Case Information
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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
___________________________
1st Circuit Court – Lancaster Probate Division
No. 2012-754
IN RE ESTATE OF JACK MICHAEL BERGQUIST
Argued: February 12, 2014 Opinion Issued: August 8, 2014 Waystack Frizzell, Trial Lawyers, of Colebrook (Erin S. Meenan and Jonathan S. Frizzell on the brief, and Ms. Meenan orally), for the petitioner. Parnell & McKay, PLLC, of Londonderry (Rory J. Parnell on the brief and orally), for the respondent.
LYNN, J. The petitioner, Eddie Nash & Sons, Inc., appeals an order of the Circuit Court – Lancaster Probate Division (Hampe, J.) ruling that the respondent, the Estate of Jack Michael Bergquist (the estate), owes the petitioner $544.21 and excluding the petitioner’s claim for post-judgment interest. We reverse and remand.
The parties either do not dispute, or the record establishes, the following facts. In November 2001, the petitioner brought a small claim complaint against the decedent in Colebrook District Court for $5,000.00 owed pursuant to an agreement to purchase logging equipment. In February 2002, the court entered a default judgment for the petitioner for $5,136.99, including costs and interest. After the decedent failed to make any payment on the judgment, the petitioner filed a motion for periodic payments in the district court pursuant to *2 RSA 524:6-a (2007) (amended 2009). In 2003, the court entered a periodic payment order requiring monthly payments of $50 to begin in May 2003 until the “judgment and all costs are paid in full.” The order listed the total due as $5,394.26, but did not indicate why that total had increased more than $250 in the thirteen months following entry of the original judgment. Neither the 2002 judgment nor the 2003 order made explicit reference to the petitioner’s entitlement to continuing post-judgment interest.
The decedent made payments under the order each month until May 2011; the petitioner was made aware of his death in June 2011. The petitioner filed a creditor’s claim against the estate that included $3,697.57 for “Balance of Court Judgment,” and requested the total claim “Plus Interest.” The estate objected to the claim, which the petitioner later amended to consist only of the $3,697.57 for the remaining balance on the court judgment, “plus statutory post[-]judgment interest on that amount.” At a hearing on the objection, Susan Nash represented the petitioner and stated her belief, based on her own extensive experience in small claims court, that judgments in small claims actions always included continuing post-judgment interest. The estate agreed that the petitioner was owed $544.21 as the remaining balance due on the $5,394.26 specified in the periodic payment order, but argued that post- judgment interest had not been awarded, and should be excluded from the claim, because the periodic payment order was silent on the subject. The probate division agreed, and entered judgment for the petitioner for $544.21.
On appeal, the petitioner argues that the probate division erred when it excluded its claim for statutory post-judgment interest. The estate counters that the petitioner’s claim for post-judgment interest is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and is an attempt to retroactively modify the 2003 periodic payment order. Alternatively, the estate contends that an award of post- judgment interest is contrary to the purpose of RSA 524:6-a.
The probate division based its ruling on the fact that the 2002 judgment
did not explicitly call for an award of continuing post-judgment interest.
However, we have held that plaintiffs can receive post-judgment interest by
statute even when the original judgment is silent on that matter. See Nault v.
N & L Dev. Co.,
*3 Indeed, in this case, the district court apparently found that its initial judgment against Bergquist included continuing post-judgment interest: The order for payments, issued thirteen months after the court’s initial entry of judgment, listed $5,394.26 as the total due to the petitioner, an increase of $257.27 from the $5,136.99 default judgment. Because the petitioner was entitled, as a matter of law, to continuing post-judgment interest, the probate division erred in excluding its claim for that interest.
The estate contends that the petitioner is not entitled to continuing post-
judgment interest because it did not specifically request such interest in the
district court. This argument is based on an incorrect reading of the facts in
Nault. The estate asserts that Nault involved a request for post-judgment
interest, which it contends is lacking here. However, the plaintiffs in Nault
requested post-judgment interest in their new action to recover a deficiency on
the original judgment, not in the civil action in which the judgment was first
obtained. Nault,
The estate also argues that the doctrine of res judicata bars the current
action. “The doctrine of res judicata prevents the parties from relitigating
matters actually litigated and matters that could have been litigated in the first
action.” Appeal of Morrissey,
Contrary to the estate’s argument, the petitioner is not requesting new
relief based on the decedent’s original failure to pay pursuant to the 2001
purchase agreement or the 2002 default judgment. Rather, the petitioner is
asserting its existing rights under the judgment against the estate, and the
question before us is what amount the petitioner is already owed under that
existing judgment. The petitioner is not re-asserting the same cause of action,
but instead is merely seeking to enforce its entitlement to the relief it obtained
in that cause of action, and thus its claim here is not barred by the doctrine of
res judicata. Cf. Hansa,
Alternatively, the estate argues that allowing the petitioner’s claim for continuing post-judgment interest would be contrary to the purposes of RSA 524:6-a. RSA 524:6-a provides that “[w]henever judgment is rendered against any person in this state, the court in which the judgment is rendered . . . may . . . order the defendant to make such periodic payments as the court in its discretion deems appropriate” either “at the time of rendition of the judgment” or “upon petition of the plaintiff after judgment.”
The estate contends that the purpose of an order for payments pursuant
to RSA 524:6-a is to fix the amount due so as to “provide the court, plaintiff
and defendant a specific set schedule that they can utilize to obtain finality in
their cases” and set a fixed payment that the defendant “can rightly refer to
when determining when his obligation has been met.” The estate cites no
authority for this proposition, nor can we find any. However, we have said that
“[t]he legislature’s intent in passing RSA 524:6-a was to give judgment creditors
a new method of obtaining payment (periodic rather than lump-sum
payments), not a new source of payment.” Sheedy v. Merrimack Cty. Super.
*5
Ct.,
Therefore, an order for payments under RSA 524:6-a does not affect the
rights of either party; rather, it authorizes a defendant to pay a judgment in
periodic payments rather than one lump sum. It does not “fix” the amount
due, as the estate contends, nor does it eliminate a plaintiff’s right to continued
post-judgment statutory interest. “The very purpose of adding interest to an
award or judgment . . . is to recognize the time value of money by
compensating a creditor for the delay between when money is due and when it
is paid.” In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co.,
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the probate division erred when it excluded the petitioner’s claim for statutory post-judgment interest. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded. DALIANIS, C.J., and CONBOY and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.
Notes
[1] “A small claim is any right of action not involving the title to real estate in which the debt or damages, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $7,500.” RSA 503:1, I (2010).
[2] The estate also claims that, because the petitioner did not specifically request post-judgment interest when it originally filed suit, it did not have the “opportunity to litigate” the issue. Aside from the fact that any lack of “opportunity to litigate” was due to the decedent’s own actions, which resulted in the entry of a default judgment against him, the more important point is that this argument is illogical. Because we hold that a judgment creditor is entitled to post-judgment interest as a matter of law, there was simply nothing the decedent could have said to the trial court that would have changed this legal reality.