James Robert Angier died testate on July 13, 1985. A will dated January 14, 1982, and a codicil dated October 1, 1982, were admitted to probate by the Register of Wills of Susquehanna County. By the terms of the will, the testator left his entire estate to his daughter, Michelle, but if she predeceased the testator, the estate was then to go to Kathy Angier Angel, another daughter. 1 On or about September 23, 1982, Michelle was killed by a person or persons unknown. On October 1, 1982, the testator executed a codicil which left his entire estate to a friend, Steven William Martel. 2 The testator’s only living child, Kathy, filed an appeal from the probate of the codicil. She argued (1) that the testator’s signature on the codicil had been forged; (2) that the testator had lacked testamentary capacity when he signed the codicil; and (3) that his signature, if genuine, had been the product of undue influence, fraud, or mistake. The orphans’ court, after hearing, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Register’s decision to admit the testator’s will and codicil to probate. Exceptions were dismissed, and this appeal by Kathy Angier Angel followed.
For thirty years prior to his death, the testator served as Postmaster in the town of Lanesboro, Susquehanna County. Steven William Martel lived in an apartment above the post office. The testator had sustained serious back and neck injuries during World War II, and thereafter suffered chronic physical ailments. Prior to his death, he had lived alone with his dog. Martel frequently had helped the testator by caring for testator’s dog, and sometimes joined *117 the testator behind the counter at the post office. The testator’s daughter, Kathy, had married and was living with her family in South Carolina but continued to correspond with her father.
The contestant of a will has the burden of proving the existence of a forgery by clear and convincing evidence. See:
In re Estate of Elias,
The law concerning testamentary capacity is well settled.
A testator possesses testamentary capacity if he knows those who are the natural objects of his bounty, of what his estate consists, and what he desires done with it, even though his memory may have been impaired by age or disease. Estate of Reichel,484 Pa. 610 ,400 A.2d 1268 , 1270 (1979); In re Estate of Hastings,479 Pa. 122 , 127,387 A.2d 865 , 867 (1978); Cohen Will,445 Pa. 549 , 551 n. 1,284 A.2d 754 , 755 n. 1 (1971). The burden of proving testamentary capacity is initially with the proponent; however, a presumption of testamentary capacity arises upon proof of execution by two subscribing witnesses. Thereafter, the burden of proof as to incapacity shifts to the contestants to overcome the presumption by clear, strong and compelling evidence. In re Estate of Hastings, supra; Cohen Will, supra,445 Pa. at 551 ,284 A.2d at 755 ; In re Estate of Brantlinger,418 Pa. 236 , 242,210 A.2d 246 , 249-50 (1965). Furthermore, proof of *118 execution does not require any representation of testamentary capacity by attesting witnesses. In re Estate of Brantlinger, supra,418 Pa. at 241 ,210 A.2d at 249 . The condition of the testator at the very time of execution is crucial; however, evidence of capacity or incapacity for a reasonable time before and after execution is admissible as indicative of capacity. In re Estate of Hastings, supra; Williams v. McCarroll,374 Pa. 281 , 293,97 A.2d 14 , 19-20 (1953). Finally, old age, sickness, distress or debility of body neither proves nor raises a presumption of incapacity. In re Estate of Hastings, supra,479 Pa. at 129 ,387 A.2d at 868 ; In re Estate of King,369 Pa. 523 , 528,87 A.2d 469 , 472 (1952).
In re Estate of Kuzma,
The challenged codicil in the instant case was signed before two subscribing witnesses. There is a presumption, therefore, that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time when he signed the codicil. The trial court found that appellant had failed to overcome the presumption of capacity, and we find nothing in the record that would permit us to disturb that finding.
An inference of testamentary incapacity does not arise merely because the testator made an unnatural testamentary disposition.
Kish v. Bakaysa,
A confidential relationship exists where on the one side there is an overmastering influence or, on the other, weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably imposed.
Estate of Krempasky,
In the instant case, there was no evidence to establish that Martel enjoyed an overmastering influence over the testator. Although appellant asserted that the testator had been suffering from a weakened intellect, the trial court found credible the testimony of the proponent’s witnesses that “nobody influenced Bob Angier____ He had a mind of his own.” After hearing the evidence, the court concluded that “it is difficult, if not impossible to imagine that the decedent was ever in a position of dependence on anyone.”
Finally, we reject appellant’s contention that the will is invalid because testator was acting under a mistake of fact concerning appellant’s parentage. Even if the testator had been mistaken in suspecting that appellant was not his biological daughter, this was not the type of “mistake of
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fact” which would invalidate the will. See: 79 Am.Jur.2d Wills §§ 415, 417. See generally: 94 C.J.S. Wills § 223;
In re Alexander’s Estate,
AFFIRMED.