179 P. 922 | Okla. | 1919
This proceeding was commenced by the grievance committee of the Oklahoma State Bar Association seeking the disbarment of one J.C. Evans. It is alleged that said defendant was convicted in the district court of Blaine county on the charge of forgery on the 1st day of October, 1909, and that said judgment of conviction was duly affirmed by the Criminal Court of Appeals on the 23rd day of May, 1911 (
To this petition defendant demurred upon the ground that the petition did not state a cause of action, and that the proceeding was barred by the statute of limitations. The petition and motion for disbarment was filed February 4, 1919. The statute of limitations relied upon is section 234, Wilson's Stat. 1903, being section 267 of Snyder's Comp. Laws of Oklahoma of 1909, which provides:
"All actions for suspension or removal shall be brought within one year after the act charged was committed, and not thereafter."
More than twelve months had elapsed from the date of the commission of the felony and from the date of the judgment and sentence of the trial court and from the date of the affirmance of the judgment and the overruling of the petition for rehearing, and if the statute be applicable this proceeding is barred.
The petitioners urge that, notwithstanding this statute, the court has inherent power to disbar an attorney for good cause, and cite in support of this proposition a great many cases laying down the general rule that a court of superior or general jurisdiction having authority to admit attorneys to practice law possesses inherent power to disbar or strike from its rolls an attorney of such court. While the inherent power of the courts to disbar an attorney cannot be defeated by legislative enactment, the exercise of this power may be regulated within reasonable limits by statute. 6 C. J. 581-584; Ex parte Saddler,
Of the great number of cases cited by petitioners it appears upon examination that no statute of limitations specifically applicable to disbarment proceedings was involved, but it was sought to obtain the benefit of general statute of limitations or of statutes limiting criminal prosecutions for the acts out of which the disbarment proceedings grew. In some cases where no statute of limitations technically applicable was involved it is said that where an unreasonable length of time has intervened between the commission of the act alleged and the commencement of the proceedings for disbarment, the courts may decline to revoke the license of the attorney. In re Smith,
In State Board v. Shimer,
This court, in Re Mosher,
In the discussion of these cases this court cited In re Lowenthal,
We think the statute relied upon was applicable, and that at the expiration of the time prescribed an action for disbarment of defendant upon the grounds alleged was barred.
But it is said that section 267, Snyder's Compiled Laws of 1909, was repealed by the act adopting the Revised Laws of 1910 (Laws 1910-11, c. 39), because same was omitted therefrom. The repeal of this statute did not have the effect of reviving the right of action against defendant for disbarment. *217 By section 52, art. 5, of the state Constitution it is declared:
"The Legislature shall have no power to revive any right or remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute of this state. * * *"
The demurrer is sustained, and the proceedings dismissed.