*1 905A.2d 471 QUICK. H. re OF Robert ESTATE Quick II, Estate Appeal Executor of the Robert H. Quick II, Quick, and Robert

of Robert H. H. Quick. Individually M. and Richard Supreme Pennsylvania. Court

Argued Sept. 2003. Aug.

Decided *3 Conti, George A. Esq., Greensburg, for Robert Quick, H. II. Cassidy, Greensburg, Sean Bean Esq., Marilyn Jeffers. C.J., CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, Before and SAYLOR, LAMB, EAKIN and JJ.

OPINION Justice EAKIN. granted

We appeal allowance determine whether a (JTWROS) joint tenancy with of survivorship was sev- execution an oil ered and lease. gas conclude the We parties intended the JTWROS to remain intact when the oil executed; gas lease accordingly, affirm the Supe- we rior Court’s decision. July, Frank Jones, A. A. Jones Grace deed,

general warranty conveyed fee simple title to approxi- mately Loyalhanna acres land Township, Westmore- County, land Quick, Kenneth Robert Quick, and Robert JTWROS; Bean October, the deed was recorded in On December 26 of year, the same three tenants and their an oil gas wives executed respect to the Seanor; favor of William and Marcus the lease was recorded March 1958.1 Kenneth Quick April died 1972, and title to the property Quick vested Robert Bean the surviving JTWROS. 14, 1979,

On June Bean executed oil and lease on *4 in property Associates, favor of Paul H. Gerrie & Inc. On 15, 1979, September Quick gave a similar oil gas and lease to Both 20, 1979, Gerrie. leases were September recorded as- signed by 15, Gerrie to Largent May Investments and assigned Loyalhanna further to Drilling Program February 1. Bean executed Non-Development covering an Affidavit of this lease 5, 1980, May days and it three recorded later. This affidavit vitiated the 1957 lease. identical, except are Quick Bean and executed The leases that states: type-written addition the Bean lease contains dis- ownership royalty question property any “Should arise, accept to full agreed the Lessor has pursements [sic] Record, E to at Exhibit Original Bean Lease responsibility.” (Petition Quick 2. The Declaratory at Judgment), Item 29 for Original at contain this clause. Lease Quick lease does not (Petition Record, Declaratory Judg- F for Exhibit to Item ment), at 2. commenced, and all to Bean and

Drilling royalties paid were (one-sixteenth) of Quick one-eighth one-half of received —each drilling. Quick until from the This continued royalties date, 25, 1981; royalties after that were September died amount, one-sixteenth each to Bean in the same paid 29, 1992, July recorded By deed dated June Quick. Estate 6, 1992, Bean, through attorney-in-fact, appellee Marilyn his Jeffers, to Since property appellee. Bean transferred royalties been paid appellee, one-sixteenth have in royalties been held escrow and one-sixteenth of have ownership of the interest that be- pending resolution of longed Quick. citation, alleg- filed a for a April, petition appellee death.

ing upon Quick’s to the vested Bean property title Record, at 4-5. for Item She Original Petition Citation require the estate to requested Quick’s the court executor royalties as under the lease and account funds received her, Loyalhanna Drilling distribute them to to order Id,, at 8-9. royalties held escrow. Program pay over II, of Quick, H. as executor of the Estate Quick, Robert individually, H. M. Quick, Quick as Robert II and Richard well Quick’s (appellants), Robert sons and heirs filed answer Bean and alleging and counterclaim JTWROS between 14,1979 oil and lease to Quick by Bean’s June was severed Gerrie, not vest Bean therefore title did held the upon Quick, Quick the death of since Bean common. property

490

At an 2001 April, hearing, appellee appellants stipulated submitted facts and petitioned court declare by whether the was JTWROS terminated the 1979 leases. The court determined the 1979 did not sever the JTWROS, thus, law, by operation of Bean became sole of property upon Quick’s owner death. Appellants appeal Court, Superior ed which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Appellants petitioned this for Court allowance of appeal, granted, which we limited to the following issue:

Did conveyance by Robert J. Bean of his one-half interest in and to the oil and the joint estate sever of tenancy rights survivorship then existing between Robert Bean Quick? J. and Robert H. 468, Quick, (2003)

In re Estate 572 Pa. A.2d 817 473 (per of curiam). law, with all As our of questions standard review novo, de and our scope review is plenary. Straub v. Industries, 608, 561, (2005). Cherne Pa. 880 583 A.2d n. 7 566 or persons

When two more property hold JTWROS, title to vests equally persons those lifetimes, during their ownership with sole passing survivor at the death the other tenant.2 In re Park Estate, 527, 476, (1961). hurst’s 402 Pa. 167 A.2d 478 In contrast, tenancy a in common is an estate there which unity possession separate but and distinct titles. In re Sale Dalessio, (Pa.Cmwlth. Property 1386, 657 A.2d 1387 n. 1 1995). The essence a interest, is the four JTWROS unities: title, time, possession. Cleck, General Credit Co. v. 338, (1992). 553, Pa.Super. 609 A.2d A must JTWROS be by express created or by implication, words necessary Thomp son, at but there are no particular must words which used its creation. Saylor, Maxwell v. 58 A.2d (1948). fact, In courts have found intent create a trumps JTWROS the use of imprecise improper language in creating it.

2. While JTWROS Pennsylvania, has been said to be disfavored in see Pennsylvania Bank Thompson, and Trust Co. Pa. 247 A.2d (1968), legitimate permissible by 771-72 it means which individuals hold title. conveyed to two brothers Thompson, property Thompson, the entireties.” 771. Since deed as “tenants ownership by by the entireties is reserved *6 held wife, the brothers a this Court determined husband and conveyor’s in order to effectuate the the as JTWROS Id., at a of 772. creating right survivorship. intent of hus- Maxwell, designated were people In two unmarried deed, as convey the land on a which would band and wife Maxwell, if they entireties had been married. the parties desired this determined the Again, at 355-56. Court in to right survivorship, give of order to a establish intent, man and to that concluded the unmarried meaning Id., at JTWROS. 356. woman were Zamiska, (1972), A.2d a 449 Pa. Zomisky his “as joint in to son

father title land himself conveyed Id., survivorship.” in common the of tenants and as intestate, the deed was Following the father’s death at 723. conflict- survivorship” of challenged phrase “right because the This found concept the of tenants common. Court ed with JTWROS, a to the because find otherwise would deed created Id., at survivorship” of “right meaningless. the phrase render above, the of the cases considered In each cited Court tenancy the of estab- parties type intent of the determine As previously explained: lished. we meaning the any ambiguity there doubt

[W]here they of grant, in a contract or the terms a the covenants construction, and one that “receive a reasonable will should and, in order to parties; the intention of the accord with intention, circum- the must look at the ascertain their court “It the grant was made.” stances under which and, guide, ultimate parties which is the intention intention, take into the court order ascertain circumstances, situation surrounding consideration view, have they parties, objects apparently subject-matter agreement.” the nature Farren, (1945) Hindman v. 44 A.2d omitted) (citation added). (emphasis Clearly and without dispute, parties here intended to hold title as Appellants argue JTWROS.' following lease, execution of Bean’s oil the JTWROS severed, and Quick between Bean in a resulting tenancy Appellants common. adopt would have us a rule that a tenants, lease executed fewer than all of in all instances severs JTWROS. This to do. The we refuse intentions of the parties executing the leases cannot ig- nored, unwary lest cause we titleholders undo inadvertently unity they title which must purposefully create. significant

Intent is equally when addressing severance as it is when considering JTWROS whether a “A joint JTWROS was created. one severed when *7 Cleck, or of more the four unities is at destroyed.” 556. “[I]t joint is well settled in this state that a tenancy with of action, survivorship by is severable the voluntary or involun tary, Worrell, 450, of either of the parties.” Angier v. 346 Pa. (1943) (citation omitted). 87, 31 A.2d An involuntary severance an act “requires effectively joint which divests the interest, tenant’s such an joint as attachment execution on a tenancy, or assignment in trust or judgment ” Lucey, 306, 444, execution.... Sheridan v. 395 Pa. 149 A.2d (1959) (citation omitted). severance, 445-46 A voluntary such here, alleged joint is occurs when one of the tenants takes affirmative create a steps common. For exam joint ple, tenant obtain a separation “[a] severance or of the a property granting partition or decree thereby and obtain an undivided fee interest in one-half of the In re property.” Larendon, (1970). Estate 439 Pa. 266 A.2d of “[Although a act on the of of voluntary part one the severance, tenants is adequate to a work act must be sufficient manifestation that the actor is unable to retreat position from his creating joint tenancy.” severance the Sheridan, 446; Sadowski, at Clingerman see also (1986) (“[A] 519 A.2d tenancy can be parties, long of one of the so by unilateral act severed sever.”). an intent unequivocally signifies clearly act Therefore, gas the 1979 oil and leases to determine whether JTWROS, inten- parties’ consider we must severed observed, the As court them. the trial executing tions in Bean Quick either which any record is devoid action tenancy. Trial destroy intent to signify the would 11/9/01, on at 22. The dates which Opinion, separate Court determinative, the parties not for signed the leases were contempo- intended to execute may very well have oil seeking gas and corporation The same was raneously. obviously both was rights, permission knew executed drilling begin. could Both leases were needed before recorded until party, in favor of the same and neither was day. the same Both signed other recorded on were —both The third simultaneously assigned party. same were oil and leases by of execution dates difference evince an intent distant owners does not geographically each where tenant sever the JTWROS. This not a situation agree- the other’s changed the use without not the simply ment. The difference in dates of the leases might factor it be in other scenarios. definitive Kissimmee, Florida, and leases indicate Bean lived Island, Original York. Bean Lease at Long on Quick lived New (Petition Record, Judg- for Declaratory Exhibit E to Item ment), 1; Record, F to at Exhibit Quick Original Lease (Petition ma- at 1. Fax Declaratory Judgment), Item 29 mail ubiquity overnight had not attained chines *8 sending not then a routine means of business delivery was like, Teleconferencing staple today, and the documents. years ago. signings parties not norm Simultaneous importantly, 1500 miles could not be and more apart expected, significant, happened until both legally nothing it was not as and technology Taken in the context leases were executed. 1979, the time the execution separating business practices owners, is not differing of the leases indicative visions held fundamentally way much less a desire to alter the two title.

The two leases themselves identical virtually were their 11/9/01, 22; Opinion, terms. See Trial Court at In re Estate of Quick, No. 2122 unpublished WDA memorandum at 17, 2002). (Pa.Super. filed The Sept. only difference two leases—an additional single type-written clause hardly Bean lease—is of an determinative intention to sever clause agreed JTWROS. The states lessor to take responsibility” questions “full for and ownership “disburse- ments” —what “responsibility questions” anyone’s means is guess, but no guess there is reason to that it had anything do the way with Bean wanted to hold title. The extra clause vague is so ambiguous and as to meaningless, be and is no all; basis for finding really the leases are different at these leases are two essentially copies of same lease. subject

The matter the leases also sheds on the light parties’ that, intentions. While this Court has stated as leases, oil between and other gas “there is no difference respects [between the interest or estate them] ...,” Foster, conveyed Hamilton v. 116 A. (1922),we recognized is, course, distinction, true that there is a upon

[i]t questions of an interpretation, gas between oil and lease and types leases, ... being the reason [other lease[s]] business, other relating like all instruments to a particular always must be construed due regard the known characteristics of the business.... (citations omitted). Thus,

Id. gas oil while leases, not legally dissimilar to other clearly such a lease is contextually Here, oil different. leases to Gerrie assigned time, were Largent Investments at the same then simultaneously were assigned Loyalhanna Drilling. Moreover, did drilling on not commence until after both leases were executed and recorded. Although times, context, leases were executed different in a business they treated functionally were attainment of but one lease. intention is the ultimate parties guide

when there is doubt or ambiguity regarding a covenant in *9 Hindman, Their at 242. a See grant. or a term in contract considering whether determinative when intention is The intention Thompson, was created. JTWROS determining the when must also considered the parties parties There is no the tenancy. of that evidence severance their and sever gas the 1979 oil here intended and, JTWROS; operation remained intact their JTWROS upon of the law, the sole Bean became owner of the we affirm the decision Accordingly, death. Quick’s Superior Court. join this CASTILLE CAPPY and Justice

Chief Justice opinion. concurring opinion files a joins SAYLOR this and

Justice opinion. opinion. dissenting files a

Justice NEWMAN in not participate and LAMB did Justices NIGRO Former the case. decision SAYLOR, concurring.

Justice for- opinion. I The tension between join majority unities and strictly applying four malism involved has effectuating aim of wishes salutary See, e.g., R.H. literature. extensively been discussed Helmholz, Joint and Formalism the Severance Realism (1998) Tenancies, (summarizing seg- 2-3 77 Neb. L.Rev. support I deci- commentary). ment of the decisions context, as oil-and-gas-lease in the sion to favor the latter the Honor- orphan’s (per court opinions reflected (which Bell), Judge adopted B. Court Superior able Alfred rationale), Accord Kuntz on present majority. Bell’s op (1989). § 5.9 the Law Oil Gas NEWMAN, dissenting. Justice tenancies, I does not favor

Pennsylvania law the execu- Majority from the determination dissent tenancy did not sever a tion of an oil and (JTWROS). survivorship at its arriving position, has Majority overlooked the four unities that are required *10 joint tenancy to create a and has reached a decision that is inconsistent our case statutory with and law.

“As first we must principle, recognize joint tenancies are by not favored the law and that a statute of the Common- survivorship wealth eliminates the from joint feature tenancies it by express by unless is created or necessary implica- words tion.” Bank Pennsylvania and Trust 432 Thompson, Co. 262, 771, (1968); 110;1 § Pa. 247 A.2d see 68 771 also In P.S. Michael, 207, 338, (1966) re Estate 421 Pa. A.2d 342 218 of (observing that our clearly ease law “[b]oth [statute] joint indicate that tenancies with the incident right survivor- law”). are not ship deemed favorites Thus, Pennsylvania, joint the vitality of the rests tenancy title, on interest, time, the existence the four unities of addition, possession. there must a specific be intent to create the right survivorship; otherwise the interest creat presumed ed is to a mere be common. See 306, (1959) (“[i]t Lucey, 444, Sheridan v. 395 Pa. 149 A.2d 445 joint relationship basic of a tenancy that the four time, title, unities of possession interest and co-exist with the right of survivorship clearly [and is] manifested Kotz, conveyance”); 444, also see Estate Pa. 406 486 (1979) 524, (“joint A.2d 532 tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commenc time, at one ing same and held one and the same Parkhurst, possession”); 527, In re 476, A.2d 167 478 (“[t]he (1961) essence of title joint as tenants the'right with part, provides In relevant this statute as follows: tenants, partition If joint they be not made between whether be such not, might compelled partition have been or make or of be, thing possessed whatever kind estates or parts holden or survivors, of those die shall who first not accrue shall but devise, debts, pass by subject charges, descend or and shall be dower, administrators, curtesy or or transmissible to executors or every and be purpose considered to other intent and in the same joint manner as if such deceased tenants had been tenants in com- .... mon §110. 68 P.S.

497 is to not common vest two survivorship and lifetime, ownerships during sole own- persons more at the death of the to the survivor passing and control ership Estate, 108, tenant”); Pa. 20 Cochrane’s 342 In re other (1941) 305, interests (explaining A.2d “[t]he 307 the half or They part own equal. tenants are title, interest, is a whole, unity tout. There per et per my possession”). time and of the four

A whenever one or more is severed joint tenancy Kotz, 531-32; A.2d Credit 406 Gen. destroyed. unities are (1992), Cleck, 556 415 609 A.2d Pa.Super. Co. v. (1992); discontinued, 560 Riccel Pa. 613 A.2d appeal (1991), Forcinito, appeal 595 A.2d Pa.Super. li v. (1992). denied, This 602 A.2d Pa. of either of action, voluntary or “by involuntary,

achieved *11 tenants in [becoming] [resulting parties the parties in] 411, 197, Pa. 115 200 Epler, common.” v. 382 A.2d Stanger Estate, 535, (1955); In re 439 266 A.2d see also Larendon’s Pa. (1970). a on one “[Although part act of voluntary 766 severance, act joint adequate of the tenants is to work a that of manifestation that the actor is unable must be sufficient joint of of the position creating retreat from his a severance Sheridan, A.2d tenancy.” 149 at this had not addressed judice,

Prior to the matter sub Court joint than whether the execution of a lease all fewer joint tenancy to terminate the and to tenants sufficient in the interest into a common. Pursuant convert England, joint rule in one of the old followed when his a survivorship stranger, leased interest with a of Allen, See “What Acts One tenancy was severed. W.W. Will or Terminate the Tenan- More Joint Tenants Sever (1959), The §918 11 and cases therein. cy,” 64 A.L.R.2d cited however, divergent in country, opin- courts this have reached from leading emerged ions The authorities on issue. two Maryland and California. Maryland English

The courts have the traditional followed Boyer, 253 Md. 253 A.2d rule. Alexander that, (1969), held one Maryland the Court of where Appeals joint tenant leased her interest in real to the hus- property tenant, another joint band of sub-leased the subsequently who to a property party, joint third tenancy was terminated. The that by executing court reasoned a for a certain lease term, joint conveyed rights tenant her in the land to the lessee, “thereby changing the nature her ‘interest’ in the present reversionary land from a interest to a interest.” Id. (emphasis original). at 365 Noting that the transaction, sub-leased after initial the court also found joint that the parted possessory tenant “had with all of her for the term the Id. In rights lease.” accordance with this analysis, Alexander court determined that transaction destroyed the unities in the possession joint interest Id. tenancy. California, however,

The state reaches a different result. articulated, As the late Stanley Justice Mosk writing Boswell, Supreme Court of California Tenhet v. 18 Cal.3d (1976), Cal.Rptr. P.2d 330 a tenant when leases his a interest third for a term of person years, and term, during dies does lease not sever the but tenancy, expires upon the death of the lessor.

The Tenhet recognized court the view expressed Alexan Tenhet, der. Cal.Rptr. 554 P.2d 334 (acknowledging argued could be unities destroys “[i]t possession interest and leasing because the tenant trans fers to the present lessee his possessory interest retains reversion”). mere Supreme California Court also ac *12 knowledged that it is difficult to reconcile the absolute survivorship of joint essential element tenancy —the —with “the the term possibility may that continue beyond Conversely, lifetime of lessor.” Id. Mr. Justice Mosk noted that joint “if lease entered into ... by [the only during joint valid tenant] [the lessee] tenant’s] [the life, then the a conveyance variety is more of life estate pur years autre vie than a term of inconsistent [which is] with [the joint to freedom alienate his interest his during tenant’s] lifetime.” Id. tenancy, of joint treatment appears

It that the disfavored Civil of the California statutory language in embodied “in of this interest Code, express declaration requires which instrument,” analysis the legal formed the crux of creating The reasoned that: opinion in Tenhet. Id. at 335. intent, and upon express only

Inasmuch as the estate arises joint intent be the intent of cases such will many in cir- themselves, to a we decline find severance clearly not estab- unambiguously do cumstances which to terminate the that either of the tenants desired lish estate. This, turn, to conclude led the court

Id. at 335-36. Tenhet “[bjecause created'only express a that intent, unambiguous añd because there are alternative estate, we hold that the the nature of that altering means tenancy.” not to sever the operate lease here issue did Id. at 336. “identical, case, except Majority labels the leases

In this a that states: type-written contains addition the Bean lease royalty or dis- any question property ownership ‘Should arise, full agreed accept the Lessor has pursements [sic] ” 489, 905 A.2d at 479. I Majority Opinion at responsibility.’ except” is an oxymoron, the term “identical believe to be purported a serving flag red warn that what is a actually different. The situation before “identical” us good example. identical, finding Majority the lease was constrained overlook, are away, reality or rationalize that the leases unlike the Majority acknowledges

not same. Quick, agreement signed by Robert document executed a encumbering Bean contained addition typewritten Robert any relating him full liability dispute Further, not the leases were ownership royalty payments. instead, three day; they signed the same were signed on apart. me the leases months This leads to conclude result, and, failed to meet from each other separate were interest, title, JTWROS, four unities: the essence which is Cleck, time, Pa.Super. Credit Co. possession. Gen. (1992). 338, 609 A.2d *13 differences,

The is Majority dismissive these to the detriment of the unities of required possession. interest and Although recognizes it the Bean lease contained an lease, additional clause not found in the Quick Majority the concludes that what that clause means “is anyone’s guess, but no there is reason to it guess anything had do the with way Bean wanted to hold vague title. extra clause is so ambiguous meaningless, as to be and is no basis for really the at finding leases are different all....” Majority added). at Opinion A.2d at (emphasis I find the reasoning Majority to be internally inconsistent and curious, First, at best. it Majority states that is impossi- means; nevertheless, ble to discern what the despite clause impossibility interpretation, the Majority concludes that “anything clause cannot have way do with the Bean Next, hold title.” Id. wanted the Majority finds that the clause, additional mean anything which could is “so nothing, vague ambiguous as to meaningless.” Finally, Majority posits impossibility interpreting “really clause means that the two are not different.” my opinion, the clause imposes substantive obligation on Bean that is neither nor meaningless vague. Although language artfully, could have been crafted more fact that the Bean lease includes a: substantive that the obligation Quick lease does not. The lease is different because clause, additional the Majority merely it speculates that “meaningless” in order to preordained reach its conclusion that the no import. difference The terms of obli- gation contained the clause encumbered Bean full with liability any relating to dispute property ownership or royalty payments. disparity, This rather than being meaning- less, plainly legal involves important obligations.

Likewise, I can not reconcile fact that the leases were signed apart three months the Majority’s view that separate signings were “not legally significant.” Majority Opinion Again, A.2d at the Majority seeks to minimize this by surveying difference in technolo- changes gy machines, that have fax occurred since when over- not used as teleconferencing were delivery, mail night *14 have been more today. recognize may I that it they are While in the signings by parties to effectuate simultaneous difficult 1970s, The is that the leases impossible. not fact were it was dates, unity require- the in time violating on signed different ment for a JTWROS. equally that is correctly *15 Ammons, (Pa.1806). v. 1 Binn.

Simpson 175 as Just with the case, in mortgage Simpson, our the lease executed by than joint fewer all of the tenants who held the property. Therefore, finding that such a transaction tenancy severs promotes with our earlier harmony pronouncement Simpson.

Having concluded that a lease executed than all fewer of the tenants in fact severs a with of survivorship, it is necessary consider whether the same rule apply would to the execution “oil of an and lease. gas” words, other is atypical there so an “oil something about and gas” lease that require given would a different result the present circumstances? I conclude that there no is material difference in this respect.

Admittedly, this Court has the recognized peculiar nature of the gas” “oil and leaseholds. “Owing the marked differ- ences in the of oil nature and and solid such minerals as coal, rights the of respective lessees the minerals are not the They any same.... bear scarcely resemblance to a house recognize may 2. We prevent specific that this rule the fairest results However, provide predictability cases. it will also the needed in the resolved, way disputes future ultimately would be which will serve to contextual, justice by forestalling ensure intent-oriented decision- making analysis of adopt this issue become could should we approach. other

503 only in solid they part resemble or farm lease and Baird, 334 Pa. 6 A.2d Appeal minerals such coal.” Lemon, (1939) curiam); v. Kleppner see also (per (1896) (“[t]he gas, nature of oil 176 Pa. 35 A. rocks, vagrant and the of the pressure superincumbent enter pressure, under influence of this habit both fluids agreement”). such an contemplation parties into the both mineral; Gas, true, peculiar it but it is a mineral with is attributes, aris- require application precedents which careful ordinary rights, out of mineral much more ing mere than principles consideration of involved oil, strongly gas, and still more decisions.... Water themselves, if not too analogy be classed animals, fanciful, In common with as minerals nature. feroe minerals, and the they power and unlike other have the escape the volition of owner.... tendency without land, it,of so part to the of the and are They belong owner control; it, subject on or in to his long they are and are land, or come escape, then into other go but when control, title the former owner under another’s land, therefore, necessarily not gone. Possession distant, If possession gas. adjoining, or even land, owner, that it your gas, his so taps drills own control, longer his his it is no comes into and under well his. yours, but DeWitt, & v. Cambria Nat. Gas Co.

Westmoreland Wheeler, (1889); Pa. 235, A. see Hague also *16 (1893) (“it 714, gas A. said the oil and are is that minerals, they may through since unlike solid move of an or in the sand rocks search spaces interstitial crevices pressure from the to opening through they may escape which subject”). they which are

Nonetheless, nature of oil and despite unique, fugacious in the manner as gas, gas” “oil and leases are treated same interests: purporting convey property other documents course, distinction, is, there upon It true is lease and interpretation, gas between an oil and questions ... being a coal lease the reason agricultural even leases, all like other instruments to a relating particular business, must always be construed with regard due to the known characteristics of the business ... but there no difference between them as respects the interest or estate ... conveyed and ... as to the owner in fee and his is, their grantees, dominion upon general principles, absolute over the fluid over the It solid minerals. exercised in the same manner and with the same results. Foster, (1922) Hamilton et al. v. 116 A. (internal omitted); quotations citations and Prager’s see also Estate, (1920) (“[wjhile 74 Pa.Super. owing to the migratory fugacious character oil there are certain distinctions existing minerals, between them and fixed there no difference as respects interest or estate will]”). conveyed by [a us, case before I see no difference “oil between an lease gas” and a “run-of-the-mill” leasehold. In both

instances, the lessee obtains the present enjoyment and utilization of the for a predetermined period of time. I Ultimately, applying propose rule to the today case, facts of I find executing favor of Gerrie, Robert Bean irrevocably altered the nature his land, interest changing present from a interest to a interest, reversionary thus the unities of destroying interest and possession and terminating tenancy. unity destroyed time was three-month gap between the parties’ Thus, signing of leases. after Robert Bean leased Gerrie, his interest both Robert Bean and Robert Quick owned undivided one-half interests in the property as tenants common. Following his death in interest Robert Quick Bean, did not revert Robert but remained an asset in his estate.

Conclusion (cid:127) all Accordingly, reasons, of the above I would reverse the Opinion Superior Order Court. notes Majority “[i]ntent is addressing a of a JTWROS as it significant when severance Majori- considering a JTWROS was created.” when whether acknowledges Opinion at A.2d at 475. It further ty more of the four joint tenancy is severed one of when “[a] (citation omitted). The destroyed.” Majority is Id. unities executing analyze parties then the intent of the proceeds to not evidence the leases and notes that the record does contain destroy joint the demonstrating parties intended respect to evidence While the record was silent tenancy. with tenancy, Majori- intent to indicating sever parties’ by surmising very in the that “the well ty gap parties fills Id. contemporaneously.” intended to execute the leases have A.2d flawed, has Majority I this that the reasoning given find intend to speculated parties that the did not sever merely JTWROS, fact that the by that is contradicted supposition one not executed and that contemporaneously were obligation lease substantive term encompassing contained a Conjecture Majority not. by that the other one did not trump parties not intend sever the does did not signed leases that were identical parties the fact that the three months apart. necessary I find that it is make the same Essentially, the Tenhet solutions to the determination as court—both facing Although are reasonable. question that we are this flexibility approach appealing, the Tenhet obvious law, factual its nuances and scenar- multiple area of case, ios, this vividly by requires plain demonstrated this all citizens of guidance by understandable directive decision, Commonwealth, by our by who will affected it. ultimately applying our be tasked with courts that will Therefore, opinion, in my bright-line espoused rule by Alexander that the of a for a signing years number joint one of the party joint tenants to a third severs tenancy option.2 the better The rule that I adopt today would consistent with the way previously Court has addressed of mortgages execution joint Kotz, tenants with survivorship. supra, we that, joint determined all where a mortgage execute purchase for the of the price jointly held property, unities and, not have been disturbed accordingly, the possessory Kotz, of the joint interest tenants remains intact. 406 A.2d at hand, 531-32. On the other this Court has also found that the execution of a mortgage on the tenancy property by than all fewer tenancy. tenants severs the