136 Iowa 116 | Iowa | 1907
But we have uniformly held, and our holding seems to be in accordance with the weight of authority in other states, that the fact of the exercise of undue influence cannot be established by proof of the declarations of the testator, made either prior or subsequent to the execution of the will. Johnson v. Johnson, 134 Iowa, 33; In re Estate of Townsend, 128 Iowa, 621; In re Wiltsey’s Will, 122 Iowa, 423; Manatt v. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; Muir v. Miller, 72 Iowa, 585; 3 Wigmore on Evidence, 1738 (2). There
In the record before us we find no evidence of the fact of undue influence having been exercised by those who are beneficiaries under the will, and to whom contestant attributes the exercise of such influence as to have caused the testatrix to make a disposition inconsistent with her intentions and desires. In view of this state of the record, we think there was no error in the instructions with reference to the. consideration to be given to the declarations proven of which contestant can complain. The court authorized the jury to-give to such declarations the effect which it was proper to give to them. Indeed, it might well have been said in unequivocal terms that such declarations should not be considered in determining the fact of undue influence. It is evident that it is difficult to explain to the jury in specific terms the effect to be given by them to such declarations if proven, and we think that the court properly cautioned the jury against giving them consideration for purposes for which they were not admissible, and explained, in other portions of the instructions which are not criticised, the purpose's for which they had been allowed to be shown.
In view of the entire record as made, the verdict is not contrary to the evidence, nor to the instructions of the court, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.