In Re Estate of Blodgett

MANDthis case for further proceedings con-

sistent opinion. with this

In the Matter of the ESTATE

OF Richard BLODGETT. Blodgett, Robert David an interested person, Appellant, Blodgett, Louann Personal Representative,

Appellee. No. S-11571. Supreme Court of Alaska.

Nov. LLC, Foster, & Rupright Rupright,

Verne Wasilla, Appellant. Associates, & Josephson Josephson, P.

Joe Appellee. PC, Anchorage, for Justice, BRYNER, Chief Before: FABE, EASTAUGH, and MATTHEWS, Justices. CARPENETI

OPINION

CARPENETLI Justice. INTRODUCTION I. criminally being convicted After father, Robert his benefits obtain attempted to Blodgett Pur will. his father's him under devised statute," supe "slayer Alaska's suant enti Blodgett was found court rior of his as a result will inherit tled to injustice re no manifest conviction, and Blodgett attacks forfeiture. sulted constitutional statutory and this decision superi- agree with we Because grounds. prove failed Blodgett court his fa benefits from the him excluding injustice, in manifest result will ther's re properly and because issues, affirm we constitutional solved claims. Blodgett's rejection court's PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS II Robert September On Blodge father, Richard his death caused murder indicted Blodgett was tt.2 entangled became Blodgett apparently Richard 13.12.803. 1. AS dragged to his was dump truck dump driving the Blodgett was ... Robert death. fol- the event briefing describes Blodgett's been had father that his unaware truck twice in dump truck jumping onto "After lows: evidentiary testimony Blodgett's 14, 2003, killed." September morning early hours degree the second January and in 2004 he thought might colorably result in manifest plea entered a of no contest to eriminally injustice, including past family relationships negligent homicide. His conviction led ato Blodgett's monetary needs. It found the three-and-one-half-year term imprison- "great deal of testimony about the nature of ment. past relationship" between his father "unhelpful" was named in the final will of irrelevant de- father, termining justice which left "all "the properties, of denying Bank allowing ac- or counts, recovery." stocks and It policies" insurance also to his concluded that Blodgett children. April In 2004 retained Blodgett petitioned sufficient income earning capacity superior the court for a hearing and holdings determine that he "would not be beggared rights participate if he did not receive these funds." in probate the pro- ceedings under probate the Alaska code and While the court specific made no findings as AS 18.12.8083. The other will beneficiaries to Blodgett's culpability in death, his father's but, consented to hearing, contending Blodgett was sentenced to three and one-half that the killing of Blodgett Richard was not years prison pled after guilty he to erimi- "unintentional," argued that AS 18.12.8038 nally negligent homicide. precluded Blodgett from receiving any prop- Blodgett appeals. erty under the will. After additional briefing and a one-day III. STANDARDOF REVIEW

evidentiary hearing, Superior Court Judge Ben Esch Because statutory issued a Memorandum and Order governs that provides this case denying Blodgett's petition that supe preventing him from rior obtaining any "may" court set benefits aside under will. The explained court statute if result,3 13.12.808 forfeiture was mandatory we superior review the unless court's deci proved by preponderance sion for abuse of discretion.4 We find an evidence that this would result abuse of "only if, discretion based on a re injustice. The court concluded that Blodget view of record, the whole we are left with a failed to make such a showing. The court definite and firm conviction that a mistake 5 considered, rejected, possible factors it has been made." hearing below stated that he quarrels, had a they separated had to be by people-on close very night with his father, and that of this death." relationship on the night of the accident when he set the truck in 13.12.803(k). 3. AS thought motion he all individuals were clear of truck. denied "any that he had Cape Corp., Fox Martinez 113 P.3d Cf. somebody indication that might have been (Alaska 2005) (where provided way climbing into the truck." He also testi- "may ... remove" director fied that he did not learn of his father's death acts, fraudulent court's decision is reviewed for police until a officer informed him of the death at discretion); abuse 714, Barber, Barber v. 837 P.2d point some after his arrest. (Alaska 1992) (''The 716 n. 2 approval of a stipulation settlement is within the discretion of Contrary testimony was also adduced at the Thus, the court. the standard of review is the hearing. Blodgett admitted that he had become clear standard."); abuse of discretion Channel arguments involved in two shortly with his father Flying, Bernhardt, Inc. v. before the homicide, that he and his father were (Alaska 1969) ("The 'may' word [in Civil Rule other," "yelling at each they and that had been 77(0(2) imposition ] makes the of the sanction "toe to toe" before pulled away by discretionary with the court. As in other cases person. another Blodgett, personal Luann where discretionary involved, authority is we representative sister, Blodgett's and Robert testi- shall only interfere where there has been an upset fied that "Dad was a lot of the time with discretion."). abuse of [Robert]. He never anything listened to that Dad had go told him. He would out and wreck Dad's 5. Alden H. v. State, Children's Servs., Office of vehicles. belongings Other of Dad's. He would 2005). P.3d 224, 228 We have also things trade belonged off that to Dad things said that we "will interfere discretionary with a for himself." personal Counsel represen- for the determination of the trial court if it is arbi argued tative closing "was trary, [not] capricious manifestly unreasonable." very interested in safety his father's because of Inc., Ins. Co. Honeywell, America v. Safeco the three quarrels different they (Alaska 1981). had-vicious policy endorse articulation, which to a statute both challenges Constitutional from his profit wrongdoer should ques review law.6 We questions wrong.13 of law own "adopt the will novo de tions precedent, light of persuasive is most amend passed In 1988 reason, policy." intentionally" "and removing the words ment The amended the statute.14 DISCUSSION IV. in AS covered homicides applied its face is, including erimi- 15-that .140 11.41.100 Not Abuse Did Superior Court A. initial intent Concluding That homicide. nally negligent Discretion Its par prevent towas Would amendment the Inheritance Forfeiture child- of their death Injustice. who caused ents in Manifest Result Not recovering long followed law has The common This estate.16 child's through damages allowed should "no one policy parent in which a case followed concern own wrong".8 Accordingly, his from profit hospital child to bring a to act failed equitable their exercised courts many state resulting in (an negligence) criminal act of in constru maxim this and followed powers During debate child's death.17 inheritance prevent statutes ing probate suggested bill, representative one the decedent.9 murdered heir who by an homicides, those just to to all apply rule this codified most states years Over final The children.18 against perpetrated "slayer statutes." known became into what this incorporated amendment of the draft 10 require removing the simply by suggestion statute, passed slayer Alaska original The of intent. ment "felo- offender 1972,11 applied when amendment, Gov- Alaska Shortly after decede kills" the intentionally niously and concern expressed Cowper Steve ernor requirement The nt.12 cireumstances, be might unusual the common from taken was intentional be taking the a killer prohibit unjust Code's Probate the Uniform rule and law 12, 803, n. 207 846 805 n. 849, Cm. L.Rev. Houston, 61 U. 851 P.3d City 104 v. 6. Varilek (1993). 2004). (Alaska Ha, year adopted in that slayer 591 was statute (quoting Guin The 11. at 851-52 7. Id. Cope 1979)). Promare Unirorm 1281, along the rest 6 1284 n. 1996, slayer 1, 78, Until § SLA 1972. ch. See by Wade, Property 75, ch. Acquisition See at AS 13.11.305. W. located See John was 8. statute Solution, Statutory 3, Killing § 1996. Another-A SLA Wrongfully Harvy. policy was This 715 L.Rev. Palmer, added). 115 N.Y. Riggs v. 78, 1, (emphasis famously described § SLA 1972 12. Ch. (1889), New York 506, where 22 N.E. 188 Appeals stated: Court Promate Unie. 190; at Riggs, 22 N.E. eg., See, 13. Version), Cope (Pre-1990 by 2-803(b) profit his own & cmt. permitted § shall be No one fraud, ("'The wrong, (1998) is confined advantage own of his take U.L.A. or to killing iniquity, and excludes upon own and intentional claim felonious to found killing."). manslaughter crime. his own property acquire accidental or to policy, by public are dictated maxims These admin- law in universal foundation have their 1988. §§ 3-8, SLA 14. Ch. countries, have no- civilized all istered in superseded statutes. been where AS 13.11.305. former 15. See Id. at 190. Stand- Soc. Servs. Health, Educ. House Co., See, Ins. v. Mutual eg., De Zotell Life (S.B.) Mins., 15th Bill Senate ing Comm. (1932); Riggs, 22 N.E. 245 N.W. S.D. 1988) (Statement Sess., (April Leg., at 2d Wade, n. 12. 190-91; supra at 717-18 n. at Stewart). of Roxanne of Co- District forty-five and the Today, states Svobodny). (Statement of Richard Id. at 32-33. nn. slayer See statutes. have lumbia infra form of some retained remaining have states (Statement Gruen- Max of Rep. Jeffrey G. at Id. rule. common-law Inherit, berg). Sherman, Right to Killing Mercy and the property victim, inas the case of deemed felonies. This includes murder an unintentional felonious killing.19 degree,26 Accord the first degree,25murder in the second ingly, another amendment adopted aughter,27 and criminally negligent mansl 1989,20creating the injustice manifest excep Thus, icide.28 Alaska's hom tion for unintentional homicides now found in statute encompasses intentional as well as (k): unintentional homicides. In the case of an unintentional When compared with killing, may a court set aside the applica statutes of jurisdictions, other tion [the Alaska's statute] the court emerges unique. No

makes findings other state has a of fact and conclu sions of law provision for unintentional subsection would result in a injus homicides. But in great majority of oth tice and that the subsection states, should not er provision such a would be unneces applied.[21] sary-in these states intentional homi statute also instructs that acquisitions cides are within statutes' reach.29 Many these statutes are covered modeled after the Uni the section "shall treated in accordance with the form principle that Probate Code. Following the common- may killer profit from the slayer rule, killer's law the current Uniform Probate wrong.22 This has remained the law in Code applies to an "individual Thus, Alaska.23 broadened who feloniously and intentionally kills the application the of slayer the statute-by ex decedent." The clarify comments that tending it to unintentional killings-and cre "this section excludes the accidental ated escape an clause-by enacting the mani manslaughter killing." The Restatement injustice fest exception.24 (Third) of Property takes a position, similar Under the current Alaska criminal its formulation of the law "does not apply unjustified all code, forms of killing are killing the reckless, was accidental, neg- 19. House Health, Educ. and Soc. Servs. application of the subsection would result in a Stand- Mins., ing Comm. Comm. Substitute for House injustice and that the subsection (C.S.H.B.) (March 14, Bill 1989) at applied. should not be (Statement Rep. of Gruenberg). Max (unclassified 25. AS 11.41.100 felony). 1,§ 20. Ch. SLA 1990. (unclassified 26. AS 11.41.110 felony). 13.12.803(k). 21. AS (class 27. AS 11.41.120 felony). A person A com- 13.12.803(e). 22. AS manslaughter mits person if the "intentionally, knowingly, recklessly causes the death of an- legislature In 1996 the adopted many provi- person other amounting circumstances not sions of the revised Uniform Probate Code and to murder in the degree." first or second Id. altered the numbering, it left the aspects intact, essential slayer re- (class 28. AS felony). 11.41.130 B person A com- jecting (apparently discussion) without the "in- criminally mits negligent "if, homicide with requirement tentional" of the Uniform Probate negligence, criminal person the causes the death Code's § statute. Ch. slayer 3, SLA 1996. person." of another Id. 24. The current Alaska statute, slayer 13.12.803, exception with the The slayer extension of relevant in this statutes to uninten- case, provides: now tional homicide was fairly uncommon until re- cently. permitted It is now (a) in nine other states An individual feloniously who kills the de- and the District of Columbia. cedent forfeits all benefits See Sherman, chapter under this 848-49, supra n. at n. respect estate, with to the decedent's including share, an intestate share, an elective an omit- Unig. Progars Cope spouse's share, ted 2-803(b) (Revised § or child's a homestead al- lowance, Version) (amended 1993), exempt property, family and a 8 U.LA. 211 allow- ance.... (k) In the {felonious case of an unintentional § Id. cmt., 8 U.LA. 214. The com- killing, may a court set application aside the of ments also state the Drafting Article II Commit- (a) ... of this section if the court makes preference tee's uniformity state findings of fact and conclusions of law that the statutes. Id. homicide facts specific the consider Higent." mani be would inheritance and, if denial of state majority noted, great the As this Nor does it. permit to unjust, festly intent be homicide require statutes with conflict rule avoid to power resemble jurisdictions minority of A ional.33 a rule: underlying policy killing to requiring merely Alaska own killer's from the profit should killer even intentional.34 unlawful, than rather in was act killer's wrong.37 Where some jurisdictions, minority of among this was the act where tentional, especially culpable with homicides only cover would cireum- reckless, other where "recklessness," and as low states mental crime, application mitigate the stances opinion judicial a followed has one least at re unduly harsh to may lead principle this its into requirement intent reading an killing Indeed, unintended sults. prac compared Thus, when statute.36 above, would example one, loved Alaska's jurisdictions, other most tices greater far killer inadvertent likely cause reach broader a much slayer statute monetary gain. than ruin personal unintentional inheritance preclude would not. convicted case, Blodgett would jurisdictions other where killers plea after homicide negligent criminally reach the broad tempered conclusively conviction This contest. no courts trial investing 18.12.803 ASof killing under established those stay its discretion criminally negligent Because atute.38 st result. where cases homicide, under unintentional unskilled denied inheritance Should to avoid (k) entitled criminally in a car drives who teenager proves if he slayer statute effects accidentally causes manner ap evidence preponderance legis- parent? remaining a sole death in mani result him will the statute plying a case in such clearly decided lature injustice. fest be discretion should there "culpable where law ing common Prop: & Wiurs (Teirp) or Restatement 32. D.C.Cope § shown); 19- negligence" (2003). cmt. £ § &8.4 TransrErs Donative homicides). (covering (2005) all felonious minority is jurisdiction type of Another (2005); § 14-2803 Ann. eg., ArizRev.Star See, killings Copz all 2005); Rev. includes (West Wast which Kansas, § 250 Pros Car. Cope Pros.Cope statute, § 59-513 Kan. (2005). generally its within See § 11.84.010-.020 Ann. recognize not does code (2004), its criminal but at 848-49. n. Sherman, supra Compare as felonies. homicides any sub-reckless (involuntary reckless (2005); § 21-3404 § Stat. 15-11-803 Kan. See, eg., CoroRev.Star § 21-3405 Star felony) with Kan. (2005); Rev.Srar. is Or § 2322 tit. Ann. negligence, is mis- homicide, based (vehicular § 112.455-.465 does which York, demeanor). addition, New In applies the which but a have covers Colorado's For example, second to reckless the first in extends rule, "murder of law crimes common (second degree man- killings omits reference manslaughter," but unintentional but degree or Will, 76 Misc.2d Rev. Coro See re Wells' slaughter). In negligent homicides. criminally statute), § 18-3-105 (N.Y.Suzr.1973). (slayer § 114, 119 15-11-803 Strat. N.Y.S.2d Manslaughter homicide). (criminally negligent killing reckless caused a (Wyo. Colorado Bell, v. 36. Dowdell similar a follows Delaware § ly. 18-3-104. Id. 1970). (in DerCopg § 2322 tit. Ann. scheme. reach, its manslaughter within cluding reckless inter- property or acquisition of wrongful "A homicide). criminally excluding but shall this covered a killer est slayer rules law common slayer statutes a principle that accordance treated of Columbia the District states several wrong." the killer's profit from may not killer killings. See however, do, apply all felonious 13.12.803(e). AS 2006) (cover (West § 381.280 Axx. KY.Rev.StAt. decedent life "takes person who ing a conviction 13.12.803(f) ("[A] of judgment felony"); LaRev. therefor is convicted felo- accountability establishing criminal persons Spat. (2005) (applying to § 22.613 Ann. conclusively estab- killing the decedent nious death" responsible for "criminally decedent's individual the convicted lishes Co., Ins. decedent), Ben. United v. Quick Life section."). of this purposes for the killer (1975) {apply- 563, 570-71 213 S.E.2d N.C. We have not had occasion to larly define situated rejected defendants when it phrase injustice" "manifest as used in the Blodgett's claim of injustice. manifest slayer statute, or to set out the relevant Blodgett attempted prove that enforce- factors that judge a trial should consider ment statute would result ruling when question. on this Similarly, be injustice manifest by introducing evidence cause no other state statute contains a (1) regarding past family relationships, and provision similar (k), (2) out-of- possible impecunity if denied the benefits case provides law ready no assis Jurisdiction of inheritance. The court found that Blod- However, tance. the Alaska Court Ap gett failed to meet his burden of proving, by peals interpreted phrase another, preponderance a evidence, extraordi- similar context. nary criminal presumptive cireumstances that would have made it sentencing, manifestly unjust "safety enacted a exclude him from his provision valve" father's will. agree. permits We review of a sentence a three-judge panel upon The court described the evidence regard- a showing of injustice.39 manifest In Smith ing family relationships "unhelpful." State,40 appeals court of equated mani While the court's statement that the "nature injustice fest with that which "plainly unfair."and quality of the relationship between these Later, 41 State,42 in Belts v. parties during life seem unrelated to the appeals held that a presumptive term can fairness of allowing the killer to benefit after manifestly the decedent's death" may unjust general" "in be a narrow inter- applied "as to particular pretation defendant." past relevance of relation- ships Before finding generally, injustice, we do not the court believe it was an held that abuse of "judge discretion must under the specific articulate cireumstances cireumstances that of this case. make defendant Witnesses sig testified Blod- gett and his father nificantly shared a different from typical relationship offender love," "tough "good relationship" within that category or that marked make the defen with occasional "squabblings" typical dant's conduct of fa- significantly different from a ther-son relationships. typical Such testimony nei- offense." adopt We ap Beltz's proves ther nor refutes the fairness of proach for- purpose of applying subsec feiting Blodgett's inheritance. The (k) court did tion Alaska's statute. not abuse its discretion in deciding that Blod- Thus, the comparison relevant here is gett be prove failed to on this tween Blodgett's conduct and that of typi ground. cal offender convicted of negligent homicide. The court also Blodgett's examined argu- In the criminal proceedings, Blodgett was ment that "it unjust would be deny to bene- sentenced to three and years one-half fits under the will to someone who physi- prison. This approaches sentence pre the cally disabled, who faces unknowable future sumptive term for felony second offenses, expenses, medical who has compromised a suggesting that superior the court did not earning capacity and ongoing psychologi- believe Blodgett's acts fell at the lowest level cal needs." superior court that, noted of culpability for a negligent homicide.45 although Blodgett suffered some medical dis- Given length the sentence, we are abilities, Blodgett's own witness testified that reassured that the court below considered he "is adept operation at the of heavy equip- Blodgett's conduct in relation to other simi- ment and has skills as a mechanic." The 39. AS 12.55.165 and 175. 45. Criminally negligent homicide is a class B felony. 11.41.130(b). A defendant convicted (Alaska 40. 711 App.1985). {felonymay class B be sentenced to a definite term of not more than ten Id. at 570 and years, shall sentenced to a presumptive years term of four if (Alaska 42. 980 P.2d App.1999). the offense is a felony second conviction. AS 12.55.125(d)(1). Id. at 480. Id. right his to process, right to due including his to lead could skills these that found court estate," rights and his "forfeiture avoid rang- compensation yearly with employment consid We clause.47 post facto the ex under $50,000 year. per $40,000 ing between prop- owns other Blodgett in turn. each that er found It also will expenses future medical erty and that Native Alaska through the likely met process 1. Due testimony, this light of In Service. Health superior that argues Blodgett not Blodgett "would that concluded court vio slayer statute these receive court's not if did he be beggared protected rights process due lated his that found court Consequently, funds." Constituti I, the Alaska 7 of injustice manifest article prove to failed Blodgett party that a requires process Due on.4 monetary need. on based opportunity an adequate notice receive abuse not court did we believe While life, deprived being heard before to be determination, making this its discretion Blod- adjudication.49 liberty, or analysis court's that concerned are we nothing is present, argues "[alt that gett showing that a the conclusion to lead could process Blodgett's due Robert protecting predic may turn on injustice of manifest court, to access access to obtain right to financial future concerning the tions health hearing." a fair receive discovery and would approach Such petitioner. if to inherit decedents slayers of their allow hearing and obtained requested financial they are they poor, but are filed ad- then court. He superior with this distinction- that doubt ly We solvent. evidence presented briefing and vance their on slayers based different between proce- judge. These in front of arguments legislature's wealth-reflects personal any due dispose of appear dures injustice manifest enacting the purpose how- Blodgett's position, argument. process provision.46 he assertion ever, on the is centered concerns, we conclude Despite these joint venture partnership de held fucto its discre- abuse court did superior argues He business. in his father's interests prove Blodgett failed finding that tion were violated rights process his due preponderance by a injustice evi- present opportunity having an evidence. interests. alleged these regarding dence Slayer Statute Application problems numerous B. There First, Blodgett had Blodgett's Consti- argument. process Not Violate due Did Rights. tutional hearing in front regarding any evidence present failed slayer argues joint venture partnership alleged these rights, constitutional his several violates 2001) (same). ica, noted, provision of 46. As attempted to appeal, reply brief ex- governor (k) after was added jury trial right argue constitutional that his cir- certain unusual pressed concern against protection right to constitutional and his cumstances, prohibit the injustice to may be an we will not violated. jeopardy were victim, double taking property of killer time in first for the arguments raised consider killing. unintentional an the case in of State, v. Exploration, Inc. reply Danco brief Standing Health, Servs. and Soc. Educ. House 435 n. 1 432, P.2d Res., 924 Natural (March Dep't 14, at 442 of 165, C.S.H.B. Mins., Comm. con- 1996). Accordingly, we decline (Alaska Gruenberg) (emphasis 1989) Rep. (Statement of claims. any constitutional of these sider added). section I, article pro- Constitution 48. Alaska Blodgett also appeal, opening brief on 47. In his life, liber- deprived of person shall "No vides: application of claim attempted to raise ..." process of law. without due ty, property, equal pro- right to his slayer violated before this claim to raise His failure tection. Co., State, Montgomery Ward Dep't Aguchak v. Willoya 49. v. waived it. superior court 1974) v. Cen- (Alaska (citing 1352, Mullane 2002) (hold- 1115, (Alaska Corrs., 53 P.3d of U.S. Co., 339 Trust for first Bank & if raised argument waived tral Hanover ing (1950)). 94 L.Ed. Corp. Amer- 313, 70 S.Ct. v. Corrs. appeal); Brandon time on of {I0 Second, Blodgett's interests. assertion on sentenced to death or declared an outlaw for appeal regarding these appears committing interests felony en or treason." Incident

tirely unsupported; points he to no attainder punishment crime, evidence and as for the support fact, record to it. felon what forfeited all of his lands and chat tels to the state.53 little evidence there is in suggests this case otherwige-a letter from to his sis We affirm the rejection court's ter after his suggests father's death Blodgett's "forfeiture of estate" claim on both any did not have partnership inter procedural grounds. and substantive Proce est in the father's Finally, business.50 durally, Blodgett argument waived his Blodgett has a argument tenable part for a inadequately briefing the issue. In his brief interest, nership it is not clear slayer that the alleged he "slayer that the statute ... works statute would cause him to forfeit his own I, forfeiture" and cited article section 15 of share of partnership. reasons, Constitution, For these the Alaska but he did not con reject Blodgett's any we process argument. argument due struct why as to that section

should slayer invalidate Alaska's statute.54 2. Substantively, "Forfeiture of estate" the law is many clear-and states have held-that the "forfeiture of es Blodgett next contends that appli tate" clause is not implicated by slayer cation statute resulted in a rule.55 Several support rationales this con "forfeiture of I, estate" violation of article First, clusion. loss caused section 15 of the Alaska Constitution. That statute is not improperly based on attainders provides: or on legal felon; rather, status of a Prohibited State Action. No bill of at- slayer statute exists to accept effectuate the post tainder or ex facto law shall be policy ed that a profit killer should not from passed. No impairing law obligation wrong.56 prevent rule does not contracts, and no making any law irrevoca- from inheriting general; grant ble privileges or immuni- prevents inheriting from from the ties shall passed. No comviction shall slayer's Second, victim. courts have noted corruption work blood or forfeiture of rule does estate. not actually forfeiture, cause a because the (Emphasis added.) provisions These re offender did not property own the at the time spond to practices certain and doctrines in homicide; merely he had an expectancy England.51 herited from Attainder existed at terest.57 By decedent, killing the in law; common it was "the act of extinguishing slayer prevents interest person's vesting rights civil Third, in himself.58 when person the constitutional 50. In that letter, stated, (1955). "And I S.E.2d 576, 580 really For more see examples, help participate want to family busi- Michael G. Walsh, Precluding Homicide Tak ness." ing By Intestacy, Under Will or 25 AL.R.Ath (2004). §§ 4, 15 Fellows, Mary Slayer Louise Solely Rule: Equity, Not a Matter 71 Iowa (collect Fellows, n. 49, at 544 & n. 168 supra L.Rev. cases). Dictronary (8th ed.2004). 52. Brack's Law cases). Id. at (collecting 540 & n. 160 Fellows, supra n. at 539. 58. This rationale accounts for those cases which have used the forfeiture of estate clause to strike Brandon Corrs. America, Corp. of aspects 2001) down ("[Clursory rules. There have been treatment of findings unconstitutionality issue is primarily considered this court to be two waiver issue."). of that areas. The first area-not relevant here-in since-superseded volves using cases the constitu provision reject E.g., tional requests to 55. judicial for the Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 678, (1918); Grierson, P. 679 See, Cook v. creation 380 Md. common-law eg., rule. (2004); 502, 845 A.2d Hagan 1231, 1234 v. Cone, Garwols v. 21 416, 94 S.E. 602, Ga.App. (1917), 603-4 Bankers Trust Co., 251 overruled 420, Mich. 232 statute as noted in 239, N.W. (1930); Smith, 403, Legette 241 v. Johnson, 226 678, S.C. 85 Keith v. Ga.App. 211 440 S.E.2d

711 obtaining benefits him from disqualified complete it covers suggests language policy, executed insurance something the life assuming that under forfeiture, but rights that his position is application Blodgett's result of 1985. as the forfeited is estate, impaired but statute, the entire were it is not contract this insurance slay Finally, the property.59 merely "some" passage of subsequent retrospectively of attainder the effect from differs er statute not reach We need slayer statute. going in the estate results it in that adjudication no has been argument, for there heirs, government.60 not to the the other policy. insurance regard to the life with estate" clause the "forfeiture Because non-probate policies Life insurance Blodgett's argument inapplicable, clearly Thus, Blodgett has been transfers.64 fail. here must slayer statute under a probate from excluded ob post facto clause him from necessarily Ex exclude does benefits.65 taining life insurance applica argues that next York Life Insurance the New not sued post the ex violated slayer statute tion of the disquali challenge its decision Company to provisi constitutional the same clause of facto challenge, whether such "passed fy him. Without a law law is post An ex on.61 facto non-probate applies to statute commission a fact or the occurrence after superior court- was not before changes the transfers act, retrospectively which of an us. before recognized-nor fact of such that court or relations consequences legal us to post ex is no occasion Accordingly, unclear whether there It is or deed.62 civil statutes.63 purely applies clause application an consider whether facto argu slayer statute is However, clause. post because ex violate the facto plausible is at least there ably punitive, in this seenario. apply that it could argument CONCLUSION v. an prevail on such Blodgett cannot did not abuse superior court Because a non- concerns his claim argument, because in- concluding that manifest its discretion poli- life insurance his father's probate asset: application of from not result justice would plea, the New Blodgett's Shortly after cy. Blodgett's statute, and because Company sent York Life Insurance to the slayer statute challenges the Alaska stating that constitutional a letter (1993); Pfanschmidt, Const, § 15. 230, 265 Ill. 1, art. v.Wall Araska 61. See 232-33 (1914), 785, 180, overruled 789-90 N.E. 106 720, (Alaska State, 722 n. 3 619 P.2d Danks v. Vallerius, 259 re Estate noted in In (5th Dicrionary 1980) 520 (citing Law 341, Brack's 350, N.E.2d Ill.Dec. Ill.App.3d ed.1979)). 1185, involves the area The second spouse a murderous question of whether narrow 1233, 1237 State, 945 P.2d Allen v. 63. Compare joint tenancies. his marital all title to forfeits ("[The (Alaska post clause App.1997) ex facto 55, Hurff, 93 A.2d 11 N.J. Compare v. Neiman laws retrospective prohibits (1952) surviving-murderer (divesting or increase of crimes the definition that 'alter vio joint property would legal spouse of title ") (citing Collins criminal acts.' punishment constitution, legal victim's placing title of late 37, 43, S.Ct. Youngblood, 497 U.S. v. circumvent trust would constructive share in (1990)) State, with Underwood 111 L.Ed.2d Estate, King's problems) with In re constitutional 1994) (analysis by 327-28 (1952) N.W.2d Wis. could post clause implies ex facto spouse surviving-murderer of entire (divesting statute). legisla civil Retroactive apply civil infirmity). presents tenancy no constitutional express of retro- statement tion must include ad case-is to this irrelevant This issue-while AS 01.10.090. activity the statute. within directly statute. in Alaska's dressed 13.12.803(b)(2) (felonious killing joint severs 64. AS 13.33.101. survivorship tenancies tenancy right into common). these benefits court noted [slayer] statute." subject to the not be "would (collect- Fellows, & n. 167 supra at 543 n. briefing recognizes that "the trial Blodgett's own cases). disqualify directly Robert court did interest contractual receiving of his the benefits policy." life insurance & n. 161. Id. at 540-41 712 unavailing, we AFFIRM the decision of intentionally causes the decedent's death.2 court. Only about ten states statute or common law forbid someone unintentionally who EASTAUGH, Justice, FABE, with whom causes the death of another from inheriting Justice, joins, concurring. estate,3 the decedent's and most of these agree I reaches, with the result the court states only disinherit for reckless conduct separately

but my write to discuss concern and not negligent for homicide.4 Other than slayer statute, about 18.12.8038, how our Alaska, no more than four states and the applies negligent homicide.1 District of appear Columbia to disinherit if Many statutes, equivalent states have wrongful but conduct that causes the death is prevent most inheritance i#f merely the heir negligent in degree.5 some "(al person 1. Per AS 11.41.130 commits the statute killing covers "unintentional derived from if, criminally negligent crime of grossly conduct"). homicide negligent reckless or negligence, person criminal causes the death slayer Louisiana's statute covers all criminal person." 11.81.900(a)(4) of another Per AS homicide. In re Hamilton, 446 So.2d 463, 465 person negligence acts with (La.App.1984) (holding criminal slayer "when the that statute "was person perceive fails to intended unjusti- substantial pre- situations such as that include case, sented degree beneficiary fiable risk ... of such a nature and where a does that intentionally perceive feloniously gross failure to cause the constitutes a death of devi- the insured but criminally ation from the nonetheless held standard of care that a reasonable responsible death"). for that person would observe in the situation." North Carolina's pro- common law any hibits wrongful inheritance after homicide. Op. 2. See at 706. Co., Quick 47, v. United Ins. 287 N.C. Benefit Life 563, (1975); 213 S.E.2d 567 Matter Estate Sherman, Jeffrey Mercy G. Killing and the Cox, 97 312, 388 S.E.2d N.C.App. 199, 201 Right to Inherit, 61 U. Cm. (1990). 803, L.Rev. 848 n. 213 The continued of this com- (1993). mon law rule light has been criticized in barring only statute intentional killers inheriting. from 314-3; § N.C. Grn.Stmar §§ (ex see Coro.Rev.Star 15-11-803 & 18-3-04 also Julie Hampton, Waller tending slayer The Need statute to recklessly killers who Slayer Carolina, a New Cong Statute in North 24 others); cause death of Der Ann. tit 12 CamPerLt L. Rev. 295 § § 2322 & (extending tit. 11 632 Kentucky § Revised Statute 381.280 bars in- recklessly to killers who cause the death of an heritance from those convicted of other); Will, 458, In re Wells' 76 Misc.2d 350 homicide. "Reckless homicide" felony. is a (N.Y.Sur.1973) N.Y.S.2d (noting that §KRS Kentucky 507.050. defines "reckless" as "[tJhere is a tremendous difference between one gross "a deviation from the standard of conduct criminally negligent who is but nevertheless that person a reasonable would observe." KRS guilty manslaughter of unintentional from one § 501.020. Reckless Kentucky homicide in guilty manslaughter degree in the second equivalent therefore negligence to criminal recklessly causing another"); the death of 11.81.900(a)(4). Alaska under AS § Orta. St Anmm. 231 & § 21 Oxta. St. Ann. § Kansas Statute 59-513 states that "[nlo per- (extending slayer involuntary statute to man son feloniously convicted killing, procuring or slaughter); § Or.RevSmt (extending 112.455 of, killing person another shall inherit." In- slayer statute to those who kill with "felonious voluntary homicide under Kansas law extends to intent," appear reckless, which would to cover '"'killing being" of a human recklessly, committed homicide); negligent, Estate, but not In re Klein's during misdemeanor, "during the commis- (1977) (hold Pa. A.2d sion of a lawful act in an unlawful manner." KS ing involuntary manslaughter bars inheri §ST 59-513. arguably This could extend to tance when the is reckless, culpability conduct, grossly negligent especially as KS ST McClure, negligent); McClure v. 184 W.Va. § explains 21-3201 'gross negli- "[the terms (1991) 403 S.E.2d 197, 200 n. 6 (holding gence,' 'culpable negligence, negli- 'wanton despite declaring anyone feloniously who gence' and 'wantonness' are included within the kills another could inherit, nonetheless term 'recklessness' as used in this code." A resulting negligence "'death gross from negli federal district court has slay- held that Kansas's gence recovery will not bar under a stat apply homicide, er statute negligent does not ute"). appear and there to be no interpret- state cases scope applying statute or it to 5. The District of Columbia statute covers Rosenberger homicide. v. Nw. Mut. Life resulting grossly negligent Co., con- F.Supp. Ins. (D.Kan.1959) Co., duct. See Turner v. Travelers Ins. 487 A.2d (explaining "the intent of the (D.C.1985) (explaining enacting the give statute must have been to effect bearing on the think cireumstances likewise potential it unusual because is Our mani- to a be relevant itself cannot conduct pre events that class of applies to a ly view, a my injustice inquiry. (because fest they likely to occur dictably more injus- manifest of the interpretation cramped unusual be It is also negligence). involve un- substantial could result tice standard family puts wrongful conduct cause the Indeed, very many cases. relatively main fairness may be at risk members operated negligently which frequency with populace much of the stream, what akin to some trial might lead cause death vehicles so especially commonly This is does. how a think the cireumstances courts to (such driving as activities involves common demonstrate operated can never vehicle vehicles) the stan often violate motor least, a court injustice. At regulat specified of care dard finding against might apply presumption a result, potentially our statute ion.6 As injustice. frequently. There broadly and applies both not necessari harsh results cireum- explain for what potential does not The statute finding the drafters. of manifest contemplated justify a ly might stances litigant try that a injustice. seem It would inter- a risk that the state's is also There under disinheritance to avoid margin- are too by the statute ests advanced any present permitted statute should with the testamenta- justify interference al to in This would arguably relevant evidence. negligence. victim of ry expectations gravity evidence relevant clude statute's challenged the has not beneficiary's rela to the conduct or negligent here assume constitutionality. I therefore jurisdic Foreign tionship with the decedent. in deter- interest has sufficient that the state es also contain slayer statutes tions whose safety to bar inheritance public and rence of a broad permit clauses consideration cape none- There is homicide. negligent for English Forfei The range of cireumstances. injustice if the statute potential theless make shall not "The court ture Act states: case. harshly particular in a applied modifying the an order has contained statute since Our unless case forfeiture rule effect of the leg injustice." The "manifest exception for that, regard to the con having it is satisfied injus islature, possible about concerned of the deceased of the offender duct uninten slayer statute to applying tice appear to the other cireumstances to such homicides, adopted an year in that tional material, case justice of the to be to avoid permits a court escape clause rule to be so modi requires the effect findings fact "makes if it forfeiture leading En One of in that case."9 fied injus that manifest of law" and conclusions cireumstances considering what glish cases result.8 tice would explained: has might be relevant into account to take court is entitled applies necessarily the statute But because relevant homicide, might mis- cireumstances range of trial courts whole negligent from the con discretion, apart quite involving that cireumstances takenly assume the deceased: of the offender duct the statute well within conduct mainstream them; degree of relationship between (such arising out happened; for what vehicle) culpability moral provide a basis cannot operation offense; gravity nature and might injustice. A court finding manifest State, 758 negligence. Comeau v. criminal rule"). Kansas common-law to the (noting (Alaska App.1988) essentially unchanged since Rosenber- statute is consti- impaired by could driving alcohol while ger. negligence). tute criminal of care set a standard who breaches 6. A driver See, negligent. regulations is traffic statutes 13.12.803(k); Op. at 705-706. also see 7. AS Ardinger Hummell, eg., 1999) "who indis- (explaining that one (discussing legislative histo- Op. 8. See at 705-706 to be be found putably a statute must violates ry). gross deviation from negligent"). is a If there person a reasonable care that the standard of Act, (Eng.). §2 c. 9. Forfeiture to the level could rise the conduct would observe deceased; intentions the size of the

estate and the value of

dispute; position the financial of the of fender; and the moral claims and wishes of

those who would be entitled to take the of the forfeiture .[10] rule It would seem beneficiary also if a requests findings on cireumstances that are

arguably injustice, relevant to manifest trial court should make findings as to each explain

relevant cireumstance and which cir- cumstances the court concludes are irrele- vant. does not claim here that

the trial findings court's inadequate. were Although the trial court addressed one

cireumstance-the financial effect of disin- Blodgett-there heritance on request was no for findings as to other cireumstance and appeal

there is no claim on findings court's were deficient. I agree therefore to affirm. KOHLHAAS, Appellant,

Scott Alaska, STATE of OFFICE OF the GOVERNOR, LIEUTENANT Appellee. No. S-11866. Supreme Court of Alaska.

Nov. Dunbar v. 10. peal taken from Plant, Chancery Ch. ^[1998] Division) (U.K.) (hold- (ap- could inherit her husband's that survivor of husband-wife suicide estate). pact

Case Details

Case Name: In Re Estate of Blodgett

Court Name: Alaska Supreme Court

Date Published: Nov 17, 2006

Citation: 147 P.3d 702

Docket Number: S-11571

Court Abbreviation: Alaska