OPINION OF THE COURT
On Junе 18, 1976, Victor E. Kiger, the testator, died. A will dated April 16, 1976, was offered for probate on August 3, 1976. On August 12, 1976, appellant, Fred Kiger, brother *145 of the testator, filed a caveat, alleging that the testator’s will was the result of undue influence exercised over the testatоr by the appellees, Robert R. and Nancy Hennen, beneficiaries under the testator’s will.
Following a hearing, the Register of Wills of Greene County ruled on September 29, 1977, that the will was valid. Pursuant to a petition filed by the appellees, the Orphans’ Cоurt of Greene County, in the presence of the parties and their attorneys, issued a decree limiting the appeal time to six months from the date of the Register’s decision. Appellant filed an appeal from the decision of the Rеgister of Wills on May 8, 1978. On August 4, 1978, the court granted the appellees’ motion to strike the appeal, holding the appeal was untimely filed. This appeal is from the decree striking the appeal.
Appellant first argues the court erred in limiting the time for appeal to six months. The court entered the decree pursuant to § 908 of the Probate Estates & Fiduciaries Code, 1 which stated:
“. . . Any party in interеst who is aggrieved by a decree of the register, or a fiduciary whose estate or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom to the court within two years of the decree . . . . The court, upon petition of a party in interest, may limit the time for appeal to six months.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a) (Emphasis added.)
However, that section was amended on July 9, 1976, to read:
“. . . Any party in interest who is aggrieved by a decree of the register, or a fiduciary whose estate or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom to the court within one year of the decree . . . . The court, upon petitiоn of a party in interest, may limit the time for appeal to three months.” Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 551, No. 135, § 3, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a) (Supp.1979-80).
*146 Appellant argues that since the court limited the appeal time under the old § 908 of the code, which was no longer in effect at the time .of the decree, the resulting decree was a nullity. As such, appellant argues the one-year limitation for appeals should аpply, making his appeal timely. We disagree.
At the time the decree limiting appeal time was entered, appellant was present and was represented by counsel. Yet, the record contains no indication that appеllant objected to the time limitation of six months under the original unamended § 908 of the code. Having failed to object at thе time the decree was entered, appellant may not now complain that the wrong statute was used to limit the time for appeal.
Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.,
Appellant next argues he did file his appeal within the six-month period. The register held the will was valid on September 29, 1977. The Court of Common Pleas deсreed the appeal time be limited to six months on November 23, 1977. Appellant argues the six-month period should have run from the date the time for appeal was limited, or November 23, 1977. Using that date, the six-month period would have expired on May 23, 1978, making appellant’s May 8, 1978, appeal timely. We find, however, no merit to appellant’s argument.
The court entered the following decree:
“AND NOW, this 23rd day of November, 1977, let thе record show the Court directs the Executor to file an inventory and appraisal on or before Friday, December 9, 1977, and the same to be filed at the peril of being removed from the office of Executor, and the Court further orders that the time for filing an appeal on the ruling of the Register and Recorder be limited to six (6) months from the date of the same.” (Emphasis added.)
Any commonsense reading of the decree makes clear that the court intended the six-month limitation to run from the *147 date of the register’s decision, Septеmber 29, 1977. As the period expired on March 29, 1978, appellant’s appeal was filed out of time.
Appellant finally arguеs he be excused from appealing within the required time period because of certain exceptions to thе general rule, which holds:
“. . . That a register’s decree admitting to probate a last will, unappealed from within the statutory period, becomes thereafter conclusive and exempt from collateral attack, is too well established to be gainsaid. Such probate is conclusive as to all questions and disputes touching the will as fall within the jurisdiction of the registеr, as for instance, questions of fraud in the procurement of the will, whether by undue influence, restraint, or duress of any kind. When a last will hаs been admitted to probate, the legal presumption at once arises that the will so probated is a last will, and is the free and voluntary expression of a testator, of sound and disposing mind and understanding, as to the disposition the testator desired to make of his property upon his death. Where the decree of the register is unappealed from within the рeriod allowed for such appeal, the legal presumption becomes conclusive, and it makes an end tо questions passed upon, or within the jurisdictional power of the register to consider, touching the validity of the will.” Bunce v. Galbraith,268 Pa. 389 ,112 A. 143 (1920). See, Estate of Shelly,463 Pa. 430 ,345 A.2d 596 (1975).
In
Culbertson’s Estate,
In the instant case, we do not believe the court abused its discretion in dismissing appellant’s appeal. In both Culbert *148 son’s Estate, supra, and Rockett Will, supra, the fraud and uncertainty in the record were not discovered until, the appeal time had run. In the instаnt case, the fraud and uncertainty alluded to in appellant’s attempted appeal were known or at least should have been known at the time the will was probated. This being the case, we can perceive no reason fоr allowing the instant appeal out of time and as such, we find no abuse of the Orphans’ Court discretion in refusing to allow appellant to do so.
Decree affirmed. Each party to bear own costs.
Notes
. Act of June 30, 1972, P.L. 508, No. 164, § 2, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 101, et seq.