This case is before the court on appeal from a judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division. Appellant and cross-appellee, Louis E. Wirebaugh, the executor of the estate of Walter R. Wirebaugh, appeals the *3 trial court’s award of attorney fees to appellee, B. Laurene Lea, and appellee and cross-appellant, Helen L. Ziegler.
Louis Wirebaugh, Lea and Ziegler are the children of Walter R. Wirebaugh and beneficiaries undеr the latter’s last will and testament. Lea and Ziegler filed exceptions to the inventory of the estate of Walter R. Wirebaugh and alleged that Lоuis Wirebaugh, who was appointed the executor of that estate, had converted funds held in joint and survivorship accounts with his father. Those exсeptions were found well taken by the trial court and Louis Wirebaugh was ordered to repay approximately $62,000 to his father’s estate. He аppealed that judgment to this court; Lea and Ziegler cross-appealed. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment in all respects but two. We сoncluded that funds in a checking account released to Louis Wirebaugh after his father’s death were the property of the estate. We further determined that the estate was entitled to prejudgment interest on all converted funds.
In re Estate of Wirebaugh
(Aug. 9, 1991), Wood App. No. WD-90-18, unreported,
For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal of Louis E. Wirebaugh, executor of the еstate of Walter R. Wirebaugh.
It is generally recognized that, in order to establish his right to an appeal on an order of the probate cоurt, a fiduciary, such as an executor, must demonstrate that he is aggrieved by the judgment in his fiduciary capacity or that he is personally affected and appeals in his individual capacity.
Fineman v. Cent. Natl. Bank of Cleveland
(App.1961),
In this case, the award of attorney fees affected only the beneficiaries of the estate. Louis Wirebaugh’s appeal is taken in his fiduciary capacity only. His assertions on appeal are directed solely at the excessiveness of the award of attorney fees and its effect on the distributive shares of Louis Wirebaugh, B. Laurene Lea, and Helen L. Ziegler. Although Ziegler cross-aрpeals and argues that, in her instance, the award of attorney fees is inadequate, both Ziegler and Lea resist the executor’s attemрt to appeal the excessiveness of the award. Accordingly, we hold that Louis Wirebaugh, in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Walter R. Wirebaugh, is not aggrieved by the lower court’s judgment and, therefore, has no right to appeal the question of whether the amоunt of attorney fees awarded is excessive. The executor’s appeal is, hereby, ordered dismissed at his costs.
On cross-appeal, Ziegler sets forth the following assignment of error:
“The Wood County Probate Court erred and failed to render judgment in favor of Appellee/Cross-Aрpellant Helen L. Ziegler in the amount of $39,558.90 for attorney fees and costs of $2,522.24 for litigating Exceptions to the Inventory of Louis E. Wirebaugh, Executor оf the Estate of Walter R. Wirebaugh, and defending his appeal ($4,281.14 more than the Judgment Entry and Memorandum Decision 12/20/91).” 1
Apparently, Ziegler asserts that the triаl court was bound to award attorney fees in the amount documented by her attorneys.
The determination of the allocation of the pаyment of attorney fees is a matter within the discretion of the probate court.
In re Keller
(1989),
In determining the reasonableness of the attorney fees charged, the probate court is not restricted to a minimum or maximum figure.
In re Guardianship of Rider
(1990),
On consideration whereof, this court finds that substantial justice was done the parties comрlaining, and the judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, is affirmed. Costs of the cross-appeal are assessed to Helеn L. Ziegler.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. The probate court ordered that $37,800 in attorney fees be paid to Ziegler’s legal counsel from the estate. The remainder оf the attorney fees are to be charged to Ziegler.
. DR 2-106(B) provides:
" * * * Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
“(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service рroperly.
"(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
"(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
“(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
"(5) The time limitations imposed by the сlient or by the circumstances.
"(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
"(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
“(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”
