35 N.W.2d 36 | Iowa | 1948
Ollie Jones, as administratrix of the estate of her husband who died without issue, set off unto herself, as surviving spouse, the exempt personalty in the sum of $3600, paid all debts and expenses, and then disposed of the remaining assets in the sum of $10,775.07 by paying herself $7500 and one half of the balance, and the other half of the balance over $7500 to the heirs of intestate's parents. Upon objection of some of the heirs the trial court ruled the surviving spouse must include the exempt personalty in the $7500 she receives under section
I. Section
"When the deceased leaves a widow, all personal property which in his hands as the head of a family would be exempt from execution, after being inventoried and appraised, shall be set apart to her as her property, and be exempt in her hands as in the hands of the decedent."
Section
"If the intestate leaves no issue, the whole of the estate to the amount of seventy-five hundred dollars, after the payment of the debts and expenses of administration, and one-half of all of the estate in excess of said seventy-five hundred dollars shall go to the surviving spouse and the other one-half of said excess shall go to the parents. * * *" *1366
The single question presented upon the appeal is whether under the above statutes the widow of a deceased intestate spouse is entitled to the exempt personal property set off to her, in addition to the first $7500 after payment of debts and costs of administration.
[1] We have often said the exemption statutes are to be liberally construed to protect the debtor and the family of which he is head. In re Estate of Kline,
Appellees argue in support of the trial court's ruling that section
[2] II. The exempt property, by section
To set apart the exempt personalty to the widow as her property means to take the personalty out of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death — to appropriate it as "her property." Peru Cemetery Co. v. Mount Hope Cemetery,
From the above it is manifest that section
While the exact question has not before been presented to this court for decision, there are expressions in several of our opinions supporting the view here taken and decisions of this court where such an interpretation was no doubt assumed to be correct.
The earlier statute, section 3379, Code, 1897, provides:
"If the intestate leaves no issue, one-half of the estate shall go to the parents, and the other one-half to the spouse * * *."
In In re Estate of Ring,
"Under the law all the exemptions allowed to the husband as head of the family shall, upon his death, be set apart to the widow as her property. This was attempted to be done, but not all of the property to which the widow was entitled was set apart to her in the appraisement * * *."
In Conkey v. Irwin,
"The evidence disclosed that decedent left seven hundred bushels of corn. Of this two hundred and fifty bushels were inventoried and appraised as exempt to the widow and three hundred and fifty bushels as part of the general assets. She was required to account for three hundred and fifty bushels in addition to that last mentioned. This must have been on the theory that she was not entitled to that set apart to her as widow. Under section 4008 of the Code, there is exempt to a debtor, who is the head of a family, enough food to feed the animals declared exempt for six months, and by section 3312 the widow, upon the death of her husband, is entitled to have the animals exempt to the husband, and such food set apart to her. No evidence was adduced that the amount of corn was in excess of what was required to feed two horses, two cows, two calves, and five hogs during the time specified, and we think the court erred in ordering the administratrix to account for more than one hundred bushels of corn, not previously inventoried."
In 1913, section 3379, Code of 1897 was repealed and the present statute enacted. (Chapter 280, Acts of Thirty-fifth *1369
General Assembly.) In re Estate of Paulson,
In In re Estate of Smith,
"Property exempt to deceased * * * is to be set apart to the widow. [Citing cases.] And there is to be paid therefrom the expenses of administration, the charges of the last sickness and funeral of deceased, and the allowance made by the court for the maintenance of the widow and minor children. What remains is to be distributed * * *."
[3] The two statutes are in pari materia, in that they both provide for the ultimate destination of property owned by deceased, and should be construed together and both given effect if possible. Balen v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co.,
[4] An analysis of the opinions of this court previously cited clearly indicates this court found no difficulty in applying the law, as expressed in both statutes, as giving the widow the exempt property plus $7500 after expenses and one half of the balance of the estate. Such a construction is a salutory one; one that carries out the beneficient purpose of exemption laws; one that is adequately supported by convincing reasoning; and one that is thoroughly consistent with the many expressions found in the opinions of this court that the exempt personalty is not part of decedent's estate. For the reasons stated, the cause is reversed. — Reversed.
SMITH, C.J., and OLIVER, BLISS, HALE, GARFIELD, WENNERSTRUM, and MANTZ, JJ., concur.
HAYS, J., takes no part. *1370