In Re Eng
This case consolidates three cases — one habeas corpus petition and two direct appeals — all arising from municipal offenses in the City of Seattle (the City) and tried in that city‘s municipal court. The Superior Court for King County heard the original habeas petition and reviewed the latter two cases under its appellate powers over courts of limited jurisdiction. The Superior Court in each case found in the City‘s favor. The Court of Appeals declined to take discretionary review of the latter two cases. We accepted review of them along with the appeal of the Superior Court‘s denial of the habeas petition, brought directly to this court.
Appellant Eng and petitioners Louis and Bowman (hereinafter appellants) contend that the creation of Departments 4, 5, and 7 under
We find that
The relevant facts of each case are brief. In In re Eng, the City charged Raymond Eng with theft, Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 12A.08.060, on February 24, 1987, in Department 7 of Seattle Municipal Court. The City later amended the charge to possession of a meter key, SMC 12A.08.105. The Municipal Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 1 year in jail, with 245 days of this sentence suspended. The court later suspended the remainder of Mr. Eng‘s sentence upon his agreement to inpatient alcohol treatment at Thunderbird House. Because of an incident at this treatment center, Mr. Eng was again charged with theft and the court reimposed the unserved portion of his suspended meter key sentence. Mr. Eng subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus from the King County Superior Court in which he contested the legitimacy and jurisdiction of Department 7. He now appeals the denial of his petition.
In Seattle v. Louis, Jeanetta Louis faced a charge of theft, SMC 12A.08.060, in Seattle Municipal Court Department 4 on September 24, 1987. At trial, she moved for a change of venue to Departments 1, 2, or 3 or, in the alternative, dismissal. She argued that these were the only constitutionally and/or legally created departments in the Seattle municipal court system. The municipal judge denied this motion, the case proceeded to trial, and Ms. Louis was found guilty and sentenced to 1 year in jail.
In Seattle v. Bowman, Richardo Bowman was found guilty of driving while intoxicated, SMC 11.56.020, and negligent driving, SMC 11.58.005, in a jury trial before Seattle Municipal Court Department 5 on April 20, 1987. Rather than raise the issue at the outset — as Ms. Louis had — Mr. Bowman first challenged the legality and constitutionality of Department 5 in his appeal before King County Superior Court.
Appellants challenge the constitutionality of portions of
There shall be three departments of the municipal court, which shall be designated as Department Nos. 1, 2 and 3: Provided, That when the administration of justice and the accomplishment of the work of the court make additional departments necessary, the legislative body of the city may create additional departments as they are needed.
Appellants base their argument on the premise that the judges in Seattle‘s municipal court system are, for constitutional purposes, “justices of the peace.” This premise would place the municipal court under the strictures of
The legislature shall determine the number of justices of the peace to be elected and shall prescribe by law the powers, duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace: ...
This provision, appellants argue, places upon the Legislature the responsibility for setting the number of justices of the peace. Such responsibility cannot be delegated to a municipal legislative body.
The City, on the other hand, argues that the Seattle municipal court system was created pursuant to a different constitutional provision,
The legislature shall prescribe by law the jurisdiction and powers of any of the inferior courts which may be established in pursuance of this Constitution.
The language of this provision, the City argues, does not restrict the Legislature‘s ability to delegate certain aspects of the authority to create and maintain “inferior courts.” Among these, the City claims, is the ability to add additional departments to the Seattle Municipal Court. At the heart of this constitutional dispute, then, is whether the Seattle municipal court system is an “inferior court” under
Each incorporated city in this Territory, together with any adjoining precincts, if any there are, lying partly within and partly without said city, shall, for the purposes of this act, and for fixing and limiting the number of justices of the peace to be elected in such city, be deemed and considered one precinct ...
Laws of 1887-88, ch. 68, § 3, p. 120.
Using their definition as a frame of reference, appellants trace the development of the justice of the peace statutes through the years. Not surprisingly, appellants interpret this history of the justice of the peace courts to include the Seattle municipal court system. Because these municipal judges, so the argument goes, are in actuality “justices of the peace,” their number can only be set by the Legislature.
In response to the City‘s argument that the municipal court system represents an “inferior court,” appellants contend that the Legislature must create “inferior courts” with specific language to that effect. As an example, appellants cite
In addition, appellants argue that because
[1] Appellants’ historical argument fails because it takes only a limited and selective view of the constitution‘s language and of the body of statutes creating Washington‘s court system. This court has long held that in construing a constitutional provision, one must view the instrument as a whole and give effect to all of its provisions harmoniously. See State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter, 50 Wash. 164, 96 P. 1047 (1908); Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, Inc., 10 Wn.2d 372, 116 P.2d 756 (1941); Farris v. Munro, 99 Wn.2d 326, 662 P.2d 821 (1983). With this rule in mind, it follows that neither
[2, 3] A complete understanding of these two constitutional provisions requires a careful reading of the unifying section of the constitution‘s judicial article,
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the legislature may provide.
(Italics ours.) As the emphasized words of section 1 indicate, the Legislature is mandated to create the justice of the peace courts. Along with this mandate comes the Legislature‘s responsibility for setting the number of justices of the peace in section 10. The constitution, however, gives the Legislature more flexibility in creating other kinds of “inferior courts” as the need arises. Part of this flexibility is the ability to delegate the power to set the number of judges in these courts.
Because the constitution mandates the creation of justice of the peace courts, it is logical for the Legislature to identify these courts in legislation specifically, rather than so identifying the “inferior courts,” as appellants suggest. A
Further, appellants’ suggestion concerning the specific identification of “inferior courts” fails to take into account the Court Improvement Act of 1984, which converted the justices of the peace into the district court system. Laws of 1984, ch. 258. This legislation, unlike
It is true that when the statute that is now
Because of the lack of specific identification as a justice of the peace court, the Seattle municipal court system is, for constitutional purposes, an “inferior court.” In addition, the statutory provision allowing concurrent jurisdiction between these municipal courts and the district/justice of the peace courts, further identifies the former as an entity separate from the latter system. See
The justice court act of 1961, Laws of 1961, ch. 299, provides further evidence that the Seattle courts are separate from justices of the peace. That act contained a provision allowing Seattle to maintain its court system as if the act “had never been enacted.” Laws of 1961, ch. 299, § 2; see also
Appellants cite a number of cases which they claim construe the limitations of
Despite appellants’ contention, neither Cloherty nor Fugita actually deal with
In their historical analysis, appellants overlook legislation which, in 1891, created a municipal court system in cities of over 20,000 — cities of the first class. See Laws of 1891, ch. 64. This legislation, passed February 28, 1891, may have been an effort to follow up on the impact of the Cloherty decision of February 20 of that year, which held that no statute had authorized the police court in Tacoma, a first class city. This statute provided for change of venue between the municipal courts and justice of the peace courts, thus identifying them as distinct bodies. Laws of 1891, ch. 64, § 4, p. 109. This distinction is reinforced by a proviso that the act would not affect the jurisdiction of that latter court. Laws of 1891, ch. 64, § 16, p. 113. In section 17, the act states that the new municipal courts would “take the place of and supersede the police courts now existing in any of the cities to which this act applies“, thus increasing
Two other cases which appellants cite, Manus and Long, directly address legislation concerning justices of the peace but have nothing to do with the Seattle municipal court system. Essentially, these two cases stand for the uncontested proposition that the Legislature cannot delegate the power to determine the number of justices of the peace. See Manus, 44 Wn.2d at 896; Long, 60 Wn.2d at 152. Because appellants’ argument that the Seattle municipal judges are justices of the peace fails, these cases are not relevant.
Appellants are correct in arguing that Seattle v. Filson, supra, supports their position. The issue in that case concerned whether the Seattle municipal courts were courts of record. In holding the courts were not, this court stated that
At the time the constitution was adopted, the justices of the peace were the only courts inferior to the superior court, and they exercised all of the jurisdiction now distributed among other courts of limited jurisdiction, including municipal courts. Thus, as we understand the import of
Const. art. 4, § 11 , the Legislature is not empowered to make an inferior court a court of record.
For reasons of historical interpretation and constitutional construction, the Seattle municipal judges are not justices of the peace. Therefore, the City‘s ability to add new departments to that court is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. These courts are constitutionally legitimate.
II
Appellants next contend that, if Departments 4, 5, and 7 are constitutional, they were nonetheless created contrary to state law and the Seattle City Charter. Because Departments 4 and 5 present issues different from Department 7, we address these two departments first.
Every legislative act of said City shall be by ordinance. Every ordinance shall be clearly entitled and shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title....
Seattle City Charter, art. 4, § 7. Therefore, if Departments 4, 5, and 7 were validly created, such creation would have to have been accomplished by ordinances “clearly entitled” and containing “but one subject.”
The structure of Seattle‘s municipal court system is set out at section 3.33.040 of the SMC. This section states, in part:
A. The Municipal Court shall consist of six (6) judicial departments, as follows:
1. Departments 1-3 established pursuant to RCW 35.20.100 ; and2. Departments 4-6 heretofore established pursuant to
RCW 35.20.100 by Ordinances 101811, 108666 and 110900.
The ordinances mentioned in SMC 3.33.040(A)(2) do not specifically identify themselves as creating additional departments to the municipal court. Ordinances 108666 and 110900 adopted the City‘s budget for the years 1980 and 1983, respectively. Ordinance 101811, dating from 1973, does mention the city council‘s resolve to seek federal funds to establish — eventually — a fourth department of the municipal court. It does not, however, actually establish that department. The City claims in its supplemental brief that Department 4 was created by ordinance 101630, which adopted the City‘s general budget for 1973.
A close inspection of the annual budgets referred to in ordinances 101630, 108666, and 110900 reveals that the allotments for municipal judges’ salaries were increased by one position each time. The City argued at the Superior Court appeal of Louis that it is not required to pass separately titled ordinances to create more departments. In addition, the City maintained that “[b]y appropriating by ordinance the necessary monies to operate full-time municipal court departments 4, 5 and 6, and creating positions therefor, the Seattle City Council `created’ those departments in accordance with
Twigg does not apply here. At issue in that case was whether the City of Aberdeen was required to pass an ordinance to continue the operation of its municipal court after the passage of the justice court act. The Court of Appeals looked to the statute allowing for such continuation, former
[4] The budget ordinances do not meet the specificity required by
[5] Nevertheless, while the budget ordinances by themselves do not fulfill the charter‘s requirements, the provision in SMC 3.33.040 quoted above serves more than adequate notice, albeit after the fact, that the departments were created. This code provision explicitly identifies the City‘s court departments and the authority upon which they exist. Thus, the City officially created half of its municipal court departments years after it “created” them in practice.
While Departments 4 and 5 are legitimate, albeit belatedly, the same cannot be said for Department 7. The ultimate issue here is whether the judge in what is called Department 7 had jurisdiction.
Department 7 is the City‘s designation for the courtroom in the new King County Jail. When the jail was first completed, the City arranged with King County to use the courtroom for arraignments. Soon, however, the increasing
The City maintains that it has not created a permanent, fully funded department with Department 7. Rather, it contends that it is exercising its statutory power to employ judicial officers and judges pro tempore to assist with the caseload of the established municipal court departments. The question, then, becomes whether the judge exceeded the authority allowed in the judge pro tempore statute.
The “judge” presiding in this courtroom was originally designated as a “Commissioner/Judicial Officer.” See Clerk‘s Papers (In re Eng), at 59, 62 (new position request forms for the Seattle budgeting process for 1984 and 1985). The City, in its brief, now terms this person as a judicial officer and judge pro tempore.
Unlike the judicial officer position, judges pro tempore, under
The two offices described above each have their own limitations. The judicial officers may only “hear and determine” traffic violations but they may be “employed” in an open-ended fashion. The judges pro tempore, on the other hand, have the same powers as the other municipal judges but serve limited terms. The City attempts to blur the two offices and have the best of both worlds. It has operated Department 7 since 1986, staffed by a person who acts like a judge but who was originally hired under the title of half-time commissioner/judicial officer, at least as evidenced by the 1985 budget request.
This situation resembles what appellants argue is a “subset of permanent pro tempore judges to hear and decide criminal matters.” Brief of Appellant, at 17. Such an arrangement, appellants suggest, goes beyond the authority granted in
[6] The City has not validly created Department 7. It has therefore abused the provisions allowing for judges pro tempore. As appellants point out,
To construe the municipal court statute as a harmonious whole, one must interpret the concept of judge pro tempore strictly. The term “pro tempore” means “[f]or the time being; temporarily; provisionally.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 639 (5th ed. 1983). An indefinitely appointed or continually reappointed judge pro tempore is a contradiction in terms.
In addition,
Further,
[7] Because the language of
III
[8] Although we find that the judge in Department 7 lacked jurisdiction, appellant Eng‘s counsel concedes that this judge had de facto authority over him. Therefore, Mr. Eng‘s conviction remains valid. Because Departments 4 and 5 are constitutionally and legally legitimate, the convictions of Ms. Louis and Mr. Bowman are also affirmed.
CALLOW, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, DORE, PEARSON, ANDERSEN, DURHAM, and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Reconsideration denied November 8, 1989.