In Re Estate of Sauers

disease, bring single he cannot now a second related disease and a cause of action mesothelioma, malig- action for another non-malignant for one dis- asbestos-related nant disease. The statute of limitations Marinari to in limit nothing ease. We see cause of action for ma- [Appellant’s] on that manner. See id. This in Appellant lignant expired years two from diseases just very limitation is another form of the he with diagnosed the date was first mischief Marinari was designed to abolish cancer; therefore, lung present his ac- separate Contrary with its disease rule. untimely. tion is to interpretation, the trial court’s we con- court [Appel- While this understands clude Marinari permits separate causes of argument from a medical stand- lant’s] action for distinct diseases due asbestos point sep- that mesothelioma is a disease exposure. See id. cancer, lung arate and distinct from ¶ 14 on the we foregoing, Based hold the nonetheless, we are constrained to follow misapplied trial court the law in granting Pennsylvania precedent which allows a summary judgment Appellees favor of plaintiff bring only one cause of action unduly based on the court’s in- restrictive nonmalignant malignant for each terpretation separate disease rule exposure. disease caused asbestos Marinari. Accordingly, we vacate the or- viewing [Appellant’s] Even mesothelio- disease, granting summary der judgment a favor separate ma as and distinct thus, years within timely Appellees filed two of of remand case to the diagnosis, [Appellant’s] subsequent proceedings. trial court for further action would still be barred under Penn- vacated; 15 Order case remanded for sylvania [Appellant’s] case law. Because proceedings. further Jurisdiction is relin- previous malignant claim was for a dis- quished. cancer) (lung he precluded ease second, separate a claim bringing pro- not [Appellant]

mesothelioma. has

vided, found, any nor we Pennsyl- have permit plaintiff

vania cases that file lung

an action for cancer caused as- exposure bring

bestos and to then

second action for mesothelioma based on exposure. that same asbestos SAUERS, In re ESTATE OF Paul J. (Trial 4-5) (internal Opinion at Court foot- III, Deceased. omitted). respectfully reject note We interpretation trial court’s narrow of Penn- Appeal of Jodie L. Sauers. sylvania Although Pennsylvania law. case Superior Pennsylvania. nomenclature, law frequently uses the Marinari rule, specifically “two-disease” Argued Oct. 2008. adopting “separate stated it was disease” April Filed actions, exposure rule in asbestos to do away recovery of speculative dam-

ages, preserving plaintiffs right while than

recover more one asbestos-related

disease, separate developed. if a disease interpretation

The trial narrow court’s

Marinari Appellant single limits to a malignant

cause of action for one asbestos- following

which she received the death of her former affirm. husband. We ¶ 2 employee group Pursuant to an ben- plan, efit effective June Paul J. Sauers, III, (“Decedent”) obtained a $40,000.00 policy life insurance issued the Hartford Life Company Insurance (“Insurer”). dispute There is no policy part employee insurance of an plan subject benefit to Employee Re- Security tirement Income Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), seq. 1001 et 29 U.S.C. On 27, 1998, June Decedent married Jodie L. (“Appellant”). 13, Sauers On October 1998, Decedent named Appellant as benefi- ciary nephew, and his Ian D. Rehn (“Nephew”), contingent beneficiary. as On 11, 2002, June Appellant Decedent and divorced. Decedent on September died 19, 2006. He changed desig- had not nation of Appellant beneficiary. In ac- documentation, cordance with Insurer $40,000.00 19, paid Appellant to on March 2007.

¶ 26, 2006, September 3 On F. William (“Administrator”) Sauers received letters of administration for the estate of Dece- 16, 2007, dent. On February Administra- tor a petition rеquesting Appellant filed to why show cause relinquish she should not proceeds all interest and title to the of policy Decedent’s life insurance for benefit Nephew. Appellant pre- of filed York, Keenan, appellant. James G. 30, liminary objections on March 2007. Mills, York, appellee. David A. The trial court overruled Appellant’s pre- objections liminary April Ap- on 2007. STEVENS, MUSMANNO, BEFORE: pellant April filed motion to dismiss on KLEIN, BENDER, BOWES, 16, 2007, May 2007. On the trial court GANTMAN, SHOGAN, FREEDBERG Appellant’s denied motion to dismiss and CLELAND, JJ. Appellant directed to surrender the life proceeds Nephew. FREEDBERG, OPINION BY J.: ¶ 4 Appellant appeal filed a notice of on 1 This matter is before the on 25, 2007, June 2007. On June the trial appeal from the order entered in the Appellant court ordered to file a County Court of Common Pleas for York statement directing (“Appellant”) complained appeal. Jodie L. Sauers of matters of Ap- on 1925(b) surrender all of the life insuranсe pellant filed a Pa.R.A.P. statement Com., Dept. Welfare, Public 567 Pa. 2007. The trial court filed a July on (2001) 1925(a) 16, 141, July (noting on statement Pa.R.A.P. interplay proper interpretation “the law). question statutes” is a questions for raises three Appellant (1) whether ERISA our consideration: pre-emption origi 8 Federal 6111.2, a benefi- pre-empts 20 Pa.C.S.A. Supremacy nates Clause (2) statute; whether ciary re-designation States Constitution. Const. United U.S. capacity lacked the the Administrator VI, undisput “Congress Art. cl. 2. has the (3) suit; peti- whether the bring this pre-empt state law in areas of power ed by the Administrator should brought tion federal concern.” Stone Partner Crushed subject dismissed for lack have been ship v. Kassab Archbold Jackson & We address each jurisdiction. matter 875, O’Brien, 589 Pa. in turn. question (2006), citing Pac. & Elec. v. State Gas Co. contends that the trial Appellant Energy Res. & Dev. Conservation concluding that court erred in not ERISA Comm’n, 461 U.S. 103 S.Ct. § pre-empts 20 Pa.C.S.A. 6111.2 which (1983). In those L.Ed.2d 752 areas tradi provides: stаtes, tionally regulated by the “it should in this person If a domiciled Common- not presumed Congress be ‍​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‍did intend the time of his death is di- wealth at supersede authority to state absent a clear matrimony vorced from the bonds legislative purpose and manifest designating spouse after his as benefi- contrary.” Partnership, Stone Crushed ciary policy, annuity of a life insurance 908 A.2d at 880. There are three forms of contract, profit-sharing plan or pension pre-emption: federal arrangement pro- or other contractual First, may pre-empted state law be viding payments spouse, any to his Congress where the United States en- spouse in favor of his former designation provision expressly pre- acts a which which was revocable him after the Likewise, empts the state enactment. divorce become for all shall ineffective may be found preemption where Con- shall if purposes and be construed as gress legislated compre- has in a field so spouse predeceased such former had hensively implicitly expressed that it has appears wording him unless it from the occupy given an intention to field to designation, a order or a court Finally, state the exclusion of law. a person written contract between the pre-empted enactment will be state designation such former law a federal where state conflicts with was intended to survive the divorce. may a conflict law. Such be found order, by court Unless restrained no instances, profit- impossible or two when it company, pension is sharing plan obligor law, trustee or other comply with both federal and state for making payments shall be liable to a or where the state law stands as an spouse which would have been former the accomplishment obstacle to and exe- in the section. proper absence this purposes objectives cution of the full Any payment to whom is Congress. anyone

made shall be answerable to (internal omitted). Id. at 881 citations Be- prejudiced by payment. explicitly cause the ERISA statute defines § 6111.2. Pa.C.S.A. pre-emptive power, the extent of its we are dealing express pre-emption this subject 7 This of law question is plenary review. See C.B. ex rel. R.R.M. case. governing the rel. Brein documents and instruments Egelhoff, In ex Egelhoff 1104(a)(1)(D). Any er, plan.” 29 U.S.C. (2001), goal undermines this is scope of ERISA state law which L.Ed.2d subject pre-emption. follows: was discussed as pre-emption section, 29 pre-emption U.S.C. ERISA’s ¶ 11 In children from an intes- Egelhoff, 1144(a), states that ERISA “shall su- marriage first sued intestate’s sec- tate’s insofar as any and all State laws persede marriage to ond wife whose intestate had any now or hereafter relate to they may death, shortly been dissolved before his covered employеe plan” benefit claiming pro- entitlement to life insurance repeatedly ERISA. We have observed plan benefits. pension ceeds and Wash- broadly provision this worded ington beneficiary re-designation had a clearly expansive. But at the same provided: statute which time, that the term recognized we have invalidated, If marriage is dissolved or “relate to” cannot be taken to extend made to that event that indeterminacy, furthest stretch of its relates to the or payment transfer practical purposes pre- or else for all death of the decedent’s interest in a run emption would never its course. nonprobate granting asset favor of or have held that a state law relates to We power an interest or to the decedent’s plan an ERISA if it has a connection spouse is revoked. A plan. or reference to such a Peti- with by this affected sectiоn must be inter- on the with” tioner focuses “connection preted, nonprobate and the asset affect- inquiry. Acknowledging of this part passes, ed as if the former failed scarcely that “connection with” is more decedent, to the having survive died at to,” than we restrictive “relate have cau- entry the time of of the decree of disso- against an uncritical literalism tioned lution or declaration of invalidity. pre-emption that would make turn on 11.07.010(2)(a)(1994). § Wash. Rev.Code Instead, infinite connections. to deter- ¶ 12 the Washington Because statute re- mine whether a state law has the forbid- plan that quired “pay administrators bene- connection, look to the ob- den we both to the beneficiaries by fits chosen state guide of the ERISA statute as a jectives law, rather than to those identified the scope of the state law that Con- documents,” the statute plan implicated an survive, gress understood wоuld as well Egelhoff area of core ERISA concern. at the as to the nature of effect state Thus, Supreme 121 1322. the S.Ct. plans. law on ERISA found that the state statute ran 146-147, at Egelhoff, 532 U.S. S.Ct. provisions counter to ERISA’s a plan (internal quotations citations and “specify payments shall the basis on which omitted). Id., plan,” quot- are to and from the made ¶ 10 A principal objective of 1102(b)(4), § ing 29 and that the U.S.C. a uniform ERISA is “to establish adminis fiduciary the “in shall administer scheme, provides a trative which set of accordance with the documents and instru- Id., procedures guide processing standard governing plan,” quoting ments the 1104(a)(1)(D), § claims and disbursement of benefits.” making payments U.S.C. Egelhoff quoting beneficiary “designated by partici- S.Ct. Id., Coyne, pant plan.” or terms of the Packing Company Fort Halifax 1002(8). 1, 9, addition, In quoting 107 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed.2d U.S.C. (1987). Washington interfered ERISA directs fiduciaries to ad statute nationally “in objective minister a accordance with the of a uniform ad- Thus, delay uncertainty). “Uniformity impossible, wanted ministration. legal Egelhoff possibility forecloses the subject to different plans ... if are requir- to a administrator Id. at court order in different states.” obligations plan proceeds of “the ei- ing distribution person court or to a who is not ther into Washington stat 13 Unlike plan beneficiary.” ute, Pennsyl ensures that Section 6111.2 envisions 15 The restraint clause im statute has no re-designation vania’s judicial authority. grant a far narrower plan administrators. pact on ERISA Qualified domestic relations orders Thus, of the statute the second sentence provided for [QDROs] expressly are by court or provides: “Unless restrained 1056(d)(3)(A) §§ See 29 ERISA. U.S.C.A. der, company, pension or no insurance (excepting QDROs prohibition from the trustee, or other obli- profit sharing alienation), assignment or making payments gor shall be liable 1056(d)(3)(J) that a who (providing “person been a former which would have [QDRO] payee is an alternate undеr a of this proper in the absence section.” purposes any shall considered for be. (“prior 6111.2. restraint Pa.C.S.A. under provision of [ERISA] clause”). Plan continue to con documents plan”). Supreme Court of the administration, objective trol the and the recently recognized States has United of a national uniform administrative format QDROs effectively ERISA enforcement of expansive is maintained. Because of the rule provides exception general immunization, Pennsylva nature of the rely solely upon plan that administrators nia statute has no effect on the administra Kennedy v. Plan Admin documents. See Therefore, plans.1 tion of ERISA we hold Savings and Invest istrator DuPont pre-empted that Section 6111.2 is not —U.S. Plan, , -, ment - at 129 preemption There need for ERISA. is no 865, 876, 662, 172 L.Ed.2d 2009 WL S.Ct. by there is no conflict ERISA because (2009) 160440, (quoting at *9 from Section between ERISA and state law. 1056(d)(3)(J) stating, “But this ef ¶ 14 The Dissent concerned that the is fect means that a who administrator by reference to restraint court order in QDRO must be said to enforce enforces Section 6111.2 authorizes court orders “re- them.”). documents, ignore not strain[ing] plan fiduciary prior to distri- In concluding bution of benefits.” This concern is 16 that the re-des that, Egelhoff ignation not well founded. holds ex- clause of Section 6111.2 is ERISA, ERISA, cept expressly preempted by authorized the Dissent cites judicial re-designation plan proceeds favorably Metropolitan of is Ins. Co. v. Life (W.D.Penn.1995) 3, Walsh, pre-empted. Egelhoff F.Supp. See at 149-150 n. 892 671 (“Walsh”), (suggesting 121 S.Ct. 1322 that court inter- wherein the federal district vention increases costs and creates un- court held that ERISA Section pre-empts Washington subjected might 1. The statute had a more limited to a risk that a court hold protected plan immunization which payments were made with "actual knowl- liability making pay- administrators from Further, waiting edge” pay of a divorce. to the named unless ments among dispute benefits until resolution of knowledge had of the dissolution or "actual "simply claimants would transfer to the bene- also, marriage;” per- other invalidation of it delay uncertainty.” ficiaries the costs of pay- mitted administrators to refuse to make 149, Egelhoff at 121 S.Ct. 1322. Section among any dispute ments until resolution of grant 6111.2 has no such limitations on its of Supreme claimants to the benefits. The immunity. commented that were administrators

1271 Decisions of a federal district 17 In summary, Pennsylvania 6111.2.2 leg- court, of deserving respectful accomplished while consid islature policy objective eration, controlling precedent. are not See of re-designation of beneficiaries after di- Walker, Hill, v. LLP Barth and vorce. It enabling Carbis did so while ERISA (Pa.Su LLC, 573, King, 581 n. 9 perform administrators to their func- Further, the per.2007). brief discussion of tions as specified ERISA and without court predates by Pennsylvania issue district limitation law. Finally, by prоviding that a Supreme adoption United States Court’s of who payment receives interpretation impact anyone narrower “answerable to prejudiced by the preemption payment,” the “relate to” standard in 20 Pa.C.S.A. 6111.2, it has established a ERISA. See New York State basis for Conference disputes resolution of between Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. claimants which Co., 645, 655-656, impact does not on plan Travelers 514 administra- Ins. U.S. Therefore, tors.4 (1995); Section 6111.2 is 115 S.Ct. 131 L.Ed.2d 695 not 1322; pre-empted by ERISA. Egelhoff compare at 121 S.Ct. McClendon,

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 133, 139, U.S. S.Ct. Appellant L.Ed.2d also contends that (1990).3 the trial court overruling erred in her pre- course, 2. The Walsh ‍​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‍decision mirrors that in Metro- Congress’s would be to read politan sham, Company Hanslip, Insurance words of limitation as a mere and to Life (10th Cir.1991), 939 F.2d 904 presumption cited read the pre-emption p. Dissent 1276. The Oklahoma statute at Congress speaks out of the law whenever Hanslip signifiсantly said, issue in the case is dif- generality. the matter with That we ferent than Section 6111.2 in that the Okla- recognize have to attempt our homa statute does not insulate adminis- phrase construe the "relate to" does not liability implementing trators give help us drawing much the line here. documents, according to its nor does it create New York State Blue & Cross Conference of persons prejudiced by a cause of action for Co., Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. payment inappropriate assign liability or 655-656, U.S. Walsh, beneficiary. the named F.Supp. (1995) (internal omitted) L.Ed.2d 695 citation 1, quoting at 674 n. 15 Okl.St.Ann. (concluding statutory language is un- helpful proper analysis requires an 3. The Walsh decision cites to United objectives evaluation of of the ERISA stat- case, Supreme Ingersoll-Rand States ute). McClendon, 133, v.Co. 111 S.Ct. 478, (1990), incorporat- 112 L.Ed.2d 474 thus dispute provision provides 4.The resolution ing analysis that case's of the "relate to” remеdy comparable ato constructive trust as phrase scope pre- which defines the of ERISA Note, Rayho, advocated in Sarabeth A. Divor Co., emption. Ingersoll-Rand See 498 U.S. at cees Turn About in Their Graves as Ex- 139, ("Under broad, 111 S.Ct. 478 this com- Spouses Cash In: Codified Constructive meaning, may mon-sense a state law relate to Equitable Regarding Trusts Ensure Results plan, thereby pre-empted, benefit be Plans, Employee ERISA-Governed Benefit specifically designed even if the law is not to (2007); 106 Mich. L.Rev. 373 see also Kenne plans, only affect such or the effect is indi- dy v. Savings Plan Administrator DuPont for rect.”). However, subsequent Ingersoll- to - U.S. -, at - n. Plan, and Investment Rand, Supreme adopted Court has nar- 865, 875, 10, n. 172 L.Ed.2d interpretation phrase. rower of the "relate to” (2009) 2009 WL *8 n. 10 (declining express If “relate to” were taken to extend any regarding view indeterminacy, furthest stretch of brought its then "whether the could have an [estate] practical purposes pre-emption for all action state or federal court [for course, really, would never run spouse] its uni- mer to obtain benefits after were that, distributed.”). versally, stop relations nowhere. But 1272 ¶21 trial court is The Order of the Administrator

liminary objections this suit and bring capacity affirmed. lacked subject matter court lacked that the trial will it. “This Court hear

jurisdiction ¶ concurs Judge CLELAND regarding decision trial court’s reverse the result. only where there objections preliminary of law or abuse error of has been an ¶ Judge BOWES files a Const., Clemleddy Inc. v. discretion.” Concurring/Dissenting Opinion. (Pa.Su Yorston, A.2d Agres Inc. v. citing Denlinger, per.2002), AND DISSENTING CONCURRING ta, (Pa.Super.1998). BOWES, OPINION BY J.: ¶ regarding contention Appellant’s matter, 1 In we must determine this capacity is lack the Administrator’s Retirement Income Employee whether the pre-emp- alleged entirely upon based (“ERISA”) Security Act OF 1974 by ERISA. See 6111.2 tion of Section 6111.2, effect of preempts Pa.C.S. 17. Because ERISA Appellant, p. Brief beneficiaries, to designation divorce on 6111.2, we con- Section pre-empt does not applies section the extent without merit. that this claim is clude plan. ERISA-covered Finally, Appellant contends 2 That states: subject matter court lacked that the trial Probate, Pennsylvania jurisdiction. in this person If a domiciled Common- Fiduciary vests the or Estate and Code at the time of his death is di- wealth mandatory juris phans’ court division with matrimony from the bonds of vorced and distribu diction in the “administration as benefi- designating after his personal property the real and tion of annuity ciary policy, of a life insurance “adjudication and the decedents’ estates” contract, pension profit-sharing or property” of the personal of the title to arrangement pro- other contractual or or his nominee. 20 Pa.C.SA. decedent any spouse, to his viding payments (7) 711(1) A life in (respectivеly). designation in favor of his estate; an asset of the policy surance is was revocable him which therefore, subject it to the administra ineffec- after the divorce shall become of the estate. tion purposes and be con- tive for all shall has held that even Supreme Court [0]ur spouse had if such former strued as are not though life insurance predeceased appears him unless it assets, policies the life insurance estate a court wording designation, personal are producing the the or a written contract between order posses of the decedent his property spouse that the person and such former death, vesting Orphan’s the at sion was intended to survive the designation ap the jurisdiction to order by court the divorce. Unless restrained delivery proceeds. propriate order, company, pension no 91, Shahan, Pa.Super. In 429 re profit-shаring plan trustee or other or (1993), 1298, citing In re Henderson’s 1302 making pay- obligor be liable for shall (1959). 215, Estate, 395 Pa. 149 A.2d 892 a former which would ments to we the trial court Accordingly, find in the absence of this proper have been jurisdiction over this properly exercised its Any spouse to whom section. matter.

1273 Lines, Air In Shaw v. Delta limitations. be answerable made shall payment is 2890, 85, 97, 77 payment. Inc., 103 S.Ct. anyone the 463 prejudiced U.S. (1983), the States Su- United L.Ed.2d added). (emphases § 6111.2 20 Pa.C.S. that “some State recognized preme Court ¶ portion bolded refer to the first 3 I will plans benefit employee affect may actions “redesignation ‍​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‍the as of this section tenuous, remote, a peripheral or in too as the clause,” emphasized part the second law finding a that the to warrant manner final bold- and the restraint clause” “prior 100, plan.” to’ the 463 U.S. ‘relates I clause.” “remedy the segment as ed York State Con See also New S.Ct. 2890. majority’s with thе disagree respectfully Blue & Blue Shield Plans Cross clause the ference of conclusion 645, 655, Co., 514 v. Travelers Ins. U.S. not clause are restraint and the (“If (1995) 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 115 S.Ct. however, ERISA; I concur preempted were taken to extend to ‘relate to’ to the extent majority’s analysis with the indeterminacy, not then remedy clause is stretch of its furthest that it holds preemption practical purposes all preempted.1 for course, really, uni never run its would provide of ERISA is purpose 4 “The (cita nowhere[.]”) stop relations versally, employ- regime over regulatory uniform quotations marks omit tion and internal v. Health Inc. Aetna plans.” ee benefit ted). 2488, 200, 208, Davila, 124 S.Ct. 542 U.S. (2004). preempts ERISA L.Ed.2d 312 ERISA, “beneficiary” is defined 5 In laws insofar as “any and all State to the benefit person who is entitled any em- relate to now or hereafter may designated by participant or as either by ERISA. plan” covered ployee benefit employee plan. benefit 29 U.S.C. 1144(a). § A law relates state 29 U.S.C. 1002(8). fiduciary An is re- ERISA “in the normal sense an ERISA his duties with re- quired “discharge with or refer- if it has a connection phrase, plan” solely in the interest of the spect to Ingersoll-Rand Co. plan.” ence to such a and “beneficiaries” and “in “participants” 138-39, McClendon, v. 498 U.S. and instru- accordance with the documents (1990). “[T]o 112 L.Ed.2d 474 S.Ct. plan.” U.S.C. governing ments law has the whether a state determine 1104(a)(1)(D). connection, to the we look both forbidden view, redesignation clause my In guide as a objectives of the ERISA statute preempted be- clearly unequivocally is Congress of the state law that scope to the fiduciary employ- of an requires cause it survive, as well to the understood would by ERISA to dis- ee benefit covered law on the effect of the state nature of respect to a charge his duties with Div. Labor plans.” ERISA California contrary to the docu- a manner that Dillingham v. Standards Enfоrcement plan. governing ments and instruments N.A., Inc., Constr., 519 U.S. designation of its plan’s It mandates the (1997) (internal 136 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. beneficiary to rendered “ineffective be omitted). marks and citation quotation adminis- purposes” all and directs ERISA, although preemptive power particular to “construe” a bene- trator “deliberately expansive,” Pilot Ins. Life contrary specific in a manner Dedeaux, 41, 46, ficiary Co. (1987), plan in the document. terms contained does have its 95 L.Ed.2d majority's less. agree with the conclusion I also merit- final two claims are Appellant's that The clause section 6111.2 event” relating to the “payment or trans- thus “relates to” an plan ERISA-covered fer at death of the decedent’s interest requires plan because it distribution of as- nonprobate asset in favor of or granting an sets in a manner that is inconsistent with power interest or to the decedent’s former plan documents. spouse is revokеd.” The statute continued by redesignating recipient prior the asset restraint clause is also preempted because it those who would have expressly envisions received the asset that a court plan fiduciary can restrain a if the former spouse Nonpro- had died. prior to plan distribution of benefits. It bate assets were defined to include both a thereby exposes plan fiduciary to a court life policy insurance employee and an ben- action regarding proposed distribution of efit plan. retirement A plan administrator benefits, plan derogation plan protected was liability under the stat- documents, permit would a court to order ute if the administrator paid plan assets fiduciary plan pro- distribute the without “actual knowledge” that the mar- ceeds either court person into or to a who riage was no longer valid. plan beneficiary. is not the A fiduciary ¶ 10 The former argued that the subjected to such a court action would statute was preempted by ERISA. The fees, incur attorney’s at the expense of the United Supreme States agreed Court plan remaining and its participants and the former wife. It held that ERISA ex- beneficiaries, and required could be to dis- pressly preempted the statute in question plan tribute assets a manner that is for three discrete reasons. It first con- contrary documents. cluded that the statute preempted was be- ¶ 8 The United Supreme States required cause it “ERISA administra- case of Egelhoff Egelhoff, “pay tors” to benefits to the beneficiaries (2001), 149 L.Ed.2d 264 law, chosen state rather than to those Therein, controlling. the decedent/hus- identified in documents.” Id. at employed band was by a company that 147, 121 S.Ct. 1322. The Court found that provided him with a policy life insurance requirement to conflict with section pension plan that were govеrned both 1102(b)(4), which requires the plan to married, ERISA. While decedent des- “specify the basis on which payments are ignated his wife under both made to and from the plan,” and section plans. Two months after their subsequent 1104(a)(1)(D), which mandates divorce, intestate, the husband died having plan fiduciary administer “in ac- change failed to his beneficiary designation cordance with the documents and instru- under the life policy and pension ment governing the plan.” Id. The stat- plan. The plan paid ERISA the life insur- ute was ruled governed invalid because it proceeds ance to decedent’s former spouse. payment benefits, “the a central matter ¶ 9 Decedent’s children a previous administration.” Id. at

marriage were his intestate heirs under S.Ct. 1322. The Court held that “the stat- applicable laws of the state of Wash- ute at issue directly” here conflicted with ington. They instituted an action ERISA’s “plans mandates that be adminis- the former wife to recover the life insur- tered, and paid, benefits be in accordance ance pension benefits, with plan documents.” Id. at relying upon a statute similar to the one at S.Ct. 1322. issue in this case. The Washington statute provided Second, marriage once a was invali- Supreme United States dated “a made to that Court ruled that Washington statute provisions. out of the statute’s It rea- opt connection with ERISA prohibited had a nationally-uni- interfering opt provision with out still re- plans by soned administration, goal another of plan form quired plan language. a modification of It noted that administration ERISA. ¶ Finally, expressly reject- the Court possible plans is not if are standardization question position ed the that statute legal obligations in subject to “different preemption because it was saved Id. at 121 S.Ct. States.” different family probate law and pertained “both opined, Washington “The 1822. The Court law, regulation.” of trаditional state areas that poses precisely at issue here statute 1322. It noted that Id. S.Ct. cannot make threat. Plan administrators against preemption of presumption by identifying the benefi- simply payments of concern time-honored areas state In- ciary specified by documents. Congress if overcome has evidenced its themselves they must familiarize stead The ob- preemption. desire for Court they that can deter- with state statutes so family that state law will be served beneficiary’s mine whether the named sta- preempted “if it conflicts with ERISA or by operation of has been ‘revoked’ tus plans.” (citing relates to ERISA Id. (foot- 148-49, 121 S.Ct. 1322 law.” Id. at Boggs Boggs, omitted). noted (1997) (ERISA 138 L.Ed.2d held that ERISA Finally, the Court preempts community property state law ques- statute in was violated state testamentary transfer of an allowed it additional financial imposed tion because benefit)). pension plan interest in a plans. Thе on ERISA-covered burdens that, 15 I therefore must conclude un- required that the statute observed Court Egelhoff, der clause familiarize ERISA administrators to both is preempted Pa.C.S. 6111.2 because it fifty the laws of states and themselves with beneficiary alters the who is entitled to litigation.” The Court to “contend designated receive assets from the Washington statute continued that under the instruments. congressional “the thereby undermined “any designation That clause states that enacting ‘minimizing goal ERISA] [in spouse favor of his which was revo- financial burdens’ the administrative and cable him after the divorce shall be- ultimately on administrators-burdens 149-50, purposes Id. at come ineffective for all and shall borne the beneficiaries.” (quoting Ingersoll-Rand spouse if such former had 121 S.Ct. 1322 be construed as McClendon, 133, 142, Co. v. U.S. predeceased ‍​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‍parallel him.” The section (1990)). 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 S.Ct. Washington state law that was “A affected preempted provides, persuaded 13 The was not Court interpreted as if by this section must be preemption by the statute was saved spouse the former has failed to survive the insulating plan administrators from liabili- decedent.” Both statutes treat the former ty they paid if benefits without actual predeceased require distri- knowledge invalidity of the mar- would bution of the asset those who It noted that the statute still sub- riage. law have the benefit under state received jected those administrators “risk once the former is so treated. The might that a court later find that had indistinguishable operation. clauses are knowledge’ ‘actual divorce.” Thus, Washington statute in just as the similarly was unconvinced that the did, this of 20 Pa.C.S. per- Egelhoff portion because it preempted statute was not § 6111.2 “runs counter to ERISA’s com- to, documents to be modified mitted 1276 ¶ fiduciary the shall adminis- 18 The preemptive operation

mand ... of section in accordance with the docu- plan by Metropolitan ter the 6111.2 is best illustrated governing instruments the Walsh, ments and F.Supp. Insurance Co. 892 Life at 121 S.Ct. plan.” Egelhoff, (W.D.Pa.1995). case, 671 In that the ac- (internal marks citation quotation 1322 by fiduciary tion was filed the of an omitted). employee plan. ERISA benefit The fidu- a ciary sought justi- declaration that it was

¶ Moreover, by payment to directing paying fied in a death benefit due under a beneficiary plan a not listed docu- life disability program benefits to the ment, redesignation clause of 20 Pa. decedent/participant’s former wife. § interferes with nationwide When C.S. 6111.2 died, ex-wife, it re- plan participant uniform administration since had from his administrators to familiarize quires plan thirty whom he had been divorced for potentially conflicting themselves with years, beneficiary remained the named un- beneficiary state statutes to determine sta- beneficiary der the designation form on 148-49, Egelhoff, tus. U.S. plan file with the fiduciary, plan аnd the Hence, S.Ct. 1322. documents mandated that the benefits be sufficiently clause of 20 6111.2 is Pa.C.S. paid beneficiary to the named on that analogous Washington statute at form. The decedent’s current also Egelhoff. issue in sought the benefits. Both women ac- knowledged that Similarly, prior restraint clause under terms of the preempted by applicable ERISA because it allows ERISA plan, the ex-wife was fiduciary party to be named as a in a entitled to them. by court action and to be restrained court 19 The current averred that the thereby exposes plan fiduciary order. It designation was rendered void under 20 costs, litigation to court action and which Pa.C.S. 6111.2. The former wife coun- burden the plan. This conflicts with tered that section 6111.2 preempted was congressional goal ERISA’s stated “of ERISA, by and the district court agreed minimizing the administrative and financial because section 6111.2 related to an plan burdens on administrаtors-burdens plan. ERISA-covered The adopted ultimately borne the beneficiaries.” “Pennsylvania” stance that is “not in a 149-50, Egelhoff, supra at S.Ct. position provisions to alter of an (internal quotation marks and citation ERISA Id. plan.” at 675. It awarded the omitted). may restraint clause benefits to the spouse. also requiring result an order ¶ 20 The court upon Walsh relied Metro- pay plan administrator to benefits to some- politan Hanslip, Insurance Co. v. one not entitled Life to those benefits under the (10th Cir.1991), F.2d 904 where an ERISA The fact documents. plan fiduciary had been after sued distrib- administrator is not liable for distributing uting proceeds life insurance to its de- assets under the documents un- participant’s ceased ex-spouse, who re- less restrained court order does not mained applicable plan under being save section 6111.2 from preempted plaintiff documents. The because, noted, was the dece- Wаshington as under the estate, dent’s which have should received statute reviewed the United States Su- Court, the insurance preme under state stat- plan administrators were that, 6111.2, ute similarly immune if does section invalidated liability dis- tributed knowledge beneficiary designation assets without in fa- the divorce. vor of a spouse upon divorce. The Tenth Washington the state law was 24 The statute at issue in held Circuit applied ERISA-plan Egelhojf to an did not have a similar remedial preempted plan by provision. remedy it “related” to such affect- The of because clause section of designated beneficiary plan the as- ing 6111.2 has no effect on an ERISA-covered summary judgment It in granted sets. plan operate uninterrupted and allows it to plan fiduciary. the favor of litigation. and the threat of As without long redesignation prior as the and re- ¶ Walsh, Thus, in faced with 20 Pa. inapplicable straint clauses are to an 6111.2, fiduciаry plan the was C.S. plan, remedy provi- ERISA-covered the bring seeking guidance forced to an action sion, itself, in require and of does not the pay to whom it should benefits. In about to plan pay proceeds administrator the doing, fiduciary litigation so the incurred anyone plan beneficiary, other than the attorney’s expense costs and fees at the of require plan does not the administrator to and plan participants. other beneficiaries law, beneficiary ascertain a under state If the district court had not the adopted expose plan and does not the to court magistrate’s position, plan fiduciary the action. to pay plan would have been forced bene- fits to someone not entitled to them under plan 25 Once the assets are so distrib- governing plan. the documents the Both uted, redesignation the clause op- becomes prohibited arе the of these scenarios under erative as to the former and en-

Egelhojf decision. through remedy provision. forceable the

¶22 remedy provision applies only after my firm It is conclusion that the plan the benefits have been distributed restraint clauses of redesignation prior benefits, recipient and renders the of those preempted 611.2 are to the extent section benefits, only recipient the of the an- applicable are to an ERISA-covered Indeed, remedy swerable in court. the They mandate that the plan. actually of section 6111.2 envi- plan an ERISA-covered be distributed plan sions the administrator has dis- derogation expose documents and required by tributed the assets as the to the burden of famil- plan administrators plan document. It should not be consid- iarizing themselves with various state laws preempted. ered potential litigations and the costs. ¶26 However, view, my remеdy are the Several decisions instructive. States, preempted

clause of section 6111.2 is not In Central Southeast and South- Howell, v. remedy ERISA. The clause of section west & Areas Pension Fund (6th Cir.2000), provides, “Any to F.3d 678-79 an ERISA 6111.2 payment is made shall be answera- administrator instituted the action whom anyone prejudiced by payment.” seeking a declaration of who was entitled ble By declaring proceeds payable to insurance from an inoperative plan. as to ERISA- ERISA-covered The decedent had restraint clauses injunction thus issued in a divorce plans, covered we would free ERISA violated an him changing administrators to distribute as- court that restricted beneficiary designation with the his of the insur- sets accordance terms any during benefits from his wife being and from risk of hauled ance clause, Then, remedy oper- He pendency into court. of the court action. had beneficiary from ating independеntly, permits redesig- changed his wife children, beneficiary directly sought to seek redress his who had the life insur- nated spouse. proceeds. the former ance against ERISA, claim then Appeals could be [state law] 27 The Sixth Circuit Court beneficiary court acknowledged alleg divorce filed the named first and was was ineffective injunction right waived her to retain the ing that she to the extent that it 713; ERISA preempted proceeds.” Id. at see also Pardee alter the of bene- attempted Pardee, Representative Pers. Estate governing the terms payable fits under (Okla.Civ.App.2004) 112 P.3d However, the plan. ERISA-covered (once pension plan distributed as ERISA that the wife was entitled to concluded documents, plan in sets accordance of a con- equitable remedy imposition of subjected assets could be to constructive plans ERISA pro- trust on the structive recipient; trust under state law as tо It reasoned that ERISA does not ceeds. pension not funds protect “ERISA does rem- possible causes of action and preempt funds”). beneficiary after the receives the upon state law that attach edies based ¶ Although regulates ERISA the es- proceeds are ERISA-plan after the dis- of operation plan tablishment and adminis- tributed to the beneficiaries as mandated benefits, of it tration and the distribution plan the documents. ‍​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‍The court held govern rights does not the to and owner- that “once the benefits of ERISA em- ship of benefits once are disbursed to ployee’s plan welfare benefit have been such, beneficiary. the named As the rem- according to the plan distributed docu- 6111.2, edy provision of 20 on its Pa.C.S. ments, preempt impo- does not the ERISA applied particular face and as to the facts of a constructive trust on those ben- sition case, impermissi- of does nоt have an this efits.” Id. at 678. plans. ble “connection with” ERISA The Sweebe, Similarly, in Sweebe remedy provision solely gov- 6111.2 (2006), a Mich. 712 N.W.2d 708 dece spouse’s right erns divorced to retain paid dent’s former had been the after them proceeds receiving insurance proceeds proceeds of life insurance administrator; plan consequent- from the plan an ERISA-covered because she was ly, statutory operate this clause fails to in proceeds the named of those a manner that the administrator’s alters plan under the documents. The dece ability payment to make to a named bene- proceeds, dent’s estate claimed those ficiary or with the overall goal interferes the Supreme Michigan permitted Court of plan uniform nor it administration does the estate to recover them the subjecting risk to a plan administrator she had the because waived underlying court aсtion. the concerns As right proceeds to receive insurance in the Egelhojf not espoused implicated are divorce action. case, any impact remedy provision this the ¶ 29 The concluded that ERISA has on an ERISA is too tenuous and preempt not the action the did because the that it peripheral warrant conclusion properly administrator distributed preempted. remedy provision is The policy the life insurance to the named ben- section afoul 6111.2 does not run eficiary in accordance with the docu- pronounce- Supreme United States Court’s ruled, ments and mandates of ERISA. It in Egelhojf. ment require- “There is no invasion into the Furthermore, I believe that the the plan ments of ERISA because adminis- remedy provision is severable from the proceeds trator distributed the are portions section 6111.2 beneficiary, required named as ERISA. However, majority, the preempted. after the administrator dis- As noted proceeds required by preemption grounded upon Suprem- tributed the the acy redesignation in the States clause and re- Clause United Constitu part or not one of a stat tion. “Whether applica- straint clause in their preempted the excision of another ute can survive attempt tions administra- govern plan ques held is a part which has been invalid By tor’s initial distribution of assets. construction, statutory tion of de contrast, remedy provision the assumes termining it the court searches for disregarded administrator legislature.” intention of Rieck- clause, disbursing Dairy v. Milk Control McJunkin Co. proceeds spouse, to the divorced Pa. Pennsylvanda, 341 Commission of provides “any a cause of action to (1941). The public policy person prejudiced by payment” to col- severability, of this Commonwealth favors lect from the divorced specified within the and unless otherwise sрouse. statute, provisions of all individual presumptively are severable. statutes ¶ 33 Once the assets are distributed to Williams, 487, v. 574 Pa. Commonwealth the spouse with accordance the (2003); Annenberg 832 A.2d 968 v. documents, longer ERISA is no im- Commonwealth, 562 Pa. However, pacted. legislative the intent (2000). Statutory 346 The Construction spouse that a divorced should not retain a Act, § provides: Pa.C.S. life proceeds decedent’s can still provisions every statute shall be be through remedy provision, achieved the any If provision any severable. stat- which can look to the redesignation clause application ute or the any thereof to expressed for the purpose of the statute. invalid, person or circumstance is held statute, the remainder of the and the remedy 34 The provision, standing application provision of such to other alone, is capable of execution in accordance circumstances, persons or shall not be with legislature’s our intent. With the thereby, affected unless the court finds clause and restraint provisions that the valid of the statutes severed, clause applied as to ERISA ad- essentially inseparably are so con- ministrators, remedy provision the is none- with, depend upon, nected and so operable, specifically theless requiring a void or that it provision application, can- divorced to transfer life insurance presumed Assembly not be the General a person “prejudiced” by remaining would have enacted the valid severance, payment. Despite remedy one; provisions without the void or un- self-sustaining language contains less the court finds that remaining capable statutory that is of a construction alone, provisions, standing valid are in- demonstrating complete expression of complete incapable аre being exe- legislative intent. To the extent the reme- legislative cuted accordance dy provision’s may appear vague terms or intent. ambiguous, reference to the redesignation Pa.C.S. clause, longer subject pre- which is no ¶ Here, preempted I do not find the emption once the pro- receives the portions of 20 6111.2 to be “so Pa.C.S. ceeds, understanding clarifies our of these essentially inseparably connected part “[I]f terms. statute is held to remedy provision with” the to overcome unconstitutional, be the language of that presumption legislature that our would be part may clarify referred to order to remedy provision have enacted the had it the part and sustain that is constitutional.” known the other two void clauses were applied to ERISA administrators. Commonwealth ex. rel. Schnader v. Great Co., A. Pa.

American Indem. (1933).

¶ Thus, reached in the result I concur conclude that this majority and Appellee, the proceed because

action can III, Sauers, proceeding of Paul J.

Estate Sauers, L. under Jodie

against Appellant, of section 6111.2. remedy provision MINTO, Appellant

Marton

v. TRANSPORT, INC.

J.B. HUNT Minto, Appellant

Marton Inc., Services, Transport

J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.

and J.B. Hunt Pennsylvania.

Superior Court of

Argued June 2008. April

Filed

Case Details

Case Name: In Re Estate of Sauers

Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Apr 17, 2009

Citation: 971 A.2d 1265

Docket Number: 1060 MDA 2007

Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.