint does not affirmatively allege when Plaintiffs acquired actual knowledge of the facts that comprised the alleged fraud. But although Plaintiffs knew that EveryWare had adjusted its financial projections downward on October 30, 2013, and that its stock price had begun to drop precipitously, there are many reasons why a company might underperform, or its stock price drop, that have nothing to do with fraud (as Defendants have argued vigorously in other portions of their motions to dismiss). See La Grasta,
Defendants rely on Sixth Circuit precedent in Bishop v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. to bolster their argument that Plaintiffs’ failure to “plead facts in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense” is fatal to their claims.
At this stage, the Court’s ruling for Plaintiffs on the question of the statute of limitations does not, of course, definitively mean that the amended complaint was timely filed. Rather, the Court merely holds that it is mot “apparent from the face of the complaint” that the claim is time-barred and, therefore, the issue is one of fact that must be determined at a later stage of the litigation. Bishop,
2. Section 11 Standing
Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, imposes liability for securities registration statements containing materially false or misleading statements or omissions of material fact. J&R Marketing, SEP v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
Plaintiffs’ complaint states the following. Plaintiffs purchased 29,000 shares of EveryWare stock through their broker, Morgan Stanley, on September 16, 2013, the date of the Secondary Offering. (Doc. 38 at ¶ 20.) These 29,000 shares were approximately 15% of the 196,700 Every-Ware shares traded on that day. (Id.) They paid a uniform price of $11.54 per share, four cents above the offering price. (Id.) Plaintiffs further allege that:
Typically, a broker such as Morgan Stanley will purchase shares of a Company, such as EveryWare, from multiple counterparties, including the Underwriter Defendants, to satisfy its customers’ purchase orders. Given the amount of shares sold in the Secondary Offering (1,750,000 shares) in comparison to thepre-existing public float (2,023,000 shares), the large number of shares purchased by IBEW on the same day as the Secondary Offering and the fact that IBEW’s purchase price was within pennies of the offering’s price, it is almost certain that at least some, if not all, of IBEW’s shares purchased are the same as the shares offered by the Defendants in the Secondary Offering.
(Id.) Plaintiffs further state that they expect to develop evidence proving this inference in discovery, including through third-party subpoenas to the Depository Trust Company and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and discovery from the Underwriter Defendants. (Id.)
Defendants urge the Court to adopt the pleading standard articulated in a recent Ninth Circuit decision, In Re Century Aluminum Co. Securities Litigation,
When a company has issued shares in multiple offerings under more than one registration statement, ... a greater level of factual specificity will be needed before a court can reasonably infer that shares purchased in the aftermarket are traceable to a particular offering. Making this determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,556 U.S. at 679 ,129 S.Ct. 1937 . As noted earlier, experience and common sense tell us that when a company has offered shares under more than one registration statement, aftermarket purchasers usually will not be able to trace their shares back to a particular offering. Thus, in this' case, plaintiffs had to allege facts from which we can reasonably infer that their situation is different. Standing alone, the conclusory allegation that plaintiffs “purchased Century Aluminum common stock directly traceable to the Company’s Secondary Offering” does not allow us to draw a reasonable inference about anything because it is devoid of factual content.
Id. at 1107-08. The court went oh to determine that allegations that the plaintiffs purchased a certain number of shares on particular dates for particular prices were not sufficient factual detail
Neither the Sixth Circuit nor any district court therein has yet considered whether Century Aluminum is persuasive. Plaintiffs point the Court to several post-Twombly/Iqbal cases that found that plaintiffs had ■ adequately alleged traceability even if they did not allege facts that tended to exclude the possibility that the shares had been bought in another offering. See, e.g., In re Ariad Pharms., Inc.,
Even in the cases that have rejected conclusory allegations that a plaintiff has purchased “pursuant to or traceable to” a registration statement, courts have left open the door for plaintiffs to plead factual allegations that, while not establishing with great certainty that their shares are traceable, may state a plausible claim. For instance, in Grand Lodge of Pennsylvania v. Peters,
Although the Court agrees with the reasoning in Century Aluminum that Iqbal and Twombly “moved us away from a system 'of pure notice pleading,”
3. Section 12(a)(2) Standing
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77Z(a)(2), imposes liability for selling a security by means of a prospectus or oral communication containing materially false or misleading statements or omissions of material fact. Sec
Plaintiffs have alleged that they “purchased” shares of EveryWare stock on the day of the Secondary Offering from their broker, Morgan Stanley. (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶ 20.) They have also alleged that they purchased 29,000 shares on that day at a purchase price of $11.54 per share. (Id. at Sch. A.) See Lehman Bros.,
Section 12(a)(2) applies only to “a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling shareholder” and not to aftermarket trading. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
None of the cases cited by Defendants presents the issue of an agent purchasing the stock on the date of the initial public offering. And it would make little sense to preclude a buyer from bringing a Section 12(a)(2) claim against a seller solely because that buyer used an agent. Plaintiffs have alleged that they purchased Every-Ware stock through their broker, Morgan Stanley, which purchased it directly from EveryWare. A “stock or commodities broker is the agent of the customer.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.,
The Non-Management Director Defendants assert that they are not statutory sellers because merely signing a registration statement is insufficient to show “solicitation” of purchase; they cite decisions from the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits that support this position. (Doc. 114 at 19-20.) Plaintiffs fail-to respond to this argument in their opposition brief. Their only allegations in the Complaint as to the Section 12(a)(2) claims against the Non-Management Director Defendants are that these Defendants signed the Registration Statement, which “was used to induce investors, such as Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class, to purchase the Company’s shares.” (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶ 216.)
In Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., the First Circuit dismissed for lack of standing the plaintiffs’ Section 12(a)(2) claims against individual directors, applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Pinter v. Dahl,
k. False and Misleading Statements or Omissions under Section 11 and 12(a)(2)
a. Pleading Standard
Having found that Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their Section 11 ■ claims, as well as Section 12(a)(2) claims, against all Defendants except the Non-Management Directors, the Court will consider whether Plaintiffs have alleged false or misleading statements in the Registration Statement and the Prospectus, respectively.
As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether the Rule 8 pleading standard or the more demanding Rule 9(b) standard applies to Plaintiffs’ Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims. Plaintiffs are correct that as to Defendants against whom' no fraud is alleged, the plausibility pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) apply. See Rombach v. Chang,
Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint contains no allegations that the Section 11 claims against the Non-Management Directors or Underwriter Defendants, or the Section 12(a) claims against the Underwriter .Defendants, sound in fraud. Rather, the complaint contains only assertions that they failed to conduct a reasonable investigation to ensure the truth and accuracy of the Registration Statement they signed. (Id. at ¶¶ 209, 219.) Cf. In re Alstom SA,
Because Plaintiffs’ claims “carefully segregate[] [their] allegations of negligence against [certain defendants] from [their] allegations of fraud against those defendants,” thereby creating “a clear conceptu
b. False or Misleading Statements
Because Plaintiffs essentially argue that the Registration Statement and Prospectus contained the same representations and were false and misleading for the same reasons, the Court will consider the parties’ arguments regarding Section 11 and 12 claims together. (See Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶ 160.)
To state a claim under Section 11, “a plaintiff need only show that he purchased a security issued pursuant to a registration statement and that the statement made a material misrepresentation or omission.” Albert Fadem Trust,
First, Plaintiffs allege that the Registration Statement was false and misleading because it incorporated by reference Ever-yWare’s false and misleading earnings and revenue projections from its earlier-filed Form 8-Ks. (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶ 152.)
Plaintiffs next allege that the Registration Statement and Prospectus were misleading because by September 16, 2013, the date of the Secondary Offering, the Company was on the brink of collapse, had run out . of money, and was in danger of violating its debt covenants, all of which the Company should have disclosed under Item 303. (Id. at ¶ 155.)
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the Registration Statement and Prospectus violated Item 303 because they failed to disclose the following material trends and conditions: (1) that the Merger had decapital-ized EveryWare and rendered it insolvent without the ability to pay its suppliers and expenses; (2) that in the wake of stripping the Company’s capital, the Monomoy Defendants and Sheppard had imposed draconian cost reductions, which had led to
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims must be dismissed, contending that Plaintiffs have not alleged any materially false or misleading statements or omissions because: (1) Defendants fully disclosed the terms of the merger, including the basis for the calculations that Plaintiffs’ claim were misleading; (2) the 2013 projections were forward-looking statements that were entitled to the statutory “safe harbor,” and. even if they were not, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Defendants did not believe that the 2013 projections were achievable; (3) Ever-yWare’s decision to recalibrate the amount of factory expenses incorporated into its inventory calculation does not establish that the inventory calculations in the Registration Statement were misleading; and (4) Plaintiffs’ claims that the Registration Statement wrongly omitted pessimistic predictions about the Company’s prospects are not actionable. (Doc. Ill at 24-25.)
As to Plaintiffs’ argument that Registration Statement and Prospectus were false and misleading because they incorporated the 2013 projections, the Court has already found that these projections were not false or misleading. Accordingly, the Court finds this argument meritless.
As to Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, the Court finds that Plaintiffs allegations are not well-pleaded. First, Plaintiffs’ allegations of accounting violations lack factual support. The complaint contains the vague statement that former General Counsel Love discovered certain “inaccurate financial disclosures” at EveryWare. (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶ 112.) Plaintiffs’ complaint also cites a complaint from former EveryWare employee Michael Stewart, who conducted an investigation of Love after she notified' management of the accounting inaccuracies. Stewart alleged that he was charged with reporting his findings on Love’s records to Defendant Peters. (Id. at ¶ 114.) Based on the date of her departure, October 7, 2013, and Stewart’s account in his complaint that she had approached management and “threatened to report her discovery to the [SEC] if the issues were not corrected within ninety days,” they speculate that her discovery occurred around the time of the Secondary Offering. (Id. at ¶ 113.) But Plaintiffs put forth no allegations about the nature of the “inaccurate financial disclosures” or the content of the reports,Stewart provided to Peters. Such a flimsy allegation cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that the accounting improprieties are related to the supposed concealment of factory costs, Plaintiffs’ allegations are as follows. The improved margins that the Company cited in its October 30, 2013 announcement of third-quarter earnings and revenue were obtained by including factory expenses in inventories to make the Company’s margins appear stronger than they were. (Id. at ¶ 100.) Then on March 31, 2014, when it announced its fourth-quarter earnings, the Company stated that its “calculation of the factory manufacturing variance capitalized in inventory was based on historical experience. In the fourth quarter 2013, we identified a deviation from historical experience resulting in an increase in the inventory revaluation reserve of $5.9 million, or $0.35 per diluted share, which was accounted for as a change in accounting esti
Similarly, choosing to sell products at a loss temporarily (see Am. Compl., Doc, 38 at ¶¶ 103-04) is sometimes a valid business judgment and companies are not required to disclose such a strategy. See In re Canandaigua Sec. Litig.,
As to Plaintiffs’ allegations that' it was obvious by the time the Registration Statement and Prospectus were issued that the Company was “running out of money,” Plaintiffs’ argument appears to rely mainly on allegations from CW7, the Director of Finance in EveryWare’s United Kingdom office. CW7 stated that based on his knowledge of EveryWare’s business and the substantial lead time required for placing orders, “EveryWare’s management had to have known that EveryWare was running out of money and in- danger of defaulting on its debt” by July 2013. (Id. at ¶ 98.) But without more support for this conclusory allegation, the Court cannot determine that the Director of Finance for the United Kingdom office would have been in a position to know this information about finances in the United States, especially since Plaintiffs have not offered any other non-eonclusory allegations that the Company was running out of money when the Registration Statement and Prospectus were issued. There is no factual support for the proposition that July 2013 would have been the date when the danger of running out of money “would have been unmistakable to EveryWare management.” (Id.) Indeed, the only specific conversation CW7 cites regarding the company running out of money is a conference call in which CW7 participated when an unidentified person told Defendant Peters “that it was time for EveryWare U.S. to extend the promised capital [for the U.K. branch],” at which point Peters said that “the funding would not be forthcoming because there was ‘no money in the U.S.’ ” (Id. at ¶ 97.)
Nor do the statements from other confidential witnesses constitute plausible factual allegations that the Company was running out of money when it issued the Registration Statement on June 17, 2013, the later amendments to the Registration Statement on August 13, 2013 and September 3, 2013, or the Prospectus on September 16, 2013. Plaintiffs’ complaint does not indicate how any of the other confidential witnesses — a sales manager, an inventory control manager in the United Kingdom, a district sales manager, and á national sales manager — would have been in a position to know that the Company was running out of money by September 16, 2013. For instance, Confidential Wit
Finally, as to Plaintiffs’ argument that EveryWare was running out of money because the Monomoy Defendants had stripped it of $90 million in capital, Defendants are correct that the, January 31, 2013 Form 8-K disclosed that the Monomoy Defendants would receive a payout of between $90 million and $107.5 million in cash under the terms of the merger. (1/31/13 Form 8-K, Doc..111-1 at 3; 5/21/13 Form 8-K, Doc. 111-3 at 8.) The fact that the ROI Merger resulted in negative stockholder equity of $59 million was also disclosed. (Doc. 111-3 at 81.)
D. Section 15 Control-Person Claims
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ “control person” claims under Section 15 of the Securities Act on the grounds that: (1) they have not stated a claim for relief under Section 11 or 12(a)(2); and, in the alternative, (2) they have not alleged that Defendants were sufficiently involved in the challenged statements to support “control person” liability. (Doc. Ill at 33.)
Section 15 claims must be dismissed if Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims are disrnissed because Section 15 liability is “triggered only to the extent primary liability first attaches to a ‘controlled person.’ ” Lenartz v. Am. Superconductor Corp.,
Y. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS all Defendants’ Motions to Dis
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. EBITDA, which stands for "earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization,” is a commonly reported measure of a company’s pre-tax earnings calculated on a cash basis. (Id. at ¶ 4 n.l.) The Court will use the terms "EBITDA” and “earnings” interchangeably.
. Peters replaced Church as CFO in January 2013. (Id. at ¶ 75.)
. The $10'figure was derived from the ROI initial public ■ offering share price. (See Am. Compl,, Doc1. 38 at ¶ 72.)
. Although they do not discuss it in their opposition brief, in the complaint Plaintiffs also allege that Collin made a false and misleading statement when he said on an investor call regarding the merger with ROI on February 1, 2013: "We believe in the business, we believe in its people and we believe in the future growth of the organization. We also believe that the structure of the transaction we are discussing today aligns the interests of all parties involved .... ” (Am. Compl., Doc. 38 at ¶ 126.) This statement is likely forward-looking, and even if it is not, this falls outside of the realm of actionable misstatements because it is "a certain ldnd of rosy affirmation commonly heard from corporate managers and numbingly familiar to the marketplace — loosely optimistic statements that are so vague, so lacking in specificily, or so clearly constituting the opinions of the speaker, that no reasonable investor could find them important.” Ind. State Dist. of Laborers v. Omnicare, Inc.,
. Defendants also note that 3.5 million of Monomoy’s shares were "earn out” shares that the Monomoy Entities would forfeit if the Company did not achieve share prices above specified levels. They ultimately hit the vesting triggers for 2.5 million of the 3.5 million earn out shares during the three-month period between June 30, 2013 and September 30, 2013. Monomoy did not earn the remaining one million shares because the share price did not reach $15. The Court concludes that this fact does not necessarily support either Plaintiffs' or Defendants' theory. On the one hand, Monomoy earned the majority of the eligible shares before the stock price began to plummet after the Secondary Offering. On the other hand, they did lose a significant number of shares when the share price failed to reach the $15 threshold.
. Under the SEC’s Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation 612.09, a company must show “whether a purported secondary offering is really a primary offering, i.e., the selling shareholders are actually underwriters selling on behalf of an issuer. Underwriter status may involve additional disclosure... The question of whether an offering styled a secondary one is really on behalf of the issuer is a difficult factual one..." EveryWare's correspondence with the SEC suggests that it may have reduced the number of shares in the offering in order to shorten the SEC registration process. (See 7/12/13 SEC Comment Letter, Doc. 123-1 at 2-3; 8/13/13 EveryWare Response Letter to SEC, Doc. 123-4.) ("While the Registrant does not believe that the amount of shares being registered alone is determinative of whether an offering is a disguised primary offering or a valid secondary offering, the Registrant acknowledges the Staff's concern regarding the amount of shares to be offered by the selling stockholders and has reduced the amount of shares to be offered by the selling stockholders pursuant to the initial filing of the Registration Statement from 21,313,334 shares to 6,500,-000 shares, as reflected in Amendment No. 2 filed concurrently with this letter.”)
. New England Health Care was a Section 10(b) case, but district courts through this circuit have applied the inquiry notice standard to Securities Act claims as well. See, e.g., Wuliger v. Owens,
. .Defendants further argue that since Sheppard left the company on February 25, 2014, an event that apparently “blindsided” analysts and led to a 28% drop in stock price (Doc. 38 at ¶ 169), at a very minimum, Plaintiffs should be charged with inquiry notice on that date, which would render the claims in the May 15, 2015 Amended Complaint outside the one-year limitations period. (Doc. 121 at 8 n.5.)
. In Century Aluminum, on January 28, 2009, the company issued a prospectus and registration statement in connection with a secondary offering of 24.5 million shares, at which point 49 million shares of the company’s common stock were already trading in tlie market. Id. at 1106. The offering price was $4.50 per share and the plaintiffs purchased shares on January 29, 2009 at $4.56 per share and on January 30, 2009 at $3.56 per share. Id. at 1108.
. Pinter addressed standing in the context of a Section 12(a)(1), not a Section 12(a)(2), claim, but the First Circuit found that the standing requirements of both statutes were identical.
. In Craftmatic, the Third Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ allegations regarding standing were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, but explicitly relied on the pleading standard in Conley v. Gibson,
. CW5 did allege that, in his capacity as the inventory control manager in which he worked with vendors to procure inventory required for customer sales, his manager told him that Everyware was experiencing cash shortages that required the Company's international segment to manage inventory will less available capital, but there is no suggestion that this problem was not specific to the international segment of the business. (Id. at ¶¶ 92-93.)