In re ESTATE OF RONALD A. REEDER, Deceased (Gery R. Gasick, Executor, Petitioner-Appellant, and The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, Intervenor-Appellee).
Appeal No. 3-21-0361
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT
January 25, 2023
2023 IL App (3d) 210361
JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Brennan and Davenport concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justices Brennan and Davenport concurred in the judgment and opinion.*
OPINION
¶ 1 On remand in an estate proceeding, petitioner, Gery R. Gasick, the executor of the decedent’s estate, sought to retain several thousand dollars in executor, attorney, and power of attorney (POA) fees that he had been paid by the estate. The Illinois Attorney General’s Office (AG), which had previously intervened in the case, opposed Gasick’s request. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to Gasick’s POA fees. After full briefing and a hearing on the cross-motions and the other matters pending before the court on remand, the trial court granted the AG’s motion for summary judgment, denied Gasick’s cross-motion for the same relief, and ordered Gasick to refund a large sum to the estate, including all of the POA fees that Gasick had been paid.1 Gasick appeals but only challenges a portion of the trial court’s ruling. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with one small correction.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 2 ¶ 3 In July 2014, the decedent, Ronald A. Reeder, died at the age of 76, leaving no spouse or descendants. In his will, the decedent left his entire residual estate, over $3 million, to 27 different charities. During the decedent’s lifetime, Gasick was the decedent’s attorney and also served as the decedent’s agent under a POA. Gasick was named as the executor of the decedent’s estate in the decedent’s will. Among other things, the decedent’s will provided for independent administration of the decedent’s estate; indicated that Gasick was not required to furnish security on his bond as executor; gave Gasick “full discretion” as executor in regard to the selection, valuation, and sale of the decedent’s tangible personal property; and granted to Gasick as executor certain “powers and discretions, in each case to be exercisable without Court Order,” including the power to settle claims for or against the estate.
¶ 4 In September 2014, Gasick filed a petition in the trial court to probate the decedent’s will. The trial court entered an order admitting the will to probate, appointing Gasick as the executor, and approving independent administration of the estate.
¶ 5 In May 2016, Gasick filed a final report in the trial court as the executor of the estate and mailed a copy of that report to each of the charitable legatees that had not waived notice. Among other things, the final report indicated that no claims had been filed against the estate; that a summary accounting had been sent by mail to all 27 of the charitable legatees in April 2016; and that a supplemental summary accounting, which showed the amount of attorney fees due from the estate, had been sent later that same month to the charitable legatees that had not responded to the first letter. After one of the charitable legatees objected to the final report due to a claimed lack of sufficient documentation, the AG sought, and was allowed, to intervene in the case. At the AG’s request and over Gasick’s opposition, independent administration of the estate was terminated, and Gasick was ordered to file an inventory, a petition for approval of
¶ 6 In June 2017, Gasick filed a petition for approval of the approximately $119,000 in postdeath attorney fees that he had been paid by the estate with various billing statements attached. The AG objected to the petition, claiming, among other things, that the amount of fees was excessive, that some of the fees were not sufficiently supported with documentation, and that a portion of the fees was for work that Gasick had performed as the executor of the estate, rather than as the attorney for the estate. Gasick filed a reply and provided some additional documentation.
¶ 7 In May 2018, a hearing was held in the trial court on Gasick’s petition for fees. The following month, the trial court issued its decision, finding that Gasick had overcharged the estate for certain matters and ordered Gasick to refund approximately $45,000 to the estate. Despite the AG’s request, the trial court did not address approximately $51,000 that Gasick had paid himself for work that he had performed for the decedent prior to the decedent’s death while acting as the decedent’s agent under a POA.2 After Gasick and the AG filed motions to reconsider, the trial court subsequently entered an order reducing the amount that Gasick was required to reimburse the estate to approximately $37,000 to account for a mathematical error that the trial court had made in its initial calculation of the amount of the refund required. Gasick filed his first appeal in this case to challenge the trial court’s ruling, and the AG filed a cross-appeal.
¶ 8 In October 2020, this court issued its decision on Gasick’s first appeal and reversed a portion of the trial court’s judgment. See In re Estate of Reeder, 2020 IL App (3d) 180739-U, ¶ 47. This court remanded the case to the trial court with directions to, among other things, determine whether the $51,000 in fees was for work that Gasick had performed in some capacity, other than as executor or attorney of the estate, and to determine if Gasick was required to file a claim with the probate court for those fees during the statutory claims period.
¶ 9 Upon remand in the trial court, there was no dispute between the parties that (1) the $51,000 in fees was for work that Gasick had performed for the decedent prior to the decedent’s death as the decedent’s agent under a POA and (2) Gasick had not filed a claim for those fees with the probate court during the statutory claims period. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to whether Gasick was required to file such a claim and as to whether Gasick was required to refund the $51,000 in POA fees to the estate. After full briefing and a hearing on that matter and the other matters pending before the court, the trial court found that Gasick was required to file a claim for the POA fees with the probate court during the statutory claims period and that Gasick had to refund the $51,000 in POA fees to the estate because he had failed to file such a claim. As part of the other issues that the trial court decided, the trial court also required Gasick to refund to the estate $600 in fees for work that Gasick had performed for the estate on October 20, 2014, despite the fact that the estate was never billed for, and
¶ 10 ¶ 11 ¶ 12
II. ANALYSIS
A. POA Fees
As his first point of contention on appeal, Gasick argues that the trial court erred in finding that Gasick was required to refund the POA fees to the estate because Gasick had failed to file a claim for those fees with the probate court during the statutory claims period, in granting summary judgment for the AG on the POA fees on that basis, and in denying Gasick’s cross-motion for the same relief. In support of that argument, Gasick makes two main assertions. First, Gasick asserts that the clear and unambiguous language of
¶ 13 The AG argues that the trial court’s ruling on the POA fees was proper and should be upheld. More specifically, as to Gasick’s first assertion, the AG contends that the trial court correctly found that the applicable statutes (
¶ 14 In reply to the AG’s assertions on appeal, Gasick repeats his initial contentions. Gasick also asserts that the public
¶ 15 The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact but to determine if one exists. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 42-43 (2004). Summary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, and affidavits, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
¶ 16 In resolving this particular issue, we must consider the language of the decedent’s will, the applicable statutory provisions, and the rules of statutory and will construction. Starting with the decedent’s will, the relevant provisions have been set forth above and will not be repeated here.
¶ 17 As for the applicable statutes, there are three that directly apply,
“An independent representative acting reasonably for the best interests of the estate has the powers granted in the will and the following powers, all exercisable without court order, except to the extent
that the following powers are inconsistent with the will: * * *
(e) To settle, compound or compromise any claim or interest of the decedent in any property or exchange any such claim or interest for other claims or property; and to settle compound or compromise and pay all claims against the estate as provided in Sections 18-11 and 18-13 [(
755 ILCS 5/18-11 ,18-13 (West 2014)) ], but claims of the independent representative or his attorney shall be subject to Section 18-8[.]”Id. § 28-8(e) .
Finally,
¶ 18 Turning to statutory construction, the rules that apply are well established. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56. The most reliable indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the statute itself. Id. In determining the plain meaning of statutory terms, a court should consider the statute in its entirety and keep in mind the subject the statute addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 29 (2009);
¶ 19 Lastly, with regard to the principles of will interpretation, it is well settled that, when interpreting the provisions of a will, a court’s purpose is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intent of the testator. Overturf, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 642. The testator’s intent should be determined from the will as a whole, bearing in mind the plan of the testator as expressed in the entire will, and should not be gathered from considering only one clause of the testator’s will standing alone. Id.
¶ 20 In the present case, when we consider the provisions of the decedent’s will as a whole, the applicable statutory sections, and the rules of statutory and will construction, we find that Gasick was required to file a claim with the probate court during the statutory claims period for the POA fees that he sought to be paid from the estate. See
¶ 21 Under the circumstances of the present case, the trial court correctly determined that Gasick was required to file a claim against the estate for the POA fees and that Gasick’s claim was barred because he had failed to file that claim with the probate court during the statutory claims period. See
¶ 22 ¶ 23
B. Fees for Work Performed on October 20, 2014
As his second point of contention on appeal, Gasick argues, and the AG agrees, that the trial court erred in requiring Gasick to reimburse the estate for $600 in fees for work performed by Gasick on October 20, 2014. As both parties rightly note, the estate was not billed for, and did not pay, the fees in question. We, therefore, correct the trial court’s judgment on appeal to deduct that $600 from the amount that Gasick is required to refund to the estate. See
¶ 24
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County as modified.
¶ 26 Affirmed as modified.
In re Estate of Reeder, 2023 IL App (3d) 210361
No. 14-P-423
Circuit Court of Peoria County
Hon. David A. Brown, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: Gery R. Gasick, of Dunlap, for appellant. Attorneys for Appellee: Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Evan Siegel, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee.