249 N.W. 417 | Minn. | 1933
290 U.S. ___,
Jacob E. Hallbom, a soldier of the United States during the world war serving in the area of hostilities in France, took out war risk *385 insurance in the sum of $10,000. The one named beneficiary was Peter J. Hallbom, his father. The insured departed this life October 20, 1925. Thereafter the father, as beneficiary, received monthly instalments until he too passed away February 22, 1928. Selma Hallbom, mother of the soldier and wife of Peter, the beneficiary, survived both.
Edward A. Pagel as administrator of the estate of the deceased soldier, in his final account reported to the probate court that claims had been allowed against the estate but not paid because objection had been made to their payment "from funds derived from U.S. War Veterans' insurance." The probate court held that the commuted fund ($9,116) was a part of the estate of the deceased soldier and subject to the payment of his debts. Selma, the soldier's mother, appealed to the district court, which held that the fund was not subject to the soldier's debts but should pass free of them to the soldier's heirs within the permitted class of beneficiaries (
To review that decision, certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States (Pagel v. Hallbom,
The case returning here, we filed an ex parte opinion (
1. Our former decision (
2. Our former decision must now be considered erroneous because in disagreement with the rule settled by the Supreme Court of the United States. But, say appellants, it nevertheless remains the law of the case. Their argument is that, even though the decision was not an end of the matter so as to make it res judicata, it yet stands as the decision of an appellate court, so settling the law of the case as to be controlling in district and probate courts and also here. That view is erroneous because, on a federal question, this is but an intermediate appellate court rather than the tribunal of last resort. The law is that a rule "laid down by an intermediate appellate court upon an appeal is not binding upon that court, upon a second appeal, where the highest appellate court has, since the first appeal," even in another case, "decided the precise question" otherwise. So, also, "a decision of an intermediate appellate court, which has been reversed or modified on appeal, and held for naught, is not binding upon it, upon a subsequent appeal of the same case." 1 A.L.R. 1275, citing Zerulla v. Supreme Lodge,
3. The war risk insurance act (see, as to origin, 40 St. 398) in respect to the present issue, has been much changed by amendment and now provides (38 USCA, § 514):
"If no person within the permitted class be designated as beneficiary * * * by the insured either in his lifetime or by his last will and testament or if the designated beneficiary does not survive the insured or survives the insured and dies prior to receiving all of the two hundred and forty installments or all such as are payable and applicable, there shall be paid to the estate of the insured the present value of the monthly installments thereafter payable, said value to be computed as of date of last payment made under any existing award."
The effect of that section is settled by Singleton v. Cheek,
"By that amendment," the court said, "the rule, which, upon the happening of the contingencies named in the prior acts, limited the benefit of the unpaid installments to persons within the designated class of permittees, was abandoned, and 'the estate of the insured' was wholly substituted as the payee. All installments, whether accruing before the death of the insured or after the death of the beneficiary named in the certificate of insurance, as a result became assets of the estate of the insured as of the instant of his death, to be distributed to the heirs of the insured in accordance with the intestacy laws of the state of his residence, such heirs to be determined as of the date of his death, and not as of the date of the death of the beneficiary." *388
Comment is made that the state courts, with almost entire unanimity, have reached the same conclusion. The state cases pro and con are cited in a footnote [
4. To be distributed as part of the estate of the deceased, the fund is subject to the claims of creditors, whose claims were presented to and allowed by the probate court, unless there is statutory bar. There is none. It is provided by 38 USCA, § 454, that "the compensation, insurance, and maintenance and support allowance payable under Parts II, III, [relating to insurance] and IV respectively, shall not be assignable; shall not be subject to the claims of creditors of any person to whom an award is made under Parts II, III, or IV; and shall be exempt from all taxation." However it might be otherwise, and in view of the amendment of § 514, construed in Singleton v. Cheek,
As we construe it, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in this case (Pagel v. MacLean,
"whether, under the provisions of the act and of the certificate of insurance, the administrator of the insured received the insurance as an asset of the estate subject to payment of debts and administration expenses, or as trustee for the benefit of such of the surviving members of 'the permitted class' of beneficiaries as would be entitled to decedent's personal property under the laws of Minnesota, * * *. The court held that despite the difference in language between § 303 [38 USCA, § 514] and its earlier forms * * * the members of the permitted class were to be preferred over creditors of the insured, and directed judgment for payment of the insurance to the mother, as the only person in the permitted class entitled to take the personal property of insured under the intestacy laws of the state." *390
"The difference in language" so referred to was considered in Singleton v. Cheek,
The judgment is affirmed. *391