110 Cal. 524 | Cal. | 1895
This is an appeal by Ira Mathewson, Daniel Mathewson, Henry Mathewson, Rhoda Smith, and Lucy A. Angelí from parts of an order of
Although said deceased left a will, the part of his estate here in question is, for reasons not necessary to be stated, to be distributed as though he had died intestate. His next of kin of equal degree are aunts and uncles, and are the appellants, who are sisters and brothers of the decedent’s mother, Ann Charity Pearsons, and Clarissa P. Wheeler and Lucy A. Valentine, who are sisters of the decedent’s father, Hiram Pearsons. (Lucy A. Valentine being now dead, her estate and interests are represented by her administrator, Joseph W. Beay.) The greater part of the estate to be distributed came to the deceased, Hiram Arthur Pearsons, by gift and devise of his father, Hiram Pearsons, deceased; while a lesser part came to him from his mother, Ann Charity Pearsons. The probate court held that all of said estate which came from the father should be distributed to said Clarissa P. Wheeler and the administrator of said Lucy A. Valentine; and that the appellants should share only in that part of the estate which came to the deceased from his mother. Appellants contend that the whole of the estate of the deceased should be distributed equally to all the aunts and uncles. This contention presents the only question to be determined on this appeal, and it appears to us quite clear that it must be sustained.
The rule which governs here is the one declared in subdivision 6 of section 1386 of the Civil Code, and is as follows: “ If the decedent leave neither issue, husband, wife, father, mother, brother, nor sister, the estate must go to the next of kin in equal degree.” In the case at bar “ the next of kin” were the seven aunts and uncles of the decedent and they were “ in equal degree” ; therefore the estate goes to them in seven equal parts. Next of bin means, of course, next of kin of the decedent. Our code has no allusion to “ the blood of the first purchaser,” and makes no attempt at any distinction founded upon the sources from which the estate of
Respondents’ whole contention rests upon the theory that section 1394 of the Civil Code changes the rule of section 1386 above quoted. But, to see the mistake of that theory, it is only necessary to observe that section 1394 deals entirely with the case of kindred of “ the half blood”—not with kindred of the whole blood, whose rights had already been fixed by section 1386. Section 1394 is as follows: “ Kindred of the half blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood in the same degree, unless the inheritance came to the intestate by descent, devise, or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all those who are not of the blood of such ancestor must be excluded from such inheritance.” Here the words “ all those” clearly refer to their antecedents in the sentence “kindred of the half blood.” Kindred of the half blood being the subject of the main proposition of the section is necessarily the subject of the exception which follows the word “ unless.” The section simply means that kindred of the half blood shall inherit equally with those of the whole blood, except in a certain case, and, in that case, kindred of the half blood shall not inherit. And who are kindred of the half blood ?—why, of course kindred of the half "blood of the decedent. There were none such in the case at bar. If the next of kin of equal degree of the intestate be some of the whole blood and some of the half blood of the intestate, the half blood, shall not inherit if they are not of the blood of the person from whom the .intestate inherited the property to be distributed; but, if all be kin of the whole blood of the intestate, or if the half bloods be of the bloods of the ancestor, then all share alike. Kindred of the whole blood, if next of kin, share in all of the estate of the decedent, no matter from what source it came.
(It is said incidentally in the brief of appellants, that perhaps the administrator of Mrs. Valentine should not share in that part of the estate which came from
The parts of the order of distribution appealed from ■are reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to the probate court to make distribution of all the estate of said Hiram Pearsons, deceased, now ready for distribution, in equal shares to the said seven aunts and -uncles of said deceased.
Henshaw, J., and Temple, J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied.