149 P. 576 | Cal. | 1915
By the will of Laura J. Haskins, deceased, all of her estate was given to her step-son, George M. Haskins. This will was duly admitted to probate and all probate proceedings thereunder were regularly had and taken. The time came when the estate was ready to be closed, and George M. Haskins, above named, who was also the executor of the estate, filed his final account and report and therewith his petition for distribution. It was set forth, and on the hearing shown, that the estate consisted of $1055.39 in money; that there were no offsets against this amount for claims or credits or disbursements. Erroneously the petition declared that no inheritance tax was chargeable or payable upon the inheritance of George M. Haskins or upon any of the property of the estate. Thereupon the court settled the final account and distributed the whole of the estate to George *269 M. Haskins. From this decree the controller of the state appealed, upon the ground that there was an inheritance tax due to the state and that the steps prescribed by law had not been taken in the matter of the appraisement of such inheritance tax and that the decree of distribution made no award to the state of such a tax. Following the taking of this appeal the court, by anunc pro tunc order, corrected the decree of final distribution, the correction consisting in a finding that an inheritance tax of $27.67 was due the state of California; that this sum was "in open court" ordered paid; "that said executor tendered the amount of said inheritance tax to the county treasurer of the county of Los Angeles on the 7th day of October, 1914" (the day upon which the original decree of final distribution was made), and that the county treasurer refused to receive this sum.
It is not in question but that the amount of the inheritance tax which the court thus decreed is the amount justly due to the state under the law. (Inheritance Tax Law, 1911, secs. 2, 3 and 4, Stats. 1911, p. 713, et seq.) The procedure, however, which the court adopted, it is urged, is so at variance with the law governing the matter as to call for a reversal, with directions to the court in probate to proceed in conformity with that law. To the method of procedure laid down we are thus brought.
Section
With these provisions before us (and they are thus elaborately set forth, not because of their consequence in this litigation, but because the state has asked a definition of the powers and duties of our courts in probate), we may briefly sum up the matter. The controller names one or more inheritance tax appraisers in each county. The court in probate names three disinterested appraisers for each estate in probate. Of these appraisers in probate, one must, and the the others may or may not (within the discretion of the court in probate) be selected from the list of authorized inheritance tax appraisers within the county. There is no compulsion in the law upon the court in probate to appoint more than one inheritance tax appraiser as a probate appraiser. It does become *272
the duty of the probate court, under section 16, to appoint, however, an inheritance tax appraiser. His duties and functions are quite independent and apart from those of the probate appraisers. The law in this regard prescribes merely that if the inheritance tax appraiser shall have failed to act as one of the probate appraisers, the expense of making the inheritance tax appraisement shall be paid out of the estate and not out of the inheritance tax fund under the control of the county treasurer. As a matter of economy, therefore, the executor or administrator may well see that such inheritance tax appraiser acts in the matter of the inventory and appraisement of the estate. But, again, we repeat, there is no compulsion in the law that this shall be done, the penalty for a failure so to do being fixed by section 14 of the statute as above set forth. We may in this connection, however, anticipate the law by calling attention to the fact that by an amendment to section
While the appraisers in probate report upon the character and probable value of all the properties of the estate, the duties of the inheritance tax appraiser are essentially different. He is to report upon the character and probable value of so much of the estate as is liable for the inheritance tax, and, still further, he is to determine whether transfers of property have been made by the deceased of such nature as to render the property transferred liable to the inheritance tax. (Estate of Reynolds,
Furthermore, the law contemplates notice and a hearing of the report of such inheritance tax appraiser, a determination by the court after such hearing, and an authorization to the county treasurer to receive the inheritance tax when such formal proceedings have been taken. The state itself may justly be heard to complain if the course prescribed by its own law is not followed, and it is not a sufficient answer to say that in the individual case no wrong has resulted. Judicially we cannot upon this bench know whether error has been committed *273 and wrong has resulted until after the formal hearing and determination so plainly prescribed by the law. The treasurer, therefore, was justified in refusing to receive this money in settlement of the inheritance tax of the estate in the absence of a decree of the court in probate fixing the amount of that tax. The order of the court amending its decree could not avail to cure these radical omissions.
The decree appealed from is reversed, with directions to the trial court to pursue, in the matter of the closing of the estate, the course prescribed by law.
Lorigan, J., and Melvin, J., concurred.