In Re Elizabeth A. Briggs Revocable Living Trust
Case Information
*1 #28017-a-SLZ
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
* * * *
IN RE: THE ELIZABETH A.
BRIGGS REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST.
* * * *
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT SANBORN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA * * * *
THE HONORABLE JON R. ERICKSON
Judge
* * * *
MARY A. AKKERMAN
NICOLE O. TUPMAN of
Lindquist & Vennum, LLP
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for petitioner and
appellant, Thomas F. Briggs.
SHEILA S. WOODWARD
PAUL T. VAN OLSON of
Johnson, Miner, Marlow,
Woodward & Huff, LLC
Yankton, South Dakota Attorneys for trustee and
appellee, Judith Briggs. * * * *
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS ON MAY 30, 2017 OPINION FILED 06/28/17 ZINTER, Justice
[¶1.]
Facts and Procedural History Judith and Thomas Briggs are the two children of Willard and
Elizabeth Briggs. On November 28, 1995, both Willard and Elizabeth executed several estate planning documents, including separate revocable trusts. Elizabeth amended her trust on two occasions. In 2009, she amended it to expressly remove Thomas as a beneficiary and provide that her assets were to be distributed to Judith after Elizabeth’s death. The amended trust stated: “Grantor has purposely omitted her son, Thomas F. Briggs, from any provisions hereunder for reasons known to him and also for reasons identified in a letter which Grantor has signed and directed her attorney to retain and deliver to her son, Tom, at Grantor’s demise.” In 2012, Elizabeth amended her trust to expressly omit Thomas’s daughter. Elizabeth died on July 16, 2013. On August 15, 2013, an attorney for
Elizabeth’s trust and estate sent Thomas a letter informing him of his mother’s
death and that she had left him no property. Pursuant to
amendments within sixty days. Instead, he emailed the Sanborn County clerk of courts and the trust’s attorney. The email contained an unsigned, pro se “Notice of Objection to the Trust Instrument for Elizabeth A. Briggs.” The notice did not, however, identify what the objection was or any reason for it; and it contained no request for relief. It merely stated that Thomas was “giving notice of objection to the trust instruments.” Because there was no file opened regarding Elizabeth’s trust, the clerk filed Thomas’s notice in a miscellaneous file folder. Thomas was aware that no court file was opened.
1. Thomas did receive an interest in real estate upon Elizabeth’s death. Willard and Elizabeth deeded Thomas eighty acres of land in 1990 but reserved a life estate, which terminated on Elizabeth’s death. The email was sent on October 15, 2013. Thomas also mailed the Notice of
Objection to the trust’s attorney via certified mail. The mail receipt was dated October 16, 2013.
[¶5.] On April 18, 2015—611 days after Thomas received notice that he had sixty days to commence a judicial proceeding—Thomas commenced this proceeding to contest the trust amendments. He alleged the amendments were invalid because Elizabeth lacked capacity and was unduly influenced by Judith, who was a beneficiary and the trustee. Thomas’s petition also included a claim that Judith breached her fiduciary duty and requested that Judith “be held liable for any and all damages caused by the breach of her fiduciary duties.” Thomas did not, however, name Judith as a party defendant or commence an action against her in her individual capacity. Finally, Thomas’s petition contained a request for an accounting. Judith in her capacity as trustee moved to dismiss the petition. She
contended that Thomas’s claims were barred by
Decision
Thomas first argues the circuit court erroneously interpreted
should be governed by the general six-year statute of limitations in
enacted in 2010 and amended in 2013. Subsection (a) limits the time to contest whether certain trusts were validly created. It provides in relevant part:
(a) A judicial proceeding to contest whether a revocable trust or any amendment thereto, or an irrevocable trust was validly created may not be commenced later than the first to occur of:
(1) One year after the settlor’s death; [or] (2) Sixty days after the trustee, trust advisor, trust protector, or the settlor sent the person who is contesting the trust a copy of the trust instrument and a notice informing the person of the trust’s existence, of the trustee’s name and address, and of the time allowed for commencing a proceeding . . . .
proceedings to contest whether the designated trusts and amendments were validly
created. If a settlor dies, subsection (a)(1) gives the contestant one year from the
settlor’s death. Subsection (a)(2), however, prescribes a shorter sixty-day limit if
the contestant has been given a copy of the trust instrument, notice of the trust’s
existence, notice of the trustee’s name and address, and notice of the time allowed
for commencing a proceeding. The purpose of
asserting lack of capacity and undue influence. In his view, the question whether a
trust was
validly created
only concerns “whether the trust was actually formed or
properly in existence.” We disagree because the creation of a trust involves more
than document formalities: there must also be “[a]n intention on the part of the
trustor to
create
” the trust.
statute of repose bars all actions after a specified period of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a cause of action.” Peterson ex rel. Peterson v. Burns ,2001 S.D. 126 , ¶ 41,635 N.W.2d 556 , 570.SDCL 55-4-57(a)(1) bars claims contesting the validity of revocable and irrevocable trusts one year after the settlor’s death, regardless of when the injury arose or when the person received notice.
create a valid trust.
See In re Estate of Linnell
,
influence claims are arguably governed by two statutes of limitation: the six-year
period in
7. Notably, the UTC uses claims of undue influence and lack of capacity as
specific examples of claims that are subject to section 604(a)’s time limits. Unif. Trust Code § 604 cmt.
prescribed by statute,” and this trust contest is a special case specifically governed
by
substantially complied with the requirements of
Objection did not substantially comply with
circuit court erred in dismissing his claim for damages against Judith for breach of
fiduciary duty. We disagree. A claim for breach of fiduciary duty sounds in tort,
O’Toole v. Bd. of Trs. of S.D. Ret. Sys.
,
trustee powers at that time. Under the terms of the trust, Judith was an alternate trustee whose powers did not come into existence until Elizabeth’s death.
was not made a party defendant and was not served with the complaint). Because Thomas did not commence an action against Judith in her individual capacity, the court did not err in dismissing Thomas’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. Thomas finally contends the circuit court erred in dismissing his request for an accounting. We disagree because Thomas had no standing to demand an accounting. Trustors, fiduciaries, and beneficiaries are authorized to request
accountings and court supervision of trusts.
11. The Legislature recently amended
of a “beneficiary.” 2017 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 204, § 23 (effective July 1, 2017) (defining beneficiary as one who has a “beneficial interest” or direct financial interest in a trust).
Elizabeth’s trust.
See
Conclusion Thomas’s petition seeking to invalidate Elizabeth’s trust amendments
on grounds of undue influence or lack of capacity was barred by
and WILBUR, Retired Justice, concur.
12. Thomas relies on a number of cases acknowledging that heirs at law or former beneficiaries have standing to sue regarding matters by which they could potentially obtain an interest. However, those cases are inapposite because Thomas is barred as a matter of law from contesting the amendment and therefore has no contingent potential of ever becoming interested in Elizabeth’s trust.