OPINION BY
Appellant, Audrey C. Locke, appeals from the order entered in the Allegheny
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. Between 1997 and 2003, Decedent opened these joint bank accounts: Parkvale Savings Bank account No. * * * * *426 (“PK-426”) (opened February 28, 1997); National City Bank of Pennsylvania account No. * * * * * *643 (“NC-643”) (opened October 10, 2002); and National City Bank of Pennsylvania account No. ***** *542 (“NC-642”) (opened May 22, 2003). Upon opening the accounts, both Decedent and Appellant
On January 7, 2005, Decedent executed his last will and testament and a durable power of attorney. Under the express terms and conditions of his will, Decedent devised all of his real and personal property to his three (3) grandchildren, and named Appellee
On April 14, 2005, the Register of Wills issued letters testamentary. On July 27, 2007, Appellee filed a petition for citation, requesting Appellant to produce an accounting of the funds from the three bank accounts at issue. On September 14, 2007, the court ordered Appellant to show cause why she should not provide a full and final accounting of any and all accounts and assets titled in Decedent’s name that existed at the time of Decedent’s death and/or one year prior to his death.
On March 12, 2008, the Orphans’ court held a hearing on the petition. On June 19, 2008, the court ordered the funds in the three accounts to pass to Decedent’s estate to be distributed in accordance with Decedent’s will. The court found Decedent had created the accounts solely as a matter of convenience; consequently, Appellant was not the owner of the accounts upon Decedent’s death and had no right of survivorship in the bank accounts as against Decedent’s estate. On July 8, 2008, Appellant timely filed exceptions, which the court denied on August 6, 2008. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on September 3, 2008. On September 10, 2008, the court ordered Appellant to file a
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE ORPHANS’ COURT ERR IN INTERPRETING AND APPLYING THE MPAA SURVIVORSHIP PROVISION [AND] RULING THAT THE ACCOUNTS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN OPENED FOR [DECEDENT’S] CONVENIENCE DID NOT THEREFORE HAVE ANY SURVIV-ORSHIP INTEREST?
DID THE COURT ERR IN ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY] DISREGARDING SUBSTANTIAL HISTORICAL DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF [DECEDENT’S] INTENT UNDER THE MPAA’S SURVIVOR-SHIP PROVISION IN REACHING [THE] FACTUAL [CONCLUSION] THAT [DECEDENT] DID NOT INTEND APPELLANT ... TO HAVE SURVIVORSHIP INTERESTS IN THE DISPUTED ACCOUNTS?
DID THE COURT ERR IN ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY RELYING ON CONFUSED AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF [DECEDENT’S] INTENT UNDER THE MPAA SUR-VIVORSHIP PROVISION IN REACHING [THE] FACTUAL [CONCLUSION] THAT [DECEDENT] DID NOT INTEND APPELLANT ... TO HAVE SURVIVORSHIP INTERESTS IN THE DISPUTED ACCOUNTS?
(Appellant’s Brief at 2-3).
As a prefatory matter, we observe: “The appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.” Estate of Considine v. Wachovia Bank,
[A]n appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 312, 1311, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313).
Stahl v. Redcay,
Rule 341. Final Orders; Generally
(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in subdivisions (d), and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of an administrative agency or lower court.
(b) Definition of final order. A final order is any order that:
(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or
(2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute; or
(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision (c) of this rule.
(c) Determination of finality. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim ... the trial court ... may enter a final order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims ... only upon an express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of such a determination and entry of a final order, any order ... that adjudicates fewer than all the claims ... shall not constitute a final order. ...
Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) — (c). Under Rule 341, a final order can be one that disposes of all the parties and all the claims, is expressly defined as a final order by statute, or is entered as a final order pursuant to the trial court’s determination under Rule 341(c). Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(l)-(3); In re N.B.,
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 342 provides:
Rule 342. Orphans’ Court Orders Ap-pealable. Orders Determining Realty, Personalty and Status of Individuals or Entities. Orders Making Distribution
An order of the Orphans’ Court Division making a distribution, or determining an interest in realty or personalty or the status of individuals or entities, shall be immediately appealable:
(1) upon a determination of finality by the Orphans’ Court Division, or
(2) as otherwise provided by Chapter 3 of these rules.
Pa.R.A.P. 342 (emphasis added). In 2005, the legislature amended Rule 342 to clarify the procedure set forth in subsection (1) is not the exclusive method of appealing interlocutory orders in estate cases. Pa. R.A.P. 342, Note. A party may also take an appeal from an interlocutory order under subsection (2). Pa.R.A.P. 342(2).
The instant case involves an appeal from the Orphans’ court order declaring the three joint bank accounts as part of Decedent’s estate, to be distributed according to his will. By order entered June 19, 2008, the court directed Appellant to turn over the accounts to Decedent’s estate. Appellant filed exceptions to the order, which the court denied on August 6, 2008. By order entered December 11, 2008, the court expressly deemed as final its August 6, 2008 order. See Pa.RA.P. 341(b)(1); 342(1). Thus, we have no jurisdictional impediments and will review the merits of Appellant’s claims.
When reviewing an order from the Orphans’ court:
[Ojur standard is narrow: we will not reverse unless there is a clear error of law or an abuse of discretion. Our scope of review is also limited: we determine only whether the court’s findings are based on competent and credible evidence of record.
In re Estate of Westin,
For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s issues. Appellant argues she is the true owner of the joint accounts because each of the accounts at issue was expressly designated JWROS. In support of her position, Appellant at first directs our attention to evidence of Decedent’s banking and financial plan
In Pennsylvania, the ownership of funds held in a multi-party account is governed by statute. In re Estate of Dembiec,
One who knowledgeably creates a joint account with another arguably does so with the present intent to employ the account’s survivorship characteristic in substitution for a testamentary device. Furthermore, accounts with right of sur-vivorship provisions are often set up to allow caretakers to assist senior citizens with the management of their finances. Their well-planned financial protection can best be honored by adhering to the statutory presumption[s].... Like other testamentary devices, creation of a joint account, without more, accomplishes no present transfer of title to property. If ... one person deposits all sums in the joint account, this arrangement contemplates transfer of title to those funds to the other person or persons named on the account upon the death of the depositor. Moreover, the creator of a joint account, like the maker of a will and unlike the giver of a gift, may change his or her mind prior to death.
Id. at 530,
Section 6304 of the MPAA addresses the right of survivorship in a joint account, and provides in pertinent part:
§ 6304. Right of Survivorship
(a) Joint Account. — Any sum remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belongs to the surviving party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent at the time the account is created. ...
[[Image here]]
(d) Change by will prohibited. — A right of survivorship arising from the express terms of an account or under this section, or a beneficiary designation in a trust account cannot be changed by will.
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6304 (emphasis added).
The underlying assumption is that most persons who use joint accounts want the survivor or survivors to have all balances remaining at death. As to the ownership of funds held in a joint account, the statute favors the surviving party over the estate of the decedent. By [enacting] 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6304, the legislature has created a statutory presumption that survivorship rights are intended when a joint account is created. This presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of contrary intent. The burden of establishing a contrary intent is on the party who opposes the presumption of sur-vivorship.
In re Estate of Meyers,
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified certain concepts concerning the nature of joint accounts and the statutory presumption of survivorship generally, as well as the necessary quantum of proof to overcome that presumption and what effect if any the creation of a will has on that presumption. In re Novosielski, supra. First, the Court reiterated that joint accounts with rights of survivorship are typically created as “convenience” accounts; as such, a legitimately created joint account carries the statutory presumption of survivorship unless negated by the form of the account. Id. at 535,
“Absent a finding based on clear and convincing evidence that the [accounts were] fraudulently created or accomplished through a breach of trust” the court must apply the MPAA to resolve the dispute. Id. at 538,
Moreover, the creation of a will does not defeat the survivorship right created by joint accounts merely because the will would distribute a decedent’s property in a conflicting manner. Id. at 527,
Instantly, the Orphans’ court decided Appellee had rebutted the statutory presumption of survivorship as follows:
$ ^
9. It appears to this [c]ourt that [Decedent] treated the monies in the three [ (3) ] disputed accounts as his own during his lifetime.
10. It appears to this [c]ourt that [Appellant] was simply the person who signed checks from the three [ (3) ] disputed accounts.
11. It appears to this [c]ourt that [Appellant] exercised no dominion or control over the funds which were deposited exclusively by [Decedent] prior to his death.
12. This [c]ourt is convinced that the three [ (3) ] disputed accounts were created jointly as a matter of convenience to [Decedent],
13. This [c]ourt finds that [Decedent] did not impart the right of survivorship to [Appellant].
14. This [c]ourt finds that [Appellee] has produced sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the funds remaining in the three [ (3) ] disputed accounts, at the time of the death of [Decedent,] belonged to [Appellant] by means of survivorship pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6304(a).
[[Image here]]
(Orphans’ Court Order, filed June 19, 2008, at 2). After a thorough review of the record and the relevant law, we respectfully disagree that these findings were sufficient to support the court’s decision.
At the March 12, 2008 hearing, the parties stipulated Decedent had opened the joint accounts expressly as JWROS accounts with Appellant. (See N.T. Hearing, 3/12/08, at 5.) Decedent and Appellant signed account cards each time, expressly designating the respective account as JWROS. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301. By the manner in which Decedent titled the joint accounts as JWROS, he created a right of survivorship in Appellant. Pursuant to the MPAA survivorship presumption, and in the absence of any evidence of fraud or undue influence involved in the titling of the accounts, the accounts belonged to Appellant when Decedent died. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6304(a); In re Novosielski, supra.
Consequently, Appellee had to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the survivorship presumption and prove Decedent, in fact, had not intended a right of survivorship regardless of how the accounts were created. See id. Although Decedent solely funded the disputed accounts, treated the monies in those accounts as his own during his lifetime, and Appellant did not exercise dominion or control over those accounts, Decedent’s acts were wholly consistent with the statutory presumption that funds in a joint account belong to the depositor during his lifetime. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(a); In re Novosielski, supra; Deutsch, Larrimore & Farnish, P.C., supra. There was absolutely no evidence that Decedent changed his mind regarding the nature of the joint accounts at any time before he
Moreover, joint accounts are typically created as “convenience accounts”; such arrangements are also consistent with the statutory presumption of survivorship. See In re Novosielski, supra; Deutsch, Larrimore & Farnish, P.C., supra. Regardless of whether the subject accounts were “convenience” accounts, legitimately created joint accounts still carry the statutory presumption of survivorship, unless negated by the form of the account.
As the opponent of the survivorship right, Appellee had the burden to produce evidence so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing that the fact finder could without hesitation, come to a clear conviction that Decedent, in fact, had not intended a right of survivorship in Appellant, regardless of how the accounts were created. See In re Novosielski, supra. Without a finding based on clear and convincing evidence that the joint accounts were fraudulently created/maintained or titled through a breach of trust, the Orphans’ court should have applied the MPAA to resolve this dispute and found in favor of Appellant. See id.
Likewise, the fact that Decedent drafted his will naming his grandchildren as beneficiaries of his estate, after he had opened the joint accounts, is not clear and convincing evidence Decedent also intended the funds in the joint accounts to pass as part of his probate estate. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6304(d); In re Novosielslci, supra. At the hearing, Appellee and Decedent’s family members admitted Decedent had not discussed with any of them his specific intentions regarding the joint accounts. Rather, Appellee and Decedent’s family members articulated only a general knowledge that Decedent wanted to benefit his grandchildren upon his death. While the testimony adduced at the hearing indicated generally Decedent’s objective to provide for his grandchildren, Appellee failed to produce testimony/evidence regarding the manner or the specific property he wished to leave his grandchildren upon his death.
Order reversed; case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Notes
. Appellant was Decedent’s sister.
. Appellee was Decedent’s daughter.
. Rule 342 as amended supersedes In re Estate of Sorber,
. In addition to designating his grandchildren as the residuary beneficiaries under his will, Decedent also named his grandchildren as the sole beneficiaries of his IRA accounts, which indicates Decedent knew what he had and what he wished to leave to his grandchildren.
. Appellee did produce evidence of Decedent’s specific intent regarding his IRA accounts; Appellee testified; "[Decedent] had given me a sealed envelope and said, ‘If anything happens to me, this is for the girls.’ ” (See id. at 147.)