In re E.H.
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Craven, Mills, Trapp
Judgment reversed.
Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent, a minor, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Champaign County, Illinois, declaring a forfeiture of his bail bond (
From the record it appears thаt on June 22, 1978, respondent, at age 16, was adjudicated a delinquent, made a ward of the court, and committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections. The trial court granted the respondent‘s motion for bond pending appeal and set it in the amount of $7,500. Among the conditions of bond was that respondent not “violate any criminal law of the State of Illinois, or any ordinance of any municipality of said State.” Bond was posted and the respondent was released. On November 5, 1978, respondent was arrested for aggravated bаttery and disorderly conduct. While being booked at the police station, the respondent bolted out of the booking room and ran down a hallway to the station door at which point he was apprehended. At the subsequent adjudicatory hearing held on Decеmber 15, 1978, the respondent was acquitted on the charges of aggravated battery and disorderly conduct, but was found to have committed misdemeanor escape. (
On January 12, 1979, the State moved this court to revoke the appeal bond and forfeit the money deposited. We remandеd the State‘s motion and the respondent‘s objections to the circuit court for decision. On February 9, 1979, a hearing was held wherein the triаl court ruled that section 110-7(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev.
The central issue in this case involves the intеrpretation to be given section 110-7(h) which provides:
“(h) If the accused does not comply with the conditions of the bail bond the cоurt having jurisdiction shall enter an order declaring the bail to be forfeited. Notice of such order of forfeiture shall be mailed forthwith to the accused at his last known address. If the accused does not appear and surrender to the court having jurisdiction within 30 days from thе date of the forfeiture or within such period satisfy the court that appearance and surrender by the accused is impossible and without his fault the court shall enter judgment for the State if the charge for which the bond was given was a felony or misdemeanor, or if the сharge was quasi-criminal or traffic, judgment for the political subdivision of the State which prosecuted the case, against the aсcused for the amount of the bail and costs of the court proceedings. The deposit made in accordance with paragraph (a) shall be applied to the payment of costs. If any amount of such deposit remains after the payment of сosts it shall be applied to payment of the judgment and transferred to the treasury of the municipal corporation wherein the bond was taken if the offense was a violation of any penal ordinance of a political subdivision of this State, or to the trеasury of the county wherein the bond was taken if the offense was a violation of any penal statute of this State. The balance of the judgment may be enforced and collected in the same manner as a judgment entered in a civil action.”
Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 110-7(h) .
The State arguеs that the cited provision mandates a bond forfeiture when any bond condition is violated. The State further argues that the second and third sentences of this section should be applicable only when a defendant has failed to appear. The State cоntends that forfeiture is a necessary sanction for punishment of defendants who violate bond conditions.
Such an interpretation of section 110-7(h) does violence to the plain language. The State has not cited nor have we found any reported Illinois cаses which have allowed a forfeiture for any reason other than a defendant‘s failure to appear. This is certainly an indication that forfeiture is not a usual means of punishing a defendant who violates other bail conditions. Moreover, applicаtion of the State‘s interpretation leads to
• 1, 2 We hold that section 110-7(h) does not authоrize a forfeiture (as distinguished from modification or revocation) of bond for the violation of any bond condition other than a dеfendant‘s failure to make a timely appearance in a designated court.
• 3 Beyond the question of statutory authorization, this сourt has the duty to see that the rights of minors are adequately protected, and we are bound to notice substantial irregularities even though they are not expressly presented. (Muscarello v. Peterson (1960), 20 Ill.2d 548, 170 N.E.2d 564; Frederick v. Ziegler Coal Co. (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 888, 372 N.E.2d 730.) In this regard, we view with concern the entry of a $7,500 judgment against a 16-year-old minor for whom а guardian ad litem was not appointed. The general rule is that if the record does not affirmatively show representation by a guardian ad litem, a judgment against a minor is voidable and must be reversed. Skaggs v. Industrial Com. (1939), 371 Ill. 535, 21 N.E.2d 731.
In City of Danville v. Clark (1976), 63 Ill.2d 408, 348 N.E.2d 844, cert. denied (1977), 429 U.S. 899, 50 L.Ed.2d 184, 97 S.Ct. 266, the supreme court held that appointment of a guardian ad litеm was not necessary where the judgment was based on a municipal ordinance violation. However, that case may be distinguished frоm the instant case both as to the statutory origin of the judgment and the amount of money involved. Because of our ruling on the first issue, a ruling on this point is unnecessary. We deem it sufficient to draw attention to the problem.
In light of the foregoing, we reverse the judgment on the bond forfeiture and order that the $750 deposit, minus 10 percent administrative expense, be returned.
Reversed.
MILLS and TRAPP, JJ., concur.