Defendant-appellant, Michael S. Morris, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, finding that defendant intentionally and feloniously caused the death of Joyce Ann Cotton Morris and is barred from benefitting from her death in any manner. Defendant’s single assignment of error stаtes:
“The court erred in applying common law to disqualify appellant from inheritance as surviving spouse, where O.R.C. 2105.19. (the civil disqualification statute) is the exclusive method by which to determine the beneficiary status of the appellant, who has been identified, adjudicated, and convicted of invоluntary manslaughter, a non-purposeful homicide exempted from disqualification as beneficiary by the terms of O.R.C. 2105.19.”
*370 The facts of this case are undisрuted. On April 6, 1992, defendant entered a guilty plea to the stipulated lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter, with a firearm specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.04, an aggravated felony of the first degree. The trial court found defendant guilty on the charge and sentenced him. The victim of the offensе, Joyce Ann Cotton Morris, defendant’s wife, left a last will and testament, which was admitted to probate on May 30, 1991.
Given the foregoing, plaintiff, Darryl D. Cotton, Administratоr WWA of the Estate of Joyce Ann Cotton Morris, filed an action in the probate division of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, seeking direction regarding the rights of Michael Morris as surviving spouse to inherit from the decedent.
Following a pretrial, the parties submitted briefs addressing whether defendant could lose his right of inheritance through application of the common law, given that his conviction for involuntary manslaughter involves an offense not speсified in R.C. 2105.19, which provides:
“[N]o person who is convicted of, pleads guilty to, or is found not guilty by reason of insanity of a violation of or complicity in the violation of section 2903.01, 2903.02, or 2903.03 of the Revised Code * * * shall in any way benefit by the death. All property of the decedent, and all money, insurance proceeds, or other property or benefits payable or distributable in respect of the decedent’s death, shall pass or be paid оr distributed as if the person who caused the death of decedent had predeceased the decedent.”
On the recommendation of thе referee who initially considered the issue, the trial court concluded that R.C. 2105.19 does not provide the exclusive method for disqualifying defendant from еxercising spousal rights or receiving estate assets. Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Shrader v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.
(1985),
The parties subsequently submitted stipulated facts relevant to the ultimate issue, on which the trial court concluded that defendant intentionally and feloniously caused the death of the decedent and “therefore, by common law, is barred from benefitting from thе death” in any manner. Contending that R.C. 2105.19 provides the exclusive means for prohibiting him from receiving under the decedent’s will, defendant urges in his single assignment of error that the trial court erred in applying the common law to determine that he may not benefit from his actions in causing the death of decedent.
The Supreme Court in Shrader addressed similar circumstances. In that case, John Shrader had not been convicted of any criminal offense, including *371 those set forth in R.C. 2105.19, and thus the Supreme Court found that the statute was inapplicable. As defendant urges here, Shrader argued that R.C. 2105.19 provided the exclusive means for disqualifying him from any benefits rеsulting from his wife’s death. In rejecting his contention, the Supreme Court stated:
“ * * * A familiar principle of statutory construction, however, is that a statute should nоt be construed to impair pre-existing law in the absence of an explicit legislative statement to the contrary.
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson
(1952),
Further, noting the “well-established policy of the common law that no оne should be allowed to profit from his own wrongful conduct,”
id.
at 44, 20 OBR at 346,
Defendant attempts to distinguish
Shrader
by noting that in
Shrader
the identity of the wrongdoer was unknown, whereas in the present case the wrongdоer has been identified by his guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter in the common pleas court. Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive. In
Huff v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co.
(1984),
Given the foregoing, the trial court properly determined that R.C. 2105.19(A) is not the exclusive means for disqualifying defendant as a beneficiary under decedent’s last will and testament. Although defendant was not convicted of any of the offenses specified in R.C. 2105.19(A), and thus is not barred by the terms of that statutе from benefitting from his wife’s death, plaintiff may assume the burden under common law to prove that defendant intentionally and feloniously killed decedent, and thus is barred under common-law principles from receiving under her last will and testament.
Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s conclusiоn that he intentionally and feloniously killed the decedent. Rather, his sole contention is the exclusivity of R.C. 2105.19 as a vehicle to prohibit his receiving under thе decedent’s last will and testament. Having rejected his contentions, we overrule his single assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.