OPINION OF THE COURT
The Orphans’ Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County dismissed objections to the final account of the executor of the estate of Katherine McCrea. The orphans’ court found that a settlement agreement among the devisees of the McCrea Estate did not exist *385 and imposed a surcharge upon the former executors. We affirm. 1
Katherine Jane Wiest McCrea (Mrs. McCrea), whose husband had predeceased her by some thirty years, died testate on March 24, 1961. Her will divided her estate among her six children, Katherine, William, Sarah, Elizabeth, Margaret and John. Her will named as executors John, William, and Sarah, all of whom were law school graduates. At her death, Mrs. McCrea ownеd several farms in Cumberland County. Some structures on the property were rental units, and others were converted into rental units by the executors. The will contained no authority to continue the operation of either the farms or the rental units and the executors did not request permission, as required by 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3314 (1975), to do so.
Following Mrs. McCrea’s death in 1961, John and William continued operation of the properties. Their law partnership, McCrea and McCrea, used one building on the property as an office, and William lived in anоther building.
The executors made no attempt to file an account and wind up the estate for twelve years when, in late 1973, William filed a First and Final Account. 2 After a hearing on exceptions to the First Account, William filed a Supplemental Account, to which exceptions were also filed. Katherine filed a petition to remove the surviving executors. On April 8,1974, after a hearing, the orphans’ court revoked the Letters Testamentary issued to William and Sarah and directed Letters to be issued to appellee Farmers Trust Company.
Appellee’s First and Supplemental Accounts sought to deny certain claims for expenses, commissions, and fees submitted by John’s estate and William, to requirе William and his law firm to pay rent for the premises they occupied, *386 and to impose a surcharge of 3.5% per year on the value of property held by the former exеcutors. 3 The orphans’ court confirmed the Accounts absolutely, except as to the imposition of a surcharge on Sarah, who the court found had relied solely on the advice of her brothers.
William and Iris, the executrix of her husband John’s estate, filed exceptions to the decree of the orphans’ court. After a hearing, the cоurt dismissed the exceptions. William and Iris (appellants) appeal.
Appellants contend that after Mrs. McCrea’s death, the beneficiaries entered into a family sеttlement agreement by which each daughter would receive cash and John and William would receive the real estate and stocks and assume the debts of the estatе. 4 The orphans’ court found that no such agreement had been entered into.
Although family settlement agreements are favored because they avoid potentially divisivе litigation,
Stancik Estate,
“[I]n reviewing the decision of the orрhans’ court, our task is to assure that the record is free from legal error and to
*387
determine if the chancellor’s findings are supported by competent and adequatе evidence, and are not predicated upon capricious disbelief of competent and credible evidence.”
Cohen Will,
Appellants also argue that the orphans’ court impropеrly imposed a surcharge upon the former executors. We do not agree.
An executor is required to exercise the same degree of judgment that a reasonable person would exercise in the management of his own estate.
Ellis Estate,
The present case is similar to Jones Estate, supra, where we affirmed the imposition of a surcharge upon executors for failing to distribute the estate expeditiously. Executors in Jones Estate sold estate realty and neither distributed nor invested the proceeds from the sale. This Court stated:
“These executors, by their acts of commission and omission, delayed and postponed settlement of this estate sо that, for a period of at least five years, funds, which could and should have been distributed to the beneficiaries by whom the funds could have been made productive, were аllowed to remain idle and unproductive. Particularly is *388 this made evident by the fact that the executors converted extremely productive realty into non-productive cash, thus during the period pending final distribution depriving the beneficiaries of income to which they were entitled. The executors deprived the beneficiaries of estate аssets which were productive and at the same time withheld distribution of the cash assets of the estate which the beneficiaries might have made productive. Regardless of а duty or lack of duty to invest estate funds on the part of these executors after the death of the life tenant, even when they had testamentary authority to invest, during the lifetime of the life tenant, they chose not to do so. The executors were gravely at fault and oblivious of the responsibility of their stewardship in the manner in which they administered this estate, through their action and inaction they permitted a status to continue where moneys rightfully due for distribution to the beneficiaries were allowed to remain in an unproductive stаte, while the corporate executor was permitted to employ such moneys for its own profits.”
Jones Estate,
supra,
As in Jones Estate, the evidence supports the imposition of a surcharge. The former executors, through their positions of trust, took control of the farm operations and all the accompanying realty. They made no effort to distribute the estate promptly. They never petitioned the orphans’ court to allow continued operation of the farming business. See Pa.C.S.A. § 3314 (1975). Instead, the former executors delayed the final settlement of this estate for twelve years, and allowed the property to remain unproductive.
The former executors’ failure to distribute the property ovеr twelve years is inexcusable, particularly in view of the executors’ legal training. See
Killey Trust,
Appellants assert that becausе the real estate in this case has appreciated in value since Mrs. McCrea’s death — from an estimated $39,000 to an estimated $218,000 — there has been no loss to the estаte and its beneficiaries. We find this argument unpersuasive. It is hardly surprising that the value of the real estate has increased over the twelve years that appellants wrongfully withheld it from the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries have nonetheless been denied its beneficial enjoyment by the former executors’ unwarranted delay. Nor do we see any reason to reach a different result because appellant William, and not one of the beneficiaries, took the initiative in bringing this matter to a final accоunting. This was his duty as executor. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3316 (1975); Wallis Estate, supra.
Decree affirmed. Each party to pay own costs.
Notes
. We hear this appeal pursuant to Section 202(3) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, art. II, 17 P.S. § 211.202(3) (Supp.1977).
. John had died in 1971, and Sarah did not participate in the preparation of the Account.
. The record indicates that the surcharge exceeded $60,000.
. The real estate at the time of Mrs. McCrea’s death was valued at approximately $39,000.