185 Iowa 339 | Iowa | 1919
This action involves the right of the widow to have a claim allowed against the estate of her husband.
“This antenuptial contract, made and entered this the 29th day of June, 1903, by and between Joseph C. Mansfield of Shelby, Shelby County, Iowa, party of the first part, and Mrs. Genevra A. Sampey, of Shelby, Shelby County, Iowa, party of the second part, witnesseth: That whereas the said Joseph 0. Mansfield and the said Genevra Sampey have entered into a contract for marriage to be solemnized in the near future, and both of the said parties hereto having real as well as personal property in their own names,
After the making of the said contract, the marriage was duly consummated. At the time of the execution of said contract, she, the widow, had no property whatsoever. The husband was the owner of both real and personal property, aggregating $3,500. His estate is now worth approximately $50,000. She has, since the marriage, acquired property, and has, at this time, property worth approximately $10,000. No children were born to this marriage. She, the widow, is now 57 years of age. The sum of $1,000 per annum is necessary for her support: that is, to support her in the circumstances in which she lived as the wife of the deceased.
It is claimed that, under the terms of the antenuptial contract, the estate of deceased should continue to contribute to the “family running expenses;” that the running expenses, in proportion to the net income from the respective properties, are $1,000 annually; that it is necessary, and for the best interest of the estate, that it be closed within three years. To this claim the administrator appeared, and filed a demurrer alleging that the facts stated
That the contract, herein set out, is one which the parties to it were competent to make, and that, when made, it is binding upon both, in the absence of fraud, mistake, or undue influence, see Fisher v. Koontz, 110 Iowa 498, and cases therein cited. Such contracts are favored by the law. They tend, under some conditions, to promote happiness, by settling property questions which otherwise might be fruitful of dissension. Especially is this true when either or both of the parties had been previously married, and had children. The intent of the parties in mailing the contract, and the purposes sought to be attained by its making, when made plain in the contract, are recognized and enforced by the courts. When the contract is plain and unambiguous on its face, and the meaning is plainly indicated upon the instrument itself, there is no occasion to resort to any of the rules of construction. In construing a contract, and in ascertaining its meaning and the purpose of the parties, the words used. must be given their usual and ordinary signification. There should be no unnatural or strained construction given to any part of the contract,' in determining the intent and meaning of the parties. The contract should be construed as a whole, and every part given fair consideration in its relation to all other parts.
The statute (Section 3165 of the Supplement to the Code, 1913), provides:
“The reasonable and necessary expenses of the family and the education of the children are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or separately.”
This statute has stood upon the books for many years, and yet no one has ever had the temerity to claim that the rights and duties and liability created by this statute continued after death. Upon the death, the property passes to those legally entitled to it, unincumbered by any right of the family, as' such, to receive support from it. The owner of the property, notwithstanding this statute, can dispose of it by will, and, on such disposition, it passes absolutely to those to whom it is bequeathed, and this, though the family, as such, is left with no means of support; and this is true, though the wife is a member of the family while it exists. Under this statute, she can receive no more upon the death of her husband than her dower right, her distributive share in his property, and the allowance for her support for one year. This may be wholly inadequate for her support, and yet the law makes no provision for
On the whole record, we think the plaintiff has shown no right to what she is now claiming, and’ the demurrer was rightly sustained,- — Affirmed.