99 Neb. 275 | Neb. | 1916
Lead Opinion
Upon the motion for rehearing in this case, briefs have been filed by the attorneys involved, and also several briefs have been filed by attorneys interested in the general question involved. It is strenuously argued that the statute is unconstitutional. It is said in the brief: “The court in the case at bar erroneously concedes to the legislature the unlawful power to change the judicial construction of the existing will statute (Rev. St. 1918, sec.
The language of the statute we are construing and of the title to the act furnish some ground for the contention that the statute is unconstitutional for the reason above stated. It says what the term “weeks” shall be construed to mean, and the .title of the act is to define the word, “week,” but this is an entirely different thing from specifying and construing a particular statute. A general law that a week in the publication of legal notices shall always be seven full days would, if valid, of course change the holding of the court in many cases in the construction of various statutes, and indirectly tend to give a different meaning to many statutes from the meaning which ■the court has already given them; but it is a general statute, applying in all cases, and does not enact that the court shall construe a certain statute in a certain way, but provides what shall constitute a week in the state in regard to the publication of notices. Formerly the courts were very technical in holding statutes unconstitutional, but the courts are not now looking for excuses to declare laws unconstitutional, but are seeking to avoid that un
Our former opinion construes this statute to mean that ; in no case will the publication be' complete until the full number of weeks of at least seven days each have elapsed after the first publication. The statute would have this meaning if it simply read “a period of seven consecutive days beginning with the date of the first publication of notice,” and omitted the other clause referring to calendar week, so that the clause referring to calendar week seems to have no force or effect in the statute as we have construed it. This court had decided that when a statute provided that a notice should be published three weeks successively, publication on any day during each week, if in a weekly paper, would be complete upon the last publication, but in a semiweekly paper it would not be complete until it had been published twice in each of the required number of weeks. Some statutes provided that the legal notice should be published for a certain number of weeks; some omitted the word “for” and provided that they should be inserted in a paper three successive weeks, with different variations of these several wordings, so that the decisions of the court became diverse and perhaps inconsistent. If it was the intention of the legislature to simply provide that in all publications a week should be full seven days, and that three or four weeks’ publication must be three or four full weeks of seven days each after the
The sole purpose, then, of this statute is to provide for publications in other than weekly papers. When we consider the effect of the emergency clause, it seems, still more probable that it was not intended by the legislature to extend the required time of publication in weekly papers without notice to those who might make such publications before the new statute should be published. Other publications generally, if complying with the former statutes, would be valid under this act. While the matter is unfortunately not free from doubt, uve have concluded that this statute does not affect publications in weekly papers,
Our former judgment is vacated, and the judgment of the district court is reversed, with instructions to enter a judgment reversing the judgment of the county court.
Reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
In my judgment the majority opinion constitutes a judicial amendment of chapter 222, Laws 1915. In our former opinion (98 Neb. 799) it is stated: “We think this act of the legislature is clear and unmistakable in its terms and relieves the situation of all doubt as to the construction which must be given to statutes of the kind therein referred to, and that section 1303, Rev. St. 1913, is clearly one of the statutes contemplated.” Nothing has been said in the briefs on rehearing or in the majority opinion which, in my judgment, should cause us to change that construction of the statute referred’ to. I concede that it is unfortunate that the legislature passed chapter 222 with an emergency clause. It was bad judgment. But my idea of the law is that the question as to whether the legislature uses good or bad judgment in the passage of an act is not one for review by the court. I think our former judgment should be adhered to.