110 Cal. 494 | Cal. | 1895
Among the items of the account filed by the executrix of the estate were these:
“ By payment to Frank J. Oapitan, for architectural services, general contract, brick work, plumbing, etc., for repairing and building stables at No. 24 Aliso street.....$2,611.74
“By services of said Oapitan for preparing plans for said building.................. 130.53”
Upon the settlement of the account the court below rejected and disallowed these items, upon the ground, as stated in the bill of exceptions, “ that the said items were not a proper charge of the said executrix against the said estate”; and the only question involved in the appeal, which is taken by the executrix, is the propriety of the action of the court in that regard.
The evidence in support of the rejected items was wholly u'ncontroverted, and was, in substance, this:
The executrix testified: The estate is the owner of an undivided one-half of certain premises situate at Nos. 24 and 26 Aliso street. I am the owner of the other undivided one-half in my own right. At the time of the death of Pierre Clos, and long prior thereto, on a part of the premises, to wit, the yard immediately back of the front of the said building, which front part is used as a lodging-house and saloon and restaurant, there were some structures used as stables, which had been built a great many years before the death of Pierre Clos, my husband, and the structures were old and decayed, and had been repaired from time to time. The stalls for horses, and the sheds for carriages, had no
The architect testified: I was the architect and supervised the building of the stables at Mo. 24 Aliso street for the executrix. I saw the stables as they stood there before I did the work. They were totally unfit to be occupied as a stable, both from a sanitary point of view and from a financial point of view. I do not believe the stables, as they stood there before my work was done, should have been kept for stable purposes. The stalls were old and rotten. The roofs were tumbling down and were decayed. The floors were all of mud, and were in such a condition that a person could not retain his health and work on the premises. When it came to figuring how the stable should be rebuilt we were confronted by the city ordinance of the city of Los Angeles, which would compel us to put on fire-proof roofs and fire-proof walls, and extend them up on three sides to conform to the requirements of the city ordinance. I figured on the work and put it down as low as possible. The work had to be done, or else the stables had to be abandoned. I consider the expenditure an absolutely necessary one and very reasonable. The work is fully worth the money. The stable could not be built in any other manner than as we built it. I have heard the statement by the executrix here in court, and I consider it a fair, full, and true statement of the circumstances under which these stables were built. The work renders the place a pure, healthy, clean business place, and I consider that the value of the premises has been greatly added to by the work.
Mr. Sabichi, the agent of the executrix for the buildings, testified: I know the premises in question. I know when the repairs were made. I was her agent at the time. I consulted with a number of architects and
It does not clearly appear from the record upon what ground the learned judge of the court below based his action in the premises, as no specific findings were made, and the only reason stated is the general one found in the order settling the account, that the rejected items were not proper charges against the estate. From expressions in the brief of respondent, however, we infer that the items were disallowed because the court adopted the view now taken by the respondent that the alterations made in the building in question were deemed to-be more in the nature of the erection of a new building than the repair or improvement of an old one, and that such expenditure was not for that reason the subject matter of a proper charge against the estate.
It is perfectly true, as a general proposition, that executors and administrators are not required nor permitted to make permanent improvements upon the-property of the estate in their charge, in the way of erecting new buildings or structures, and that expenditures made for such purposes will not be allowed; and the only question is whether that rule in its strictness-should be applied to the facts of this case. We are constrained to think that it should not. If the case,were-, one where the executrix had proceeded to erect buildings' or other permanent improvements upon a vacant lot or unoccupied piece of land of the estate, it would no doubt fall strictly within the rule contended for-But such is not this case. Here the intention and purpose óf the executrix was to improve and put in repair premises for many years devoted to a particular Use, and from which the estate was deriving an income, for the purpose of keeping those premises from being
No question is made of her perfect good faith in the premises, and it appears that by the repairs and improvements made the property has been largely enhanced in value, and has been bringing in a steady income since the completion of the alterations made; of all which the estate has had the benefit. The work appears to have been done only after taking the advice of competent builders as to the best method to pursue in making the repairs rendered necessary; and that the. work was well done, and the cost a reasonable one for the character of such work, no question is made. Under these circumstances, and it appearing that the estate has received the full benefit of the expenditure, we think it would be very inequitable indeed to hold the executrix not entitled to a reimbursement. And it is according to the rules and principles of equity that the acts of an executor had in the administration of his trust are to be adjudged. (In re Moore, 96 Cal. 528.) In that case, quoting from Matter of Niles, 113 N. Y. 556, the court say: “ This matter of the administration of assets of the estate is peculiarly within the cognizance of equity, and the surrogate’s court, in adjusting the accounts of executors and administrators, is governed by principles of equity as well as law. (Upson v. Badeau, 3 Bradf. 15.)
In the exercise of the statutory powers conferred upon him, to direct and control the conduct and settle ..the
Judged by these principles, we think the work done in this instance should be held to be a repairing of the premises, within the meaning of the statute, the expenditure for which appellant should have been allowed in her account. It would have been better, perhaps, as it would in any case, had the executrix first procured the permission of the probate court to make the contemplated improvement before proceeding thereto; but this is not an indispensable condition to the allowance of the demand in her account, where it appears that the expenditures were just and reasonable, and have been made in the interests of the estate. (Estate of Moore, 88 Cal. 1.)
It follows that the order should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the court below to modify its order by allowing the rejected items. It is so ordered.
Harrison, J., and Garoutte, J., concurred.