Chapter 11
Re: Docket No. 1682 OPINION
Before the Court is a Bar Date Motion (as defined below) through which the above-captioned debtors and debtors in possession (the “Debtors”) request the Court to establish a bar date for claims of unknown persons that have yet to manifest any sign of illness from exposure to asbestos (“Unmanifested Claimants” and “Un-manifested Claims”).
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 157 and 1334. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1408 and 1409. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 157(b)(2). The Court has the judicial authority to enter a final order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Procedural History
On April 29, 2014, each of the Debtors filed a voluntary petition with the court under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtors are operating their businesses and managing their properties as debtors in possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.
On July 23, 2014, the Debtors filed a motion seeking a bar date for prepetition claims (the “Bar Date Motion”).
B. Factual History Related to Bar Date Motion and Asbestos Claims
According to the PI Law Firms, both nuclear and electric power generation produces extreme amounts of heat. The presence of this heat necessitates the installment of insulation throughout power plants including in the walls, wires, pipes, boilers and generators. As such, historically, power plants were depositories of asbestos and asbestos-laden materials and products. In addition to its presence throughout the plant and equipment, workers responsible for building and maintaining the plants and equipment would wear insulated clothing or gear to do their jobs. For years, these pants, coats, aprons, mitts and masks contained asbestos. Asbestos exposure was virtually unavoidable in power plants built prior to 1980. EECI, one of the Debtors, was at one time known as Ebasco, which was at various times affiliated with Boise Cascade, Halliburton and Raytheon Corporation (all of which have had asbestos-related personal injury liability).
The Debtors scheduled 392 asbestos-related cases against the Debtors, including approximately 121 cases being defended
The Debtors filed the Bar Date Motion seeking to establish October 27, 2014, as the “General Bar Date” in these cases for all claims;
LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. The PI Law Firms Lack Standing to Object to the Bar Date Motion
Section 1109(b)
This ruling is limited to Unmani-fested Claims’. The PI Law Firms do not represent any Unmanifested Claimants nor do the PI Law Firms have a legally protected interest independent of their potential, future clients.
Although the PI Law Firms do not have standing to object to the Bar Date Motion and, thus, there is no pending objection to the motion, given the due process concerns in play, the Court, in exercising its independent review, will consider the PI Law Firms’ arguments in determining whether to establish a bar date for Unmanifested Claims.
B. Why Establish a Bar Date?
Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) provides:
Time for Filing. The court shall fix and for cause shown may extend time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed. Notwithstanding the expiration of such time, a proof of claim may be filed to the extent and under the conditions stated in Rule 3002(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4).15
“A bar date serves the important purpose of enabling the parties to a bankruptcy case to identify with reasonable promptness the identity of those making claims against the bankruptcy estate, and the
Absent the setting of a bar date, a Chapter 11 case could not be administered to a conclusion. There would be no time established for the filing of claims. But it is essential to the bar date mechanism that notice be given to creditors consistent with the demands of due process, for as provided in Rule 3003(c)(2), a creditor who fails to file a claim within the time allowed is precluded from being treated as a creditor and from both voting on a plan and receiving a distribution from estate property. Failure to give notice consistent with due process surely constitutes cause under Rule 3003(c)(3). A failure to do so would require that the filing of late claim be permitted.18
Furthermore, “[t]he objectives of finality and fixing the universe of claims permeate the law. of bankruptcy, and in achieving those ends, the setting of a bar date is no more unfair, assuming reasonable notice, than is a statute of limitations, a finality concept firmly embedded in our legal system generally. Tort claimants can have their right to pursue their claims foreclosed if they fail to take action before the expiration of a statute of limitations. It is no more unfair to require that they here take action before expiration of the bar date.”
C. The Unmanifested Claims Arose Prior to the Petition Date
In the Third Circuit, a “ ‘claim’ arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product or other conduct giv
As the Unmanifested Claimants, if any, were exposed to asbestos prior to the Debtors’ petition date, any claims against the Debtors flowing from that exposure, i.e., the Unmanifested Claims, arose prior to the petition date.
D. Would The Discharge of the Un-manifested Claims Be Consistent With Due Process?
The heart of the issue before the Court is whether the discharge of the Debtors’ liability for Unmanifested Claims would be consistent with due process. If the nature of the claims is such that due process dictates that discharge is unavailable then there is no point in undergoing the expense and confusion of establishing a bar date. However, if discharge might be available then establishment of a bar date could be appropriate as a first step in the Debtors’ pursuit of such a discharge.
In Grossman’s, the Third Circuit discussed a non-comprehensive list of factors for courts to consider in determining whether an asbestos claim has been discharged by a plan of reorganization:
Whether a particular claim has been discharged by a plan of reorganization depends on factors applicable to the particular case and is best determined by the appropriate bankruptcy court or the district court. In determining whether an asbestos claim has been discharged, the court may wish to consider, inter alia, the circumstances of the initial exposure to asbestos, whether and/or when the claimants were aware of their vulnerability to asbestos, whether the notice of the claims bar date came to their attention, whether the claimants were known or unknown creditors, whether the claimants had a colorable claim at the time of the bar date, and other circumstances specific to the parties, including whether it was reasonable or possible for the debtor to establish a trust for future claimants as provided by § 524(g).24
Section 523(a)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a creditor’s claim may be discharged upon the bankruptcy plan’s confirmation if the “creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for ... timely filing.”
The level of notice required by the Due Process Clause depends on whether a creditor is “known” or “unknown.” A debtor must provide actual notice to all “known creditors” in order to discharge their claims.
As the Unmanifested Claimants are “unknown” creditors, the issue becomes whether due process can be satisfied by publication notice. Discussion of the evolving case law on that point follows:
i. In re Waterman S.S. Corp.
In In re Waterman S.S. Corp.,
ii: In re Placid Oil Co.
In In re Placid Oil Co.,
Prior to its bankruptcy, Placid was aware of the hazards of asbestos exposure and of the claimant-employee’s exposure in the course of his employment. However, prior to Placid’s plan confirmation, no asbestos-related claims had been filed against Placid and these claimants had not yet filed their claims. Furthermore, as of the Fifth Circuit ruling, Placid had not been held liable in any asbestos lawsuits nor had it paid any money to settle an asbestos case. The Placid claimants argued that the method and substance of Placid’s notice were insufficient on due process grounds and, as a result, their claims were not discharged. The Fifth Circuit disagreed.
The Fifth Circuit held that the asbestos claimants were “unknown” stating:
policy concerns specific to bankruptcy weigh heavily against defining known creditors as those with merely foreseeable claims. Bankruptcy offers the struggling debtor a clean start. In the interests of facilitating this recovery and balancing due process considerations, the courts have established a practical limit to the debtor’s duty to notify creditors: Actual notice is required only for “known” creditors. We decline today to alter this limit.40
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that, although Placid knew of the dangers of asbestos and the claimant’s exposure, such information suggesting only a risk to the claimant does not make the claimant a known creditor.
As the debtor was not required to provide actual notice, the Fifth Circuit then turned to the issue of whether the published notice should have referred specifically to potential asbestos claims. The Fifth Circuit held:
that because a bar date notice need not inform unknown claimants of the nature of their potential claims, Placid’s notices were substantively sufficient to satisfy due process. Placid’s notice informed claimants of the existence of the bankruptcy case, the opportunity to file proofs of claim, relevant deadlines, consequences of not filing a proof of claim, and how proofs of claim should be filed. We decline to articulate a new rule that would require more specific notice for unknown, potential asbestos claimants.45
In Placid Oil, one of the Fifth Circuit Court Judges filed a dissent, which was concerned almost exclusively with the issue of “whether a latent asbestos claim of an asbestos-exposed, but not yet knowingly injured, person is dischargeable in bankruptcy and, if so, under what circumstances.”
Many persons in the exposure-only category, the [Third Circuit] Court of Appeals stressed, may not even know of their exposure, or realize the extent of ■ the harm they may incur. Even if they fully appreciate the significance of class notice, those without current afflictions may not have the information or foresight needed to decide, intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out.
Family members of asbestos-exposed individuals may themselves fall prey to disease or may ultimately have ripe claims for loss of consortium. Yet large numbers of people in this category— future spouses and children of asbestos victims — could not be alerted to their class membership. And current spouses and children of the occupationally exposed may know nothing of that exposure.
Because we have concluded that the class in this case cannot satisfy the requirements of common issue predominance and adequacy of representation, we need not rule, definitively, on the notice given here. In accord with the Third Circuit, however, ... we recognize the gravity of the question whether class action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous.49
The dissent continued that “[ujnknown, future claimants, even if they receive notice of a bankruptcy proceeding, are often unable to recognize that their rights will be affected by the bankruptcy, for instance because they are unaware that the debtor has exposed them to toxic substances or because they have yet to manifest any injuries by the time the debtor files for
in. In re Chemtura Corp.
In re Chemtura Corp. involved tort claims based on the debtor’s production and sale of diacetyl, a butter flavoring ingredient used in food products.
The objections represent alternative perspectives as to how the debtors’ Chapter 11 case should be run. And that’s not a satisfactory basis for objection on a motion of this character. Their suggestion that even though this isn’t an asbestos case that the filing of this case wasn’t asbestos or tort liability driven and the debtors aren’t seeking a channeling injunction — I should nevertheless require or expect the debtors to craft a plan with a 524(g) injunction or other claims channeling mechanism. It’s inconsistent with the concept of Section 1121 of the Code which gives the debtors the exclusive right to propose a plan during the period authorized by law, subject to the rights of parties in interest who oppose extensions of the debtors’ exclusive period or to seek the termination of that right. At this juncture, the debtors are free to propose a plan to meet their needs and concerns and the concerns of what they believe will satisfy their unsecured creditor community.
[T]he diacetyl litigants have to understand that this case, with billions of dollars of debt to be satisfied, can’t be run for their convenience or strategic preferences.
I need simply find, and I do find, as a factor, mixed question of fact and law, that a bar date is necessary and appropriate here. The debtors and their major creditor constituencies — and by that I mean at the least the creditors’ committee-need to know the universe of potential claims that must be satisfied.Frankly, to suggest otherwise is ludicrous. 56
Thereafter, the debtors mailed direct notice of the bar date to all known creditors and publication of both general notices and “site-specific” notices for unknown creditors.
After the bar date had passed, and after the bankruptcy plan was confirmed, nine claimants filed state court law suits against the debtors alleging injuries caused by exposure to diacetyl. The debtors moved the bankruptcy court to enforce the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy court found, in an oral ruling, that the claims were discharged and enjoined the claimants from further prosecuting their suits. The diacetyl claimants then appealed. The sole issue on appeal was whether the diacetyl claimants received constitutionally adequate notice of the bar date because they did not know they had diacetyl-in-duced illnesses until after the bar date and plan confirmation.
iv. In re Specialty Products Holding Corp.
Recently, when faced with establishing a bar date in In re Specialty Products,
v. Wñght v. Owens Coming
In Wright v. Owens Corning,
vi. In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc.
Finally, in In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc.,
Although the District Court noted that publication notice satisfied the requirements of due process for unknown creditors, the court looked at the facts and circumstances to determine whether notice was reasonably calculated, “ ‘under all the circumstances [in New Century ] to apprise the interested parties of the pen-dency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ”
unknown claimants in the instant proceeding were given a mere 39 days’ notice by a single publication. That single publication was presented in The Wall Street Journal, certainly a newspaper with a national distribution, but not one — like USA Today —that necessarily enjoys a broad circulation among less than sophisticated, focused readers. The court concludes that the adequacy of the notice provided in this case has not been meaningfully explored and likely was not reasonably calculated to apprise appellants of the bar date. The court concludes that “[d]ue process affords a re-do” under the circumstances of this case.74
In effect, the court held that, although publication notice is sufficient due process for unknown creditors, in New Century, the publication notice was insufficient. The debtors in New Century have appealed the District Court decision to the Third Circuit.
vii. Summary of the Case Law
The decision in Waterman S.S. Corp. and the dissent in Placid Oil stand for the proposition that publication notice is insufficient to provide adequate notice and, thus, due process, to claimants whose injuries and associated claims have not manifested as of the bar date. As such, those claims cannot be discharged.
As the Unmanifested Claimants are “unknown” creditors, the issue is whether due process can be satisfied by publication notice. Although the case law reaches disparate conclusions, the weight of the developing authority holds that publication notice may be sufficient to satisfy due process and, thus, would allow for the discharge of the Unmanifested Claims. As a discharge of some or all of the Unmanifested Claims may be available to the Debtors, the Court must now turn to whether to establish a bar date.
E. The Court Will Establish a Bar Date For Unmanifested Claims
The Court is faced with whether to establish a bar date for Unmanifested Claims. These are the claims of persons that were exposed to asbestos pre-petition but have not yet manifested any signs of illness. These are claimants that do not know that they have an asbestos related injury. Indeed, they are unknown to themselves, let alone the Debtors. As a mixed question of law and fact, however, the Court finds that a bar date should be established for all claims, including Un-manifested Claims.
i. Facts of These Cases
In these cases, the Unmanifested Claimants, if any, were exposed to asbestos prior to the Debtors’ petition date and, as a result, have claims against the debtors. The posture of these cases is different, however, from much of the case law discussed above. Here, the Debtors are seeking a bar date. No plan has been filed and no discharge is being sought. The ultimate treatment of the Unmanifested Claims is not before the Court. The sole issue is whether to establish a bar date for those claims.
Here, the Court is not looking back to determine if adequate due process was given to an unknown claimant.
The Debtors did not file these cases as a result of asbestos or tort liability. In fact, the Debtors estimate that, annually, their prior pay-out on behalf of asbestos claims is less than 0.05% of the Debtors’ consolidated annual revenues. While the Court is sympathetic to all asbestos victims, the Court cannot allow this case to be run for the potential victims’ convenience or strategic gains. The Court must consider all of the Debtors’ creditors. Furthermore,
ii. Statutory Interpretation
The PI Law Firms argue that a bar date for the Unmanifested Claims is not required and that the only way to deal with those claims is through a channeling injunction under section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. The plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules, however, lead to the opposite conclusion. First, Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) states: “[t]he court shall fix ... the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed.”
Second, section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code states: “After notice and
As a result of the plain meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 3003 and section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court finds that a bar date must be established for all claims, including Unmanifested Claims, even though the Court may later extend such bar date for cause shown.
Hi. Policy Considerations
The only issue before the Court is whether a bar date may be established. It would be inconsistent with the concept of section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code, which initially gives the debtors the exclusive right to propose and to solicit a plan of reorganization,
As set forth above, the Court will grant the Debtors’ Bar Date Motion and will establish a bar date for Unmanifested Claimants. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, an order establishing the bar date and specifying notice thereof will be entered after further proceedings before the Court.
Notes
.The Debtors and the PI Law Firms, defined infra, have limited the scope of the issue before the Court to whether the Court should enter a bar date for unmanifested claims. There is no dispute over the establishment of a bar date for any other claims, including manifested claims arising from asbestos exposure. The parties have agreed to address the requirements of the content and scope of the notice required for the bar date at a later time.
. D.I. 1682.
. D.I. 1796. The objectors are Gori Julian & Associates, P.C., Simmons Hanley Conroy, Paul Reich & Meyers, P.C., Kazan McClain, Satterley & Greenwood, a Professional Law Corporation, and Early, Lucarelli, Sweeney & Meisenkothen (collectively referred to herein as the "PI Law Firms”). The PI Law Firms represent over 125 asbestos claimants.
. Although the Court made some preliminary rulings at the August 13, 2014, hearing, the Court subsequently decided to hear the asbestos bar date issue de novo at the hearing scheduled for September 16, 2014.
. See D.I. 1983 and 1984.
. The United States Trustee had previously appointed a committee of unsecured creditors (the “T-side Committee”). See D.I. 420. None of the members of the T-side Committee, however, are asbestos claimants.
The T-side Committee is composed of creditors of Energy Future Competitive Holdings Company LLC ("EFCH”), EFCH’s direct sub-sidiaiy, Texas Competitive Holdings Company LLC (“TCEH”), TCEH’s direct and indirect subsidiaries, and EFH Corporate Services Company. This committee represents the interests of the unsecured creditors of the aforementioned debtors and no others.
.D.I. 2570. The E-side Committee is composed of creditors of Energy Future Holdings Corp.; Energy Future Intermediate Holding Company, LLC; EFIH Finance, Inc.; and EECI. This committee represents the interests of the unsecured creditors of the aforementioned debtors and no others.
. Tr.Hr’g Aug. 13, 2014 71:14-16 (D.I. 1945). Compare Declaration of Paul Keglevic, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, and Co-Chief Restructuring Office of Energy Future Holdings Corp., et al., in Support of First Day Motions at ¶21 (estimating $36 ' billion in assets, $49 billion in liabilities, including funded indebtedness, and $5.9 billion in consolidated annual revenues for the year ending December 31, 2013).
. On the petition date, the Debtors filed a motion seeking approval and continuation of its customer programs (the “Customer Programs Motion,” D.I. 31). The Customer Programs Motion sought authority to, among other things, establish the Customer Claims Bar Date (as defined in the Customer Programs Motion) as the deadline by which each customer (including governmental units asserting claims solely in their capacities as customers of the Debtors) must file its proof of claim against any of the Debtors. The Court approved the Customer Programs Motion and established October 27, 2014, as the Customer Programs Bar Date. D.I. 307.
. Section 1109(b) states:
A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issues in a case under this chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 1109(b).
. In re ANC Rental Corp., Inc.,
. In re Global Indus. Technologies, Inc.,
.Kowalski v. Tesmer,
. As a predicate to discussing the unmani-fested claimants’ right to counsel, the court in In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
... a resolution of the interests of the future claimants is a central focus of these reorganization proceedings. Any plan emerging from this case which ignores these claimants would serve the interests of neither the debtor nor the creditor constituencies in that the central short and long-term economic drain on the debtor would not have been eliminated.
Id. at 746. As a result, the potential future claimants were found to have standing. Id. at 747-57.
. Bankr.R. 3003(c)(3) (emphasis added).
. In re Victory Mem’l Hosp.,
. In re Smidth & Co.,
. In re Waterman S.S. Corp.,
.In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.,
. Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.),
. Grossman’s,
. Grossman's,
. Id. at 126 ("Without notice of a bankruptcy claim, the claimant will not have a meaningful opportunity to protect his or her claim.”) (citations omitted).
. Id. at 127-28.
. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A).
. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
. City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.,
. Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope,
. In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
. Chemetron Corp. v. Jones,
. Id. at 348 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Wright v. Owens Corning,
. Chemetron Corp.,
. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Aguiar (In re Waterman S.S. Corp.),
. Id. at 559 ("[N]o future Asbestosis Claimant who, by definition, had yet to manifest any detectible injury prior to confirmation, could be deemed to have relinquished substantive rights when, even if that individual had read the 'notice,' those individuals would have remained completely unaware that their substantive rights were affected.”).
. In re Waterman S.S. Corp.,
. Id.
. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Aguiar (In re Waterman S.S. Corp.),
. Williams v. Placid Oil Co. (In re Placid Oil Co.),
. Id. at 152-53.
. Id. at 157.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. at 158.
. Id. at 157 (“Press clippings about widely-known, but general, risks of asbestos exposure do not establish that Placid knew of any specific injury to its employees or any asbestos-related claim.” (footnote excluded)).
.Id. at 158 (footnotes excluded). See also In re Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. Co.,
. Id. at 160. The dissent acknowledged that this issue was not briefed by the parties; however, the dissent reasoned that the panel owed a duty to oversee orderly development of the Fifth Circuit jurisprudence. Id.
. Id. at 160-161 (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
. Id. at 628,
. Placid Oil Co.,
. Id. at 164. Notwithstanding the dissent’s conclusion, it is important to note that there is a difference between class certification and a bar date. There are numerous statutory provisions and policy considerations in connection with establishment of a bar date (discussed infra) that are not in play in the class action context.
. Gabauer v. Chemtura Corporation (In re Chemtura Corp.),
. Id. at 429.
. Counsel to certain diacetyl claimants argued that certain individuals would not know that they had a diacetyl-induced disease because of the latency period of the disease and delays related to diagnosis of the disease. In re Chemtura Corp. (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 09-11233), Transcript of Hr'g Aug. 17, 2009, 28:9-30:6.
. Id. at 429. Although the bankruptcy court did not issue an opinion related to its ruling, the hearing transcript was provided by the Debtors. See D.I. 1984 (Excerpt of Transcript of August 17, 2009 Hearing).
. In re Chemtura Corp. (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 09-11233), Transcript of Hr'g Aug. 17, 2009, 52:20-53:11; 54:13-15; and 54:23-55:6.
. Chemtura Corp.,
. Id.
. Id. at 430 ("In essence, Appellants argue that, while the Notice may have been adequate as to people with reason to know that they might have diacetyl-related claims, it was inadequate as to Appellants because they 'had not yet been diagnosed with a diacetyl-in-duced disease’ and thus had no reason to know that they might have claims.”)
. Id.
. Id. at 431.
. Id. (citation omitted).
. It bears noting that lung disease caused by diacetyl had a latency of approximately five (5) months — in comparison asbestos related illness can have a latency of approximately 40 years. As latency periods are vastly diverse, the diacetyl claimants may have had a better understanding of their exposure versus an asbestos claimant who may have been exposed years/decades prior to the notice.
. Del. Bankr. 10-11780.
. In re Specialty Products Holding Corp., Del.Bankr. 10-11780, Tr. Hr'g Nov. 5, 2013, 40:8-11 (D.I. 4286).
. See generally, docket in Del. Bankr. 10-11780.
. Del. Bankr. Case No. 10-11780 (D.I. 449) (appointing a legal representative for future claimants).
. Id. at D.I. 3852 and 3853 (opinion and order regarding asbestos liability).
. Wright v. Owens Corning,
. Id. at 103.
. Id. at 108. Although in Owens Corning, the Third Circuit allowed a “re-do” because at the time of Owens Coming’s confirmation Frenville was the law of the Third Circuit and under Frenville the plaintiffs did not have claims against the debtors (whereas under Grossman’s the plaintiffs did have claims). As the claimants in Owens Coming would be affected retroactively by Grossman’s, the Third Circuit held that their claims were not discharged when the "notice to those persons was with the understanding that they did not hold claims.” Id. Under the reasoning of the decision, however, absent the Frenville issue, the claims would have been barred.
.White v. Jacobs (In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc.), Civ. No. 13-1719, - B.R. -,
. Id. at *6 (quoting Owens Corning,
. Id. (footnotes omitted; quoting Owens Corning,
. White v. Jacobs (In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc.), D. Del. Case No. 13-vc-1719, D.I. 20.
. The Placid Oil dissent cites to the Supreme Court's opinion in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor in support of its conclusion. While it is true that the Supreme Court identified "the gravity of the question whether ... notice sufficient under the Constitution ... could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous” as the holders of unmani-fested asbestos claims, it did so in dicta and specifically declined to decide the issue.
.The oral observation in Speciality Products that the Court was inclined to establish a bar date seems to support the holdings in Placid Oil and Chemtura but, as the issue was not actually decided and, ultimately, was moot, its persuasive authority is nominal.
. See, e.g., Placid Oil Co.,
. Chemtura Corp. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 09-11233), Transcript of Hr’g Aug. 17, 2009, 52:20-53:11; 54:13-15; and 54:23-55:6.
. See, e.g., In re Chemtura Corp. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 09-11233), Transcript of Hr'g Aug. 17, 2009, 52:20-53:11; 54:13-15; and 54:23-55:6.
. Fed. R. Bankr.Pro. 3003(c)(3).
. In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.,
. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
. See, e.g., Fed. R. Bankr.R. 3003(c)(1) ("Any creditor or indenture trustee may file a proof of claim ...”); 3003(c)(5) ("An indenture trustee may file a claim ...”).
. Barbieri v. RAJ Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri),
. Byrum v. IRS (In re Byrum),
. Carchman v. Nash,
When interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause inwhich general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature....
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
.11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A) (emphasis added). A section 524(g)’s trust mechanism may be used if it "is likely to be subject to substantial future demands for payment arising out of the same or similar conduct or events that gave rise to the claims that are addressed by the injunction.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(I). Furthermore, "[a] § 524(g) injunction is only appropriate where the debtor is likely to be subject to significant future demands.” In re WR Grace & Co.,
. Subject to the rights of parties in interest who oppose extensions of the debtors’ exclusive period or to seek the termination of that right to propose a plan during the period authorized by law.
. See In re Chemtura Corp. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 09-11233), Transcript of Hr’g Aug. 17, 2009, 52:20-53:11; 54:1315; and 54:23-55:6.