22 S.D. 355 | S.D. | 1908
This is an original proceeding instituted in this court by a committee of the bar of Minnehaha county to disbar George W. Egan, an attorney of this court.
On the 15th day of November, 1907, the accused was admitted to practice as an attorney of this court, and the usual license issued to' him. At the time the application was made for his admission, objections were filed thereto on the part of the bar of Minnehaha county; but, in view of the fact that proceedings were pending in the county court of that county for the appointment of a guardian for the person and estate of Julia Ann O’Grady, and also an action was about to be commenced by the guardian of Julia Ann O’Grady in the circuit court of that county to cancel and annuli certain conveyances alleged to have been made by her to the accused, and in order not to embarrass the courts before named in their decisions, this court declined at that time'to enter upon a full examination of the objections filed on the part of the members of the bar, and therefore granted a license conditional, which is as follows: “It is ordered that George W. Egan, upon taking and filing the required óath, be' admitted and licensed to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in all the courts of this state, pro
Upon this application to this court in this original proceeding, this court appointed a commissioner to take the testimony in the case, and report the same to this court on the first day of the present month. That duty has been performed by the commissioner, and the case is now before us for final determination. The prosecutors, after setting out the findings and the judgment of the court in the action before referred to, tried before the Honorable Frank B. Smith, as judge sitting for, and at the request of the Honorable Joseph W. Jones, judge of the circuit court of Minne-haha county, proceed to> allege: “The said accusers, irrespective of the findings, conclusions, and judgment hereinbefore referred to, and in addition thereto, charge the said George W. Fgan, with
It is disclosed by the undisputed evidence that on and for a long time prior to the 29th day of September, 1907, John O’Grady and his wife, Julia, resided on a farm which was their homestead, in Mapleton township, between six and seven mile|S north of the
It further appears from the' evidence that Mrs. O’Grady had the sum of about $50 which she turned over to the accused in connection with her other property on the forenoon of October 9th, and that she was left with a small sum in change, and, with that exception, she had transferred to the accused all of her property, real and personal, including the bond above mentioned and a $2,400 note and mortgage and the $50 in money, and that she left the office of Dr. Egan, after making those transfers without any means for her support or maintenance. It further appears from the evidence that during the time she was in the office of Dr. Egan, and was making these transfers of her property to the accused, Dr. Egan, Mr. Mumby, and Roster were present, but she had no friends or acquaintances with her, and there alone with the accused and the three parties before named she apparently signed any paper that was presented to her by the accused for her signature. It is further disclosed by the evidence that for some time prior to the death of her husband she had shown evident signs of insanity;. that, after she was taken to the jail, she seemed possessed with the delusion that she was to be hanged immediately in the presence of the people, and that she said to Mr. Winsor, Mrs. Winsor, Mr. O’Reiley, the deputy jailor and the sheriff, repeatedly that she knew she was to be hung on the same gallows that had been used some years previously for hanging a person that she named, and that she had seen the workmen preparing the scaffold for her execution. While in jail she complained of being ill, and, the county physician being called to attend to her, she refused to take his medicine, stating that she knew that it was poison; that she refused to eat anything prepared at the jail for the reason that they were intending to poison'her. It further appears that, when she
It is claimed by the accused that at the time she transferred all of her property to him that he made out a written memorandum agreeing to account to her for the property received, but, in view of the fact that he had her contract agreeing to pay him a fee of $xo,ooo, the accounting would have been of little benefit to her, as the property transferred by Mrs. O’Grady did not exceed in value $6,000, and she would have therefore been left indebted to him in the sum of $4,000 on account of his fee, less some reductions he claims he agreed to make in case the criminal proceedings against her should be terminated in the circuit court. It will be noticed that the conduct of the accused after being retained b)'" Mrs. 0’Grad)r to defend her on the charge of the murder of her husband, in advising her to resist the. application for the appointment of a- guardian for her and acting as her counsel in the probate court in, resisting the application on the ground that she was mentally incompetent to attend to her business, and again appearing in the circuit court in further resistance of the- application for the appointment of a guardian for her, was an extraordinary proceeding, as the establishment of her mental incapacity would have aided him very greatly in her defense upon the grave charge against her. In thus defending her and m appearing for her in opposing these proceedings, he was acting directly against the interest of his client, and could have had no other object in view than that of maintaining the legality of the transfers of her property to him made by her.
It is claimed by the accused that the conveyances of the property were taken in the nature of security to her bondsmen, but this claim cannot be- considered a valid one, as, if that was the object
The relation existing between an attorney and his client is one of great confidence, and gives the attorney great influence over his client. The relation he bears to his client implies the highest trust and confidence. He is an officer of this court, and in the performance of his duties as such'an attorney he is required to observe towards his client the utmost good faith, and to allow no private interests of his own to conflict with the interests of his client. An attorney also owes a duty to his profession and to the court from which he has received his license, as well as to his client. As an officer of the court, the latter may exercise its jurisdiction over him to the extent of depriving him of his office, and striking his name from the roll. Such a power is indispensable to protect the courts, the dignity and purity of the profession, and for the public good and the protection of clients. While our Code has provided certain causes for the revocation or suspension of an attorney, the power to cancel a license issued is an inherent power in the court, and, as stated by Mr. Weeks in his work on Attorneys: ‘‘Xo statute or rule is necessary to authorize the punishment in proper cases. Statutes and rules may regulate the power, but they do not create it. * * * And, where certain grounds are specified by the statute, this does not necessarily exclude striking from the rolls for causes not specified. A statute is not to be construed as restrictive of the general powers of the court over its officers.” Weeks on Attorneys at Law, § 80; 4 Cyc. 905, 906; In re Smith, 73 Kan.
The conduct of the accused in this case, not only shows his unfitness to be a member of this court, but shows that his perceptions of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney are such as to render him an undesirable associate of the members of a highly honorable profession, and dangerous for clients who may seek his assistance as an attorney. While we cannot overlook the fact that striking the name of the accused from the roll and revoking his license may result in serious consequences to himself and family, we cannot be unmindful of the duty we owe to ourselves, the courts of the state, the members of the bar, and the community in general. Such conduct as has been shown in this case reflects, not only upon the attorney himself, but seriously reflects upon the court and the members of the bar. All of the considerations that could be advanced in favor of the accused were ably presented by eminent counsel, but we have failed to- discover any extenuating circumstances attending this remarkable transaction. To permit the accused to longer remain an officer of the court and entitled to the privileges accorded to an attorney would be to lower the standard of professional conduct, and encourage the younger members of the bar to pursue a course that cannot be recognized by this court. It has been the aim of this court to elevate the character both morally and intellectually of the members of the bar and to retain the accused longer as a member of the bar would be doing an injustice to ourselves, to the profession, and to- the community. Unpleasant, therefore, as is the duty, we must perform it, and strike from the roll of this court the name of the accused, and cancel the license heretofore issued to him.