In re Estate of Luoma
O P I N I O N
Civil Aрpeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, Case No. 09 ES 0063.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Alex J. Morton, 2000 Auburn Drive, Suite 200, Beachwood, OH 44122 (For Appellant, Jonathan C. Luoma).
Jay F. Crook, Jay F. Crook, Attorney At Law, L.L.C., 30601 Euclid Avenue, Wickliffe, OH 44092 (For Appellee, Robert D. Luoma).
Gina M. Bevack, Thrasher, Dinsmore & Dolan, 100 Seventh Avеnue, Suite 150, Chardon, OH 44024-1079 (For Appellee, Matthew N. Luoma).
Anthony J. Aveni, Cannon, Aveni & Malchesky Co., L.P.A., 41 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077. (Administrator for the Estate).
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.
{¶1} Jonathan C. Luoma appeals from a judgment of the Probate Division of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, which denied the Exceptions to Inventory and Appraisal he filed regarding his father‘s estate. He claims a Toyota owned by his father should have been included in the inventory of the estate because it was brought from his father‘s home in Massachusetts to Ohio and sold in Ohio. We disagree, as we
{¶2} Substantive Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} Robеrt M. Luoma (“Mr. Luoma“), a resident of Rockport, Massachusetts, died on December 7, 2005. He was survived by three sons: Jonathan C Luoma, of Maine, Matthew N. Luoma, of California, and Robert D. Luoma, of Ohio. Mr. Luoma‘s most valuable asset was a house in Fairport Harbor, Lake County. In his will, he bequeathed 50 percent of the interest in the house to Robert and 25 percent each to Jonathan and Matthew. The three brothers were to share the residue of his estate equally.
{¶4} After Mr. Luoma died, the brothers met at his apartment in Massachusetts to divide minor household items he owned. As for his 1998 Toyota Corolla, the brothers agreed Robert should drive it to Ohio, sell it, and divide the proceeds among the brothers. Robert sold the car in Ohio for $4,000, but used the funds to repair the Fairport Harbor house that had been cited by the city for its deteriorating condition.
{¶5} Matthew was named the executor in Mr. Luoma‘s will and Jonathan the alternate executor. Matthew, however, did not file his father‘s will for probate in Massachusetts, apparently believing his father only owned nominal рroperty in Massachusetts. The Fairport Harbor house, valued at $67,000, was rented for a short period of time to tenants after his father moved to Massachusetts.
{¶7} On February 11, 2010, Mr. Aveni filed the Inventory and Appraisal (the “Inventory“) of the estate. The only property listed on the inventory was the Fairport Harbor real property. On March 1, 2010, Jonathan filed “Exceptions to Inventory and Appraisal,” alleging the inventory failed to include rental income from the Fairport Harbor house, its furnishings, and the Toyota Corolla.1
{¶8} The court scheduled a hearing on the exceptions, which was rescheduled upon Jonathan‘s cоunsel‘s request. On the rescheduled date, neither Jonathan nor his counsel appeared. The court denied the exceptions, but later granted Jonathan‘s motion for relief from judgment and scheduled another hearing.
{¶9} On July 16, 2010, a hearing on the exceptions wаs held before the magistrate. Jonathan‘s counsel conceded the only basis for the inclusion of the Toyota on the Inventory is the fact that “it ended up in Ohio” and that Robert sold it in Ohio. Mr. Aveni, the Administrator, WWA, stated he did not believe the automobile should be
{¶10} On August 6, 2000, the magistrate issued a decision recommending that the trial court deny the exceptions. The mаgistrate concluded Jonathan did not meet his burden as the exceptor to prove that the Toyota Corolla, various household goods and furnishings, and $1,000 in rental income should be included in the inventory of the estate. Regarding the Toyota, the magistrate pointed to the lack of evidence regarding where it was titled.
{¶11} Jonathan filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision. Interestingly, his only objection was that the Toyota should have been included in the estate, citing the sale of the automobile in Ohio. He attached to his objections a copy of certificate of title to the Toyota issued by the commonwealth of Massachusetts. The assignment of certificate of title shows the automobile was sold to a buyer in Ohio in February of 2006. That exhibit was admitted by the trial court at the hearing held on December 14, 2010 on Jonathan‘s objections.2
{¶12} The only issue before the court was whether the Toyota should be included in the Inventory in the instant ancillary administration. After hearing, the court overruled Jonathan‘s objections. The court nоted that the Toyota was the subject of a
{¶13} The separate complaint to which the trial court referred was a complaint for concealment or conveying estate assets filed by Jonathan in a different trial court case number, 10 CV 0108. Jonathan alleged Robert embezzled or concealed the 1998 Toyota and the rental payments generated by the real property. It appears the case remains pending and awaits final adjudication.3
{¶14} On appeal, Jonathan raises the following assignment of error:
{¶15} “The Probate Court erred by overruling beneficiary‘s Objections tо Magistrate‘s Decision recommending that beneficiary‘s Exceptions to Inventory of decedent‘s estate be denied and that Inventory which did not list decedent‘s automobile be approved as submitted.”
{¶16} Exceptions to an Inventory
{¶17} “A hearing of exceptions to an inventory, pursuant to
{¶18} The exceptor has the burden of proving the existence of assets he claims should have been included on the inventory. In re Estate of Haas, 10th Dist No. 07AP-512, 2007-Ohio-7011, ¶43; Talbott v. Fisk, 10th Dist. Nos. 02AP-427 and 02AP-428, 2002-Ohio-6960, ¶31.
{¶19} Standard of Review
{¶20} Our standard of review of such a proceeding is one of abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion is the trial court‘s “failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.” State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶62, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary (8 Ed.Rev.2004) 11.
{¶21} Here, Jonathan claims the Toyota should have been included in the estate because it was sold in Ohio. The certificate of title he produced subsequent to the hearing conducted by the magistrate shows the automobile was titled in Massachusetts and sold in Ohio. On appeal, he conceded the automobile had a Massachusetts certificate of title. Citing no case law or statutory authority, he claims the probate court should have included the automobile in the estate becаuse its sale took place in Ohio.
{¶22} What Property Is Subject to Ancillary Administration
{¶23}
{¶25} Administration of ancillary estate is concerned solely with decedent‘s real and personal property located within territorial limits of the state in which ancillary administration is granted. In re Kelley (1940), 68 Ohio App. 51, 57.
{¶26} The question is then whether Mr. Luoma‘s Toyоta was “within the state” for purposes of
{¶27} The Situs of Personal Property
{¶28} “Personal property has no fixed situs and adheres, in contemplation of law, to the person of the owner and is disposed of according to the jus domicilii.” In re Estate of Gould (P.C.1956), 75 Ohio L.Abs. 289, 1 O.O.2d 366, paragraph nine of the syllabus. See, also, In re Walker (P.C.1939), 34 Ohio L. Abs. 246, 21 O. O. 220, paragraph three of the syllabus (“[t]he situs of a wrecked automobile, the personal effects, and clothing of the dеcedent, is the domicile of the owner.“) In Howard v. Reynolds (1972), 30 Ohio St. 2d 214, a case where the decedent was domiciled in one state but his intangible personal property located in another, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the law where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death governs the succession of the decedent‘s personal property. In that case, the trial court found the services rendered by appellant were fair and reasonable, yet without explanation, the trial court reducеd appellant‘s fees by $ 45,373.50. The court explained that the domiciliary rule grew out of “the transitory nature of personal property.” Id. at 217.
{¶29} The rationale is equally applicable to inherently movable personal property such as automobiles, which are often in transit to and from different places. Therefore, based on the long-established law and for purposes of
{¶30} Because the automobile was not “within the state,” it could not be included in the ancillary administration. Therefore, the exceptor failed to meet his burden of proving the automobile should be part of the inventory of Mr. Luoma‘s estate in Ohio. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the exceptions filed by Jonathan.
{¶31} In any event, the automobile had been sold three years before the opening of the аncillary estate in Ohio. Therefore, it would appear the essence of Jonathan‘s claim is that Robert misappropriated the sale proceeds of the automobile by using it to repair Mr. Luoma‘s real property, to which Jonathan is entitlеd to 25% instead of 33%. As the trial court noted, Jonathan had indeed filed a separate complaint
{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment оf the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, is affirmed.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
concur.