179 P. 922
Okla.
1919
HARDY, C. J.

This рroceeding was commenced by the grievance committee of the Oklahoma State Bar Association seeking the disbarment of one J. C. Evans. It is alleged that said defendant was convicted in the district сourt of Blaine county on the charge of forgery on the 1st day of October, 1909, and that said judgment of cоnviction was duly affirmed by the Criminal Court of Appeals on the 23rd day of May, 1911 (5 Okla. Cr. 643, 115 Pac. 809, 34 L. R. A. [N. S.] 577), that a petition for rehearing in sаid case was by the Criminal *216 Court of Appe'als denied, and that said .defendant, pursuant to such convictiоn, served a term in the state penitentiary. Copies .of the verdict of the jury and the judgment ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‍and sentence of the district court of Blaine county and the orders of the Criminal Court of Appeals are attached to and made a part of the motion and petition.

To this petition defendant demurred upon thе ground that the petition did hot state a cause of action, and that the proceeding was barrеd by the statute of limitations. The petition and motion for disbarment was filed February 4, 1919. The statute of limitations relied upon is section 234, Wilson’s Stat. 1903, being section 267 of Snyder’s Comp. Laws of Oklahoma of 1909, which provides:

“All actions for suspension or removal shall be brought within one year after the act charged was committed, аnd not thereafter.”

More than twelve months had elapsed from the date of the commission of the fеlony and from the date of the judgment and sentence of the trial court and from ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‍the date of the affirmance of the judgment and the overruling of the petition for rehearing, and if the statute be applicable this proceeding is barred.

The petitioners urge that, notwithstanding this statute, the couft has inherent power to disbar an attorney for good cause, and cite in support of this proposition a great mаny cases laying down the general rule that a court of superior or general jurisdiction having authority to admit attorneys to practice law possesses inherent power to disbar or strike from its rolls an attorney of such court. While the inherent power of the courts to disbar an attorney cannot be dеfeated by legislative enactment, the exercise of this power may be regulated within reasonаble limits by statute. 6 C. J. 581-584; Ex parte Saddler, 35 Okla. 510. 130 Pac. 906, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1195.

Of the great number of cases cited by petitioners it appears uрon examination that no statute of limitations specifically applicable to disbarment prоceedings was involved, but it was sought to obtain the benefit of general statute of limitations or of statutes limiting сriminal prosecutions for the acts out of which the disbarment proceedings grew. In some cases where no statute of limitations technically applicable was involved it is said that where an unreasonable length of time has intervened between the commission of the act alleged and the commencement of the proceedings for disbarment, the courts may decline to revoke the licensе of the attorney. In re Smith, 73 Kan. 743, 85 Pac. 584; In re Elliott, 73 Kan. 151, 84 Pac. 750; People v. Tanquary, 48 Colo. 122, 109 Pac. 260.

In State Board v. Shimer, 131 Tenn. 343, 174 S. W. 1142, the respondent procured a license through fraud. A statute required proceedings to revoke an attorney’s license to be commenced within two years, and the court ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‍hеld that the period of limitation commenced to run when knowledge of the fraud had been brought home to the board petitioning for revocation of the license.

This court, in Re Mosher, 24 Okla. 61, 102 Pac. 707, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 530, 20 Ann. Cas. 209, referring to section 267, Snyder’s Comp. Laws of 1909', held that the statute was not applicable in that case because it first became effective on the Indian Territory side of the state November 16, 1907, and the proceedings were begun Octobеr 1, 1908, and hence were not barred. Again in State Bar Commission v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 704, L. R. A. 1915D, 1218, the court held that in a proceeding for disbarment upon the charge of publication of a pamphlet disrespectful to the court the statute of limitations was not available as a defense, especially where the pamphlet remained in circulation until a time within what would be the limitation period if the statute were construed to apply, thereby holding that as long as the pamphlet was in circulation the offense was a continuing оne.

In the discussion of these cases ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‍this court cited In re Lowenthal, 78 Cal. 427, 21 Pac. 7, but upon examination we fail to find any statute of limitations in California at that time applicable to disbarment proceedings. In no gtate except Tennessee, other than- Oklahoma, hasi a statute applicable by its term to disbarmеnt proceedings been called to our attention and in Tennessee the court has recognizеd the binding force of the statute.

We think the statute relied upon was applicable, and that at the expiration of the time prescribed an action for disbarment of defendant upon the grounds alleged was barred.

But it is said that section 267, Snyder’s Compiled Laws of 1909, was repealed by the act adopting the Revised Laws of 1910 (Laws 1910-11, c. 39), ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‍because same was omitted therefrom. The repeal of this statute did not have the effect of reviving the right of action against defendant for dis *217 barment. By section 52, art. 5, of tlie state Constitution it is declared:

‘•Tlie Legislature shall have no power to revive any right or remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute of this state. * * *”

The demurrer is sustained, and the proceedings dismissed.